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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the possible implications of international cross-listings for the 
wealth of shareholders, for stock liquidity and volatility, and for the distribution of trading 
volumes across both the domestic and foreign stock markets where the shares are traded. For 
the purpose of clarity, these three issues are analysed in three empirical chapters in the thesis. 
The first empirical issue examined in this thesis is the effects of international cross-
listings on shareholders’ wealth. This is discussed in chapter 2. The chapter compares the 
gains in shareholders’ wealth that result from cross-listing in the American, British, and 
European stock exchanges and then evaluates their determinants by applying various theories 
on the wealth effects of cross-listing. Moreover, it evaluates how the wealth effect of cross-
listing has changed over time reflecting the implications of the significant developments in 
capital markets that have taken place in recent years. In particular, the effects of the 
introduction of the Euro in Europe and the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US are 
analysed. The findings suggest that, on average, cross-listing of stocks enhances 
shareholders’ wealth but the gains are dependent on the destination market. In addition, the 
regulatory and economic changes in the listing environment not only alter the wealth effects 
of cross-listings, but also affect the sources of value creation. Overall, this chapter provides 
in-depth insights into the motivations for, and the benefits of, cross-listings across different 
host markets in changing market conditions. 
The second empirical issue examined is the impact of cross-listing and multimarket 
trading on stock liquidity and volatility (chapter 3). Cross-listing leads to additional 
mandatory disclosure in order to comply with the requirements of the host market. Such 
requirements are expected to reduce information asymmetry among various market 
participants (corporate managers, stock dealers, and investors). An enhanced information 
environment, in turn, should increase stock liquidity and reduce stock return volatility. The 
findings of this study suggest that the stock liquidity and volatility improves after cross-
listing on a foreign stock exchange. Moreover, this study distinguishes between cross-listing 
and cross-trading. The distinction is important because cross-trading, unlike cross-listing, 
does not require the disclosing of additional information. Although such a distinction means 
there is a variation in the information environment of cross-listed and cross-traded stocks, 
the results do not reveal any significant difference in the liquidity and volatility of the stocks 
that are cross-listed and cross-traded. This evidence suggests that the improvement in the 
liquidity and volatility of cross-listed/traded stocks comes primarily from the intensified 
competition among traders rather than from mandatory disclosure requirements. 
iii 
 
The final empirical issue investigated in this thesis (chapter 4) is the identification of 
the determinants of the distribution of equity trading volume from both stock exchange and 
firm specific perspectives. From a stock exchange perspective, exchange level analysis 
focuses on the stock exchange characteristics that determine the ability of a stock exchange 
to attract trading of foreign stocks. While from a firm perspective, firm level analysis focuses 
on firm specific characteristics that affect the distribution of foreign trading. The results 
show that a stock exchange’s ability to attract trading volumes of foreign equity is positively 
associated with a stock exchange’s organizational efficiency, market liquidity, and also the 
quality of investor protection and insider trading regulations. Analysis also reveals the 
superior ability of American stock exchanges to attract trading of European stocks. 
Moreover, there is strong evidence suggesting that regulated stock exchanges are more 
successful in attracting trading of foreign stocks than non-regulated markets, such as OTC 
and alternative markets and trading platforms. From a firm perspective, the proportion of 
trading on a foreign exchange is higher for smaller and riskier companies, and for companies 
that exhibit lower correlation of returns with market index returns in the host market. Also 
this proportion is higher when foreign trading takes place in the same currency as trading in 
the firm’s home market and increases with the duration of a listing. Finally, the study 
provides separate evidence on the expected levels of trading activity on various stock 
exchanges for a stock with particular characteristics. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that international cross-listing is 
beneficial for both firms and their shareholders but the findings also suggest that there are 
significant variations in the implications of cross-listings for different firms and from listing 
in different destination foreign markets. Finally, these implications are not static and respond 
to changes and reforms in listing and trading conditions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The liberalization of cross-border capital flows in recent decades has significantly 
reduced investment barriers between national capital markets and opened up possibilities for 
companies to raise capital in international markets through listing and trading. In the 1980s 
and in the first half of the 1990s, the fragmentation of the capital markets was the main 
motivation for corporate managers to consider an international cross-listing as a means of 
overcoming investment barriers and making a company’s shares accessible to foreign 
investors.1  In more recent years, despite the fact that foreign equity markets are now more 
integrated and more easily accessible to investors, international listing and trading of a 
company’s shares still remains important. This can potentially be attributed to the fact that 
significant differences across stock exchanges still exist in the level of investor protection, 
equity trading costs and information costs. Nevertheless, the increased integration and 
technological sophistication of capital markets, combined with significantly increased costs 
of foreign listings in the US during the last decade, have fuelled a debate in the media2 and in 
academic literature on the net benefits of international cross-listings (Marosi and Massoud, 
2008; Litvak, 2008). 
International cross-listings have been intensively covered in the literature.3  
However, in light of the important developments that have taken place in capital markets in 
the last decade many questions remain unanswered. This is essentially because recent 
developments have potentially affected the motivations for and the costs and benefits of 
listing a company’s shares abroad. First, the regulatory environment of US-listed companies 
has significantly changed as the result of the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and this has also affected non-US companies cross-listed in the US. While this law was 
intended to enhance investor protection and confidence, it has also significantly increased the 
                                                 
1 Cross-listing is a cross-border listing of shares, i.e. a listing of shares on a stock exchange outside of 
the country of the company’s origin, in addition to the home market listing. 
2 For example, ‘Why cross-listing shares doesn’t create value’, McKinsey Quarterly, (November, 
2008); ‘Do cross-listings still make sense?’, Business Times Singapore, (July, 15, 2010). 
3 Karoly (1998 and 2006) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on cross-listing and its 
development over time. 
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costs for companies of listing on US stock exchanges. Second, the trading environment in 
Europe has been affected by the introduction of the single European currency, the Euro. 
While the European Monetary Union facilitates cross-border capital flows in Europe due to 
the elimination of foreign currency risk, it also poses questions about the need to cross-list 
within increasingly integrated European markets. Third, the global equity trading 
environment has changed significantly due to considerable advances in technology that have 
meant securities’ trading has moved from the traditional trading floor to electronic trading. 
In turn, electronic trading, combined with competition pressure in the stock exchange 
industry, has facilitated the introduction of new types of markets and trading platforms that 
are generally different from traditional regulated markets in their level of added disclosure 
requirements.4 Admission to trade on such markets makes a company’s shares available to a 
wider range of investors at no additional direct costs for the company. Despite the fact that a 
significant number of stocks are traded on non-regulated markets, current understanding of 
the implications is very limited. Potentially, admission to trade on a foreign exchange, or 
cross-trading, could be a substitute for the more costly cross-listing.5 However, whether the 
benefits from cross-listing and cross-trading are comparable is an empirical question that 
needs to be addressed. Moreover, the changes in the global equity trading environment raise 
questions for stock exchanges on how to compete successfully in attracting and maintaining 
stock listing and trading. 
The literature indicates that potential benefits from international cross-listings are 
associated with the level of economic and financial development and the regulatory 
framework of the host market. Existing empirical evidence on the economic consequences of 
international cross-listings, however, is primarily based on the experience of non-US 
companies that cross-list on US exchanges. Nevertheless, statistics show that a significant 
portion of companies also cross-list on European markets (Table 1.1) where the institutional 
                                                 
4  For example, Open market of Deutsche Börse. 
5 Cross-listing is different from cross-trading in the way that it is initiated by the company’s decision 
to cross-list its shares on a foreign stock exchange and involves a company submitting a listing 
application and meeting listing and disclosure requirements of the host foreign stock exchange. An 
admission to trade on a foreign stock exchange, or cross-trading, refers to trading of shares on a stock 
exchange outside of the country of the company’s origin without meeting the stock exchange’s 
disclosure and listing requirements, often without the company even being aware that its stock is 
cross-traded. Both cross-listing and cross-trading are in addition to the home market listing of the 
stock. 
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characteristics differ significantly from those of the US market.6 Additionally, European 
markets have been going through significant changes themselves, prompting the need for 
empirical investigation on the net benefits of foreign listing and trading in these markets.7 
This thesis aims to address the above gaps in the literature by evaluating the 
economic consequences of international cross-listing and multimarket trading of equities on 
various international markets by European companies. The European sample provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the implications of cross-listing and multimarket trading for stocks 
from a wide range of home countries; from Western European countries with developed 
markets to Central and Eastern European countries with emerging markets, and from 
countries which use common law to those that use civil law. In addition, significant 
developments in European markets7 motivate further investigation into how these 
developments affect the competitiveness of European financial markets vs. the US financial 
markets. Also, European financial markets are appealing for an investigation into the 
implications of multimarket trading due to their leadership in technological advances in 
equity trading. This leadership can be seen in the number of equity trading platforms that 
have been introduced in recent years (e.g. VIRTX of Swiss stock exchange and Open market 
of Deutsche Börse). Lastly, the European sample of cross-listed stocks represents a 
substantial portion of cross-listed stocks worldwide. For example, in 2007 out of the total 
341 foreign companies listed on the London stock exchanges 149 companies, or 43.7% of 
the total number of foreign listed companies, were from European countries. 
The thesis examines the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth, on the 
stock liquidity and volatility, and on the location of trading of cross-listed stocks. 
Shareholders’ wealth maximization is the ultimate goal of corporate financial policies. 
Whether a cross-listing could help to achieve this goal is examined in the first empirical 
chapter. In turn, the increase in market valuation of cross-listed stocks could by driven by the 
improvement in stock liquidity and volatility after cross-listing. The second empirical 
                                                 
6  Discussion of the differences in the institutional characteristics of major equity markets and stock 
exchanges is presented in chapter 2, section 2.6.2, and in chapter 4, section 4.6.2. 
7 European regional integration in the recent decade comprises, in addition to the introduction of the 
Euro, a significant enlargement of the European Union. Also, Poser (2001) and Galati and Tsatsaronis 
(2003) suggest that capital market financing as opposed to bank-intermediated credit has become 
more important in Europe. Finally, significant regulatory changes have been taking place in European 
financial markets such as the adoption of Financial Services Action Plan including the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). However, the full implementation of the MiFID took place 
at the end of 2007. Thus, analysis of the impact of this regulation is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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chapter explicitly examines the impact of cross-listing on stock liquidity and volatility. 
Finally, a cross-listing is expected to be beneficial only if the cross-listed stock is actively 
traded on the foreign stock exchanges following the cross-listing. The third empirical chapter 
addresses the importance of the location of trading of cross-listed stocks and investigates the 
determinants of the distribution of foreign trading of cross-listed stocks. 
This research has important implications for various groups of market participants. 
First, understanding the potential outcomes of cross-listing and multimarket trading is 
important for cross-listed companies or companies considering a foreign listing of their 
shares. Second, it is relevant for investors that trade foreign equity shares. Third, the findings 
of this research help stock exchanges identify the factors that make them competitive in 
attracting trading of foreign equities. Finally, the findings of this research should be of 
considerable importance to financial market regulators. Because the thesis focuses on cross-
listing and multimarket trading that takes place in different international markets, the 
implications of its findings are relevant on an international level. 
Cross-listing trends and possible motivations to cross-list are discussed in sections 
1.1 and 1.2 respectively. While the individual empirical chapters of this thesis are self 
contained and include literature specific to the issue discussed in the chapter, a broad review 
of literature on the economic consequences of international cross-listings and multimarket 
trading and the contribution this thesis makes to the field are discussed in section 1.3. In 
particular, section 1.3 covers the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth, on the 
stock liquidity and volatility and on the location of trading of cross-listed stocks. 
 
1.1 Cross-listing trends  
Cross-listing of stocks gained importance in the 1980s facilitated by the 
liberalization of cross-border capital flows and by the internationalization of companies’ 
operations. Since the 1980s, it has been a widespread corporate strategy to access foreign 
capital markets, particularly for large companies with an international orientation (Pagano et 
al, 2002). Historically, the capital markets of the United States have been considered as the 
ultimate destination for a cross-listing, possibly due to a more liquid trading environment, a 
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larger investor base and higher availability of equity capital.8  In recent years, increased 
capital market integration and significant technological advances in equity trading, such as 
electronic trading, have made equity trading in foreign markets more feasible for investors 
and, thus, have potentially reduced the need for companies to cross-list. Despite these 
significant changes, the numbers of companies that choose to be cross-listed as well as the 
volumes of foreign trading in cross-listed stocks remain considerable. For example, 
according to the Bank of New York’s ‘The Depository Receipts9 Markets Review 2007’ in 
2007 there were 2,060 foreign companies from 76 countries cross-listed in the United States 
providing a total trading volume of nearly $3.3 trillion in 2007.10 
Clearly, cross-listing is still an important aspect of international financial markets. 
Statistics on the number of foreign companies listed (Table 1.1) show that the US is an 
important listing destination for foreign companies. However, it also shows that European 
exchanges are important host markets. Thus, foreign companies constitute on average 14% 
of the total number of listed companies in the major American exchanges and on average 
19% of the total number of listed companies in the British and other major European 
exchanges. Moreover, an argument proposed recently suggests that while European markets 
have improved their quality and attractiveness to foreign companies, the US is potentially 
losing its competitive edge, particularly after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX), which has significantly increased the costs of a US listing11 (see, for example, 
Zingales, 2007; Yallapragada et al, 2008). Marosi and Massoud (2008) explicitly argue that 
foreign companies fled the US market12 due to reduction in net benefits of a US cross-listing 
                                                 
8 A number of the US firms chose to cross-list outside of the US in the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that a cross-listing by a US firm outside of the US has no conventional 
advantages for the cross-listing firm such as improved market valuation (Howe and Kelm, 1987; Lee, 
1991; Torabzadeh et al, 1992; Varela and Lee, 1993; Lau et al, 1994). In contrast, two more recent 
studies report that global equity offerings by US firms outperform domestic equity offerings 
(Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2000; Wu and Kwok, 2002).  
9  A cross-listing in the US takes place in the form of depository receipt (DR), a negotiable certificate 
issued by a bank to represent the underlying shares held in trust at a foreign bank, as opposed to direct 
listing of ordinary shares on a foreign exchange. 
10 To put this number into perspective, the total value of the share trading on the NYSE in 2007 was 
$29.1 trillion. 
11 King and Mitto (2007) estimate the annual direct costs of SOX compliance to be $2 to $3 million 
US dollars. An example from industry: British Airways in their press release related to the delisting of 
its shares from NYSE announced that rising costs of compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a 
primary reason for delisting; this delisting saves the company £10 million British pounds per year. 
Source: The Evening Standard (April, 25, 2007). 
12 Marosi and Massoud (2008) report that during the period 2002-2006 126 foreign companies 
voluntary deregistered from US exchanges. Fernandes et al (2010) report that 80 foreign companies 
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after the adoption of SOX.13  Overall, there is recent evidence that a significant number of 
companies still choose to have their shares listed on foreign exchanges and also at the same 
time, a number of companies choose to delist their shares from foreign exchanges. Such 
contradictory cross-listing trends call for further research to explore the costs and benefits of 
international cross-listings in the current conditions for different types of companies. 
 
1.2 Why do companies cross-list? 
Managerial surveys14 and the literature on the determinants of cross-listing decisions 
(Pagano et al, 2002; Sarkissian and Shill, 2004) indicate that an international cross-listing is 
often an integrated part of the company’s global business strategy (King and Mittoo, 2007). 
Larger, often recently privatized, and more export-oriented companies choose to list their 
shares on a foreign exchange to signal to markets, including the consumer market, that the 
company has become a global player.15  Furthermore, cross-listing is considered to be a 
means of internationalizing the investor base in line with the international profile of the 
firm’s operations and thereby accessing the foreign equity capital needed to finance 
investment opportunities (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001). As confirmation of the importance of 
access to new equity capital, Reese and Weisbach (2002) report a significant increase in both 
the number and value of equity offerings following cross-listing in the US. Moreover, a 
foreign listing can provide the cross-listed company with an acquisition currency, a foreign 
exchange-listed security that is valid in the foreign country to pay for acquisitions in that 
                                                                                                                                          
announced their intention to deregister from US exchanges in the eight months since the rule 12h-6 
took effect in 2007 (this rule has made it significantly easier for foreign firms to deregister with the 
SEC and thus to delist from US exchanges). Additionally, evidence from business press includes: 
Goodbye, farewell, auf wiedersehen, adieu…, Wall Street Journal, (February, 9, 2005); Delisting 
European companies should think twice before delisting from the US stock markets, Financial Times, 
(April, 25, 2005). 
13 Marosi and Massoud (2008) show that SOX has significantly increased the probability of foreign 
companies delisting from US exchanges. In addition, they show that investor’s reaction to a 
company’s decision to delist after SOX is significantly less negative than that before SOX, consistent 
with investors recognizing the compliance costs of SOX. 
14 Published survey of foreign managers of companies cross-listed in the US include: Mittoo (1992), 
Fanto and Karmel (1997), Bancel and Mittoo (2001). 
15 Survey of 288 cross-listing announcement statements by European companies obtained from the 
Factiva news database reveals the following most commonly named reasons to cross-list: foreign 
operations (named in 50 out of 288 statements); broader investor base (named in 45 out of 288 
statements); acquisition plans in the foreign market (named in 42 out of 288 statements); access to 
capital, enhanced reputation and company profile (named in 29 out of 288 statements); international 
expansion/growth strategy (named in 20 out of 288 statements); improved company’s visibility 
(named in 20 out of 288 statements). 
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country.16 Empirically, there is evidence that non-US firms cross-listed in the US are 
significantly more active in acquiring US companies (Tolmunen and Torsila, 2005) and 
compared to their domestically listed peers, pay less by using US-listed equity rather than 
cash (Burns, 2004). In addition, there is evidence that a US cross-listing facilitates greater 
access to external financing (Lins et al, 2005), reduces the cost of debt (Ball et al, 2009), 
which, in turn, contributes to higher firm growth (Khurana et al, 2008)  and improved 
operating performance (Charitou and Louca, 2009). 
On the flip side of the managerial motivation to cross-list, Charitou et al (2008) 
show that a non-US firm is more likely to cross-list in the US if the CEO has substantial 
holdings of vested options, which she/he is likely to exercise subsequent to the cross-listing 
event associated with abnormal positive stock price performance. Ayyagari and Doidge 
(2010) argue that controlling shareholders of non-US firms use a US listing as a means to 
decrease the costs of ownership transfer. They provide evidence that controlling shareholders 
are more likely than controlling shareholders of matched firms that do not cross-list, to sell 
voting rights and control stakes to foreign investors following a listing in the US. 
 
1.3 Economic consequences of international cross-listings 
1.3.1 Shareholders’ wealth 
Although managers may be motivated by such considerations as the improved 
prestige, image and visibility of their company to customers and investors (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2001), the primary financial objective of a foreign listing is a reduction in the 
company’s costs of capital and, accordingly, improved corporate valuation (Chouinard and 
D’Souza, 2003-2004). Existing empirical evidence on this issue is provided by three groups 
of studies that use different  methodologies: 1) studies that explicitly examine the changes in 
the cost of capital after cross-listing, 2) studies that examine the valuation multiples of cross-
listed firms relative to those of firms that do not cross-list using cross-sectional analysis, and 
3) studies that examine changes in stock price around the announcement of cross-listings 
and/or around the cross-listing event using the time-series framework. 
                                                 
16 Creation of acquisition currency, as a benefit of a foreign listing, has long been advocated by 
practitioners. E.g. J.P. Morgan suggests that a cross-listing ‘facilitates merger and acquisition activity 
by creating a desirable stock-swap acquisition currency’. (Source: www.adr.com). 
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Studies from the first group report that cross-listing in the US by non-US firms is 
associated with a significant reduction in the cost of equity capital (Errunza and Losq, 1985; 
Jorion and Schwartz, 1986; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Koedijk and van Dijk, 2004). In 
addition, Hail and Leuz (2009) show the reduction in the cost of equity is sustained over a 
long period of time following the cross-listing event. At the same time, there is no evidence 
on the changes in the cost of capital after cross-listing in host markets other than the US. 
The second group of studies, the cross-sectional studies, estimate the valuation 
premium of cross-listed firms using valuation multiples, most often Tobin’s Q17, and report 
that non-US firms that cross-list in the US experience significantly higher valuations 
compared to firms that do not cross-list (Lang et al, 2003a; Doidge et al, 2004; Hope et al, 
2007; O’Connor, 2009; King and Segal, 2009). However, Gozzi et al (2008) show that 
corporate valuation increases significantly before and during the year of cross-listing and 
declines afterwards. Such evidence questions the causality of the relationship between cross-
listing and firm valuation. Several studies also compare the valuation premium from cross-
listing in the US and in the UK. However, the findings are conflicting. Thus, Doidge et al 
(2009a) find significant valuation premiums for US cross-listings that are persistent over 
time, while they find no premiums in valuation for UK cross-listings. The authors interpret 
these findings as consistent with the theory that a stock exchange listing in the US ‘has 
unique governance benefits for foreign firms’ (Doidge et al, 2009a, p.235). On the other 
hand, Bianconi and Tan (2010) find significant valuation premiums for both US and UK 
cross-listings. 
Finally, the third group of empirical studies, the event studies, focuses on the impact 
of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth and report that, on average, cross-listing in the US 
results in significant positive abnormal returns both around the announcement of the decision 
to cross-list (Miller, 1999; Doukas and Switzer, 2000; Lee, 2003) and around the cross-
listing event itself (Foerster and Karolyi, 1993 and 1999; Mittoo, 2003; Bris et al, 2007). 
However, such evidence primarily concerns cross-listings in the US, while the market 
reaction to cross-listing on a foreign market other than the US has received significantly less 
attention in the literature. Concerning cross-listing in the UK, prior studies find positive 
                                                 
17 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm's assets (measured by the market value of its 
outstanding stock and debt) to the replacement cost of the firm's assets (Tobin, 1959). It provides an 
indication of the valuation premium that investors assign to the future earnings potential of the firm 
(King and Mittoo, 2007). 
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abnormal returns (Serra, 1999; Roosenboom and van Dijk, 2009). In addition, Sarkissian and 
Schill (2009a) report permanent valuation gains from cross-listing on various host markets 
and suggest that cross-listing in the US does not offer unique valuation benefits. 
Overall, empirical evidence on the effects of international cross-listings arrive at the 
general consensus that cross-listing in the US has a positive impact on shareholders’ wealth. 
Evidence on the wealth effects of foreign listings in other markets is limited and 
inconclusive. In addition, significant changes in international capital markets discussed 
above have potentially altered the net benefits of cross-listings in different markets.  
Moreover, there is an ongoing debate in the literature on the sources of value 
creation around cross-listings. Conventional wisdom has been that cross-listing is a way to 
overcome investment barriers and make shares accessible to foreign investors (Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam, 1977; Errunza and Losq, 1985; Alexander et al, 1987). Accordingly, the 
reduction in the cost of capital is the result of the increased shareholder base and wider risk 
sharing (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000). In the late 1990s, however, 
despite the increased integration of national capital markets, the number of cross-listings 
continued to grow and the valuation benefits from cross-listing continued to be significant. 
This challenged the market segmentation argument and prompted new theories on the 
valuation impact of cross-listings (Karolyi, 2006). As an alternative explanation, Stulz 
(1999) and Coffee (1999) initiated the discussion on the legal bonding of the US cross-listing 
and suggested that the impact on the cost of capital of cross-listed companies might come 
from the new legal environment that provides better protection to minority shareholders.  
In line with the legal bonding explanation of the valuation effects of cross-listing, a 
number of empirical studies provide evidence that cross-listing in the US is associated with 
an improvement in corporate governance. Doidge et al (2004 and 2009a) explicitly show that 
the valuation premium is higher for cross–listings on stock exchanges with stricter disclosure 
requirements. Additionally, Doidge (2004) and Doidge et al (2009b) argue that a US cross-
listing constrains the consumption of private benefits by controlling shareholders. More 
specifically, Doidge (2004) report that firms that cross-list in the US have significantly lower 
voting premiums than firms that do not cross-list, which they interpret as evidence of the 
improved protection of minority investors. Doidge et al (2009b) show that firms that have 
controlling shareholders with greater ownership of voting are less likely to cross-list in the 
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US because the controlling shareholders would have to give up more private benefits of 
control. Charitou et al (2007) and Lel and Miller (2008) also argue that listing on US stock 
exchanges improves a company’s corporate governance. Particularly, Charitou et al (2007) 
show that cross-listing is associated with more independent boards and audit committees and 
more dispersed ownership, while Lel and Miller (2008) show that cross-listing improves the 
ability to terminate poorly performing CEOs, especially for companies from countries with 
weak investor protection. Finally, Fresard and Salva (2010) suggest that cross-listing in the 
US mitigates insiders’ ability to convert the company’s cash holdings into private benefits, 
evidenced by the differences in valuation of excess cash of cross-listed companies and their 
non-cross-listed peers. 
Based on the argument that improved corporate governance and investor protection 
are the main sources of benefits from cross-listing, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act18 of 2002 (SOX) in the US was expected to further increase the benefits from cross-
listing in the US. However, in sharp contrast to this expectation, financial markets have 
witnessed a wave of de-listings from US exchanges in recent years (as discussed above in 
section 1.1). In addition, there is evidence of a negative perception of SOX by investors, 
arguably due to the significantly increased compliance costs of a US listing (Zhang, 2007; 
Litvak, 2007). Also Litvak (2008) specifically shows that valuation premiums of US cross-
listed companies have declined significantly after the adoption of SOX. Overall, the trend of 
de-listing from US exchanges and the empirical evidence regarding investors’ negative 
perception of SOX have raised questions about the strength of the legal bonding explanation 
for  the net benefits of cross-listing. 
Although financial research has intensively covered the impact of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth, there remain open questions. First, neither of the theories on the 
valuation effects of cross-listing has been successful in single-handedly explaining cross-
listing trends and the net benefits of cross-listing. Second, several important capital market 
developments, such as the adoption of SOX in the US and the adoption of the single 
currency in Europe, have raised new questions on the value of cross-listing.19  Third, since 
                                                 
18 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has toughened corporate governance requirements for publicly 
traded companies in order to improve investor confidence and reassure the US capital market integrity 
(Donaldson, 2005). 
19 According to the 2005 survey by Mazars, a Paris-based auditing firm, only 43% of European 
companies think the benefits of US cross-listing after the adoption of SOX outweigh its costs, while 
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the majority of empirical studies provide evidence on the impact of cross-listing in the US, 
which is significantly different from other major capital markets in terms of disclosure 
requirements and costs of listing, the sources of the benefits of cross-listing in other markets 
are still not clear. Chapter 2 of this thesis contributes to the debate on the effects of 
international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth by addressing these gaps in the literature. 
In particular, chapter 2 addresses two research questions: 1) Do international cross-listings 
on various host markets create shareholders’ wealth? 2) What are the sources of wealth 
creation around a cross-listing event? Both the wealth effects of cross-listings and their 
determinants are compared across various host markets. The determinants of the wealth 
effects are evaluated with a particular focus on the impact of the recent developments in 
capital markets on the net benefits of cross-listings and on the sources of these benefits. 
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
wealth depends on the destination market. More specifically, cross-listings in the US result 
in the most significant positive cumulative abnormal returns around the cross-listing 
announcement, closely followed by cross-listing in the UK, while cross-listings in Europe 
have no significant impact on the stock’s market valuation. More importantly, it is 
documented that significant developments such as the introduction of Euro in Europe, the 
introduction of AIM by the London stock exchange and the adoption of SOX in the US have 
significantly affected the impact of international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth and 
also the determinants of this impact. 
Chapter 2 contributes to literature on the effects of international cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth in the following ways. First, it adds to the literature empirical evidence 
on the experiences of European stocks cross-listed and traded in American, British and 
European markets in addition to the widely reported evidence on the experiences of foreign 
stocks cross-listed in the US. Second, it provides evidence on the time variation in the net 
benefits of international cross-listing. Specifically, it evaluates how important capital market 
developments in the last decade have altered the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
wealth. Third, it empirically examines potential determinants of the wealth effects of cross-
listings on various host markets. 
                                                                                                                                          
17% are considering delisting to escape the law. Source: Sarbanes-Oxley Goes Global, Forbes 
Magazine (July, 13, 2006). 
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1.3.2 Liquidity and volatility and information environment of cross-listed stocks 
Along with access to foreign equity markets and a broader shareholders base, 
enhanced stock liquidity is an important expected benefit of listing on a foreign market 
(Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Bris et al, 2007). All else being 
constant, greater liquidity should translate into a lower cost of equity capital because it 
reduces the costs of trading for investors and therefore reduces the required illiquidity 
premium (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan et al, 1998; Jacoby et al, 2000). However, 
empirical evidence on the impact of cross-listing on stock liquidity is mixed. Some studies 
report an improvement in stock liquidity after cross-listing in terms of reduced trading costs 
(Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Domowitz et al, 1998), reduced frequency of zero returns (Bris 
et al, 2007), and increased trading volumes (Smith and Sofianos, 1997; Foerster and Karolyi, 
1998). Other studies, however, report no significant improvement or even deterioration in 
stock liquidity after cross-listing (Noronha et al, 1996; Domowitz et al, 1998; Silva and 
Chavez, 2008; Berkman and Nguyen, 2010). Overall, existing empirical evidence on the 
impact of cross-listing on stock liquidity is not conclusive. In regards to the empirical 
evidence on the impact of cross-listing on stock return volatility, there is evidence that the 
increase in trading volume after cross-listing is associated with increased stock return 
volatility (Barclay et al, 1990; Chan et al, 1996; Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Menkveld, 
2008). While this is in line with the literature on the positive relationship between trading 
volume and volatility (Karpoff, 1987; Jones et al, 1994; Chan and Fong, 2000), it challenges 
theoretical predictions on the positive effects of cross-listings. This contradiction calls for 
further investigation of the impact of cross-listings on stock return volatility. 
While stock liquidity and volatility are important factors on their own, these stock 
trading characteristics have also been used in the literature to proxy the quality of the firm’s 
information environment (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003).20 Information 
asymmetry is one of the sources of market segmentation that can be alleviated through cross-
listing (Chouinard and D'Souza, 2003-2004). Since cross-listing is associated with additional 
mandatory disclosure requirements, it is expected to reduce information asymmetry between 
corporate managers and investors and also among different groups of investors. In turn, an 
improved information environment reduces an investor’s information costs and therefore 
                                                 
20 The quality of information environment refers to the costs of acquiring and processing relevant 
information about the firm and reliability of this information. 
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should lower the cost of equity capital for cross-listed companies (Diamond and Verrechia, 
1991). In the case of cross-listing, the theoretical model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) 
predicts a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of cross-listing on a foreign 
exchange that has higher disclosure standards than the home exchange, explained by the 
reduction in investor’s monitoring costs after cross-listing. Empirically, Doidge et al (2004) 
show that cross-listing on a stock exchange with stricter disclosure requirements results in 
higher valuation premiums of cross-listed companies. Bris et al (2009) compare the stock 
price reaction to cross-listing and admission to trade on the London stock exchange. They 
find strong evidence that additional disclosure requirements associated with a stock 
exchange listing can explain significantly higher abnormal returns around stock exchange 
listing vs. admission to trade. Also, Baker et al (2002) and Lang et al (2003a) show that 
increased production of stock-specific information after cross-listing is associated with 
higher market valuations.  
The quality of the stock’s information environment, however, is not straightforward 
to quantify and test empirically. Several studies provide indirect evidence on the 
improvement in the stock’s information environment. For example, Baker et al (2002) and 
Lang et al (2003a) show that cross-listing is associated with increased media coverage and 
improved analyst coverage.21 Baker et al (2002) find that international cross-listings, 
including both listings on the New York and London stock exchanges, result in a significant 
increase in financial analyst coverage and in media attention.22  Moreover, there is empirical 
evidence that, in addition to the increase in the number of analysts following the company 
after cross-listing, cross-listing also results in increased analyst forecast accuracy (Lang et al, 
2003a) and greater consensus among financial analysts (Das and Saudagaran, 1998). 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) investigate the change in the quality of the information 
environment around cross-listings measured by the stock price informativeness, which is 
measured by firm-specific stock return variation. They find cross-listing in the US improves 
price informativeness for companies from developed markets but decreases price 
informativeness for companies from emerging markets. Overall, existing empirical evidence 
on the change in the quality of the stocks’ information environment after cross-listing is 
                                                 
21 In turn, the level of analyst coverage of the company is positively related to the quality of the 
information environment (Draper and Paudyal, 2008). 
22 Baker et al (2002) measure stock visibility by the number of analysts following the stock and the 
number of newspaper articles written about the company. 
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mainly based on the sample of foreign stocks cross-listed in the US. This fact should prompt 
an investigation of this issue that would have implications for other international markets. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis links the changes in stock liquidity and volatility after cross-
listing to the changes in the quality of the firm’s information environment. The main 
research question addressed is: Does cross-listing improve stock liquidity and volatility? An 
improvement in stock liquidity and volatility is expected since cross-listing enhances the 
stock’s information environment. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
different dimensions of stock liquidity and volatility before and after the cross-listing event. 
The chapter explicitly addresses the self-selection bias in the cross-sectional analysis of the 
consequences of cross-listings, which is potentially present due to the endogenous nature of 
cross-listings. This issue is tackled using several alternative techniques. The impact of cross-
listings on liquidity and volatility is evaluated after controlling for the change in stock-
specific characteristics after cross-listing, such as company size, accounting practices, 
analyst coverage and trading activity. The sample includes European stocks cross-listed on 
various markets. Therefore, the evidence not only complements the existing literature on the 
consequences of cross-listing in the US but also offers an analysis of how equity market 
specific factors may shape the effects of cross-listing. Last but not least, chapter 3 
distinguishes between cross-listing and cross-trading; this is because cross-trading, unlike 
cross-listing, does not entail additional disclosure. Thus, the second research question 
addressed is: Does cross-listing have a more profound impact on the liquidity and volatility 
than cross-trading? If additional mandatory disclosure is the main channel for improvement 
in the stock’s information environment then the improvement in the information 
environment and, accordingly, the improvement in stock liquidity and volatility after cross-
listing is expected to be more significant than after cross-trading. 
The empirical findings of chapter 3 suggest that stock liquidity and volatility 
improve after listing on a foreign exchange. Yet, contrary to expectations, the difference in 
the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on stock liquidity and volatility is not 
significant. This finding suggests that the improvement in liquidity and volatility of cross-
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listed and cross-traded stocks is not due to mandatory information disclosure requirements 
but rather due to greater information production and intensified competition among traders.23 
The major contributions of chapter 3 are as follows: First, it provides up-to-date 
evidence on the liquidity and volatility of stocks cross-listed and cross-traded on various 
exchanges both relative to stocks that do not cross-list and also relative to the pre-cross-
listing period. Second, it distinguishes between cross-listing and cross-trading and compares 
the consequences of these two types of presence on a foreign stock exchange in terms of 
stock liquidity and volatility. 
1.3.3 Implications of the location of trading 
Improvement in transaction costs and stock liquidity after cross-listing can be largely 
attributed to the global competition for order flow. This competition forces stock exchanges 
to continuously look for ways to improve market quality24 in order to attract and maintain 
trading volumes. This task has become particularly relevant in the current environment, 
which is characterised by globalization, integration and digitalization of capital markets. In 
theory, when a stock is listed on multiple markets, traders make decisions on the location of 
trading based largely on transaction costs (Pagano, 1989; Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991). 
Accordingly, it is expected that order flow from liquidity traders who seek to attain the 
highest possible level of liquidity will eventually gravitate to a single market with the lowest 
possible transaction costs. 
Another important consideration for traders is the quality of the market’s 
information environment. Huddart et al (1999) developed a theoretical model where liquidity 
traders choose to trade only on the exchange with the strictest disclosure requirements 
because on such exchanges the information advantage of corporate insiders is less. While 
theoretical predictions on the location of equity trading are straightforward, it is a difficult 
empirical task to validate those predictions while taking into account significant market 
                                                 
23 On occasions the information to be disclosed could also differ. This may not, on its own, mean a 
higher ‘level’ of disclosure but effectively this brings more information to the market and hence 
reduces the information asymmetry. It is also possible that the format and regulations pertinent to 
financial statements may also differ across markets, and hence investors will have information based 
on two or more accounting practices. This also will lead to lower information asymmetry. 
24 Important aspects of market quality include the level of market liquidity and volatility, operational 
and informational efficiency, transparency and the level of investor protection and insider trading 
regulations. 
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frictions that potentially distort the equilibrium predicted. Existing empirical evidence on the 
location of trading of cross-listed stocks shows the importance of the following stock 
exchange characteristics for the ability of a stock exchange to attract foreign equity trading: 
time zone differences between the home and host markets, transaction costs, the level of 
insider trading regulation, and the level of economic development of the home market 
(Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999; Halling et al, 2008). Existing literature, however, is solely 
focused on the distribution of trading volumes between the US market and the stock’s home 
market based on samples of non-US stocks cross-listed in the US. This indicates a 
considerable gap in the literature on the relative competitiveness of different international 
stock exchanges in attracting trading volumes of foreign stocks. Evidence from non-US 
markets would be of significant importance because these markets differ significantly from 
the US capital market in their institutional characteristics.  
From the point of view of a cross-listed company, the benefits of international cross-
listings are directly associated with the level of trading activity on the foreign exchange. 
Thus, there is evidence that more active stock trading on the foreign exchange has several 
important outcomes: 1) more significant reduction in the bid-ask spread (Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1998), 2) more significant improvement in the stock market valuation (King and 
Segal, 2004), and 3) more significant portion of the stock price discovery taking place in the 
foreign market (Eun and Sabherwahl, 2003). Existing research shows that the distribution of 
the trading volumes of cross-listed stock varies significantly depending on the stock-specific 
characteristics (Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999; Baruch et al, 2007; Halling et al, 2008). 
Once again, the evidence is based on the sample of foreign stocks cross-listed in the US and 
ignores trading of cross-listed stocks in other markets. Thus, such evidence is not useful for 
companies in understanding potential outcomes from cross-listing in various foreign 
markets. This understanding is needed in order to for a company to choose the right host 
market for their stock. Hence, this gap in the literature needs to be addressed. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis contributes to the empirical literature on the implications of 
the location of trading of cross-listed stocks by addressing the following research question: 
What determines the distribution of trading of cross-listed stocks? This issue is investigated 
both from the point of view of stock exchanges seeking to attract business from abroad and 
also from the point of view of corporate managers looking to maximize the liquidity of their 
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company’s stock via listing on a foreign exchange. First, using trading data of cross-listed 
stocks that trade on various exchanges, chapter 4 compares the ability of the major 
international stock exchanges to attract trading volumes of foreign stocks and evaluates the 
stock exchange characteristics that determine this ability. Furthermore, the unique sample 
includes data on trading on both regulated stock exchanges and non-regulated markets such 
as OTC markets and alternative trading platforms. This allows a comparison of the ability of 
these two types of markets, which differ mainly in the level of disclosure required, to attract 
foreign equity trading. Second, chapter 4 addresses the importance of stock characteristics in 
explaining the distribution of trading volumes of cross-listed stocks. More specifically, it 
provides empirical evidence on how firm-specific characteristics affect the level of trading 
activity on a foreign exchange and also provides evidence, given its characteristics, on which 
particular foreign stock exchange the stock is likely to experience more active trading. 
The findings of chapter 4 reveal the superior ability of the US stock exchanges to 
attract foreign equity trading of European stocks. The ability of a stock exchange to attract 
foreign equity trading is found to be positively determined by its organizational efficiency, 
the level of liquidity, the level of investor protection and the enforcement of insider trading 
regulation. In line with the predictions of Huddart et al (1999), chapter 4 reports that 
regulated stock exchanges have a superior ability to attract trading volumes of foreign equity 
compared to non-regulated markets. Finally, it is found that firm-specific factors, such as 
currency and duration of trading, company size and stock risk, have significant power in 
explaining the distribution of trading volumes in multi-market trading. 
The major contributions of chapter 4 are as follows: First, it provides evidence on 
the relative ability of the major stock exchanges to attract trading volumes of foreign equity 
and factors that affect this ability. Also, it provides evidence on which foreign exchange is 
more likely to offer higher trading volumes for a company with specific characteristics. Such 
evidence is particularly relevant for companies looking to maximize stock liquidity and 
expand their investor base by means of cross-listing. 
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1.4 Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 explores the effects of international 
cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth. Using cumulative abnormal returns around the cross-
listing announcement as a measure of the wealth effects of cross-listing, chapter 2 compares 
the effect of cross-listing on the American, British and European stock exchanges and 
evaluates the determinants of these effects. Additionally, it examines the impact of 
significant capital market developments, such as the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the US and the single currency, the Euro, in Europe, on the benefits of cross-listings. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of cross-listing and multimarket trading on stock 
liquidity and volatility. Furthermore, the study distinguishes between cross-listing and cross-
trading, because cross-trading, in contrast to cross-listing, does not entail additional 
disclosure. Chapter 3 examines and compares the changes in stock liquidity and volatility 
after cross-listing and cross-trading. 
Chapter 4 examines both the stock exchange level and firm level determinants of the 
foreign trading volume of cross-listed and cross-traded stocks. In particular, it evaluates 
stock exchange characteristics that affect an exchange's ability to attract and maintain foreign 
equity trading and, thus, its competitive position in the industry. Furthermore, the unique 
sample of stocks traded on various stock exchanges allows an evaluation of how successful 
stock exchanges are in attracting active trading of foreign stocks with particular company 
characteristics. 
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the findings and their implications. 
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Table 1.1. Number of listed foreign companies on major American and European exchanges 
The table reports the number of listed international companies (absolute number and as percentage of 
total listed companies) on AMEX, NYSE, NASDAQ, LSE’s Main Market and LSE’s AIM, Deutsche 
Borse (Frankfurt stock exchange official regulated market only) and Euronext (consolidated statistics 
for Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Lisbon) for the period of time from 1999 to 2007. The sources of 
data include: World Federation of Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org), LSE 
(www.londonstockexchange.com), Deutsche Borse (http://www.deutsche-boerse.com), Euronext 
(http://www.euronext.com). 
2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
AMEX
Number of foreign listed companies 104 100 100 73 55 48 48 51 na
% of total listed companies 17% 17% 17% 13% 10% 8% 8% 8% na
NYSE
Number of foreign listed companies 421 451 452 459 466 472 461 433 406
% of total listed companies 18% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 19% 18% 13%
NASDAQ
Number of foreign listed companies 307 321 332 340 343 381 445 488 429
% of total listed companies 10% 10% 10% 11% 10% 10% 11% 10% 9%
London SE Main Market
Number of foreign listed companies 341 330 334 351 381 419 453 501 499
% of total listed companies 22% 21% 20% 19% 20% 20% 20% 21% 20%
London SE AIM
Number of foreign listed companies 347 306 220 116 60 50 42 31 22
% of total listed companies 20% 19% 16% 11% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6%
Number of foreign listed companies 105 104 116 159 182 177 180 187 192
% of total listed companies 12% 14% 15% 19% 21% 26% 27% 29% 30%
Euronext
Number of foreign listed companies 225 256 293 334 346 370
% of total listed companies 19% 21% 23% 25% 25% 25%
Total: major US exchanges
Number of foreign listed companies 832 872 884 872 864 901 954 972
% of total listed companies 14% 15% 15% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13%
Total: major European exchanges
Number of foreign listed companies 1,018 996 963 960 969 1,016
% of total listed companies 19% 19% 19% 19% 20% 20%
Frankfurt SE Official Regulated Market
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Chapter 2 
 International Cross-Listing of Stocks  
and Shareholders’ Wealth 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The globalization and integration of the world financial markets, and in particular, 
significant  capital market developments such as the introduction of the Euro in the European 
Union in 1999, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the introduction of the 
Alternative Investments Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange in 1996, have 
generated considerable debate among academics and practitioners concerning the 
motivations for, and the benefits of, cross-listings of European companies on American, 
British and European stock exchanges.25  With the introduction of a common currency, the 
Euro, the European markets have become more integrated, creating doubt as to whether 
cross-listings within Europe actually add wealth to shareholders. Similarly, SOX is likely to 
increase the costs of meeting the legal and disclosure requirements of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, making listing in the US markets less desirable.26  Finally, the 
introduction of stock exchanges that are characterised by light disclosure requirements and 
easy access to capital (for example the AIM in London) are likely to affect the geographic 
trends in cross-listings. The immediate consequence of these developments is that the 
motivations and the net benefits of cross-listings are likely to change across different listing 
destination markets and over time. This study contributes to this debate by investigating the 
effect on the wealth of shareholders in European companies of cross-listing in the American, 
British and European stock exchanges. 
                                                 
25 Some anecdotal evidence includes: “Delisting European companies should think twice before 
delisting from the US stock markets”, Financial Times, (April, 25, 2005); “Why cross-listing shares 
doesn’t create value”, McKinsey Quarterly, (November, 2008). 
26 In this respect, Zhang (2007) and Litvak (2007) find a negative market reaction for companies that 
are subject to SOX compliance during key announcements that SOX would fully apply to cross-listed 
foreign issuers. 
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The effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth have been the subject of 
intensive theoretical and empirical research (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Alexander 
et al, 1987; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999). Prior studies, on average, uncover 
positive gains in shareholders’ wealth as a result of cross-listings on American stock 
exchanges. Conventional wisdom attributes gains in shareholders’ wealth from cross-listing 
to market segmentation, liquidity and signalling theories. Market segmentation theory 
suggests that cross-listing in a foreign market makes a company’s stocks accessible to 
investors who, because of investment barriers, would otherwise find it less advantageous to 
hold the stocks. This potentially increases the shareholder base and risk sharing, which in 
turn leads to a lower cost of capital and a higher market valuation (Stulz, 1981; Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000). Liquidity theory postulates that cross-listing in a 
more liquid market reduces trading costs for investors and increases the company’s valuation 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). Finally, cross-listing may 
signal the company’s high quality and future prospects to the market (Fuerst, 1998). 
Later research by Stulz (1999) and Karolyi (2006) challenges the adequacy of the 
aforementioned theories in explaining the variation of cross-listing valuation effects and the 
time series pattern of cross-listings. As a result, other promising theories such as bonding, 
market timing and proximity preference theory were developed. Bonding theory proposes 
that cross-listing on an exchange with higher legal and disclosure standards ‘bonds’ the 
company to better corporate governance practices that limit the ability of managers and 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders rights (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 
1999 and 2002; Doidge et al, 2004). Market timing theory attributes gains in shareholders’ 
wealth from cross-listing to managers’ ability to time a cross-listing in relatively ‘hot’ host 
markets (Sarkissian and Shill, 2009b). Finally, the wealth effects of cross-listing could be 
positively related to the level of investors’ familiarity with the company measured by 
geographic, economic, cultural, and industrial proximity between the home and the host 
markets (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004, 2009a). Overall, these theories explain the effect of 
cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth at a market level. However, the effects on shareholders’ 
wealth may also vary at a company level. Thus, other researchers have proposed business 
strategy theory. Business strategy theory assumes that a cross-listing decision is associated 
with a company’s global strategy and predicts that gains in shareholder wealth from cross-
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listing are a function of company-specific characteristics (Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Bancel 
and Mittoo, 2001; Pagano et al, 2002). 
Empirical evidence on the aforementioned cross-listing theories is mixed. Miller 
(1999) and Errunza and Miller (2000) provide empirical evidence consistent with market 
segmentation theory, while Doidge et al (2004) provide empirical evidence consistent with 
legal bonding theory. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) interpret their findings as consistent with 
liquidity and investor recognition theories. Baker et al (2002) and Lang et al (2003a) also 
find evidence consistent with investor recognition theory. Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) and 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009b) advocate proximity preference theory and market timing 
theory respectively. Finally, business strategy theory is empirically supported by Bancel et al 
(2007). Several studies have attempted to test empirically the joint significance of the cross-
listing theories. In this vein, Bris et al (2007) suggest that the explanatory power of market 
segmentation theory is more significant than that of legal bonding theory while Bris et al 
(2009) find that the explanatory power of the information-based theory of cross-listing is 
more significant than that of market segmentation and liquidity theories. Overall, the joint 
significance of the cross-listing theories is still not clear. This study contributes to the debate 
by providing empirical evidence on the explanatory power of potential determinants of 
wealth effects of cross-listings on various markets. Potential determinants are identified 
based on the aforementioned cross-listing theories. 
In addition, evidence on the impact of developments in capital markets on the 
motivations for and net benefits of cross-listings is limited. It is important to consider such 
developments in order to improve understanding of the relationship between shareholders’ 
wealth gains from cross-listing and their determinants. Furthermore, prior studies largely 
ignore cross-listings on British and European stock exchanges.27 Since American, British and 
European stock exchanges have different characteristics with respect to their level of 
economic development in terms of capital market size and liquidity, investor protection and 
accounting standards, the motivations for and the net benefits of cross-listings across these 
                                                 
27 At the same time, stock exchange industry statistics show that the number of foreign companies 
listed on British and European stock exchanges is significant compared to the number of foreign 
companies listed on American exchanges. Thus, in 2007, 688 foreign companies were listed on the 
London stock exchange, 225 on the Euronext, and 105 on the Frankfurt stock exchange. Meanwhile, 
in 2007, all together 832 foreign companies were listed on American exchanges including AMEX, 
NYSE and Nasdaq (Table 1.1 of Chapter 1, discussed in section 1.1 of Chapter 1). 
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markets are likely to be diverse. In this respect, Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) compare 
the sources of value creation around cross-listings in various markets. For US cross-listings 
they report that the effect on shareholders’ wealth is determined by market liquidity, 
information disclosure and the level of investor protection. For UK cross-listings, they report 
transparency and investor protection as being significant. However, for Europe and Japan the 
study finds no significant determinants for the effect of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth, 
which suggests the need for further theoretical and empirical work in these areas. 
This study contributes to the cross-listing literature by investigating the effects of 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth for European companies in American, British and 
European markets, the determinants of these effects and their evolution over time. More 
specifically, the following research questions are addressed: 1) Do international cross-
listings on various host markets create shareholders’ wealth? 2) What are the sources of 
wealth creation around a cross-listing event? To explain the variation in the effects on wealth 
of cross-listing across various host markets, this study investigates the role of market 
segmentation, liquidity, information disclosure, legal bonding, market timing, proximity 
preference, investor recognition, and business strategy theories. Moreover, it considers the 
role of capital market developments on the motivations for and benefits of cross-listings. 
Using a hand-collected dataset of 254 cross-listing announcements from 21 
European markets during the period from 1982 to 2007, the results show an average 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 1.8% around the announcement of an 
international cross-listing. Mostly, these abnormal returns are contributed by American and 
British cross-listings (3.3% and 2.7%, respectively), while European listings do not generate 
any significant abnormal returns. The results show that the introduction of the Euro had no 
impact on the wealth effects of European cross-listings.   
This study provides evidence that the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
wealth is affected by capital market developments such as the introduction of AIM by the 
London stock exchange and the adoption of SOX in the US. With respect to British cross-
listings, the significant abnormal returns can mainly be attributed to the AIM listings, despite 
the fact that the AIM offers weaker investor protection than the Main Market of the London 
stock exchange. In turn, higher abnormal returns around the AIM listings are driven by the 
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smaller size of the companies listing on AIM. The effects on shareholders’ wealth of British 
cross-listings can be explained by proximity preference and business strategy theories. 
Finally, regarding American cross-listings, the results are consistent with the 
argument that the costs from the adoption of SOX outweigh the benefits. More specifically, 
cross-listings that took place in the US before the adoption of SOX resulted in positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns, while cross-listings that took place in the US after 
the adoption of SOX have produced insignificant abnormal returns. Positive effects on 
shareholders’ wealth before the adoption of SOX are particularly profound for small and 
growth companies, while after the adoption of SOX they are positive and significant only for 
large companies and for companies from countries with weaker legal environment. Hence, 
business strategy can generally explain the effect on shareholders’ wealth of international 
cross-listings in the US market, while the investor recognition theory is also valid in the 
post-SOX period. The findings on the impact of AIM and SOX on the stock price suggest 
that investors evaluate the benefits of a foreign listing in conjunction with the costs involved. 
On the whole, this study provides insights into the nature of the motivations for, and 
the benefits of, cross-listings across different host markets and over time. The findings are 
consistent with the view that the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth depends on 
the destination market and the time it takes place. Changes in the listing environment not 
only alter the wealth effects of cross-listings but also affect the sources of value creation 
around cross-listings. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of international cross-
listings on  shareholders’ wealth, section 2.3 develops testable hypotheses on the direction 
and relative magnitude of the effects on shareholders’ wealth of cross-listing and on the 
potential determinants, section 2.4 and section 2.5 describe the methodology and the sample 
employed respectively, section 2.6 presents the empirical findings and, finally, section 2.7 
concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Theoretical background on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
wealth 
In perfect markets the decision of in which market shares should be listed would be a 
source of indifference to companies. In reality, investment barriers such as foreign 
investment restrictions, transaction costs, taxes, regulatory frictions, incomplete information, 
and variation in liquidity, investor bases, and levels of investor protection between home and 
foreign markets might result in differences in a stock’s market valuation. The literature 
offers a number of theories which attempt to explain the impact of an international cross-
listing on shareholders’ wealth. 
Capital Markets Segmentation theory 
A cross-listing makes a company’s stocks accessible to investors who would 
otherwise find it less advantageous to hold the stocks because of investment barriers. In turn, 
improved stock investability after the cross-listing increases the shareholder base and the risk 
sharing and, thus, leads to a lower cost of capital. The seminal work by Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam (1977) offers analysis of the imperfections in international capital markets, 
including foreign investments restrictions and taxes, and the implication of these 
imperfections for corporate financial decisions. They show that cross-listing is one of the 
corporate financial policies that overcome the effects of capital market segmentation and, 
accordingly, results in a higher price of cross-listed stock.  
Studies by Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and 
Janakiramanan (1986), and Alexander et al (1987) offer theoretical models of equilibrium 
capital market prices with various investment barriers. Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) show 
that taxes on asset holdings by foreign investors might explain the deviation of asset prices 
from the expected level and also the bias of investors towards domestic stocks. Errunza and 
Losq (1985) examine the impact of regulatory restrictions that result in the inability of some 
investors to trade a subset of securities (referred to as ineligible securities) and predict super 
risk premium on ineligible securities, which is a function of the differential risk aversion of 
restricted and unrestricted investors. Eun and Janakiramanan’s (1986) model that 
incorporates legal foreign ownership restrictions also predicts a risk premium over the ‘no-
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constrains equilibrium price’ for restricted, or domestic, investors and a discount for 
unrestricted, or foreign, investors. Extending the work of Stapleton and Subrahmanyam 
(1977), Alexander et al (1987) view a listing of a domestic security on a foreign capital 
market as the initial stage of capital market integration that produces the so called 
‘externality effect’ of indirectly integrating domestic and foreign capital markets. Their 
model demonstrates that expected returns are lower when a security is cross-listed under the 
condition that stock prices are less positively correlated between different countries than they 
are within a single country. 
A number of empirical studies (Alexander et al, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1993; 
Miller, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000) provide empirical evidence consistent with the 
market segmentation theory on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. 
Legal bonding theory 
Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999) initiated the discussion on whether the impact on the 
market valuation of cross-listed companies might come from the new legal environment that 
provides better protection to minority shareholders. Thus, a cross-listing on an exchange 
with stricter legal and disclosure requirements compared to those of the home market is a 
way to ‘bond’ the company to better corporate governance practices, which limit the ability 
of managers and controlling shareholders to take excessive private benefits. Doidge et al 
(2004) compare the valuation of foreign companies listed in the US to the valuation of those 
not listed in the US and report that at the end of 1997, the valuation premium of companies 
cross-listed in the US was on average 16.5%, with the premium being higher for companies 
cross-listed on major American exchanges, compared to companies with Rule 144a private 
placements and OTC listings. Based on their findings, Doidge et al (2004) argue that an 
American listing reduces the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in 
expropriation, and this increases the company’s ability to take advantage of growth 
opportunities. 
Signalling theory 
Legal bonding theory is closely related to signalling theory in terms of the effects of 
foreign listings on shareholders’ wealth. Fuerst (1998), in an attempt to explain the increase 
in the number of listings by foreign companies on American stock exchanges with strict 
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disclosure requirements in the 1990s, developed a theoretical model that rationalises the 
choice to cross-list on exchanges with high disclosure levels. Fuerst (1998) argues that 
voluntarily bonding to higher levels of disclosure via a cross-listing is a way for managers to 
convey information to the market about the firm’s future prospects and quality. Since a 
cross-listing on an exchange with strict disclosure requirements signals superior operating 
performance in the future, the market reaction to the cross-listing decision is predicted to be 
strongly positive. 
Liquidity 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) highlight the importance of market microstructure 
and, in particular, liquidity in pricing assets and show that expected asset returns is an 
increasing and concave function of the bid-ask spread. Thus, financial policies that improve 
stock liquidity, such as a cross-listing, are expected to result in increased firm valuation. 
Empirically, Kadlec and McConnell (1994) find that Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) 
liquidity factor can partly explain the value effects of listings on the New York Stock 
Exchange by over-the-counter (OTC) stocks. They find that abnormal returns around a 
NYSE listing are higher for firms that experience a reduction in bid-ask spreads following 
the listing. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) provide an indirect test of liquidity theory using the 
case of non-US companies cross-listing on American exchanges. They report that abnormal 
returns during the listing week, after controlling for the difference in shareholder base, are 
positive and significant for NYSE listings and negative for AMEX and NASDAQ listings. 
Based on the assumption that NYSE is the most liquid market in this case, the findings are 
interpreted as being consistent with the liquidity theory of the effects of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth. 
Investor Recognition theory 
The classic assumption of asset pricing is that markets are efficient, i.e. all 
information is costless and immediately available to all investors. However, in reality the 
process of the acquisition and dissemination of information in financial markets is 
complicated and costly. To address this shortcoming, Merton (1987) developed a model of 
capital market equilibrium with incomplete information that relaxes the assumption of equal 
information availability and assumes that investors know only about a subset of securities. In 
this case, expected returns depend not only on market risk but also on the costs of incomplete 
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information. The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM does not price firm-specific risk since it can be 
eliminated via diversification. On the other hand, in Merton’s model investors are not aware 
of some stocks, making complete diversification impossible. Thus, returns are expected to be 
higher when the firm’s specific risk is higher and the size of the firm’s investor base is 
smaller (investor base is referred to as ‘degree of investor recognition’). Accordingly, an 
increase in the investor base will result in a higher valuation of the firm and the benefits are 
expected to be greater for firms that are less well known by investors. Merton (1987) 
suggests that firms should make efforts to expand their investor base in order to improve 
their valuation, for example, by increasing a firm’s visibility via advertising and public 
relations or by making the stock available to investors who would be unable to invest 
otherwise because of regulatory constraints, for example, by an exchange listing. Kadlec and 
McConnell (1994) provide empirical support for investor recognition theory in terms of the 
effects on shareholders’ wealth. They show that greater abnormal returns around an NYSE 
listing announcement by OTC stocks is associated with a greater increase in the number of 
shareholders. Extending the application of Merton’s (1987) model to the case of a foreign 
listing, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show that the share price reaction around American 
listings by non-US firms can partly be explained by an increase in the investor base. They 
suggest that a larger shareholder base after the cross-listing results in wider risk sharing and, 
thus, in a reduction in the risk premium. 
By listing shares on a foreign exchange, companies increase investor awareness 
abroad and make information about the company more easily accessible by foreign investors, 
which significantly reduce investors’ monitoring costs. Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (2006) 
theoretical model predicts a positive effect on shareholders’ wealth from a cross-listing 
decision, given that following the cross-listing, investors can produce information about the 
company at a lower cost. Empirical evidence on the information environment of cross-listed 
companies shows that non-US companies cross-listed in the US enjoy an increase in media 
attention, analyst coverage and forecast accuracy following the cross-listing and the increase 
in visibility is associated with a decrease in the cost of capital after the cross-listing. (Baker 
et al, 2002; Lang et al, 2003a; Bailey et al, 2006). 
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Proximity preference theory 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004) argue that corporate financing decisions, like portfolio 
investments decisions, are biased towards domestic assets, i.e. they exhibit a ‘home bias’. 
More specifically, Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that geographical, economic, cultural, 
and industrial proximity measures are important determinants of the corporate decision to 
cross-list. Furthermore, Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) provide evidence that wealth benefits 
are higher for cross-listings on markets that are already familiar with the company’s home 
market’s products (measured by cross-border export) and that are relatively close 
geographically (measured by the distance between the capitals). 
The expectations of the impact of a cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth based on 
proximity preference theory are the opposite of the expectations that arise from investor 
recognition theory. While investor recognition theory implies the greatest wealth gains for 
shareholders’ occur when the host market is least familiar, due to the need to overcome 
higher information barriers, proximity preference theory implies the greatest benefits occur 
when the host market is most familiar. 
Market timing theory 
Corporate managers time the company’s listing on a foreign exchange to take 
advantage of high market valuation at the stock-level, i.e. listing following a strong stock 
performance on the home market. Also managers time a foreign listing at the market-level, 
in other words, listing during a ‘hot’ market period. Ndubizu (2007) presents evidence in 
favour of a company-level window-of-opportunities theory that a cross-listing company’s 
performance (measured by ROA and cash flows) peaks in the year of the cross-listing and 
falls significantly in subsequent years. Also, King and Segal (2009) and Gozzi et al (2008) 
report that relative company valuation measured by Tobin’s Q peaks around the cross-listing 
and reduces significantly in the following years. Sarkissian and Shill (2009a) provide 
evidence of the transitory nature of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth, i.e. 
they document positive abnormal returns prior to the cross-listing and significantly negative 
abnormal returns after the cross-listing.  
Henderson et al (2006) evaluate how market-level conditions affect corporate capital 
raising decisions and find evidence that companies issue equity in ‘hot’ markets in order to 
 38 
 
take advantage of soaring market valuations. Sarkissian and Shill (2009b) show that 
companies tend to cross-list in ‘hot’ host markets, i.e. when the host market outperforms 
other markets economically (in terms of GDP growth) and financially (in terms of growth in 
market capitalization-to-GDP ratio). 
Business strategy theory 
Business strategy theory predicts the impact of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth 
to be a function of company-specific factors, because companies make the decision to cross-
list for reasons related to their global corporate strategy. Pagano et al (2001) report that 
companies tend to cross-list on markets where their industry peers are listed, which can be 
attributed to cross-listing companies attempting to strengthen their competitive position in 
their industry (Pagano et al, 2002). Surveys of corporate finance managers on the benefits of 
cross-listings by Fanto and Karmel (1997) and Bancel and Mittoo (2001) reveal that 
industry-specific reasons and a company’s global business strategy are among the main 
reasons to cross-list. Bancel et al (2007) provide empirical evidence that emphasises the 
importance of the business strategy theory in explaining the stock performance of cross-
listed companies. 
Overall, predictions of legal bonding, liquidity and investor recognition theories are 
similar as they all suggest that a cross-listing in a better quality market than the home market 
is beneficial for investors. In each theory, however, market quality is assessed from a 
different angle: legal bonding theory addresses the level of investor protection, liquidity 
theory the level of market liquidity, and investor recognition theory the quality of the 
information environment. Empirically, more developed financial markets offer high levels of 
investor protection, liquidity and information availability, and, ultimately lower transaction 
costs. This fact makes an empirical test of joint significance of the theories related to the 
effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth a challenging task. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that market segmentation and proximity 
preference theories make opposite predictions. Market segmentation theory suggests that the 
benefits of cross-listing would be higher because of the need to overcome more significant 
levels of segmentation between the home and the host markets. In contrast, proximity 
preference theory expects that the benefits would be higher from cross-listings in host 
markets that have a high level of similarities and connections with the home market. Lastly, 
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market timing and business strategy theories predict a significant variation in the effects of 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth based on both market conditions and company-
specific factors. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical evidence on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth 
The empirical evidence on the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth 
suggests that in the 1980s and the 1990s non-US companies listing in the US, on average, 
experienced significant positive abnormal returns, while the evidence on the effects of cross-
listings on non-US exchanges on stock price is mixed. 
Cross-listings in the US  
Listing in the US by a foreign company usually takes place in the form of an 
American Depository Receipt (ADR). American exchanges offer listing companies a number 
of benefits including high liquidity, a large investor base, analyst and media coverage, 
greater access to capital and a high level of investor protection. Not surprisingly, the 
empirical evidence shows that in the 1980s and 1990s non-US companies listing in the US, 
on average, experienced a significant positive abnormal return. 
Miller (1999) examines the stock price reaction around the cross-listing 
announcement dates for 181 companies from 35 countries that instituted their first 
Depository Receipt programme over the period 1985-1995. Miller (1999) finds a positive 
abnormal return of 1.15% for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window around the announcement of an 
ADR-issuance. Importantly, the stock price reaction is determined by the listing venue 
(exchange vs. OTC), home market (emerging vs. developed), and avenues for raising capital 
(public or private). Abnormal return is found to be higher for companies from emerging 
markets (1.54%) and significantly higher for exchange listings (2.63%) compared to OTC 
listings and private placements. Miller (1999) interprets his findings as being consistent with 
the argument that higher liquidity and a larger shareholder base increase shareholder wealth. 
Later, Coffee (2002) interprets the findings of Miller (1999) as evidence for the legal 
bonding theory. Coffee (2002) argues that this difference in price reaction on the 
announcement day of different type of listings is important evidence because exchange 
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listings, Rule 144a private placements and OTC listings have critical differences in legal and 
reporting requirements.  
Lee (2003) reports significant abnormal returns of 1.7% for a 3-day (-1, +1) event 
window and 3.3% for a 7-day (-5, +1) event window for a sample of 69 companies from 11 
Asian and Latin emerging markets that cross-listed in the US via ADR programs from 1991 
to 2001. Lee (2003) shows that the excess returns are unrelated to the degree of integration 
between a company’s home stock market and the US stock market and argues that the value 
effects are mostly due to an improvement in the company’s ability to take advantage of 
growth opportunities. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) examine stock price behaviour around the first-time US 
listings of 153 companies from Canada, Europe and the Asia-Pacific Basin region from 1976 
to 1992. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find a prelisting run-up in prices, defined as the average 
daily abnormal returns for the (-49, -10) days event period, are 0.095 % (t=2.28). Around the 
day of listing the average daily abnormal returns are as high as 0.35 %. Overall, cross-listing 
companies earn CARs of 19% during the year before listing, and an additional 1.20% during 
the listing week, however, they incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following the 
listing. In general, the findings of Foerster and Karolyi (1999) are consistent with the 
liquidity and investor recognition theories on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
wealth. A more recent study by Bris et al (2007) uses a relatively small sample of 20 non-US 
companies with dual-class shares cross-listed in the US and reports positive and significant 
annualized average daily abnormal return of 1.32% for the domestic share class and 0.62% 
for the US-listed share class during the 50 day period prior to the cross-listing event. The 
findings of Bris et al (2007) mainly support market segmentation theory. 
A number of studies examine listings in the US by Canadian companies. Canadian 
companies list on the US exchanges directly as opposed to issuing ADRs. Moreover, the 
Canadian and the US markets have been geographically, economically and culturally 
integrated for some time. Despite this perceptible market integration, the studies of Doukas 
and Switzer (2000) and Mittoo (2003) report that Canadian companies experience significant 
positive price effects from a cross-listing in the US. Doukas and Switzer (2000) conduct a 
joint test of changes in the degree of capital market integration through time and of changes 
in risk premium for the sample of 79 Canadian stocks over the period 1985-1996. They find 
 41 
 
significant positive announcement effects during the (-120;+60) day period around a US 
listing announcement. Significant abnormal performance is observed mainly in the listing 
announcement period and, particularly, during the 60 trading days prior to the listing 
(31.06% on an annualized basis), whereas no significant effects on shareholders’ wealth are 
found around the listing dates. Doukas and Switzer (2000) argue that their findings are 
consistent with the view that an international listing increases the investor base of the firm 
with beneficial effects on its cost of capital.  
Mittoo (2003) investigates short- and long- run effects on shareholders’ wealth of 
direct listings in the US of 56 Canadian companies over the period of 1976-1990 and of 108 
companies over the period of 1991-1999. The short-run performance analysis for the 7-day (-
3,3) day event window around the listing date provides evidence of positive price effects, 
with the price effects being smaller in the post-1990 period compared to the pre-1990 period. 
The long-run performance analysis shows that cross-listed companies significantly under-
perform Canadian market indices, yielding negative cumulative abnormal returns of -10.53% 
during the three years subsequent to a US listing. Mittoo (2003) provides evidence that the 
determinants of the effects of a US listing including liquidity and industry factors, vary 
cross-sectionally and over time. 
Cross-listings outside of the US 
   Since the US market differs significantly from other international financial markets 
by size, liquidity and regulatory environment, the implications from cross-listings in other 
markets could differ significantly from cross-listings in the US. Nevertheless, only a few 
studies look at cross-listings on exchanges outside of the US. 
A number of earlier empirical studies investigated the consequences for 
shareholders’ wealth of international cross-listings of US companies (Howe and Kelm, 1987; 
Lee, 1991; Torabzadeh, Bertin and Zivney, 1992; Varela and Lee, 1993; Lau, Diltz and 
Apilado, 1994). As trading volumes of US cross-listed stocks are generally concentrated in 
the US, even after a cross-listing on a foreign exchange (Karolyi, 1998), it would be 
unreasonable to anticipate significant effects of a cross-listing for US companies. In fact, the 
empirical evidence on the subject shows that the price effects for US companies listing on 
major non-US exchanges are negligible. 
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Serra (1999) was one of the first to compare the stock price impact of cross-listings 
by non-US companies in the US and in the UK. The study examines the stock returns of 70 
companies from 10 emerging markets and a control sample of 65 European companies from 
mature markets, around cross-listings in the US (NYSE & NASDAQ) and London (SEAQ-I) 
over the period 1991-1995. The study provides evidence that there are significant positive 
abnormal returns before listing and a significant decline in returns over the first five weeks 
following the listing. Overall, the evidence provided could be supportive of market 
segmentation theory. This study reports that, for companies from emerging markets, listing 
in the UK has the same effects on shareholders’ wealth as listing in the US. However, for 
companies from mature markets, the positive impact on shareholders’ wealth is limited to 
NYSE listings. 
Bris et al (2009) investigate abnormal returns around cross-listings on the London 
stock exchange. Using a sample of 273 stocks including both stocks listed on the LSE and 
stocks admitted to trade on SEAQ, this study finds positive significant abnormal returns for 
the period (-20, 20) days around the listing/trading date for the stock exchange listings but 
not for the admissions to trade. Bris et al (2009) argue that the main source of value creation 
around cross-listings is greater information disclosure. 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) examine monthly stock returns during (-120 months; 
+120 months) around foreign listings for more than 1500 listings placed in 25 host countries 
based on the listing status as of December 1998. Firstly, they control for the order of the 
firm’s foreign listing and report that the first listing is associated with unique effects on 
shareholders’ wealth (at least transitory) while  multiple listings yield diminishing gains. 
Secondly, they report substantial stock price run-up prior to cross-listing and a profound 
post-listing decline in returns in the long run, which is consistent with market timing theory. 
Nevertheless, they find a permanent change in a firm’s cost of capital of about 2 percent that 
can be predominantly explained by cross-product market trade and investor familiarity. In 
other words, the long-term gains from a foreign listing are greater for firms listing on foreign 
markets that are geographically, economically, and culturally closer to their home market. 
The authors suggest that listing on American exchanges does not offer unique benefits to 
foreign firms in terms of shareholders’ wealth. 
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Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) compare the stock price reaction to cross-listing 
on eight major stock exchanges controlling for country-specific and firm-level 
characteristics. They report that abnormal returns around the day of the announcement of 
cross-listing is highest for American listings, followed by British and then by European 
listings while it is insignificant for Tokyo listings. This study identifies significant 
determinants for the effect on shareholders’ wealth that results from cross-listing in the US 
and in the UK but finds no significant determinants for either Europe or Japan. 
Overall, there is empirical evidence that, on average, international cross-listings 
create wealth for shareholders. However, the evidence on the sources of the net benefits of 
cross-listings, particularly on markets outside of the US, is inconclusive. 
 
 
2.3 Testable hypotheses 
2.3.1 The effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth  
Based on the theoretical argument that a cross-listing improves stock accessibility to 
foreign investors (Merton, 1987; Errunza and Miller, 2000) and stock liquidity (Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999), and in line with empirical evidence of Miller (1999), Serra (1999), and 
Roosenboom and Van Dijk (2009), international cross-listings are expected to generate 
positive abnormal returns. 
H1: An international cross-listing is associated with positive abnormal stock returns. 
 
2.3.2 Variation in the wealth effects by host and home markets 
Theoretically, companies from ‘low quality’ markets should experience gains in 
shareholders’ wealth upon cross-listing on a ‘higher quality’ market. The quality of the 
market is characterised by, among other things, the level of capital market development, 
investor base size, liquidity, investor protection, and information environment. The markets 
of the US, UK and continental Europe differ from each other in terms of the market qualities 
named above and these differences may potentially cause the diverse effects from cross-
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listings experienced on these markets. The US and the UK are common-law countries that 
focus on resolution of information asymmetry and have market-oriented financial systems 
(Guenther and Young, 2000). In contrast, the countries of continental Europe are civil-law 
countries with bank-oriented financial systems. 
Doidge et al (2004) argue that the US market provides a high level of liquidity, 
extremely good investor protection, and the highest disclosure standards compared to the rest 
of the world. Coffee (2002) specifies that companies cross-listed in the US are committed to 
respecting minority investor rights and to increasing disclosure as they subject themselves to 
increased enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission, to a more demanding 
litigation environment and to reconciliation of financial statements in accordance with US 
GAAP. At the same time, European laws, according to Coffee (1999), do not even remotely 
parallel the US securities laws in terms of their attempt to reduce agency costs and improve 
the protection of minority shareholders.28 An important factor influencing cross-border 
listings within the European Union is the mutual recognition principle incorporated in 
European laws regarding cross-listings (Coffee, 1999), according to which EU companies do 
not need to meet any additional legal and disclosure requirements to cross-list within the 
European Union.29 
  Additionally, a cross-listing in the US results in increased attention from financial 
analysts. Lang et al (2003a) and Bailey et al (2005) report a significant increase in analyst 
coverage following a cross-listing in the US. As to the British market, Baker et al (2002) 
report that companies that cross-list in London also experience growth in visibility, but the 
increase in the level of analyst and press attention is significantly less compared to that 
which occurs after a cross-listing on the NYSE. 
Overall, there is evidence that the American, British and European markets differ by 
the standards of corporate disclosure, investor protection, and information environment. 
Empirically, several studies provide evidence on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
                                                 
28 Investor protection regulation in Europe will be subject to significant change after the Market in 
Financial Instruments Directive becomes effective in 2004; the ultimate aim of MiFID is investor 
protection (Moloney, 2007). However, the full implementation of the MiFID is scheduled for 
November 2007, and the sample of European cross-listing events in this study after November 2007 is 
insufficient to evaluate impact of the MiFID on the market reaction to cross-listing in Europe. 
29 The mutual recognition principle, enforced by EU’s Financial Services Action Plan of 1999, states: 
“what is sufficient for a company to list in one member country should be sufficient in any other 
member country” (Wojcik et al, 2005). 
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wealth on various host markets. Mostly, foreign companies that list in the US experience 
significant positive abnormal returns (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Bris et al, 
2007). However, evidence on the effect on shareholders’ wealth of foreign listings in British 
and European stock markets is still limited. Serra (1999) and Salva (2003) document 
significant abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listings on the London stock 
exchange, whereas Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) find weaker abnormal returns on 
several European stock exchanges. 
H2.1: Cross-listing in American markets results in the highest positive abnormal 
returns, followed by cross-listings in the British and other European markets 
respectively.30 
In addition to the impact of the host market on the effects of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth, the home capital market and country-level characteristics may also 
determine the consequences of cross-listings. Two important country factors that might 
affect the impact of international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth are the origin of a 
country’s legal system and the level of economic development. According to La Porta et al 
(1998, 2002), the origin of a country’s legal system determines the level of investor 
protection and, consequently, affects corporate valuation. The level of economic 
development can be interpreted as a proxy for the level of capital market segmentation 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 1995) and also as a proxy for the level of investor protection (La Porta 
et al, 2000). Thus, cross-listing companies from emerging markets overcome more 
significant investment barriers and less efficient investors’ protection in their home countries 
than cross-listing companies from developed markets. Empirically, Miller (1999) and Serra 
(1999) show that emerging market stocks experience higher positive abnormal returns 
around cross-listing when compared to stocks from developed markets. Similarly, the 
improvement in the level of investor protection after cross-listing would be more significant 
for stocks from civil-law countries than for stocks from common-law countries that already 
have high levels of investor protection (La Porta et al, 1998). In turn, more significant 
improvements after cross-listing should result in higher gains for shareholders. 
                                                 
30 This hypothesis, however, could be challenged by proximity preference theory. According to 
proximity preference theory, more significant positive impact on shareholders’ wealth is expected 
from cross-listings in host markets that are closer geographically, i.e. within European markets in the 
context of this study. Which theory can best explain the patterns in the wealth effects of cross-listings 
is an empirical question. Forthcoming Hypothesis H4.5 addresses the Proximity preference argument. 
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H2.2: Cross-listings by firms based in emerging markets result in highest positive 
abnormal returns, followed by cross-listings by firms based in civil-law and 
common-law countries respectively. 
 
2.3.3 Change in the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth over time 
This debate on the net benefits of cross-listing in recent years was fuelled by 
developments in financial markets such as the introduction of the Euro in Europe, the 
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US and the introduction of AIM in 1996 
in the UK.31 Arguably, the introduction of the Euro makes cross-listings on European stock 
exchanges unnecessary due to increased integration of financial markets within the Euro 
zone. SOX, on the other hand, imposes onerous costs of meeting the legal and disclosure 
requirements of the US Securities and Exchange commission, making American listings less 
desirable. Finally, the introduction of AIM on the London stock exchange facilitates easier 
access to capital for small companies and offers new investment products to a group of 
investors that do not place much value on regulation and disclosure (Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai, 2007). Consequently, these capital market developments may affect 
shareholders’ wealth gains from cross-listings and also firm’s motivations for cross-listing. 
The level of global financial market integration and, particularly the level of 
integration within European Union, has increased significantly over time, particularly after 
the introduction of a single European currency in 1999 (Fratzscher, 2002; Baele et al, 2004b; 
Baele, 2005). The introduction of the Euro has eliminated currency risk and encouraged 
cross-border equity trading within the Euro zone, which has resulted in more integrated 
European markets (Fratzscher, 2002; Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2003; Allen and Song, 2005; 
Hardouvelis et al, 2006). On the other hand, the United Kingdom, an EU country that opted 
not to join the European Monetary Union, is significantly less integrated with European 
financial markets (Fratzscher, 2002; Fraser and Oyefeso, 2005; Hardouvelis et al, 2006). 
                                                 
31 There are other second tier markets in Europe that are similar to the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) of the London stock exchange. For example, Alternext market of Euronext. However, the 
sample does not include Alternext or any other second-tier market listings due to the unavailability of 
data. Such data are not available for the sample period because these markets were opened only in 
recent years. For example, Alternext was opened in May 2005. By the end of 2007 there were only a 
small number of foreign companies listed on Alternext, for which stock price data were not available 
in Datastream. 
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H3.1: The introduction of the Euro has reduced the benefits of cross-listing within 
the Euro zone markets. 
In contrast to the Main Market of the London stock exchange, AIM of the London 
Stock Exchange, a successful new market for smaller companies, imposes significantly 
reduced disclosure requirements and, thus, offers weaker protection for investors.32 
H3.2: Abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listings on the Main 
Market are significantly higher compared to abnormal returns around the 
announcement of cross-listing on AIM. 
In the US, the level of investor protection increased after the adoption of SOX in 
2002 as it imposed even stricter disclosure and listing requirements for US public companies 
as well as for non-US companies that have chosen to list on a US exchange.  
H3.3: Abnormal returns around a cross-listing on the US stock exchanges have 
increased after the adoption of SOX in 2002. 
 
2.3.4 The determinants of the effect of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth 
This section develops testable propositions for the potential determinants of the 
effects of international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. The focus is on the following 
theories: market segmentation, legal bonding, liquidity, investor recognition, proximity 
preference, market timing, and business strategy.  
Market segmentation: Stulz, (1981), Foerster and Karolyi, (1999) and Errunza and 
Miller (2000) argue that improved stock investability after a cross-listing increases the 
shareholder base and risk sharing and, thus, leads to lower cost of capital. Improvement in 
stock investability due to cross-listing, in turn, is related to the level of market segmentation 
between the home and host markets. In this respect, Baele et al (2004a, 2004b) and Baele 
(2005) document an increasing level of global and particularly regional integration of 
European financial markets over time. 
                                                 
32 While some larger companies choose to list on AIM to avoid the regulatory burden of the Main 
Market (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2007), AIM is still predominantly the market for smaller and 
younger companies that are not qualified to list on the Main Market. 
 48 
 
H4.1: The higher the market segmentation between home and host markets the 
higher the gains from the announcement of cross-listing. 
Legal bonding: Cross-listings on an exchange with stricter legal and disclosure 
standards “bond” the companies to respect minority shareholders’ rights (Coffee, 1999; 
Stulz, 1999), resulting in lower cost of capital for cross-listing companies.33   Doidge (2004) 
provides empirical support for bonding theory by showing that the voting premiums of cross-
listed companies with dual shares are 43% lower than those of non-cross-listed companies. 
The level of legal protection and the quality of disclosure standards vary in the international 
capital markets. As discussed above, US cross-listings are subject to increased enforcement 
by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, a more demanding litigation environment 
(Coffee, 2002). British cross-listings must comply with London Stock Exchange rules that 
are arguably less strict compared to those of the NYSE (Baker et al, 2002). Finally, 
European cross-listings are subject to European legal and disclosure requirements that are 
considered the least strict (Coffee, 1999). In this respect, Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) 
find that the level of investor protection is a significant determinant of stock price reaction 
for both the US and UK cross-listings but not for European cross-listings. 
H4.2: The larger the difference in the level of investor protection between home and 
host markets the higher the gains from the announcement of cross-listing. 
Liquidity: A listing on a more liquid stock exchange enhances stock liquidity and, 
accordingly, improves a stock’s market valuation (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1998). In this vein, King and Segal (2004) link the enduring wealth gains of 
shareholders’ in Canadian companies cross-listed in the US, to the changes in stock liquidity 
after the cross-listing. In contrast, Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) find no relationship 
between market-level liquidity and market reaction to foreign listings in any of the host 
markets examined. Empirical evidence suggests that liquidity in international capital markets 
varies widely. Spreads in the US equity market are significantly lower than spreads in the 
British equity market (Huang and Stoll, 2001) and other European markets (Venkataraman, 
2001). Moreover, liquidity, approximated by transaction costs, is particularly poor in the 
emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe (Domowitz et al, 2001). 
                                                 
33 Legal bonding theory has been a subject to criticism by Siegel (2005) and Burns et al (2007). In 
particular, Siegel (2005) argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission does not effectively 
enforce the law against cross-listed foreign companies. 
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H4.3: The larger the difference in market liquidity between the host and home 
markets the higher the gains from the announcement of cross-listing. 
Investor recognition: According to Merton (1987), a stock’s market valuation is 
positively related to the number of investors that are aware of the company. Cross-listing 
facilitates easier access to a company’s information and enhances a company’s recognition 
abroad, which results in an increased stock price for the cross-listing company (Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri, 2006). The level of investor recognition and stock visibility is directly related 
to the intensity of analyst coverage since, according to Baker et al (2002), analyst reports are 
the main source of firm-specific information for investors. Empirical evidence suggests that 
a cross-listing results in the increased attention from financial analysts for the US host 
market (Lang et al, 2003a; Bailey et al, 2005) as well as for the UK host market although to a 
lesser degree (Baker et al, 2002). 
H4.4: The higher the difference in the intensity of analyst coverage between the host 
and home markets the higher the gains from the announcement of cross-listing. 
Proximity preference: Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that geographic, economic, 
cultural, and industrial proximities are the important determinants of the corporate decision 
to cross-list. Furthermore, Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) report that a permanent decrease in 
the cost of capital after cross-listing is largely explained by a higher level of investor 
familiarity with the home market’s products and also by geographical proximity. Geographic 
distance between the host and home markets is a distinctive characteristic of US, British and 
European cross-listings by European companies. While continental European markets are 
geographically concentrated, with less than 200 km between the capitals of some European 
countries, the US market is more than 6,000 km away from the European markets. Thus, 
geographic distance is a potential determinant of the effects on wealth around cross-listing 
and is particularly relevant for European companies. 
H4.5: The smaller the geographical distance between the host and home markets the 
higher the gains from the announcement of cross-listing. 
Market timing: Market timing theory suggests that corporate finance managers time 
the company’s listing on a foreign exchange to take advantage of higher equity valuations in 
the host market. Relatively higher equity valuations in the host market may represent 
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differences in the level of economic development between the host and home countries. 
Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (2003) provide evidence that all countries exhibit uneven 
economic development over time, while Sarkissian and Shill (2009b) establish empirically 
the link between the frequency of international cross-listings and the level of economic and 
financial outperformance of the host country relative to the home country.  
H4.6a: The larger the difference in the level of economic performance between the 
home and host markets the higher the gains from the announcement of cross-listing. 
Furthermore, it is likely that both host and home markets exhibit high equity 
valuations over certain periods of time. Thus, international stock markets were particularly 
‘hot’ in the late 1990s, a period known as the dot-com bubble (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2003; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; Derrien, 2005). I examine the incremental impact of 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth during the dot-com bubble as an additional test of 
market timing theory.  
H4.6b: Cross-listing events during the bullish stock market period of the dot-com 
bubble of the late 1990s are associated with particularly high abnormal returns. 
Business strategy: If a cross-listing decision is related to a global corporate strategy 
then the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth should be a function of company-
specific characteristics. One of the primary company characteristics, industrial affiliation, is 
named as being among the main motivations to cross-list (Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Bancel 
and Mittoo, 2001). Failure to follow cross-listed industry peers may put a company at a 
competitive disadvantage (Pagano et al, 2001; Pagano et al, 2002; Mittoo, 2003). In this 
vein, the economic press argue that technology companies potentially obtain higher market 
valuations by listing on the NASDAQ. A cross-listing, however, may entail more significant 
costs for some companies than for others. Indeed, Mittoo (2003) finds significant industry 
variation in the effects on wealth of US cross-listings for Canadian companies.     
H4.7a: There is industry variation in abnormal returns around the announcement of 
cross-listing. 
Other company characteristics that are likely to affect the wealth of shareholders 
after a cross-listing are growth opportunities and the need for external financing. Doidge et al 
(2004) find a significant positive association between companies’ valuation, growth 
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opportunities and their cross-listing status. Growth opportunities should be particularly 
pronounced if cross-listing companies raise new equity capital. In this respect, Charitou and 
Louca (2009) provide ex post evidence that capital-raising cross-listed companies 
outperform both the control sample of non-cross-listed companies and the sample of cross-
listed companies in the pre-cross-listed period.  
H4.7b: Abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing are positively 
related to the cross-listing company’ growth.  
H4.7c: Abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing are higher for 
cross-listings that raise new equity capital. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the potential determinants of the effects of cross-listings and 
their expected impact of shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.3.5 Control variables 
Company size is positively related to stock liquidity and visibility to investors.34 As 
such, a smaller company that makes a commitment to cross-list experiences larger 
incremental improvement in the level of liquidity and the quality of the information 
environment compared to a larger cross-listing company. Similarly, the first foreign listing 
yields more significant incremental change in stock’s accessibility to foreign investors 
compared to consequent foreign listings, which is empirically confirmed by Sarkissian and 
Shill (2009a). Consequently, company size and listing order are expected to be inversely 
related to the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. Lastly, often US OTC-
traded35 foreign stocks that are already accessible to US investors choose to upgrade to a US 
stock exchange listing in order to improve stock liquidity, visibility to investors, prestige, 
and the level of investor protection and, ultimately, the stock’s market valuation. However, a 
                                                 
34 Company size is a distinct feature of cross-listed companies (Pagano et al, 2002). Taking into 
account the fixed costs associated with listing on a foreign exchange and the minimum issue size 
requirement by stock exchanges, it is not surprising that mainly large companies choose to list on 
foreign exchanges. For example, a listing on the main market of LSE costs at least £500,000 in 
professional fees and requires the minimum ADRs issue size of £700,000 (source: 
www.londonstockexchange.com). 
35 Level 1 ADRs or over-the-counter (OTC) listing is the easiest and fastest way to gain entry to the 
US capital market. The main difference between OTC and exchange listings is the level of disclosure: 
an OTC listing requires neither full SEC registration and disclosure nor US GAAP reporting. 
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US exchange listing involves substantial additional costs compared to an OTC listing. 
Accordingly, an upgrade from a US OTC to a US stock exchange listing should result in a 
positive change in stock’s market valuation, however, to a lesser degree than a US listing 
without prior OTC. 
 
 
2.4 Methodology 
This section first discusses the measurement of two categories of variables: (i) the 
effect on shareholders’ wealth from cross-listings, as the dependent variable and (ii) the 
determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth, as the explanatory 
variables. The variable description is followed by an overview of the methods of univariate 
analysis and multivariate regression analysis used to evaluate the effect of international 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth and its determinants. 
 
2.4.1 The effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth  
The wealth effects around the announcement of cross-listing 
The effects of international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth are measured by 
cumulative abnormal returns over the 21-day (-10, 10) period around the announcement of 
the cross-listing.36 As a robustness test, cumulative abnormal returns are additionally 
estimated for alternative event windows: (-5, 5) days, (-3, 3) days and (-1, 1) days around the 
announcement of cross-listing. Abnormal returns are defined as market-adjusted returns 
estimated using a modified market model37:   ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t            (1.1) 
                                                 
36 Under the assumption of market efficiency, stock prices incorporate all information available on the 
market and stock price adjustment to cross-listing accrues when the news about a company’s intention 
to cross-list is released to the market. Thus, the wealth effects of cross-listings are expected to be 
concentrated around the cross-listing announcement. 
37 Market-adjusted returns are used in order to avoid loss of observations due to unavailability of pre-
cross-listing returns that would be required in order to use conventional methods of estimation of 
abnormal returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). Brown and Warner (1980), however, show that for 
short-run analysis, adjustment for the stock’s systematic risk does not significantly affect the 
estimated excess returns. Also, Draper and Paudyal (2006) show that the abnormal return estimates for 
event window are not sensitive to the choice of return benchmark. 
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where ARi,t are abnormal returns of company i on day t; Ri,t is return of company i on day t; 
Rm,t is market return on day t. Market returns are the corresponding Datastream Total Market 
index local currency returns for developed countries and Poland, and the S&P/IFC market 
index local currency returns for the rest of the emerging countries in the sample. The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the sum of abnormal stock returns over the event 
window: CARi = ∑t ARi,t, where t={-10, +10}. The even window (-10, 10) days around the 
announcement of cross-listing is chosen for analysis to capture potential time lag in the 
announcement of cross-listing in the home country and internationally. Analysis of daily 
abnormal returns shows that stock price adjustment begins more than one week before the 
announcement of cross-listing and continues after the announcement for more than one week 
(Figure 2.0). 
Robustness test: The wealth effects around the cross-listing event date 
While most of the price reaction is expected around the announcement of the event, 
previous research suggests that there is stock price- sensitive information both around the 
announcement as well as around the cross-listing event itself (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). 
As a robustness test, I additionally evaluate excess returns during a three-month (-2,0) event 
window around the cross-listing date.38  To overcome the limitations of the traditional event-
study methodology39, an alternative method of estimating abnormal returns, the Jensen’s 
alpha approach (as in Draper and Paudyal, 2006), is used. The advantage of this method is 
that it does not require return data availability for a long estimation period prior to the event. 
Additionally, this approach allows estimation of excess returns with a multifactor asset 
pricing model accounting for size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) risk factors (Fama and 
                                                 
38 (-2,0) months event window around the cross-listing date is motivated by the fact that the median 
distance between the announcement date and the cross-listing date in the sample is 33 days. Thus, (-
2,0) months event window around the cross-listing, on average, covers the cross-listing announcement 
date and the listing event date. 
39 Market-adjusted abnormal returns for longer event windows such the event window (-2,0) months 
around cross-listing are not reliable since this approach disregards risk factors. The conventional 
event-study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) with a market model as a benchmark also has a 
number of limitations. First, the market model fails to control for additional market risk factors such 
as size and book to market (Fama and French, 1996). Second, this approach requires estimation of 
model parameters using return data over a rather long (approximately five years based on monthly 
data frequency for stable and reliable parameter estimates) estimation period, which must be 
independent of the event. In case of cross-listing, companies often choose to list on a foreign exchange 
within a few years after listing on a home exchange. Consequently, in many cases home market stock 
price data is available for a limited time period prior to cross-listing and using a conventional event-
study approach would cause the sample to be reduced by more than half. 
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French, 1996). For each event window, Jensen’s alpha αi is estimated with the following 
cross-sectional regression: R i  -  R f  = α i+β1 i(Rm  -  R f)+β 2 iSMB+b3 iHML+ε i          (1.2) 
where α i  is Jensen’s alpha for the event window; (R i  -  R f) is cumulative risk premium for 
company i for the event window; (Rm  -  R f) is cumulative market risk premium for the event 
window; SMB is cumulative difference in value-weighted returns between small market cap 
stocks and large market cap stocks for the event window; HML is cumulative difference in 
value-weighted returns between value (high book-to-market ratio) stocks and growth (low 
book-to-market ratio) stocks for the event window. The risk factors are calculated for all 
markets in the sample that contribute at least ten cross-listing events to the sample. SMB is 
the difference between monthly value-weighted (based on the market value at the end of 
December of the previous year) average returns of two portfolios ranked by size: bottom 
50% ‘small’ and top 50% ‘big’. HML is the difference in value-weighted returns between 
MSCI Value (high book-to-market ratio stocks) and Growth (low book-to-market ratio 
stocks) country indices (in local currency). Jensen’s alpha indicates whether a cross-listing 
company experienced statistically significant positive or negative abnormal returns around 
the cross-listing event. In order to limit the impact of outliers, estimations of Jensen’s alpha 
are done using trimmed (~5% of extreme observations on each end) sample and subsamples. 
 
2.4.2 Univariate analysis of abnormal returns around cross-listing 
Abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing and around the cross-
listing event are estimated for a number of subsamples motivated by the research questions: 
(1) by host markets: the US, UK and Europe, and by home markets classified based on 
the home country’s legal origin and the level of development, the UK and Ireland, 
continental Europe (excluding CEE) countries and countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). 
(2) over time: (2.1) European cross-listings: before the introduction of the Euro vs. 
within the Euro zone40, (2.2) British cross-listings: Main Market vs. AIM, (2.3) 
American cross-listings: prior and post Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
                                                 
40 The members of the Euro zone are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. The Euro was introduced from 1 Jan 
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(3) by company characteristics: (3.1) company size and (3.2) industry affiliation. 
(4) by listing characteristics: (4.1) by listing order,  (4.2) capital raising activity, and 
(4.3) American cross-listings: upgrade from OTC vs. stock exchange listings without 
prior OTC.  
Table 2.2 provides the definition and data sources of the variables that proxy 
company size, industry affiliation, capital raising activity, order of foreign listing and 
presence of OTC trading prior to the US exchange listing. The difference in mean CARs for 
different subsamples is evaluated using t-statistics of the two-sample t-test with unequal 
variances. The inequality of estimated Jensen alphas for different subsamples is evaluated 
using a Wald test. 
 
2.4.3 The determinants of the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth 
Explanatory variables that proxy for each hypothesis include three main groups: 
country, company and listing related characteristics. Each of these groups potentially affects 
the net benefits of an international cross-listing. Sarkissian and Shill (2004) and Doidge et al 
(2004) show the importance of the country-level factors, while Pagano et al (2002) show the 
significance of company characteristics for the implications of a cross-listing. Additionally, I 
use important capital market developments to capture the time varying cross-listing effects 
on shareholders’ wealth. Table 2.2 contains definitions and data sources for all the variables. 
Consistent with Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009), 
the level of market segmentation between the home and host markets is measured using the 
correlation of the host and home market returns. In addition, the increased level of market 
integration in Europe after the introduction of the Euro is captured by a dummy variable that 
represents cross-listings within the Euro zone.  
Evidence of legal bonding can be assessed by the improvement in accounting 
standards and the level of investor protection. First, I use country-level accounting standards 
index from La Porta et al (1998). Second, I calculate legal index as the product of the anti-
director rights index from Djankov et al (2008) multiplied by the rule-of-law index from 
                                                                                                                                          
1999 in all Eurozone countries except for Greece, where it was introduced from 1 Jan 2001, and 
Slovenia, where it was introduced from 1 January 2007. 
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Kaufmann et al (2005). Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that the legal index is a superior 
measure of the level of investor protection compared to the anti-director rights index, as it 
reflects both de jure, which by itself is not sufficient, and de facto aspects of investor 
protection. 
  Market-level liquidity is measured by the market turnover ratio, i.e. the ratio of the 
value of the Datastream Total Market index’s trading volume to the index’s market 
capitalization. Investor recognition is measured by the intensity of country-level analyst 
coverage, estimated as the average number of analysts per company for each country-year in 
the sample. Geographic proximity is quantified by the distance in kilometres between the 
capital cities of the host and home markets as in Sarkissian and Shill (2004). Similar to 
Sarkissian and Shill (2009b), marking timing is tested by whether the impact of a cross-
listing on shareholders’ wealth is related to the difference in the level of economic 
performance between the host and home countries. Economic performance is measured by 
the 3-year moving average of the GDP per capita using data obtained from the United 
Nations statistics division web-site. Additionally, I evaluate whether a cross-listing during 
the dot-com bubble had any valuation premium due to the high level of investor sentiment 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2007), as predicted by the market timing theory. In line with Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) and Ofek and Richardson (2003), a ‘bubble’ dummy variable is used for 
cross-listings that took place in 1999 and at the beginning of 2000. To test business strategy 
theory, several firm-level variables are obtained. First, a company’s industry is defined based 
on FTSE/DJ industry firm-level classification obtained from Datastream. In order to reduce 
the number of industry-based sub-groups with a small number of observations, companies 
from Basic materials, Consumer goods, or Industrial industry groups are combined into one 
group ‘Manufacturers’, and Oil & Gas and Utilities are also combined into one group 
‘Natural resources’. Second, company growth is measured by the three-year sales growth 
preceding the cross-listing. Lastly, motivated by the findings of Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
and Bancel et al (2007), data on capital raising activity on the foreign market following 
cross-listing are obtained from several sources including BNY and Citibank ADRs databases 
and Thomson One Banker Equity Deals database. This data are used to evaluate the impact 
of the issue of new equity on the foreign market on shareholders’ wealth. Finally, I use three 
control variables: 1) company size, which is measured by the company market capitalization, 
2) listing order, which is represented by the first foreign listing dummy variable, and 3) 
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presence of an OTC listing prior to a US stock exchange listing, which is represented by 
prior-OTC dummy variable. 
 
2.4.4 Multivariate regression analysis 
Since the sample includes cross-listing events on various foreign host markets, it is 
essential to control for the difference in host market characteristics. European, British and 
American capital markets not only differ significantly by the level of liquidity, economic 
development, legal and information environment, but also attract for listing different types of 
foreign companies (Pagano et al, 2002). In particular, host market-driven variation in the size 
of cross-listing companies could be explained by the significant difference in listing 
requirements and, accordingly, costs of foreign listing on European, British and American 
stock exchanges. Also, geographic distance from home European countries to the US, UK 
and continental Europe is profoundly different depending on the destination market. In order 
to account for the difference in host market characteristics and for the difference of 
characteristics of companies cross-listing in Europe, the US and UK, host-market-adjusted 
variables are estimated as the residuals from the following regression: 
Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj               (1.3) 
where Varj are explanatory variables, home market characteristics (market correlation, 
accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, analyst coverage intensity, 
geographic distance, and GDP per capita) and cross-listing company characteristics 
(company size and growth); Hostn is host market dummy variable. The error term εj is the 
host-market-adjusted variable, i.e. the variation that is not captured by the host market 
variable. 
The above procedure removes host-market-specific variation among the explanatory 
variables and, thus, reduces to some degree correlations among the variables. Nevertheless, it 
is important to acknowledge that multicollinearity is still potentially a problem in 
multivariate analysis due to significant correlations among country-level variables such as 
the level of liquidity, investor protection and economic development (more economically 
developed countries are likely to have more liquidity financial markets and better investor 
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protection). The variance inflation factor (VIF) criterion41 is used to verify that the level of 
correlations among the variables is sufficiently low for multivariate analysis. 
The following regression is estimated to evaluate the explanatory power of the 
determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth and their variation across 
host markets: 
CARi = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + βj,Xi,j + βj,n Hostn Xi,j + εi           (1.4) 
where Xi,j are the explanatory variables. Explanatory variable is host-market-adjusted, i.e. it 
is the residual from regression (1.3), for the following variables: market correlation, 
accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, analyst coverage, geographic 
distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth. 
Impact of the significant capital market developments 
In order to evaluate the impact of the important changes in the listing environment 
on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth and on the explanatory power of the 
determinants of these effects, I estimate regressions that include interaction variables of the 
explanatory variables with a time-specific dummy variable, specifically, the Euro for 
European cross-listings, and SOX for American cross-listings. Such analysis on the impact 
of AIM would be statistically unreliable due to the limited number of AIM cross-listing 
events in the sample. 
Impact of the introduction of the Euro: 
CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ βj Xi,j +β1j Xi,jDbeforeeuro+β2j Xi,jDeurozone + εi (1.5) 
Impact of the adoption of SOX: 
CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ βj Xi,j +β1j Xi,jDbeforesox+β2j Xi,jDsox + εi  (1.6) 
where Xi,j are the explanatory variables; Dbeforeeuro is dummy variable that equals one if cross-
listing takes place in Europe before the introduction of the Euro; Deuro is dummy variable that 
equals one if cross-listing takes place within the Euro zone after the introduction of the Euro; 
DbeforeSOX is dummy variable that equals one if cross-listing takes place in the US before the 
adoption of SOX; DafterSOX is dummy variable that equals one if cross-listing takes place in 
                                                 
41 VIF quantifies the severity of the multicollinearity in OLS regression analysis and provides an 
index that measures how much the variance of the parameter estimates is inflated due to 
multicollinearity. VIF index of 10 or below indicates that multicollinearity does not significantly 
affect the estimation results (Wooldridge, 2009). 
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the US after the adoption of SOX. Explanatory variable is host-market-adjusted, i.e. it is the 
residual from regression (1.3), for the following variables: market correlation, accounting 
standards, investor protection, market liquidity, analyst coverage, geographic distance, GDP 
per capita, company size and sales growth.  
Finally, variance inflation factors (VIF) are estimated for each coefficient estimate in 
the regressions (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6) in order to check whether multicollinearity affects the 
variables estimates and their significance.41  
 
 
2.5 The sample 
The sample consists of American, British and European cross-listings of European 
companies during the period from 1982 to 2007. The initial dataset includes companies from 
all European markets available in Datastream that have their stock listed on one or more 
stock exchanges outside of their home market. This dataset is cross-checked and 
supplemented by cross-listing data from major stock exchange web-sites that attract listings 
of European companies: NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, LSE (including Main Market and AIM), 
Euronext (including Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon stock exchanges), the Frankfurt 
stock exchange, the Irish stock exchange, the Swiss stock exchange, Borsa Italiana, and the 
Luxembourg stock exchange. Data on ADRs comes from the Bank of New York and 
Citibank ADR databases. The sample is also supplemented with information on foreign 
listings from Sarkissian and Shill (2004, 2009b) and the Factiva news database. Based on 
this sample, I searched for the cross-listing announcements in the Factiva news database.42  
Cross-listing events without cross-listing announcements are used only for a robustness test 
of the excess returns around the cross-listing event.43  Preference stock listings are excluded 
                                                 
42 The availability of the announcement date in the earlier years of the 1980s is limited due to data 
availability in the Factiva news database. For example, one of the main sources of announcement 
information, the Reuters Financial Services, is available only from 1987. 
43 Since I examine excess returns around two events: the cross-listing announcement and the cross-
listing event itself (robustness test), effectively there are two samples: (1) the sample of cross-listing 
announcement events and (2) the sample of cross-listing events. The sample of the cross-listing 
announcement events is smaller due to the unavailability of announcement dates for some of the 
cross-listing events. 
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from the analysis. Also, to make the results comparable between US and European listings, 
OTC and Portal listings are excluded, i.e. the sample consists of stock exchange listings 
only. Finally, I exclude direct IPOs in a foreign country and companies without return data 
10 days before and 10 days after the announcement date available in Datastream.  
The final sample consists of 254 cross-listing announcements by 210 companies44 
that took place on three US exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE), two markets of the 
UK’s LSE (Main Market and AIM) and seventeen other European exchanges. Table 2.3 
presents the frequency distribution of the cross-listing announcement events in the sample by 
host and home country and by the period of time. The US host market cross-listings 
constitute 40.9% of the sample, while the UK host market cross-listings 18.9%. Three largest 
home markets presented are the UK (20.1% of the sample observations), Germany (14.6%) 
and France (9.8%); the primary cross-listing destination market for these home markets is 
the US. The UK host market is the main listing venue for companies from Ireland and 
Russia. 
44.9% of the cross-listing announcement events in the sample take place in the 
1990s (Table 2.3). Additionally, Figure 2.1 presents the number of cross-listing 
announcement events in the sample by host country and by the year of cross-listing 
announcement. The number of cross-listing events within Europe had an upward trend in the 
late 1980s and reached its peak in 1991; in the 1990s it stayed relatively low with the 
exception of 1995 and 1999. In recent years the number of new cross-listing events within 
Europe still remains significant. British cross-listings are distributed relatively evenly across 
the years with the peak in 2005. Overall, there is evidence that the UK as a host market 
became more popular in the 2000s, which might be related to the introduction and rapid 
growth of AIM. The number of US cross-listing events is high in the second half of the 
1990s peaking in 2000 and beginning to decline afterwards. Two possible explanations for 
the sharp decline in the number of cross-listing companies in 2003 are 1) the dot-com bubble 
burst (year 2000-2001) and 2) the change in regulatory environment (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002). 
 
                                                 
44 The number of companies is less than the number of events because some companies have more 
than one foreign listing. 
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2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 The effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth  
Panel A of Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report that, on average, European companies 
experience a positive market reaction around the announcement of a cross-listing. In 
particular, in the event window (-10, 10) days CARs are 1.8% (significant at 1%), with 
52.0% of the announcement events resulting in positive CARs. The results for alternative 
event windows are similar. In the event window (-5, 5) days CARs are 2.0% (significant at 
1%), in the event window (-3, 3) days CARs are 1.5% (significant at 1%), and in the event 
window (-1, 1) days CARs are 0.8% (significant at 5%). In similar lines, Panel B of Table 
2.6 reports that excess returns during the (-2,0) months around the cross-listing event are 
1.2% on average, and statistically significant at the 5% level. Generally, the magnitude of 
abnormal returns around the announcement of a cross-listing detected in this study is lower 
than reported in earlier studies that used samples of American cross-listing events that took 
place before 2000.45 Abnormal returns are concentrated around the announcement and not 
around the cross-listing date. This is implied by the lower magnitude and statistical 
significance of excess returns during the three months around the cross-listing event 
compared to those during the 21-day (-10,10) period around the announcement of the cross-
listing and the insignificant abnormal returns during the 21-day (-10,10) period around the 
cross-listing event.46 This finding can be attributed to the efficiency of financial markets. 
Overall, the results are in line with existing empirical evidence (Miller, 1999; Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999; Roosenboom and van Dijk, 2009) and are also consistent with the hypothesis 
H1 that a cross-listing increases shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.6.2 Variation in the wealth effects by host and home markets 
Host market characteristics. The effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth for 
various host markets are expected to vary due to the differences in host market 
characteristics. Accordingly, before examining the variation in the effects on shareholders’ 
                                                 
45 For example, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) report the average daily abnormal returns of 0.35% 
around the cross-listing day. Also, Miller (1999) reports a positive abnormal return of 2.63% on the 
announcement of a US stock exchange listing. 
46 Findings on the abnormal returns during (-10,10) days around cross-listing event are not reported in 
this study but available upon request. 
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wealth around cross-listings by host markets, it is necessary to empirically compare market 
characteristics of the host markets in the sample. Table 2.4 reports capital market size, 
liquidity, the level of the information environment, disclosure, legal protection and economic 
development for the three sets of host markets: Europe (excluding the UK), the UK and the 
US. As expected, the US market stands out for its superior level of economic development, 
stock market size, liquidity, and analyst coverage intensity. The UK follows the US in terms 
of the level of economic development and by stock market size and liquidity. In contrast to 
the argument of Doidge et al (2004) and Coffee (2002) that the US has the highest level of 
disclosure and investor protection, it is found that, based on the accounting index from La 
Porta et al, the anti-director rights index from Djankov et al (2008), and the rule-of-law index 
from Kaufmann et al (2005), the UK has a higher level of disclosure and investor protection 
compared to the US. European markets (excluding the UK), on average, are significantly 
smaller, less liquid, with lower levels of economic development and lower quality of 
accounting disclosure compared to both the UK and the US markets. The quality of the 
information environment, proxied by analyst coverage intensity, however, is lowest in the 
UK, while the high levels of analyst coverage intensity in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands contributes to the higher quality of the average information environment in 
Europe relative to the UK. 
The wealth effects by host market. Table 2.6 reports excess returns around the 
announcement of a cross-listing and around the cross-listing event for the subsamples by 
host and home markets. Figure 2.0 plots the CARs for a period of 10 days before and after 
the announcement of European, British and American cross-listings. Cross-listings within 
Europe do not have an impact on stock price either around the announcement or around the 
cross-listing event. British cross-listings have a positive impact on the stock price: CARs 
during the 21 days around the announcement of cross-listing are 2.7%, significant at 5%. 
American cross-listings result in positive and statistically significant excess returns around 
the announcement of cross-listing (mean 3.3%) and during the three-month (-2,0) event 
window around the cross-listing event (mean 1.8%). These findings are consistent with 
hypothesis H2.1 that American cross-listings have the most profound positive impact on 
stock price, followed by British cross-listings and then by other European cross-listings. 
These results are in line with the findings of Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009). Also the 
results on the effects of British cross-listings are consistent with findings of Serra (1999).  
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The wealth effects by home market. Table 2.6 reports that, in line with expectations 
(Hypothesis H2.2) and existing empirical evidence of Miller (1999) and Serra (1999), the 
magnitude of excess returns around the announcement of a cross-listing and around the 
cross-listing event is the highest for stocks from the emerging markets of Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, the excess returns of CEE stocks are not statistically significant, which 
can be explained by the small sample size and large variation in excess returns within the 
subsample. More specifically, cross-listings of companies from two major CEE markets, 
Russia and Hungary, that together contribute around 80% of observations from emerging 
markets, have different effects on shareholders’ wealth: it is positive for Russian companies 
(8.1% around the announcement and 5.9% around the cross-listing event), and negative for 
Hungarian companies (-11.0% around the announcement and -10.1% around the cross-listing 
event). The difference in the effect of international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth for 
Russian and Hungarian companies can be explained by the difference in the level of 
integration of the Russian and Hungarian capital markets with other European capital 
markets.47  Furthermore, it is found that stocks from common-law countries, such as the UK 
and Ireland experience larger CARs around cross-listings compared to stocks from civil-law 
countries, i.e. continental Europe, which is contrary to the theoretical expectation 
(Hypothesis H2.2). 
 
2.6.3 Change in the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth over time 
Table 2.7 reports excess returns around the announcement of a cross-listing and 
around the cross-listing event for the subsamples by different periods of time. 
European cross-listings. Cross-listings within Europe have no positive effects for 
shareholders’ wealth either before or after the introduction of the Euro. The results are also 
robust to different methods of estimating excess returns (Table 2.7). European cross-listings 
within the Euro zone are associated with significant negative returns (median) with only 
                                                 
47 The Russian capital market is the most segmented CEE market with foreign equity ownership 
restrictions still in place. ADR/GDR program or a direct listing on a foreign exchange is a real 
opportunity for a Russian company to make its shares accessible to foreign investors. On the other 
hand, the Hungarian capital market is substantially more integrated with European capital markets, 
particularly, after Hungary joined European Union in 2004.  Thus, the Budapest Stock Exchange is 
integrated with XETRA, the electronic trading platform of Deutsche Börse, allowing a significant 
number of Hungarian stocks to be traded on Deutsche Borse’s Open market. 
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45.5% of cross-listing stocks experiencing positive returns during the 21 days around the 
announcement of cross-listing. The difference in cumulative abnormal returns around cross-
listings before and after the introduction of the Euro is statistically insignificant. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the changes in shareholders’ wealth that occur as a result of the 
announcement of cross-listing by host market and over time. It plots 3-year moving-average 
cumulative abnormal returns during a 21-day (-10, 10) period around the announcement of 
cross-listing for each host market. Figure 2.2 shows that a cross-listing in Europe yields 
positive abnormal returns before 1985 and during the period from 1993 to 1996. After 1995 
CARs decline sharply, possibly, in anticipation of the introduction of the single European 
currency, the Euro, and remain negative until 2001. In recent years, the effects on 
shareholders’ wealth of European cross-listings vary significantly with a positive spike in 
2002. 
British cross-listings. Contrary to Hypothesis H3.2, CARs around the announcement 
of cross-listing on the AIM are 8.4%, significant at 10%, while CARs around the 
announcement of a cross-listing on the Main Market are insignificant (Table 2.7). Similarly, 
monthly risk-adjusted excess returns around the Main Market listing are insignificant while 
excess returns around a listing on the AIM are 10.3%, significant at 10%. Wald statistics 
suggest that the difference in estimated excess returns for AIM and the Main Market listings 
is significant at 10%. The difference in types of companies that list on the AIM and the Main 
Market is striking: the average company value of an AIM company in the sample is £17 
million, while the average market value of a Main Market company is £844 million. Thus, 
potentially, the difference in excess returns between AIM and Main Market listings is driven 
by company size. Furthermore, the direct costs of listing as well as indirect costs of 
compliance with the listing requirements are significantly less for AIM listings compared to 
Main Market listings. Accordingly, the finding that the AIM listings are associated with 
higher positive abnormal returns can be interpreted as the higher-level regulation being 
evaluated by investors in conjunction with the costs involved, in line with Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai (2007) who document significant positive long-term excess stock returns of 
British companies that switch their listing from the Main Market of the LSE to AIM. This is 
because investors that are comfortable with lower levels of regulation and disclosure become 
the dominant investors of the AIM-listed companies (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2007). 
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Figure 2.2 shows that British cross-listings yielded the highest impact on 
shareholders’ wealth in the period from 1984 to 1987 when the so-called ‘Big Bang’ took  
place in London (change in trading technology and, consequently, trading costs).48  The 
periods of 1990-1992 and 1996-1998 are characterized by negative cross-listing 
announcement CARs. Starting from 1999, positive abnormal returns are experienced by 
companies cross-listing in London, which is possibly related to the introduction and rapid 
growth of AIM in the second half of the 1990s. 
American cross-listings. Analysis of the CARs before and after the introduction of 
SOX reveals that US cross-listings before the adoption of SOX yield positive abnormal 
returns of 3.4%, significant at 1% (Table 2.7). For the post-SOX subsample cross-listing 
announcement CARs are positive but insignificant, with a negative median of -0.8%, 
significant at the 5% level. This finding contradicts theoretical predictions (Hypothesis H3.3) 
that SOX increases the benefits from US cross-listings due to enhanced investor protection. 
Monthly analysis of excess returns for three months around the cross-listing fails to find a 
difference in excess returns for subsamples of the cross-listing events that take place prior to 
and post SOX adoption. While SOX improves minority investor protection, it also 
significantly increases the costs for listing companies, which explain the negative 
contribution of SOX to the impact of American cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. In this 
vein, Zhang (2007) and Litvak (2007) find significant negative abnormal returns around 
events leading to the passage of SOX and around announcements indicating that the Act will 
apply to cross-listed foreign companies. Also the findings are in line with the argument of 
Zingales (2007) that for many foreign companies’ the disclosure and compliance costs after 
the adoption of SOX outweigh the benefits from a cross-listing in the US. Due to significant 
fixed costs associated with a US cross-listing after the adoption of SOX it is possible that the 
negative effect of SOX is more profound for smaller companies. The forthcoming section 
2.6.4 addresses the variation in abnormal returns by company size. 
Figure 2.2 shows that 3-year average CARs around American cross-listing 
announcements are positive for all periods except for the most recent period. Particularly 
high CARs are in the period from the late 1980s to early 1990s and in the second half of the 
1990s. The obvious observation from Figure 2.2 is the increased variation of CARs starting 
                                                 
48 The number of observations for this period of time is limited. 
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from year 2002 when, as discussed above, significant changes in the US regulatory 
environment took place. 
Overall, there is strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the effects on 
wealth of cross-listings on various host market vary over time. The results highlight the 
relevance of changes in the listing environment in explaining the wealth benefits of cross-
listings. The forthcoming section 2.6.5 on the change in the explanatory power of the 
determinants of the effects of cross-listings over time continues the discussion on how the 
introduction of the Euro in Europe and the adoption of SOX in the US have affected the 
sources of wealth creation around cross-listings. 
 
2.6.4 The determinants of the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth 
This section discusses the findings on the potential determinants of the effects of 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth that are derived from various theoretical explanations. 
The expected impact of the determinants is summarised in Table 2.1, while the variables are 
defined in Table 2.2. The section begins with the review of the summary statistics of the 
variables that proxy for the potential determinants. 
The summary statistics  
Panel B of Table 2.5 reports summary statistics: number of observations, mean, 
median, and percentage of positive observations for the explanatory and control variables. 
As expected, the correlation between the host and home market returns, which is the measure 
of market segmentation, is the highest for cross-listings within Europe (mean 0.66). 
Companies from countries with weaker investor protection, less liquid capital markets and 
lower level of economic development, on average, choose to cross-list in the UK while 
companies from countries with stronger investor protection, more liquid capital markets, 
better information environment and higher level of economic development, on average, 
choose to cross-list in the US. Regarding geographic proximity between the host and home 
markets, the US host market stands out for the average geographic distance between the 
capitals of the host and home markets: 6,286 km vs. 632 km and 707 km are for European 
and British cross-listings respectively. 8% of European cross-listings and 12% of American 
cross-listings in the sample take place during the dot-com bubble. 
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Regarding business strategy, cross-listing companies, on average, experience 
significant growth preceding the cross-listing: mean and median corporate sales growth for 
the total sample is 68% and 27% respectively. Also, on average, 22% of cross-listings 
involve raising new equity capital. The percentage of capital-raising cross-listings is the 
highest for the US subsample (30%). Company size, measured by market capitalization, 
varies widely from 3.75 million GBP to 85.4 billion GBP. As expected, larger companies 
cross-list in the US (2.45 billion GBP median company size), while smaller companies 
choose the UK (0.6 billion GBP median company size). Furthermore, 53% of the cross-
listing events in the sample are the first foreign listings (as opposed to consequent listings). 
The percentage of the first foreign listings is the highest for the UK subsample (69%). 
Lastly, Table 2.5 indicates that 28% of American listings have had OTC trading in the US 
prior to the US stock exchange listing. 
 
The determinants: A univariate analysis  
Univariate analysis is performed for company-level and listing-specific variables. In 
particular, it covers the following proxies for business strategy theory: company’s industry 
affiliation and capital raising activity around cross-listing. Also it covers the following 
control variables: company size, listing order and indicator of US OTC trading prior to a 
stock exchange listing. 
Variation in abnormal returns by industry 
Table 2.8 reports CARs around cross-listing for sub-samples by industry 
membership classified into six industry groups. The highest positive and statistically 
significant excess returns around cross-listing are experienced by natural resources (oil & 
gas and utilities) companies. This result is particularly strong for European and American 
cross-listings: announcement mean returns of 4.2%, significant at 5%, and 7.8%, significant 
at 5%, respectively. This result is in contrast to the existing evidence by Foerster and Karolyi 
(1993) and Mittoo (2003) that Canadian resource stocks have a significantly lower price 
impact around cross-listing in the US than Canadian non-resource stocks. The positive 
impact of the announcement of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth for manufacturing 
companies (1.8%, significant at 5%) is driven mostly by cross-listings in the US (5.6%, 
significant at 5%). Overall, it is empirically shown that there is a significant variation in the 
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effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth subject to the company’s industrial affiliation 
(Hypothesis H4.7a), which is in line with findings of Bancel et al (2007) and is supportive of 
business strategy theory. 
Variation in abnormal returns by capital raising activity 
Table 2.9 reports that, overall, the effects of a cross-listing are positive and 
statistically significant for both capital raising and non-capital raising cross-listings. 
However, the effects of capital raising cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth are higher 
(CARs 3.9% vs. 1.2%), consistent with Hypothesis 4.7c. However, in contrast to the 
hypothesis that CARs are higher for cross-listings that raise new equity capital, it is found 
that a US cross-listing yields positive significant CARs when it does not raise new equity 
(around 3%, significant at least at 5%). 
Variation in abnormal returns by company size 
Table 2.10 reports that small companies experience the highest announcement CARs 
and monthly risk-adjusted returns: 2.7%, significant at 5%, and 4.3%, significant at 1%, 
respectively. As company size increases, excess returns decrease in magnitude and become 
insignificant. Overall, consistent with the theoretical predictions, there is empirical evidence 
of a negative relationship between the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth and 
company size. This is also consistent with empirical evidence of Roosenboom and van Dijk 
(2009) that company size is a negative and significantly determinant of abnormal returns 
around international cross-listings. Additionally, Table 2.10 reports cumulative abnormal 
returns around the cross-listing by size and by host market. Small companies that cross-list 
within Europe gain positive, although, statistically insignificant abnormal returns. CARs 
around British cross-listings depend on the destination market: large companies experience 
positive and significant abnormal returns around the announcement of the Main Market 
cross-listing (4.1%, significant at 5%) while small companies experience positive and 
significant abnormal returns around the announcement of the AIM cross-listing (8.4%, 
significant at 10%). Before the introduction of SOX in the US it held that smaller companies 
had a greater boost in shareholders’ wealth following an American cross-listing. However, 
after the introduction of SOX this relationship no longer holds. This finding is in line with 
evidence reported by Doidge et al (2009) that company size becomes a significant positive 
determinant of the cross-listing valuation premium after the adoption of SOX. This is in line 
 69 
 
with the argument that SOX significantly reduces the benefits of cross-listing particularly for 
smaller companies due to high fixed costs involved (Litvak, 2008).  
Variation in abnormal returns by listing order 
Table 2.9 reports that the first foreign listing has a stronger impact on shareholders’ 
wealth than consequent foreign listings: the announcement CARs for a first foreign listing is 
2.9%, significant at 5%, while mean CARs for a consequent cross-listing are around zero. 
The difference in mean CARs between first and consequent listings is 2.4%, significant at 
10%. This result holds for American cross-listings: the announcement of a first foreign 
listing in the US yields 5.3%, while consequent American cross-listings have no significant 
impact on shareholders’ wealth. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations and 
with existing empirical evidence (Sarkissian and Shill, 2009a). 
Variation in abnormal returns of American cross-listings: prior OTC trading 
The difference in cumulative abnormal returns for American cross-listings with and 
without an OTC trading prior to the exchange listing, is statistically significant both for the 
announcement CARs and for monthly risk-adjusted excess returns (Table 2.9). Stocks that 
did not have an OTC listing prior to the stock exchange listing in the US experience positive 
excess returns (4.4% CARs, significant at 1%, around the announcement of cross-listing and 
2.6% excess returns during three months around the cross-listing), while stocks that upgrade 
from an OTC to an exchange listing do not experience abnormal returns around the upgrade. 
Overall, this finding challenges legal bonding theory because it shows that additional listing 
and disclosure requirements from a stock exchange listing are not compensated via an 
increase in shareholders’ wealth. 
The determinants: A multivariate framework 
This section discusses the results of the regression analysis of the potential 
determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth. Table 2.11 reports 
coefficient estimates of regressions of CARs for a 21-day (-10, 10) event window around the 
announcement of a cross-listing on a number of potential determinants of the effects of 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. The choice of the set of determinants in each model 
specification is motivated by the need to minimize the impact of multicollinearity on the 
estimation results and by the objective of maximizing adjusted R-squared. In order to check 
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whether multicollinearity causes biases in the standard errors estimation, I estimate variance 
inflation factors41 on the explanatory variables (Appendices 2.1 – 2.3). The following 
variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, 
analyst coverage, geographic distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are 
substituted with the host-market-adjusted variables, i.e. the residuals from the regressions of 
the variable on the host market dummy variables (model (1.3), section 2.4.4). Table 2.11 
reports estimation results for the base model specification (models 1 and 2) and the extended 
specifications, which include interaction variables of the explanatory variables with host 
market dummy variables (models 3, 4 and 5). Also Table 2.11 reports R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared for each of the regressions. R-squared are within the range from 0.1186 
to 0.2073 while adjusted R-squared are within the range from 0.0309 to 0.1239. Such low R-
squared and adjusted R-squared measures are consistent with the literature. For example, 
Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) report R-squared of similar regression specifications of 
abnormal returns around cross-listing on the potential determinants that are within the range 
from 0.029 to 0.096 (Tables 4, 5 and 6 in Roosenboom and van Dijk, 2009), while this study 
does not report adjusted R-squared. 
Market segmentation. Table 2.11 reports that the market correlation between the host 
and home market returns is negatively related to the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ 
wealth. However, this relationship is not statistically significant for the total sample (model 
1). For European cross-listings, market correlation is a positive and significant determinant 
of CARs (model 3) while for American cross-listings it is negative and statistically 
significant (model 5). The result for American cross-listings is consistent with the theoretical 
argument related to international portfolio diversification benefits and market segmentation 
theory (Hypothesis H4.1), while the result for European cross-listings is in line with 
proximity preference theory rather than with market segmentation theory. 
Legal bonding. The quality of legal environment of the home country, proxied by 
accounting standards, is a positive and statistically significant determinant of CARs only for 
American cross-listings (model 5). 
Liquidity. According to liquidity theory of the effects of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth, improvement in market liquidity should be associated with positive 
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abnormal returns. However, empirical evidence does not support hypothesis H4.3 since the 
market liquidity variable has insignificant coefficient (model 1).  
Investor recognition. Also the evidence does not support Hypothesis H4.4, since the 
analyst coverage variable has insignificant coefficients (models 1 and 2). 
Proximity preference. Supportive of Hypothesis H4.5, geographic distance is a 
negative and significant determinant of CARs around the announcement of cross-listing. 
This relationship is particularly strong for British cross-listings (model 4). For European 
cross-listings, however, the interaction variable of geographic distance and host Europe 
variables has a positive and significant coefficient estimate that cancels out the positive 
coefficient on the geographic distance variable (model 3). 
Market timing. The coefficient estimate of GDP per capita variable is statistically 
insignificant while the estimate of dot-com bubble is marginally positive for all sub-samples, 
except for European cross listings (model 3). This evidence provides weak support for 
market timing theory (hypotheses H4.6a and H4.6b). 
Business strategy. Consistent with expectations (Hypothesis H4.7a) and the findings 
of the univariate analysis (section 2.6.4), Table 2.11 reports that there is a significant 
variation in CARs depending on the company’s industry. Companies from the natural 
resources sector experience positive and statistically significant CARs around cross-listing in 
all model specifications. Sales growth is positive but insignificant determinant of CARs 
around the announcement of cross-listing. Table 2.11 also reports that capital raising activity 
in the foreign market is only positively and statistically significantly associated with CARs 
for British cross-listings (model 4), consistent with Hypothesis H4.7c.  
Other determinants. Consistent with expectations and the findings of the univariate 
analysis (section 2.6.4), Table 2.11 reports that smaller companies experience larger CARs 
around the announcement of cross-listing. Contrary to expectations and the findings of the 
univariate analysis, the first foreign listing variable is insignificant in the multivariate 
regressions (model 1). Finally, the prior-OTC variable, which indicates that the stock had 
been traded on the OTC market in the US prior to the exchange listing, has a negative 
coefficient, in line with expectations, but statistically insignificant. 
To summarize, analysis of the potential determinants of the effects of cross-listings 
on shareholders’ wealth shows that for the total sample company’s affiliation with the 
 72 
 
natural resources industry is positive and significant determinant, while geographic distance 
and company size are negative and significant determinants. Therefore, there is empirical 
support for the following theories on the effects of cross-listings: proximity preference and 
business strategy.  
Even after controlling for the potential determinants, host UK and host US dummy 
variables have positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates that can be 
interpreted as being in line with the signalling theory of the effects of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth (Fuerst, 1998). Multivariate analysis of the determinants by host market 
shows that a correlation between the host and home market returns is a positive and 
significant determinant of CARs around a European cross-listing. Capital raising activity 
(positive) and geographic distance and company size (negative) are significant determinants 
of CARs around British cross-listings. Thus, there is empirical support for proximity 
preference and business strategy explanations for the effects of British cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth. Finally, correlation between the host and home market returns is 
significant negative determinants of CARs around American cross-listings. In other words, 
the effects of American cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth can be explained by market 
segmentation theory. 
 
2.6.5 Change in the explanatory power of the determinants over time 
Arguably, significant capital market developments, such as the introduction of the 
Euro in the EU and the adoption of SOX in the US, have changed the net benefits of cross-
listing and have affected the determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ 
wealth. In addition to the univariate analysis of the variation of excess returns over time 
(section 2.6.4), the impact of Euro and SOX is evaluated using multivariate regression 
analysis.49  The output is reported in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 accordingly. 
 
                                                 
49 Multivariate regression analysis on the impact of AIM would be statistically unreliable due to the 
limited number of AIM listing events in the sample. 
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Impact of the Euro on the determinants of the wealth effects of European cross-
listings 
Table 2.12 reports that mostly the determinants of the effects of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth do not differ for European cross-listings that took place before and after 
the introduction of the Euro. The only significant difference is that the improvement in 
information environment, measured by analyst coverage, becomes a significant determinant 
of higher CARs around the announcement of cross-listing within the Euro zone after the 
introduction of the Euro. 
Impact of SOX on the determinants of the wealth effects of American cross-listings 
The significant determinants of CARs around the announcement of American cross-
listing before the introduction of SOX were company growth and company size with smaller 
high-growth stocks experiencing larger abnormal returns around cross-listing (Table 2.13). 
Also the quality of the home country’s accounting standards is a positive and significant 
determinant of CARs before the adoption of SOX. The determinants of the effect of an 
American cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth after the adoption of SOX are different. 
Larger companies from countries with weaker accounting standards are more likely to 
experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement of a cross-listing in the US 
after the adoption of SOX. This is in line with findings of Litvak (2008) that SOX affects 
smaller and riskier companies and companies from countries with strong investor protection 
particularly negatively. Also, the improvement in the quality of information environment is a 
positive and significant factor contributing to cross-listing CARs after the adoption of SOX. 
Finally, a stock exchange listing in the US that takes place after the adoption of SOX 
negatively affects stock price for companies that have had their stock traded in the US OTC 
market prior to the exchange listing, as suggested by the negative and significant coefficient 
estimate on the ‘prior US OTC’ dummy variable. 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the effects of international cross-
listings on shareholders’ wealth change over time subject to important capital market 
developments that affect the listing and trading environment. More specifically, the effects 
of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth and the explanatory power of its determinants are 
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affected by the introduction of the Euro for European cross-listings, the introduction of 
AIM50 for British cross-listings and the adoption of SOX for US cross- listings. 
Multivariate analysis of the determinants: Summary of the findings 
The empirical results indicate the following. Market segmentation theory gets 
support only for American cross-listings. In line with the legal bonding theory, the 
improvement in investor protection contributes to the positive abnormal returns around an 
American cross-listing after the adoption of SOX. The degree of improvement in market 
liquidity cannot explain the effects of a cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth, i.e. there is no 
empirical support for liquidity theory for either of the host markets in the sample. In line 
with investor recognition theory, an improvement in the information environment determines 
the positive effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth for European cross-listings 
within the Euro zone and for American cross-listings after the adoption of SOX. Geographic 
distance is a significant negative determinant of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ 
wealth, in line with the proximity preference theory, particularly, for British cross-listings. 
The findings provide weak empirical support for market timing theory. In line with business 
strategy theory, the results show that a significant variation in the abnormal returns around a 
cross-listing can be explained by firm-specific factors: companies associated with natural 
resources industry and companies that raise new equity capital in the UK experience higher 
positive returns around the announcement of cross-listing. Finally, company size is found to 
be a significant negative determinant of abnormal returns around cross-listing, particularly 
for American cross-listings before the adoption of SOX. Noticeably, company size becomes 
a positive determinant of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth for American 
cross-listings that take place after the adoption of SOX, which can be attributed to the 
relatively higher costs of compliance with SOX for smaller companies. In the same way, 
higher listing and compliance costs of the US exchange listing after the adoption of SOX can 
explain the negative contribution to shareholders’ wealth that occurs as a result of an 
upgrade from an OTC listing to an exchange listing in the US. 
 
                                                 
50 The impact of AIM is evaluated using unvariate analysis only due to an insufficient number of 
observations for multivariate analysis. Accordingly, no conclusions on the impact of AIM on the 
explanatory power of the determinants of the value effects of cross-listing can be drawn. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter compares the effects on shareholders’ wealth of cross-listings by 
European companies in the US, in the UK and within Europe and examines the determinants 
of the cross-sectional variation of these effects. First, it is empirically shown that 
international cross-listings have a positive and significant impact on shareholders’ wealth of 
about 1.8% cumulative abnormal returns during the 21-day period around the announcement 
of cross-listing. The positive excess returns around a cross-listing are robust to different 
estimation methods. Second, it is shown that the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ 
wealth vary significantly among destination markets. A cross-listing in the US market, which 
is the most economically and financially developed, liquid and information-rich market in 
the sample, results in the largest stock price increase: around 3.3% CARs during the 21 days 
around the announcement of cross-listing. This is followed by a cross-listing in the UK, 
which results in, on average, 2.7% CARs around the announcement. A cross-listing within 
Europe, on the other hand, has an insignificant effect on the stock price. 
Third, the study contributes to the literature by evaluating how the effects on 
shareholders’ wealth around cross-listings change over time. Time-specific variation in the 
effects on shareholders’ wealth is driven by the significant capital market developments in 
Europe, the UK and the US. More specifically, the introduction of the Euro in the EU 
potentially makes a cross-listing within the Euro zone redundant. The introduction of the 
AIM to the London stock exchange in the UK offers new capital market opportunities for 
smaller companies and for risk-seeking investors. The adoption of SOX in the US aims to 
enhance investor protection but also dramatically increases the costs of cross-listing in the 
US. Empirically, no evidence is found that the introduction of the Euro affects the impact on 
shareholders’ wealth of a cross-listing within Europe. Contrary to expectations, it is found 
that significant positive excess returns around British cross-listings in recent years are driven 
by the excess returns around AIM listings, while the excess returns around Main Market 
listings are insignificant. Lastly, contrary to the legal bonding argument, it is found that SOX 
negatively affects shareholders’ wealth arising from cross-listings in the US. 
Finally, this study evaluates potential determinants that arise from various theories 
on the effects of international cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. The results show that 
the explanatory power of the determinants varies over time subject to important changes in 
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the cross-listing environment such as the adoption of SOX in the US. Empirical results are 
supportive to some extend of the market segmentation, investor recognition and proximity 
preference theories. Also strong empirical support is found for business strategy theory. 
To conclude, while, on average, the cross-listing of a European company is a wealth-
enhancing corporate event for shareholders, there is large variation in market reaction to an 
international cross-listing. A company that is deciding to list on a foreign exchange in order 
to improve stock shareholders’ wealth must take into account market conditions, industry-
specific trends and more importantly, carefully weigh the listing costs, both direct and 
indirect, against potential benefits. 
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Figure 2.0  Cumulative abnormal returns around European, British and American 
cross-listings 
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Figure 2.1  Number of cross-listing announcement events by host market and by year 
This figure exhibits the number of cross-listing announcement events in the sample by host market 
and by year. Out of total 254 cross-listing announcement events in the sample 104 are announcement 
of listing in the US, 48 in the UK and 102 in Europe. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  CARs around the announcement of European, UK and American listings 
This figure presents 3-year moving average cumulative abnormal returns 21-day (-10, 10) event 
window around announcement of cross-listing in the US, UK and Europe by year of cross-listing 
announcement. 3-year moving-average CARs are calculated as follows: mean CARs for each year are 
cumulated for 3-year period (a year before, during and after cross-listing) and then divided by three. 
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Table 2.1 Potential determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth 
Proxy variable Level of the 
variable
Expected impact 
on the stock price
Market segmentation 
Correlation of the host and home market index returns country-specific -
Legal bonding 
Accounting standards (home country) country-specific -
Investor protection (home country) country-specific -
Liquidity
Market liquidity (home country) country-specific -
Investor recognition 
Analyst coverage (home country) country-specific -
Proximity preference 
Geographic proximity (distance in km) country-specific -
Market timing 
GDP per capita (home country) country-specific -
Dot-com bubble time-specific +
Business strategy 
Sales growth company-specific +
Industry company-specific variation
Capital raised listing-specific +
Other determinants
Company size company-specific +
First foreign listing listing-specific +
US listings: prior OTC listing listing-specific -
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
Table 2.2 Explanatory and control variables 
Proxy variable Variable 
level
Definition Data source
Correlation of the 
host and home 
market index 
returns
Country- 
specific
Correlation of the home and host market returns is 
calculated using monthly return of DS Total Market indices 
over 3 years before the cross-listing event
DS Total Market indices return 
data are from Datastream
Eurozone listings: 
before and after 
introduction of Euro
Time- 
specific
dummy variable =1 if the listing takes place within Eurozone, 
i.e. both host and home markets are within the Eurozone 
after Euro introduction; =0 otherwise
Euro introduction dates are 
from European Commission (1)
Accounting 
standards
Country- 
specific
Accounting standards index La Porta et al (1998)
Investor protection Country- 
specific
Legal index calculated as the product of the anti-director 
rights index and the rule-of-law index
Anti-director-rights index is from 
Djankov et al (2007), the Rule-
of-law index is from Kaufmann 
et al (2005)
UK listings: Main 
Market listings vs. 
AIM listings
Time- 
specific
dummy variable =1 if the listing takes place in the UK on 
AIM of LSE; =0 otherwise
London stock exchange
US listings: before 
and after SOX 
adoption
Time- 
specific
SOX dummy variable =1 if the host market is the US and the 
listing that takes place in year 2002 or after; =0 otherwise
dataset
Market liquidity Country- 
specific
Market turnover ratio calculated as the value of all trades of 
the DS Total Market index over the total market 
capitalization of the index for the year preceding the cross-
listing. In regression analysis natural logarithm of market 
turnover ratio is used.
Market capitalization and 
turnover by value for DS Total 
Market indices data are from 
Datastream
Analyst coverage Country- 
specific
Analyst coverage intensity is calculated as the number of 1-
year EPS analyst estimates per company for each country-
year proceeding cross-listing. In regression analysis 
natural logarithm of analyst coverage is used.
Data on 1-year EPS analyst 
forecasts are from I/B/E/S 
database
Geographic 
distance
Country- 
specific
The distance in km between the capital cities of host and 
home markets. In regression analysis natural logarithm of 
distance is used.
Sarkissian and Schill (2004)
GDP per capita Country- 
specific
GDP per capita is calculated as 3-year moving average of 
GDP per capita in current international dollars for 3 years 
proceeding cross-listing. In regression analysis natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita is used.
GDP per capita in current 
international dollars data are 
from UN statistics
Dot-com bubble Time- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the listing takes place 
during the period of time from Jan 1999 to Mar 2000 and 
zero otherwise
dataset
Market segmentation
Legal bonding 
Liquidity
Investor recognition 
Proximity preference 
Market timing 
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Table 2.2 continued 
Sales growth Company- 
specific
Company total sales (revenue) 3-year growth for the 
preceding year
Company total sales data are 
from DataStream
Industry Company- 
specific
Industry dummy variables based on the FTSE/DJ Industry 
Classification; Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, or 
Industrials are further combined into industry group 
‘Manufacturers’; Oil & Gas and Utilities are further combined 
into industry group ‘Natural resources’
Stock level FTSE/DJ Industry 
Classification data are from 
DataStream
Capital raised Listing- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the cross-listing involves 
issue of new equity and zero otherwise
Data on capital raising activity is 
from BNY and Citibank ADRs 
databases and Thomson One 
Banker Equity Deals database
Company size Company- 
specific
Log of the company’s market capitalization (market value of 
common equity) in GB pounds prior to the cross-listing
Market capitalization and 
exchange rates to GB pounds 
data are from Datastream
First foreign listing Listing- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the listing is the first 
foreign listing by the company and zero otherwise
dataset
For US listings - 
prior OTC listing
Listing- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the listing takes place in 
the US and the company has had US OTC trading prior to 
the cross-listing and zero otherwise
dataset
Business strategy 
Other determinants
Control variables
 
(1) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm 
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Table 2.3  The sample description 
This table provides sample distribution by host and home countries and by host country and period of 
time. Home country is the country of domicile of the cross-listing company. Host country is the cross-
listing destination country. The total sample consists of 254 cross-listing announcement events. 
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Home country:
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 2.0
BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 3.9
CZECHREP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
DENMARK 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 2.0
FINLAND 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 2.0
FRANCE 0 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 11 25 9.8
GERMANY 3 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 6 15 37 14.6
GREECE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1.2
HUNGARY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 1.6
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 3 18 7.1
ITALY 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 2.8
LUXEMBURG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.8
NETHERLANDS 0 3 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 7 21 8.3
NORWAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 10 3.9
POLAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
RUSSIA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 12 4.7
SPAIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 6 2.4
SWEDEN 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 16 6.3
SWITZERLAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 14 5.5
TURKEY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
UK 0 1 0 0 0 6 3 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 33 51 20.1
Period of Time:
1982-1989 0 3 0 1 1 7 7 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 7 13 47 18.5
1990-1999 3 7 0 2 1 5 9 2 5 3 6 0 0 0 4 1 4 17 45 114 44.9
2000-2007 1 0 1 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 0 2 24 46 93 36.6
TOTAL 4 10 1 3 2 19 18 4 6 4 8 1 3 2 4 4 9 48 104 254 100
% of Total 1.6 3.9 0.4 1.2 0.8 7.5 7.1 1.6 2.4 1.6 3.1 0.4 1.2 0.8 1.6 1.6 3.5 18.9 40.9 100
Host country
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Table 2.4  Host markets characteristics: descriptive statistics 
This table reports mean and median values of market characteristics for three host markets: European 
markets (excluding the UK), the UK and the US. Market liquidity is measured by the annual market 
turnover ratio calculated as the value of all trades of the DS Total Market index over the total market 
capitalization of the index for the year preceding cross-listing. Analyst coverage intensity is calculated 
as the number of 1-year EPS analyst estimates per company for each country-year proceeding cross-
listing. Capital market size is the total market value of the DS Total Market index in GB pounds in the 
year proceeding cross-listing. Accounting standards index is from La Porta et al (1998). Legal 
protection is quantified by legal index calculated as the product of the anti-director rights index from 
Djankov et al (2008) and the rule-of-law index from Kaufmann et al (2005). GDP per capita is 
calculated as 3-year moving average of GDP per capita in current international dollars for 3 years 
proceeding cross-listing. 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Capital market size, billion GBP 100 175.8 52.4 48 992.0 1,115.4 104 5,221.9 6,716.2
Market liquidity 75 560.7 463.4 45 845.5 674.1 104 1085.6 941.3
Analyst coverage 89 37.96 22.91 45 20.12 18.79 104 25.39 24.04
Accounting standards 94 65.1 64.0 48 78.0 78.0 104 71.0 71.0
Investor protection 101 5.03 4.62 48 8.75 8.75 104 4.77 4.77
GDP per capita, current USD 102 20,390 18,466 48 22,799 23,315 104 28,516 30,198
Europe UK US
Host market
Host market characteristics
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Table 2.5 Dependent and explanatory variables: descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics: number of observations, mean, median, and percentage of positive observations, of the dependent variable (Panel A) and also of the 
explanatory and control variables (panel B) for the total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events and for subsamples by host market. Dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) estimated as a sum of market-adjusted abnormal returns during the event window. All explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 2.2. For 
mean CARs ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Variable N Mean Median Min Max St Dev >0,% N Mean Median % N Mean Median % N Mean Median %
Panel A. Dependent variable
CARs (-10,+10) days 254 0.018*** 0.008 -0.283 0.794 0.107 52.0 102 -0.002 -0.002 47.1 48 0.027** 0.015 58.3 104 0.033** 0.014 53.8
CARs (-5,+5) days 254 0.020*** 0.009 -0.267 0.451 0.097 53.8 102 0.000 -0.003 45.4 48 0.033*** 0.021 64.6 104 0.032*** 0.016 56.9
CARs (-3,+3) days 254 0.015*** 0.009 -0.245 0.416 0.081 55.5 102 -0.002 0.006 50.5 48 0.034** 0.017 60.4 104 0.022*** 0.012 57.8
CARs (-1,+1) days 254 0.008** 0.004 -0.251 0.256 0.052 52.6 102 0.000 0.002 53.6 48 0.014** 0.008 58.3 104 0.012** 0.000 49.0
Panel B. Explanatory and control variables
Market correlation 243 0.63 0.67 -0.05 0.94 0.18 94 0.66 0.69 48 0.61 0.63 101 0.61 0.65
Investor protection 254 5.7 6.2 -3.9 8.9 3.0 102 5.62 6.13 48 4.74 6.23 104 6.34 6.23
Accounting standards 234 69.7 69.0 51.0 83.0 7.7 96 69.15 68.00 36 68.75 71.50 102 70.48 69.00
Market liquidity 219 626.5 548.8 6.2 2099.5 486.0 90 665.4 548.4 34 352.9 284.2 95 687.7 565.1
Analyst coverage 239 33.7 20.9 1.8 268.1 36.0 96 31.36 20.96 44 32.12 12.30 99 36.61 21.68
Geographic distance, km 240 3,048 1,209 170 8,261 2,829 98 632 433 40 707 463 102 6286 6198
GDP per capita, dollars 254 20,469 20,363 5,891 54,975 7,213 102 19,749 17,698 48 18,597 15,169 104 22,040 23,301
Dot-com bubble 254 0.08 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.27 102 0.08 0.00 48 0.00 0.00 104 0.12 0.00
Sales growth 211 0.68 0.27 -11.90 19.94 2.11 84 0.97 0.27 37 0.15 0.29 90 0.62 0.31
Capital raised 254 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 102 0.12 0.00 48 0.25 0.00 104 0.30 0.00
Company size, million 
GBP 254 5,484 1,702 3.75 85,366 10,630 102 3,893 1,515 48 3,079 589 104 8,154 2,448
First foreign listing 254 0.53 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 102 0.46 0.00 48 0.69 1.00 104 0.52 1.00
US listings: prior OTC 254 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 102 0.00 0.00 48 0.00 0.00 104 0.28 0.00
All host markets Europe UK US
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Table 2.6  The wealth effects of cross-listing by host and home markets 
Panel A of the table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing 
for total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events and for subsamples by host and home markets. 
Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total Market index returns in local 
currency used as a proxy for market returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as sum of 
abnormal returns over the 21-day (-10, 10) event window. Panel A also reports the number of 
observations for each subsample and probability of t-statistics (in parenthesis). Additionally Panel A 
reports the differences in mean CARs between host markets and its significance; probability of t-statistics 
for difference in means for paired subsamples is reported in parenthesis. Panel B of the table reports 
excess returns (alpha) for three-month (-2,0) event window around cross-listing for total sample of 497 
cross-listing events, trimmed at 5%, and for subsamples by host and home markets. The excess returns 
(alpha) are estimated with 3-factor model: R i  -  R f  = α i+β1 i (Rm  -  R f )+β 2 iSMB+b 3 i HML+ε i . Panel 
B also reports the number of observations for each subsample, t-statistics on the coefficient estimates (in 
parenthesis), and probability (Pr) of Wald test. ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant 
at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
mean N mean N mean N mean N
All home markets 0.018*** 254 -0.002 102 0.027** 48 0.033** 104 0.029** 0.035** 0.006
(0.01) (0.78) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.75)
UK & Ireland 0.025* 69 0.014 18 0.022 15 0.033 36 0.008 0.019 0.011
(0.06) (0.54) (0.20) (0.15) (0.77) (0.54) (0.68)
Continental Europe 0.012* 166 -0.004 79 0.041* 21 0.023* 66 0.045** 0.027* -0.018
(ex CEE) (0.07) (0.61) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.46)
CEE 0.036 19 -0.030 5 0.009 12 0.359 2 0.039 0.390 0.351
(0.48) (0.67) (0.77) (0.56) (0.60) (0.53) (0.57)
est. N est. N est. N est. N
All home markets 0.012** 447 0.050 201 0.022 75 0.018** 171 0.81 0.06* 0.01***
(2.39) (0.72) (1.33) (2.20)
UK & Ireland 0.035*** 143 0.037* 41 0.053 26 0.021 78 0.40 0.44 0.42
(3.25) (1.82) (1.42) (1.48)
Continental Europe 0.004 276 0.002 153 0.012 29 0.003 92 0.58 0.86 0.16
(ex CEE) (0.66) (0.22) (0.73) (0.81)
CEE 0.036 28 0.167 7 0.000 20 0.071 3 0.25 0.75 0.58
(0.68) (0.62) (0.0) -
Panel A. CARs around cross-listing announcement 
Panel B. Excess returns around cross-listing event
Pr [Wald test statistics]
UK - 
Europe
US - 
Europe
US -UK
Difference between host 
markets
                                
      Home market
                                
      Home market
All Europe UK US
US -UKUK - 
Europe
US - 
Europe
Host market
Host market
All Europe UK US
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Table 2.7  The wealth effects of cross-listing over time 
Panel A of the table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing 
for total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events and for subsamples by different periods of 
time. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total Market index returns in local 
currency used as a proxy for market returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as sum of 
abnormal returns over the 21-day (-10, 10) event window. Panel A also reports the number of 
observations for each subsample and t-statistics (in parenthesis). Additionally Panel A reports median, 
minimum and maxim value, and percentage of positive observations. Panel B of the table reports excess 
returns (alpha) for three-month (-2,0) event window around cross-listing for total sample of 497 cross-
listing events, trimmed at 5%, and for subsamples by different periods of time. The excess returns (alpha) 
are estimated with 3-factor model: R i  -  R f  = α i +β1 i (Rm  -  R f)+β2 iSMB+b 3 iHML+ε i . Panel B also 
reports the number of observations for each subsample, t-statistics on the coefficient estimates (in 
parenthesis), and probability (Pr) of Wald test. ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant 
at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Subsample N Mean Median Min Max >0,% estimate N Pr [Wald test]
All host markets 254 0.018** 0.008 -0.28 0.79 52.0 0.012** 447
(2.63) (0.57) (2.39)
Host Europe 102 -0.002 -0.002 -0.28 0.21 47.1 0.050 201
(-0.28) (0.8) (0.72)
before Euro 91 -0.004 -0.001 -0.28 0.21 47.3 0.005 179
(-0.45) (0.72) (0.64)
Eurozone 11 0.011 -0.005 -0.10 0.12 45.5 0.032 22
(0.6) (2.09) (1.27) 0.29
Host UK 48 0.027** 0.015** -0.21 0.32 58.3 0.022 75
(2.11) (6.93) (1.33)
Main Market 39 0.014 0.012** -0.21 0.20 56.4 0.009 63
(1.15) (4.12) (0.53)
AIM 9 0.084* 0.070*** -0.07 0.32 66.7 0.103* 10
(2.08) (28.1) (2.25) 0.09*
Host US 104 0.033** 0.014 -0.20 0.79 53.8 0.018** 171
(2.49) (1.37) (2.20)
before SOX 83 0.034** 0.023** -0.17 0.55 56.6 0.016 139
(2.67) (4.22) (1.64)
after SOX 21 0.029 -0.008** -0.20 0.79 42.9 0.034 32
(0.69) (5.15) (1.54) 0.42
Panel A. CARs around cross-listing announcement 
Panel B. Excess returns 
around cross-listing event
 
 87 
 
Table 2.8  The wealth effects of cross-listing by industry 
Panel A of the table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing 
for total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events divided into six groups based on industry 
affiliation as defined in Table 2.2. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total 
Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. Cumulative abnormal returns 
are calculated as sum of abnormal returns over the 21-day (-10, 10) event window. Panel A also reports 
the number of observations for each group and t-statistics (in parenthesis). Panel B of the table reports 
excess returns (alpha) for three-month (-2,0) event window around cross-listing for total sample of 497 
cross-listing events, trimmed at 5%, divided into six groups based on industry affiliation. The excess 
returns (alpha) are estimated with 3-factor model: R i  -  R f  = α i+β 1 i (R m  -  R f )+β 2 iSMB+b 3 iHML+ε i .  
Panel B also reports the number of observations for each subsample and t-statistics on the coefficient 
estimates (in parenthesis). ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ 
indicates significant at 10%. 
Panel A. CARs around cross-listing announcement 
Industry
mean N mean N mean N mean N
Financials -0.006 50 0.000 25 0.012 8 -0.025 17
(-0.76) (-0.04) (0.66) (-1.39)
Healthcare 0.033 28 0.010 6 0.093 4 0.028 18
(1.26) (0.32) (2.14) (0.72)
Manufacturers 0.02** 102 -0.005 43 0.023 23 0.06** 36
(2.01) (-0.36) (1.33) (2.16)
Nat. resources 0.04** 22 0.04** 8 -0.026 5 0.08** 9
(2.39) (3.27) (-0.58) (2.78)
Services 0.012 22 0.014 7 0.055 7 -0.03** 8
(0.69) (1.05) (1.16) (-2.41)
Technology 0.012 30 -0.039 13 0.030 1 0.053 16
(0.51) (-1.16) - (1.55)
Panel B. Excess returns around cross-listing event
Industry
estimate N estimate N estimate N estimate N
Financials -0.004 85 -0.012 51 0.03 15 -0.012 19
(-0.51) (-1.25) (0.91) (-0.88)
Healthcare 0.055* 41 -0.110 9 -0.004 4 0.087** 26
(1.80) (-1.23) - (2.64)
Manufactors 0.004 179 0.009 85 -0.012 36 0.010 58
(0.50) (0.89) (-0.69) (0.67)
Nat.resources 0.046*** 46 0.071*** 16 0.07 9 0.031 21
(3.31) (3.54) (0.71) (1.38)
Services 0.027 44 0.008 14 0.106 8 -0.021 20
(1.25) (0.25) (1.47) (-0.70)
Technology -0.013 52 0.053 24 0.016 1 -0.037 27
(-0.60) (1.25) - (-1.54)
All Europe UK US
Host market
All Europe UK US
Host market
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Table 2.9  The wealth effects of cross-listing by listing characteristics 
Panel A of the table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing 
for total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events divided into subsamples by listing 
characteristics defined in Table 2.2. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total 
Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. Cumulative abnormal returns 
are calculated as sum of abnormal returns over the 21-day (-10, 10) event window. Panel A also reports 
the number of observations for each subsample and probability (in parenthesis) of t-statistics. Panel B of 
the table reports excess returns (alpha) for three-month (-2,0) event window around cross-listing for total 
sample of 497 cross-listing events, trimmed at 5%, divided into subsamples by listing characteristics. The 
excess returns (alpha) are estimated with 3-factor model: R i  -  R f  = α i+β1 i (R m  -  R f )+β 2 iSMB+ 
+b 3 i HML+ε i . Panel B also reports the number of observations for each subsample and t-statistics on the 
coefficient estimates (in parenthesis). ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% 
and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Panel A. CARs around cross-listing announcement 
mean N mean N mean N mean N
By listing order
First 0.029*** 134 0.003 47 0.026 33 0.053** 54
(2.66) (0.28) (1.57) (2.34)
Consequent 0.005 120 -0.007 55 0.030 15 0.011 50
(0.71) (-0.61) (1.48) (0.94)
By Capital raising 
Capital raising 0.039* 55 0.018 12 0.048 12 0.044 31
(1.90) (0.58) (1.40) (1.36)
Not capital raising 0.012* 199 -0.005 90 0.020 36 0.028** 73
(1.84) (-0.62) (1.56) (2.17)
US listings: with prior OTC vs without prior OTC
no prior OTC 0.044** 75
(2.59)
prior OTC 0.025 29
(0.17)
Panel B. Excess returns around cross-listing event
mean N mean N mean N mean N
By listing order
First 0.019** 243 0.023* 92 -0.003 45 0.023* 106
(2.23) (1.88) (-0.11) (1.89)
Consequent 0.004 204 -0.005 109 0.038 28 0.002 65
(0.69) (-0.55) (1.67) (0.20)
By Capital raising 
Capital raising 0.028 65 0.101* 13 0.080 14 -0.019 38
(1.47) (2.16) (1.50) (-0.98)
Not capital raising 0.010* 382 0.000 188 0.011 61 0.031*** 135
(1.87) (0.02) (0.65) (3.28)
For US listings: with 
no prior OTC 0.026*** 137
(2.69)
prior OTC 0.034 32
(1.54)
Host market
All US
Host market
All Europe UK US
UKEurope
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Table 2.10  The wealth effects of cross-listing by company size 
Panel A of the table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of cross-listing for total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events divided into 
three groups based on company size measured as natural logarithm of market value of company’s common stock prior to cross-listing. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted 
returns with Datastream Total Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as sum of abnormal returns 
over the 21-day (-10, 10) event window. Panel A also reports the number of observations for each group and t-statistics (in parenthesis). Panel B of the table reports excess 
returns (alpha) for three-month (-2,0) event window around cross-listing for total sample of 497 cross-listing events, trimmed at 5%, divided into three groups based on company 
size. The excess returns (alpha) are estimated with 3-factor model: R i  -  R f  = α i +β1 i (R m  -  R f )+β 2 iSMB+b 3 i HML+ε i .  Panel B also reports the number of observations for 
each subsample and t-statistics on the coefficient estimates (in parenthesis). Additionally Panels A and B report average company size for each group. ‘***’ indicates significant 
at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Panel A. CARs around cross-listing announcement 
all before 
Euro
Euro 
zone
all Main 
Market
AIM all before 
SOX
after 
SOX
mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N
Small 170.7 0.027** 84 0.014 35 0.010 32 0.061 3 0.030 23 -0.005 14 0.084* 9 0.042 26 0.081** 15 -0.012 11
(2.35) (0.98) (0.64) (1.61) (1.35) (-0.24) (2.08) (1.66) (2.36) (-0.36)
Medium 1,670.6 0.023 85 -0.009 41 -0.010 38 -0.009 3 0.058 12 0.058 12 - 0 0.070** 32 0.050** 29 0.267 3
(1.63) (-0.88) (-0.88) (-0.04) (0.28) (0.28) (2.12) (2.01) (1)
Large 14,548.1 0.003 85 -0.013 26 -0.013 21 -0.012 5 0.041** 13 0.041** 13 - 0 0.001 46 0.003 39 -0.008 7
(0.36) (-0.81) (-0.70) (-0.41) (2.22) (2.22) (0.12) (0.24) (-0.31)
Panel B. Excess returns around cross-listing event
all before 
Euro
Euro 
zone
all Main 
Market
AIM all before 
SOX
after 
SOX
est. N est. N est. N est. N est. N est. N est. N est. N est. N est. N
Small 185.3 0.043*** 118 0.030 38 0.033 34 -0.033 4 0.024 34 -0.002 23 0.075 11 0.065** 46 0.062** 34 0.038 12
(2.90) (1.12) (1.21) - (0.96) (-0.05) (1.49) (2.39) (2.11) (0.5)
Medium 1,896.4 0.020** 118 0.018 49 0.012 41 0.084* 8 0.043 14 0.043 14 - 0 0.015 55 0.014 48 -0.017 7
(2.08) (1.25) (0.69) (2.32) (1.2) (1.2) (0.95) (0.83) (-0.34)
Large 14,303.6 -0.009 118 -0.018 33 -0.170 26 0.051 7 -0.019 17 -0.019 17 - 0 -0.002 68 0.002 53 -0.001 15
(-1.13) (-1.07) (-0.86) (1.37) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.16) (0.17) (-0.03)
Host market
Host market
Europe
average 
company size 
(mln GBP)
UK US
average 
company size 
(mln GBP)
Europe UK USGroup 
by 
company 
size
Group 
by 
company 
size
All
All
 90 
 
Table 2.11  The determinants of the effect of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth: multivariate 
regression analysis 
The table reports the estimation results of regressions of CARs for 21-day (-10, 10) event window around 
the announcement of cross-listing on a number of potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects 
of cross-listing in the multivariate framework. CARs are calculated as sum of abnormal returns over 21-
days event window. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total Market index 
returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. The explanatory variables are defined in 
Table 2.2. Regression specification is as follows: CARi = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + βj,Xi,j + βj,n Hostn Xi,j + εi, 
where Hostn is host market dummy variable and Xi,j are explanatory variables. The following explanatory 
variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, analyst 
coverage, geographic distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are host-market-adjusted, 
i.e. εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey-West). ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ 
indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Variable
Host 
Europe Variable Host UK Variable Host US
Host Europe -0.027 -0.002 -0.007 0.00 -0.01
(-1.15) (-0.28) (-0.86) (0.04) (-1.11)
Host UK 0.026 0.032* 0.038** 0.10** 0.03**
(0.64) (1.97) (2.3) (2.14) (1.99)
Host US 0.011 0.033** 0.018 0.027* 0.032**
(0.51) (2.21) (1.37) (1.87) (2.09)
Market correlations -0.041 -0.104* 0.121* -0.045 -0.029 0.014 -0.213***
(-0.77) (-1.93) (1.68) (-0.96) (-0.23) (0.31) (-2.7)
Accounting standards 0.001 0.00 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003*
(1.25) (0.38) (0.41) (-1.00) (0.98) (0.79) (-1.57) (1.68)
Investor protection -0.006 -0.006 -0.029
(-1.13) (-1.16) (-1.53)
Market liquidity 0.005
(0.56)
Analayst coverage 0.018 0.012
(1.22) (0.98)
Geographic distance -0.027* -0.017 -0.086** 0.081** -0.015 -0.111** -0.016 -0.038
(-1.73) (-1.49) (-2.37) (2.13) (-1.1) (-2.59) (-1.34) (-0.23)
GDP per capita -0.044 -0.047 -0.021 0.015
(-0.94) (-1.61) (-0.85) (0.3)
Dot-com bubble 0.053 0.047 0.074 -0.039 0.057 0.034 0.039
(1.52) (1.34) (1.55) (-0.59) (1.57) (0.68) (0.56)
Sales growth 0.004 0.004 0.01 -0.009 0.006 -0.006 0.00 0.022
(0.79) (0.93) (1.32) (-0.96) (1.01) (-0.89) (0.10) (1.64)
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable
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Table 2.11 continued 
Variable
Host 
Europe Variable Host UK Variable Host US
Industry Financials 0.014
(0.54)
Industry Healthcare 0.019
(0.44)
Industry Manufacturing 0.027
(1.22)
Industry Resources 0.065** 0.046** 0.052** 0.059*** 0.046**
(2.04) (2.41) (2.54) (2.95) (1.98)
Industry Technology 0.031
(0.78)
Capital raised -0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.02 0.184* 0.026 -0.045
(-0.21) (0.08) (0.07) (-0.78) (1.94) (0.59) (-0.95)
Company size -0.009* -0.008* -0.009 0.005 -0.008* 0.002 -0.005 -0.003
(-1.69) (-1.84) (-1.49) (0.65) (-1.68) (0.21) (-1.22) (-0.38)
First foreign listing 0.005
(0.37)
US prior OTC -0.03 -0.027 -0.024
(-1.33) (-1.23) (-1.21)
R2 0.1498 0.1186
Adj-R2 0.0309 0.0632
N 164 187
Model 5
0.1606
0.0777
190
0.1817 0.2073
0.0848 0.1239
190 190
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
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Table 2.12 Impact of Euro on the determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ 
wealth 
The table reports the estimation results of regressions of cumulative CARs for 21-day (-10, 10) event 
window around the announcement of cross-listing on a number of potential determinants of shareholders’ 
wealth effects of cross-listing in the multivariate framework. CARs are calculated as sum of abnormal 
returns over 21-days event window. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total 
Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 2.2. Regression specification is as follows: CARi= Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+βjXi,j+ 
+β1jXi,jDbeforeeuro+β2j Xi,jDeurozone+ εi, where Xi,j are explanatory variables; Dbeforeeuro is dummy variable that 
equals one if cross-listing takes place in Europe before the introduction of Euro; Deuro is dummy variable 
that equals one if cross-listing takes place within the Euro zone after the introduction of Euro. The 
following explanatory variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, market 
liquidity, analyst coverage, geographic distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are 
host-market-adjusted, i.e. εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj. Standard errors, reported 
in parentheses, are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey-West). ‘***’ indicates 
significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Variable before Euro Euro zone Variable before Euro Euro zone
Host Europe -0.017 -0.012
(-0.77) (-1.24)
Host UK 0.001 0.031*
(0.04) (1.85)
Host US -0.014 0.018
(-0.67) (1.61)
Market Correlations -0.14** 0.168 0.18 -0.099** 0.078 0.146
(-2) (1.57) (1.15) (-2.03) (1.06) (0.91)
Investor protection 0.002 -0.002 -0.007
(1.19) (-1.26) (-1.00)
Analayst coverage 0.026* -0.03 -0.068**
(1.81) (-1.27) (-2.00)
Geographic distance -0.094*** 0.086** 0.096* -0.112*** 0.106*** 0.083*
(-2.75) (2.26) (1.91) (-3.08) (2.72) (1.75)
Dot-com bubble 0.076 -0.034 0.073 -0.03
(1.62) (-0.46) (1.53) (-0.45)
Sales growth 0.01 -0.007 -0.01 0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(1.26) (-0.76) (-0.67) (1.26) (-0.89) (-0.73)
Industry Financials 0.024
(0.95)
Industry Healthcare 0.021
(0.53)
Industry Manufacturing 0.034
(1.61)
Industry Resources 0.084*** 0.056***
(2.82) (2.9)
Host Europe Host Europe
Model 1 Model 2
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Table 2.12 continued 
Variable before Euro Euro zone Variable before Euro Euro zone
Industry Technology 0.035
(0.95)
Capital raised 0.006 -0.032 0.075
(0.17) (-0.56) (1.32)
Company size -0.009 0.00 0.007 -0.008 0.01 -0.003
(-1.41) (0.02) (0.62) (-1.38) (1.09) (-0.24)
First foreign listing 0.008 -0.042 0.011
(0.35) (-1.41) (0.20)
R2
Adj-R2
N
Host Europe Host Europe
0.2036
0.0248
181
0.1642
0.0843
196
Model 1 Model 2
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Table 2.13 Impact of SOX on the determinants of the effects of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth 
The table reports the estimation results of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns for 21-day (-10, 10) event window around the announcement of cross-listing on a number of 
potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing in the multivariate framework. CARs are calculated as sum of abnormal returns over 21-days event window.  
Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with Datastream Total Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 2.2. Regression specification is as follows: CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ βj Xi,j +β1j Xi,jDbeforesox+β2j Xi,jDsox + εi, where Xi,j are explanatory variables; DbeforeSOX is 
dummy variable that equals one if cross-listing takes place in the US before the adoption of SOX; DafterSOX is dummy variable that equals one if cross-listing takes place in the US 
after the adoption of SOX. The following explanatory variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, analyst coverage, geographic 
distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are host-market-adjusted, i.e. εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj. Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey-West). ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 
10%. 
Variable prior SOX post SOX Variable prior SOX post SOX Variable prior SOX post SOX
Host Europe -0.038* -0.008 -0.004
(-1.78) (-0.94) (-0.48)
Host UK -0.018 0.027 0.026*
(-0.55) (1.62) (1.66)
Host US 0.027 0.032*** 0.042***
(1.02) (2.73) (3.2)
Market Correlations 0.04 -0.10 -0.248
(0.58) (-0.82) (-1.14)
Accounting standards -0.001 0.004* -0.006**
(-1.09) (1.81) (-2.16)
Market liquidity -0.012 0.002 0.028
(-1.18) (0.13) (1.11)
Analayst coverage 0.03 -0.019 -0.032 0.004 0.012 -0.072**
(1.65) (-0.67) (-1.06) (0.46) (0.64) (-2.23)
Geographic distance -0.011 -0.19 0.31 -0.022* -0.098 0.492***
(-0.59) (-0.9) (0.6) (-1.84) (-0.62) (2.84)
Model 3
Host USHost US Host US
Model 1 Model 2
 
 95 
 
Table 2.13 continued 
Variable prior SOX post SOX Variable prior SOX post SOX Variable prior SOX post SOX
Dot-com bubble 0.012 0.068 0.04 0.04 0.034 0.033
(0.22) (0.88) (0.85) (0.61) (0.67) (0.48)
Sales growth 0.001 0.03 0.004 0.001 0.031* -0.002 0.001 0.028 0.003
(0.20) (1.53) (0.38) (0.27) (1.72) (-0.33) (0.28) (1.47) (0.34)
Industry Financials 0.014
(0.61)
Industry Healthcare 0.008
(0.27)
Industry Manufacturing 0.02
(0.94)
Industry Resources 0.063** 0.044** 0.042*
(2.06) (2.12) (1.83)
Industry Technology 0.047
(1.09)
Capital raised 0.031 -0.052 -0.013
(0.71) (-1.09) (-0.1)
Company size -0.003 -0.019* 0.008 -0.003 -0.020* 0.009 0.019* -0.008* -0.016
(-0.42) (-1.66) (0.67) (-0.56) (-1.93) (0.94) (1.82) (-1.72) (-1.45)
First foreign listing -0.004 0.012 -0.001
(-0.17) (0.35) (-0.02)
prior US OTC -0.005 -0.09* 0.009 -0.069** 0.006 -0.065*
(-0.18) (-1.75) (0.37) (-2.05) (0.25) (-1.78)
R2
Adj-R2
N 189
Model 3
Host US
0.2653
0.1828
0.3013
0.1174
169
0.2271
0.1603
202
Host US Host US
Model 1 Model 2
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Appendix 2.1 The determinants of the effect of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth: coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors 
The table reports the coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors (VIF) from regressions reported in Table 2.11. CARs are the sum of market-adjusted returns over 21-days 
event window. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2.2. Regression specification: CARi = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + βj,Xi,j + βj,n Hostn Xi,j + εi, where Hostn is host market 
dummy variable and Xi are explanatory variables. The following explanatory variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, analyst 
coverage, geographic distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are host-market-adjusted, i.e. εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj. 
est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF
Host Europe -0.027 5.99 -0.002 1.10 -0.007 1.40 0.00 1.27 -0.010 1.31
Host UK 0.026 2.69 0.032 1.10 0.038 1.08 0.100 9.11 0.030 1.08
Host US 0.011 7.70 0.033 1.70 0.018 1.56 0.027 1.43 0.032 2.38
Market correlations -0.041 1.58 -0.104 1.85 0.121 1.81 -0.045 1.66 -0.029 2.21 0.014 2.16 -0.213 2.43
Accounting standards 0.001 2.21 0.000 1.38 0.001 2.14 -0.002 2.14 0.001 2.37 0.003 3.02 -0.002 2.08 0.003 2.83
Investor protection -0.006 2.76 -0.006 3.01 -0.029 11.33
Market liquidity -0.005 1.40
Analayst coverage 0.018 2.51 0.012 2.62
Geographic distance -0.027 1.22 -0.017 1.08 -0.086 7.26 0.081 7.32 -0.015 1.27 -0.111 1.57 -0.016 1.11 -0.038 2.29
GDP per capita -0.044 3.35 -0.047 2.43 -0.021 1.93 0.015 2.59
Dot-com bubble 0.053 1.30 0.047 1.24 0.074 2.06 -0.039 2.20 0.057 1.27 0.034 3.28 0.039 3.39
Sales growth 0.004 1.26 0.004 1.06 0.010 3.15 -0.009 3.34 0.006 1.38 -0.006 1.52 0.0005 1.44 0.022 1.41
Industry Financials 0.014 3.92
Industry Healthcare 0.019 2.57
Industry Manufacturing 0.027 5.22
Industry Resources 0.065 1.89 0.046 1.10 0.052 1.14 0.059 1.21 0.046 1.13
Industry Technology 0.031 2.40
Capital raised -0.006 1.62 0.002 1.95 0.003 2.25 -0.020 1.56 0.184 1.63 0.026 4.60 -0.045 4.56
Company size -0.009 1.67 -0.008 1.21 -0.009 1.67 0.005 1.94 -0.008 1.59 0.002 2.28 -0.005 2.44 -0.003 2.38
First foreign listing 0.005 2.72
US prior OTC -0.030 1.81 -0.027 1.58 -0.024 1.75
Adj-R2
N
Variable
Host UK
Model 3 Model 4
190 190
0.0309
164
Model 5
Variable Host USModel 1 Model 2 Variable Host Europe Variable
0.0632
187
0.0777
190
0.0848 0.1239
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Appendix 2.2 Impact of Euro on the determinants of the effect of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth: coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors 
The table reports the coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors (VIF) from regressions reported in Table 2.12. CARs are the sum of market-adjusted returns over 21-days 
event window. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2.2. Regression specification: CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ βj Xi,j +β1j Xi,jDbeforeeuro+β2j Xi,jDeurozone + εi, where Xi,j are 
explanatory variables; Dbeforeeuro is dummy variable that equals one if cross-listing takes place in Europe before the introduction of Euro; Deuro is dummy variable that equals one if 
cross-listing takes place within Euro zone after the introduction of Euro. The following explanatory variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, 
market liquidity, analyst coverage, geographic distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are host-market-adjusted, i.e. εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn 
Hostn + εj. 
est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF
Host Europe -0.017 7.56 -0.01 1.27
Host UK 0.001 2.94 0.031 1.04
Host US -0.014 7.36 0.018 1.21
Market correlations -0.14 2.57 0.168 2.14 0.18 3.18 -0.1 1.72 0.078 1.63 0.146 1.36
Legal protection 0.002 2.88 -0.002 2.47 -0.01 7.83
Analayst coverage 0.026 2.59 -0.03 1.71 -0.068 10.97
Geographic distance -0.094 8.20 0.086 7.37 0.10 2.89 -0.11 5.55 0.106 4.83 0.08 1.90
Dot-com bubble 0.076 2.32 -0.034 2.94 0.073 2.05 -0.03 2.21
Sales growth 0.01 3.42 -0.007 3.53 -0.01 2.17 0.009 2.97 -0.008 3.04 -0.007 1.14
Industry Financials 0.024 4.18
Industry Healthcare 0.021 2.56
Industry Manufacturing 0.034 5.94
Industry Resources 0.084 1.94 0.056 1.14
Industry Technology 0.035 2.28
Capital raised 0.006 2.28 -0.032 2.29 0.08 3.91
Company size -0.009 1.92 0.00 2.63 0.01 3.47 -0.01 1.57 0.010 1.48 -0.003 1.24
First foreign listing 0.008 4.17 -0.042 4.22 0.01 7.90
Adj-R2
N
Variable
Host Europe
Variable before Euro Eurozone
0.0843
196
Model 1
0.0248
181
Model 2
Host Europe
Variable before Euro Eurozone
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Appendix 2.3 Impact of SOX on the determinants of the effect of cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth: coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors 
The table reports the coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors (VIF) from regressions reported in Table 2.13. CARs are the sum of market-adjusted returns over 21-days 
event window. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2.2. Regression specification: CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ βj Xi,j +β1j Xi,jDbeforesox+β2j Xi,jDsox + εi, where Xi,j are 
explanatory variables; DbeforeSOX is dummy variable that equals one if cross-listing takes place in the US before the adoption of SOX; DafterSOX is dummy variable that equals one if 
cross-listing takes place in the US after the adoption of SOX. The following explanatory variables: market correlation, accounting standards, investor protection, market liquidity, 
analyst coverage, geographic distance, GDP per capita, company size and sales growth, are host-market-adjusted, i.e. εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj. 
est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF est. VIF
Host Europe -0.038 6.74 -0.01 1.15 0.00 1.16
Host UK -0.018 2.84 0.03 1.02 0.03 1.04
Host US 0.027 11.64 0.03 1.93 0.04 2.25
Market correlations 0.04 3.03 -0.1 2.87 -0.248 10.28
Accounting standards 0.00 2.3 -0.01 2 0.00 1.89
Market liquidity 0.012 3.07 -0.002 2.26 -0.028 3.84
Analayst coverage 0.03 3.05 -0.019 2.20 -0.032 4.65 0.00 2.02 -0.07 2.01 0.01 1.74
Geographic distance -0.011 1.43 -0.19 1.74 0.31 7.10 -0.02 1.02 -0.10 1.07 0.49 1.15
Dot-com bubble 0.012 3.48 0.068 4.01 0.04 2.91 0.04 3.08 0.03 3.1 0.03 3.26
Sales growth 0.001 1.59 0.03 1.48 0.004 2.12 0.00 1.25 0.03 1.3 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.44 0.03 1.35
Industry Financials 0.014 4.33
Industry Healthcare 0.008 2.92
Industry Manufacturing 0.02 6.05
Industry Resources 0.063 2.12 0.04 1.12 0.04 1.12
Industry Technology 0.047 2.92
Capital raised 0.031 4.70 -0.052 4.65 -0.013 1.80
Company size -0.003 3.11 -0.019 2.74 0.008 3.16 0.00 1.82 -0.02 1.98 0.01 1.5 0.02 1.57 -0.02 2.23 -0.01 2.07
First foreign listing -0.004 5.70 0.012 5.09 -0.001 4.33
US prior OTC -0.005 2.26 -0.09 2.07 0.01 1.69 -0.07 1.26 -0.07 1.19 0.01 1.87
Adj-R2
N
0.1828
189
Model 3
Host Europe
Variable prior SOX post SOX
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
Host Europe Host Europe
Variable prior SOX
202
0.1174
169
0.1603
post SOX Variable prior SOX post SOX
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Chapter 3 
Liquidity and Volatility of Stocks Listed and  
Traded in Multiple Stock Markets 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Companies choose to list on a foreign stock exchange with a view to improving 
stock visibility, prestige and liquidity (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001) with the ultimate goal of 
enhancing their stock valuation (Chouinard and D'Souza, 2003-2004). Potentially, the 
improvement in stock valuation stems from the fact that a cross-listing results in an enhanced 
information environment because of the need to meet the mandatory listing and disclosure 
requirements. Thus, when stocks are listed in multiple stock exchanges with different 
accounting and disclosure requirements investors enjoy additional information. Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (2006) theoretically show that a foreign listing on an exchange with strict 
disclosure requirements reduces investors’ monitoring costs and improves stock valuation. 
Therefore, an enhanced information environment reduces the adverse selection component of 
trading costs and enhances liquidity, resulting in a reduction in the cost of transactions, 
especially the bid-ask spread (Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) provide an 
excellent discussion on how information flow affects the size of the bid-ask spread). This, in 
turn, results in a lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrechia, 1991; Baiman and 
Verrecchia, 1996) leading to an increase in the value of the firm.  
Existing empirical evidence shows that cross-listing in the US by a foreign company, 
on average, results in abnormal  positive returns around cross-listing (Miller, 1999; Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1999), increased company visibility (Baker et al, 2002), improved analyst 
coverage, in terms of quantity as well as accuracy (Lang et al, 2003a), enhanced stock 
liquidity (Smith and Sofianos, 1997; Foerster and Karolyi, 1993 and 1998), lower cost of 
capital (Errunza and Miller, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2009) and improved relative valuation 
(Doidge et al, 2004 and 2009a). The findings of chapter 2 of this thesis also suggest that 
international cross-listing, on average, results in gains in shareholders’ wealth for cross-
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listing companies. The possible sources of the gains in shareholders wealth after cross-listing 
include an improvement in the quality of the stock’s information environment and, 
accordingly, an improvement in the stock’s liquidity and volatility. The change in stock 
liquidity and volatility after cross-listing is the focus of chapter 3. 
The findings on the improvements in stock valuation can be interpreted as indirect 
evidence of the reduction in information asymmetry following a cross-listing. Two studies 
investigate directly the quality of the information environment of cross-listed stocks. First, 
Bailey et al (2006) examine the consequences of the increased disclosure of non-US firms 
listed in the US, and report a significant increase in stock return volatility and trading 
volume reaction to earnings announcements after cross-listing in the US, which they attribute 
to the changes in the company-level disclosure. Second, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) 
investigate the change in the quality of the information environment around cross-listing and 
focus on the change in stock price informativeness, i.e. the level of private information 
incorporated in the stock price. They find that cross-listing is positively associated with firm-
specific stock return variation, interpreted as the measure of stock price informativeness, 
particularly for stocks from developed markets. 
The existing evidence on whether cross-listing improves the information 
environment is far from conclusive. Moreover, the quality of the information environment is 
not easily quantifiable or empirically testable and the results of empirical tests are sensitive 
to the choice of proxy. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that stock liquidity and volatility 
proxy for the quality of the firm’s information environment. More specifically, the 
improvement in stock liquidity and the reduction in stock return volatility after cross-listing 
can be interpreted as an outcome of the decreased level of information asymmetry between 
company managers and investors and between different groups of investors after cross-
listing. 
Existing empirical evidence on the change in stock liquidity and volatility after 
cross-listing is mixed. Some studies report that after cross-listing there is a significant 
decrease in the stock’s trading costs (Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Domowitz et al, 1998; 
Hamet, 2002) and an increase in the stock’s trading volume (Smith and Sofianos, 1997; 
Foerster and Karolyi, 1993 and 1998; Hamet, 2002). Other studies report no impact from an 
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international cross-listing on the stock’s trading costs (Noronha et al, 1996; Silva and 
Chavez, 2008) and no impact or deterioration of trading activity on the stock’s home market 
(Berkman and Nguyen, 2010; Domowitz et al, 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). Empirical 
studies on the impact of cross-listing on volatility report either no significant relationship 
(Howe and Madura, 1990; Lau et al, 1994; Martell et al, 1999) or an increase in volatility 
after cross-listing, mainly associated with the increase in the stock’s trading activity (Barclay 
et al, 1990; Chan et al, 1996; Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Menkveld, 2008). Overall, existing 
empirical evidence on the consequences of cross-listing in terms of stock liquidity and 
volatility is not conclusive and in some cases is outdated. 
There are several potential reasons for corporate finance managers and investors to 
be concerned about stock liquidity and volatility. First, improved stock liquidity decreases 
trading costs for investors and, accordingly, reduces the required illiquidity premium 
resulting in higher stock valuation (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan et al, 1998; 
Jacoby et al, 2000; Amihud, 2002). Second, lower volatility is associated with a reduction in 
the perceived riskiness of the stock (Bushee and Noe, 2000) and, consequently, with a lower 
cost of capital (Froot et al, 1992). Finally, a stock with lower volatility provides less costly 
and more effective stock-price-based management compensation (Baiman and Verrecchia, 
1995 and 1996). 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the impact of cross-listing on 
the stock’s liquidity and volatility. More specifically, the main research question addressed 
is: Does cross-listing improve stock liquidity and volatility? Cross-listed stocks are expected 
to have higher liquidity and lower return volatility compared to domestic stocks because 
cross-listing improves the stock’s information environment. Several measures are used to 
capture various dimensions of stock’s liquidity and volatility, including trading costs and 
trading volume-based measures of stock liquidity and stock return variance and intraday 
stock price variation. The impact of cross-listing is evaluated in a multivariate framework 
after controlling for other factors that potentially affect stock liquidity and volatility. These 
include the change in company size, accounting practices, analyst coverage and trading 
activity following cross-listing. 
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The second important contribution is a direct comparison between the impact of a 
cross-listing and the impact of an admission to trade on a foreign exchange, referred to in 
this study as a cross-trading. Cross-listing is initiated by the company’s decision to cross-list 
its shares on a foreign stock exchange and involves a company submitting a listing 
application and meeting listing and disclosure requirements of the host foreign stock 
exchange. Cross-listed stocks are listed in the stock exchange’s official directory of listed 
foreign companies available on stock exchange’s web-sites. Cross-trading in this study 
includes admissions to trade on foreign over-the-counter (OTC) markets and on foreign new 
markets and alternative trading platforms such as Open market of Deutsche Borse and 
VIRTX of Swiss stock exchange. OTC trading in the US takes place in the form of a Level I 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) and is initiated by the company; OTC trading in the 
UK and trading on alternative markets and trading platforms is initiated by market 
makers/dealers without the firm’s involvement (a company could be not even aware that its 
stocks are cross-traded, for example, on the Open market of Deutsche Borse). The main 
difference between cross-listing and cross-trading is that, in contrast to cross-listing, cross-
trading does not involve meeting mandatory listing or additional disclosure requirements. 
Cross-trading is similar to cross-listing in the way that it makes a stock accessible to foreign 
investors and, thus, facilitates inter-market competition. While cross-trading has become 
wide spread in recent decade, the empirical evidence on its implications is limited.
51
 To 
address this gap, this study specifically investigates the extent to which cross-listing and 
cross-trading result in different outcomes for stock liquidity and volatility. Thus, the second 
research question addressed is: Does cross-listing have a more profound impact on the 
liquidity and volatility than cross-trading? 
The sample includes 425 stocks from 17 European countries that were listed in 
various foreign markets during the period from 1990 to 2007. While prior literature reports 
that a US cross-listing is beneficial in terms of liquidity (Foerster and Karolyi, 1993 and 
1998) and improvement in the information environment (Lang et al, 2003a; Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008), the evidence on the implications of foreign listing/trading on other host 
markets is limited. Since the US differs significantly from other markets in terms of the size 
                                                 
51
 Only a few studies examine the consequences of a foreign trading on stock liquidity (e.g. Hamet, 
2002; Ellul, 2006) and stock return volatility (e.g. Bayar and Onder, 2005). 
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of the investor pool, the level of liquidity, and the legal and information environment, it is 
reasonable to expect that the findings for the US market are not necessarily applicable to 
other markets. Moreover, the inclusion of all foreign listing and trading accounts of the 
sample cross-listed stock allows an assessment of the impact of cross-listing and cross-
trading on various host markets and an assessment of the impact of cross-listing on the 
stock’s aggregate trading activity. 
Using cross-sectional analysis, the liquidity and volatility of cross-listed stocks are 
compared against the liquidity and volatility of 3,702 domestic stocks from the same 
countries. Several studies find that the impact of a foreign listing in terms of liquidity 
(Halling et al, 2008) and corporate valuation (Gozzi et al, 2008) is concentrated around the 
cross-listing event and diminishes over time. This study contributes to the debate by 
providing evidence on the evolution of stock liquidity and volatility around cross-listing and 
cross-trading and their long-run sustainability. Finally, the change in stock liquidity and 
volatility is evaluated in a time-series framework against those of the cross-listed stocks over 
the pre-cross-listing period of time. 
The primary empirical finding is that cross-listing and cross-trading on a foreign 
market improve the liquidity and reduce volatility of a stock. In the case of liquidity, this is 
also true in comparison to the pre-cross-listing/trading period of time. After controlling for 
the effects of factors that are known to affect stock liquidity and for the change in company 
characteristics after cross-listing/ cross-trading in the multivariate analysis, it is found that a 
presence on a foreign exchange, either through cross-listing or cross-trading, is associated 
with a significantly reduced bid-ask spread, increased trading volumes, and also with a 
reduction in stock return volatility. Home market stock turnover does not improve after 
cross-listing or after cross-trading. At the same time, total turnover, which in contrast to 
home market turnover accounts for trading volumes on foreign exchange(s), improves for 
cross-listed stocks but not for cross-traded stocks. The documented effects of cross-listing 
and cross-trading are found to be sustained over a long period of time following the cross-
listing/ cross-trading event. 
Although added mandatory disclosure requirements of cross-listing should cause a 
more profound effect on the liquidity and volatility, the results do not show any significant 
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difference in the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading. This finding, arguably, can be 
attributed to the fact that the improvement in the information environment after cross-listing 
is not substantially different from that after cross-trading. The major improvement in the 
information environment of cross-listed and cross-traded stocks arises, possibly, not from 
additional mandatory information disclosure but from the intensified competition among 
market makers and from the production of stock-specific information. Both enhanced 
competition and information production are the outcome of the increase in the number of 
market participants with an economic interest in the stock after cross-listing/ cross-trading. 
Finally, the results are in line with the expectation that the implications of a foreign 
listing and trading vary depending on the level of development of the stock’s home market, 
in line with Domowitz et al (1998), Bacidore et al (2005), Halling et al (2008), Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2008). More specifically, it is found that the results are driven by the 
experience of stocks from developed markets and do not hold for stocks from emerging 
markets. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of 
the literature on the implications of cross-listing and cross-trading for stock liquidity and 
volatility. Section 3.3 develops testable hypotheses on the implications of cross-listing and/or 
cross-trading on the stock’s liquidity and volatility and discusses other important factors that 
affect stock trading after cross-listing/ cross-trading. Section 3.4 and section 3.5 describe the 
methodology and the sample employed, while section 3.6 presents the empirical findings 
and, finally, section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
3.2 Literature review 
Based on Bancel and Mittoo’s (2001) survey, European managers make a decision to 
cross-list with the expectation of improving the company’s visibility, prestige and image and 
also to increase the shareholder base and gain improved access to foreign capital markets. 
However, companies experience positive net benefits from cross-listing only if there is an 
increase in the stock’s trading volume after the cross-listing. Along similar lines, Pagano et 
 105 
 
al (2002) identify stock liquidity as one of the motives for cross-listing. Reduction in 
volatility is generally associated with a reduction in the perceived riskiness of the stock 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000). This perception of reduced riskiness can potentially lead to a lower 
cost of capital after cross-listing (Froot et al, 1992; Hail and Leuz, 2009). The following two 
sub-sections review existing empirical evidence on the impact of multimarket listing on both 
stock’s liquidity and volatility. 
 
3.2.1 Liquidity 
Cross-listing/cross-trading of a stock on a foreign exchange results in a larger 
investor base. A larger investor base in turn should facilitate increased stock turnover and 
more intense competition in stock trading among market makers and investors leading to a 
reduction in transaction costs. Additionally, cross-listing imposes extra disclosure 
requirements and, accordingly, brings more information to the market, which, in turn, is 
expected to induce more active stock trading (Kyle, 1985). 
Cross-listing and liquidity 
A number of studies examine the consequences of international cross-listing on a 
stock’s liquidity in general and on trading volumes and trading costs in particular. Noronha 
et al (1996) examine the change in liquidity of 126 US stocks following a listing in London 
and Tokyo and document a significant increase in trading activity on the home market driven 
by an increase in informed trading. However, despite the fact that a listing on a foreign 
exchange makes competition among market makers more intense, they do not find any 
decrease in spreads. Smith and Sofianos (1997) examine the change in trading activity of 128 
non-US stocks listed on the NYSE and report that in total, on the NYSE and the home 
market combined, the volume of trading increase by 42% and the home market trading 
volume increase by 24%. It should be noted, however, that the increase in the home market 
trading activity is driven by the increase in the home market trading volume of stocks from 
developed countries. Domowitz et al (1998) show that for stocks from Mexico, a segmented 
emerging market, trading activity on the home market reduces after cross-listing in the US, 
and they attribute this finding to the migration of foreign investors. However, despite the 
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migration of order flows to the US, Domowitz et al (1998) find evidence that inter-market 
competition contributes to narrower spreads. Furthermore, Silva and Chavez (2008) do not 
find evidence that internationally cross-listed companies from emerging markets in Latin 
America have enhanced liquidity in terms of trading costs in the home market compared to 
domestic companies. 
Several studies examine liquidity changes after cross-listing in the US by Canadian 
companies. Foerster and Karolyi (1993) find an increase of 62% in total trading volume after 
cross-listing and an increase in domestic trading volume of 26%. Mitto (1997) reports an 
increase in domestic trading volume for stocks listed on the Toronto stock exchange and a 
decrease for stocks listed on the Vancouver stock exchange. Foerster and Karolyi (1998) 
examine the consequences of the foreign listing of 52 Canadian firms in the US in terms of 
liquidity and report that the total trading volume (TSE and US markets combined) increases 
by 28% while trading volume on the TSE, the home market, decreases slightly, as some 
portion of trading activity migrates to the foreign market. Furthermore, trading costs 
measured by the bid-ask spread (posted as well as effective) decrease significantly following 
listing in the US, particularly for firms that have a significant portion (over 50%) of total 
trading activity taking place in the US. Foerster and Karolyi (1998) interpret the decrease in 
the trading costs as the result of intensified competition among market makers due to the 
additional presence of US market makers. A recent paper by Kryzanowski and Lazrak 
(2009) examines the liquidity of Canadian stocks that cross-list on various US exchanges and 
detects no variation in trading costs that might be driven by the choice of the any particular 
US exchange as the destination exchange. 
A group of studies employ intraday data to investigate the impact of trading on a 
foreign exchange on trading activity in the home market. Werner and Kleidon (1996), Howe 
and Ragan (2002) and Menkveld (2008) all report that the trading of a cross-listed stock in 
the home market is concentrated in the overlapping trading hours. This is in line with the 
theoretical prediction of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that traders tend to cluster in time. 
Furthermore, Bacidore et al (2005) and Moulton and Wei (2009) provide evidence that 
liquidity of cross-listed stocks, in terms of spreads and depth, improves during the 
overlapping trading hours. However, Bacidore et al (2005) report that the improvement in 
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the home market liquidity is only observed for stocks from developed countries and not for 
those from emerging markets. 
Halling et al (2008) provide empirical evidence on the home market liquidity of non-
US stocks around cross-listing in the US. They show that trading activity in the home market 
is stimulated by a listing on a foreign exchange. More specifically the home market’s stock 
turnover ratio peaks in the year of cross-listing and stays above its pre-cross-listed level in 
the consequent years. However, these findings hold only for stocks from developed countries 
and countries with strong anti-insider trading protection. Stocks from countries with weak 
anti-insider trading protection, however, experience a significant decrease in the home 
market liquidity after cross-listing. 
Finally, Berkman and Nguyen (2010) report evidence that seems to contradict the 
prior literature. They show that cross-listing in the US is not associated with improvements 
in domestic liquidity, which is proxied by the quoted bid-ask spread, price impact, turnover 
and the probability of informed trading. Moreover, they report a weak improvement in stock 
liquidity on the home market for stocks from emerging markets and from countries with 
weak investor protection and poor accounting information quality. 
Overall, existing empirical evidence suggests that after a cross-listing there is 
improvement in the home market liquidity for stocks from developed markets but for stocks 
from emerging markets there is either no impact or deterioration. These findings are 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) that equity trading 
tends to be concentrated on the market with lower trading costs.
52
  They are also in line with 
the predictions of Domowitz et al (1998) that domestic market quality of cross-listed stocks 
deteriorates if the home market is segmented in terms of information flow. None of the 
existing studies, however, examine the aggregate stock turnover after cross-listing that would 
account for trading in all markets where the stock is listed/ traded. 
Cross-trading and liquidity 
Empirical evidence on the impact of over-the-counter (OTC) and off-exchange 
trading on the home market liquidity of stocks is limited. Hamet (2002) examined  the 
                                                 
52
 The level of economic and financial development is highly correlated with trading costs; for 
example, Halling et al (2008) use capital market development measure as a proxy for trading costs. 
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trading activity of 52 French stocks that are also traded on SEAQ-I, a trading platform on the 
London stock exchange that enables trading of foreign stocks that are not listed on the 
London stock exchange. The study reports that off-board trading in London has a positive 
impact on the trading volumes and reduces transaction costs on the Paris Bourse. Ellul 
(2006) studied the inter-market flow of information and price discovery dynamics of French, 
German and Italian stocks that are cross-traded on the LSE’s SEAQ-I and found clear 
evidence of order-splitting activity of market makers between the home and the foreign 
markets. Large order execution, which is concentrated in London, results in a significant 
increase in trading volume and price impact in the home market; and trading volumes on the 
home and foreign markets are positively correlated. 
 
3.2.2 Volatility 
On the one hand, if cross-listing improves the stock’s information environment due 
to increased information production then stock risk, i.e. uncertainty about future cash flows, 
should be reduced after cross-listing. On the other hand, higher trading volumes after cross-
listing/ trading should be associated with higher volatility (Jones et al, 1994; Chan and Fong, 
2000). Higher trading volumes after cross-listing/ trading are expected due to an increase in 
the numbers of investors after a foreign listing and also due to more information released to 
the market. More information results in higher trading, potentially due to different 
interpretations of public information by investors (Bamber et al, 1999). Therefore, 
theoretical predictions on the impact of cross-listing on stock risk are controversial and need 
validation by empirical evidence. 
Cross-listing and volatility 
The literature offers empirical evidence on the consequences of international cross-
listing on stock return variance using both daily and intraday data. The studies that use daily 
data include evidence on the experience of US stocks cross-listed outside of the US and of 
non-US stocks cross-listed in the US. Barclay et al (1990) show that the increase in stock-
return variance following a listing on a foreign exchange is driven by trading volumes: 
NYSE stocks after a secondary listing in Tokyo have an insignificant (less than 1%) portion 
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of total trading volume taking place in Tokyo and their stock-return variance remains 
unchanged after cross-listing despite the significant increase in trading hours. At the same 
time Japanese stocks listed on the NYSE have more active trading on the foreign exchange 
(around 8% of the total trading volume takes place on the NYSE) and experience a 
significant increase in the stock-return variance after cross-listing. Similar to Barclay et al 
(1990), Howe and Madura (1990) and Lau et al (1994) report no significant changes in stock 
risk and return variances after an international cross-listing by a US firm. 
Several studies examine the implications on the stock volatility for non-US firms 
listing in the US. Jayaraman et al (1993) find a significant permanent increase in return 
volatility after cross-listing in the US, on average, by 56% for stocks from developed 
European and Asian countries, which they interpret as consistent with the theory that a 
foreign listing extends trading hours and creates new profitable opportunities for informed 
traders (Freedman, 1989 sited by Jayaraman et al, 1993), whereas the disclosure of more 
information via trading results in higher stock volatility (Black, 1986; French and Roll, 
1986). For a small sample of Japanese stocks, Ko et al (1997) show that abnormal return 
volatility increases after cross-listing in the US. Contrary evidence is reported by Martell et 
al (1999): they find no evidence that stock return volatility changes after cross-listing in the 
US for a sample of stocks from emerging markets in Latin America and attribute this finding 
to the fact that a cross-listing in the US does not extend trading hours for Latin American 
stocks. Domowitz et al (1998) argue that the impact of a cross-listing is complex and 
depends on the level of transparency of the home market. Empirically, Domowitz et al 
(1998) and Coppejans and Domowitz (2000) show that for stocks from Mexico, a market 
with poor information linkages, a US listing results in increased volatility in the home 
market. This is because the migration of the trading activity to the foreign market results in a 
deterioration of the quality of the home market. 
Another group of studies focuses on the intraday volatility patterns of cross-listed 
stocks. Chan et al (1996) show that foreign stocks cross-listed in the US experience higher 
volatility and higher trading volumes than similar US stocks, particularly in the early 
mornings. The authors argue that this can be explained by the market reaction to public 
information accumulated in the foreign markets overnight. Werner and Kleidon (1996), 
Forster and George (1995), and Menkveld (2008) report a significant increase in return 
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volatility of cross-listed stocks in the overlapping trading hours between the home and the 
host markets and show that this increase in volatility is related to the level of trading activity 
on the home market (Werner and Kleidon, 1996) as well as on the foreign market (Forster 
and George, 1995; Menkveld, 2008). 
Overall, empirical evidence on the impact of cross-listing on stock return volatility is 
mixed. However, there is a common element in most of the empirical evidence: the change 
in volatility after cross-listing is positively related to the change in trading volumes after 
cross-listing. 
Cross-trading and volatility 
Empirical evidence on the impact of off-exchange trading on the home market return 
volatility is far from comprehensive. Ko et al (1997) report that, for a small sample of 
Japanese stocks, abnormal return volatility increases significantly after cross-listing on the 
NYSE as well as after listing on the US OTC market.  However, the increase in volatility is 
less for OTC listings. Bayar and Onder (2005) examine the volatility of French stocks traded 
on the Deutsche Borse’s electronic market XETRA and find that volatility increases after 
cross-trading on the XETRA for the majority of the stocks in the sample. This finding is 
puzzling given the significant level of integration of French and German markets and 
because of the additional finding that the home market liquidity deteriorates after cross-
trading on XETRA. The findings of Bayar and Onder (2005) are neither consistent with the 
literature that link the increase in volatility to the increase in trading volume nor with the 
argument of Domowitz et al (1998) that the increase in volatility is possible if the home and 
the host markets are informationally segmented. 
To summarize, the empirical evidence on the implications of cross-listing and cross-
trading on stock liquidity and volatility is not conclusive and is based mainly on samples of 
US stocks traded outside of the US and of non-US stocks traded in the US. However, a large 
population of non-US stocks cross-listed and cross-traded on non-US exchanges is not 
covered. At the same time, as Domowitz et al (1998) show, the impact of a cross-listing 
depends on the information linkages between the host and home markets. Thus, inclusion in 
the sample of various home as well as host markets could shed more light on the economic 
consequences of a foreign listing/trading. Furthermore, the evidence on the implications of 
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an admission to trade on a foreign exchange is limited. Moreover, there is no evidence on the 
difference between the impacts of cross-listing and cross-trading on stock liquidity and 
volatility. 
 
 
3.3  Hypotheses development 
By making the decision to cross-list on a foreign exchange, a company commits to 
higher levels of disclosure and scrutiny by a greater number of market participants, which, in 
turn, should lower the information asymmetry between company insiders and outside 
investors. Consequently, the adverse selection component of trading costs should be lower. 
Stock liquidity, measured by bid-ask spread and trading volume, and stock return volatility 
are expected to improve if the firm’s information environment improves (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). The improved information disclosure, however, is not the only outcome 
of a cross-listing. Intensified inter-market competition, increased stock-specific information 
production and enhanced stock visibility after the stock becomes available for trading on a 
foreign exchange also potentially have an impact on stock liquidity and volatility. The 
following sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 discuss specifically how international cross-listing and 
cross-trading should affect stock liquidity and volatility. 
 
3.3.1 Liquidity 
There are several potential sources of improvement in a stock’s liquidity after a 
foreign listing. Firstly, in the case of cross-listing, enhanced disclosure as a result of 
compliance with listing requirements reduces information asymmetry (Brown and Hillegeist, 
2007), and positively affects stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Since stock 
liquidity can be defined as the ability to trade large quantities of the stock at low cost, the 
two major dimensions of liquidity are trading quantity and trading cost. Bid-ask spread, a 
proxy for the trading cost dimension of liquidity, represents the cost that a trader must incur 
in order to execute a trade. Thus, a lower bid-ask spread indicates higher stock liquidity. 
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Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) theoretically establish a positive association 
between a bid-ask spread and the level of information asymmetry. Extensive empirical 
evidence confirms that improved disclosure is associated with improved liquidity in terms of 
spreads, trading volumes, depth and adverse selection spread component (Welker, 1995; 
Healy et al, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Heflin et al, 2000; and Krishnamurti et al, 
2005). 
The other sources of improved liquidity apply both for cross-listing and for cross-
trading. Improvement in the information environment could also be driven by the increase, 
after international cross-listing and cross-trading, in the number of market participants that 
have economic incentives to generate stock-specific information in order to profit from 
informed trading. Kyle (1985) shows that information arrival increases trading volumes. 
Noronha et al (1996) empirically confirm the increase in informed trading after cross-listing. 
Furthermore, the presence of foreign traders and market makers for cross-listed and cross-
traded stocks boosts inter-market competition. Stoll (1978 and 2001) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (1995) theoretically show that increased competition forces market makers to 
reduce the spreads. This proposition is supported empirically by Werner and Kleidon (1996). 
Finally, a more liquid trading environment after cross-listing could be expected as an 
outcome of increased stock visibility and investor recognition (Merton, 1987). 
H1.1: Cross-listing or cross-trading on a foreign market improves the liquidity of a 
stock. 
In case of cross-trading, the stock does not benefit from additional mandatory 
disclosure. Although the level of disclosure requirement does not change, the exposure of the 
stock to more traders enhances the level of information available in the market as more 
trading brings more information to the market (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Additionally, 
the sources of potential change in stock liquidity in the case of cross-trading include: 
increased competition among market makers, improved accessibility to foreign investors, 
and change in the composition of the investor base, but not improved disclosure. 
Consequently, cross-trading should have a less significant impact on stock liquidity. 
H1.2: The improvement in liquidity from cross-listing is significantly higher than the 
improvement in liquidity from cross-trading. 
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3.3.2 Volatility 
Limited stock-specific information is a source of risk and, accordingly, of higher 
volatility due to a higher level of uncertainty about the stock’s future cash flows (Barry and 
Brown, 1986; Wang, 1993) and also due to a higher probability of a large one-time stock 
price response to new information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). The other significant 
contributor to higher stock volatility in the presence of information asymmetry is noise 
trading (Campbell and Kyle, 1993; De Long et al, 1990; Wang, 1993), since more active 
noise trading reduces stock price informativeness, meaning it further increases the 
uncertainty about stock fundamentals to uninformed traders, and, consequently, increases the 
stock’s fundamental risk. Therefore, lower levels of information asymmetry between 
corporate managers and shareholders and/or among different groups of investors and traders 
are generally associated with lower volatility. Accordingly, since cross-listing is associated 
with higher levels of information disclosure due to the presence of additional listing 
requirements, it should reduce stock risk (Barry and Brown, 1985 and 1986) and, 
specifically, stock return volatility (Wang, 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  
H2.1: Stock presence on a foreign exchange (listed and/or traded) reduces stock 
return volatility. 
Compared to cross-listing, the change in information asymmetry after cross-trading 
is less profound as it does not impose additional disclosure requirements. However, cross-
trading does increase the production of stock-specific information as the result of the 
increase in the number of market participants that have an interest in the stock as a potential 
source of trading profit. 
H2.2: Cross-listing is associated with greater reduction in stock return volatility 
compared with cross-trading. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between the level of information asymmetry 
and volatility, however, contradicts the theoretical prediction: Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find that increased disclosure is associated with higher 
stock return volatility. Furthermore, a  survey of the literature on the implications of an 
international cross-listing and cross-trading (discussed in section 3.2.2) reveals that stock 
volatility generally increases after cross-listing and cross-trading, particularly when cross-
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listing and cross-trading is associated with an increase in trading activity. I recognize the 
complexity of the relationship between the improved disclosure and stock return volatility 
and explicitly control for other important components of the change in volatility after a 
foreign listing. Particularly, the change in trading volume after cross-listing is one of the 
most important components as its expected impact on volatility is directly opposite to that of 
the impact from increased disclosure, as discussed in the forthcoming section 3.3.4 on the 
main control variables. 
 
3.3.3 Developed vs. emerging home market 
The literature reviewed in section 3.2 provides evidence that the impact of an 
international cross-listing on stock liquidity and volatility differs depending on the level of 
development of the stock’s home market. Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) show that for stocks 
from developed countries stock price informativeness after cross-listing increases, while for 
stocks from emerging countries it decreases. Domowitz et al (1998) develop a theoretical 
model to show that a cross-listing by a stock from a market with poor information linkages, 
which is generally the case for an emerging market, results in a decrease in home market 
liquidity and an increase in stock volatility. This is an outcome of the migration of trading 
activity to the foreign market and consequent deterioration of the quality of the home market. 
Based on the theoretical argument of Domowitz et al (1998) and existing empirical evidence 
(Domowitz et al, 1998; Smith and Sofianos, 1997; Bacidore et al, 2005; Halling et al, 2008, 
Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), I put forward an additional hypothesis on the impact of 
foreign listing/ trading for stocks from developed and emerging markets. 
H3: Compared to stocks from emerging markets, stocks from developed countries 
experience a significantly higher improvement in liquidity and a significantly larger 
reduction in return volatility after cross-listing and cross-trading. 
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3.3.4 Main control variables 
After cross-listing there are several channels through which the information 
environment is affected and, accordingly, this affects stock liquidity and stock volatility. I 
account for the fact that the changes in stock liquidity and volatility after cross-listing are 
potentially driven by the changes in company size, accounting information disclosure 
practices, analyst following, and the level of trading activity, and evaluate whether a cross-
listing and/or a cross-trading have an impact on the stock liquidity and volatility after 
controlling for changes in these factors. 
Firstly, there is evidence that companies that cross-list are larger than those that do 
not (Pagano et al, 2002). In turn, larger companies have a better information environment as 
predicted by the differential information hypothesis (Freeman, 1987). However, based on the 
findings of chapter 2 the implications of cross-listing in terms of the impact on shareholders’ 
wealth are more profound for smaller companies. Arguably, smaller companies overcome 
larger information barriers by means of cross-listing and, consequently, experience greater 
incremental reduction in the level of information asymmetry. Thus, the expectation is that 
larger companies have a lower level of information asymmetry and, accordingly, better 
liquidity and lower volatility; but, the improvement in stock liquidity and volatility after 
cross-listing is more significant for smaller companies. 
Secondly, a cross-listed company is more likely to have adopted superior accounting 
practices (Lang et al, 2003b). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show that higher quality 
information disclosure as the outcome of adopting internationally recognized accounting 
standards and principles is associated with lower levels of information asymmetry, measured 
by bid-ask spreads and trading volume. Thus, the expectation is that an improvement in the 
quality of accounting information around a cross-listing enhances stock liquidity and reduced 
stock volatility. 
Thirdly, cross-listing results in increased attention from financial analysts (Baker et 
al, 2002; Lang et al, 2003a). The quality of the information environment in turn is positively 
related to the level of analyst coverage of the company (Draper and Paudyal, 2008). Thus, 
the expectation is that an increase in analyst coverage after cross-listing improves stock 
liquidity and reduces stock volatility. 
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In the case of volatility, the evidence
53
 supports the argument that higher volatility is 
associated with higher information flows, in line with Black (1986) and French and Roll 
(1986), and with higher trading volumes, in line with Karpoff (1987), Schwert (1989), Jones 
et al (1994) and Chan and Fong (2000). Therefore, it is important to control for the change in 
the level of trading activity after cross-listing. The expectation is that the increase in trading 
activity after foreign listing/ trading significantly increases stock return volatility. 
 
 
3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
In the cross-sectional analysis the liquidity and volatility of cross-listed and cross-
traded stocks are compared against those of pure domestic stocks. However, in order to 
evaluate the impact of foreign presence, and cross-listing and cross-trading individually, on 
the stock liquidity and volatility, it is necessary to account for the fact that, potentially, 
companies that have their shares listed and traded abroad differ in their characteristics from 
companies that have their shares listed and traded only in the home market. Thus, a cross-
listing decision is a matter of choice for a company and largely determined by company-
specific factors. Pagano et al (2002) provide evidence that cross-listing companies tend to be 
larger, more export-oriented and faster growing compared to peer companies from their 
home countries. Similarly, in the case of a cross-trading, larger companies are more likely to 
choose to have their shares traded on a foreign exchange (e.g. US OTC) or to be chosen by 
market makers to have their shares traded on a foreign exchange (e.g. Open market of 
Deutsche Borse). Therefore, there is a potential endogeneity problem in the estimation of the 
relationship between cross-listing and/or cross-trading and stock liquidity and volatility. In 
other words, improved liquidity and volatility after cross-listing and/or cross-trading is 
potentially not an outcome of cross-listing and/or cross-trading as such, but rather the 
reflection of the fact that stocks with better liquidity and lower volatility are more likely to 
cross-list and cross-trade. Therefore, it is essential to control for the self-selection bias in the 
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 Barclay et al (1990), Jayaraman et al (1993), Chan et al (1996), Werner and Kleidon (1996), Forster 
and George (1995), Menkveld (2008) - discussed in the literature review in section 3.2.2. 
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regression analysis. I follow Doidge et al (2004) and use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
estimation method to control for potential endogeneity.
54
  The first stage of this estimation 
procedure evaluates the likelihood of a company cross-listing and/or cross-trading given 
company and home country characteristics, using the sample of cross-listed as well as 
domestic stocks: 
Probability (FPi,t) = f (ωFi,t)     (3.1) 
where Fi,t is the foreign presence dummy variable that equals one if stock i  is cross-listed 
and/or cross-traded in month t and equals zero otherwise; Fi,t are the potential determinants 
of cross-listing and/or cross-trading status. 
Similar to Doidge et al (2004, 2009a), I estimate a probit model that includes 
company size and a number of country characteristics, such as economic development, 
financial development, legal environment and accounting opacity, as potential determinants 
of a cross-listing and/or cross-trading status. Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates from 
the probit model are used to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratios, which are the ratios of the 
probability density function over the cumulative distribution function of a distribution, for 
each observation in the sample:  
for FPi,t =1,  λi,t = φ(ωFi,t)/ Φ(ωFi,t) 
for FPi,t =0,  λi,t = -φ(ωFi,t)/[1-Φ(ωFi,t)]      (3.2) 
where Fi,t is the foreign presence dummy variable that equals one if stock i  is cross-listed 
and/or cross-traded in month t and equals zero otherwise; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio; φ is 
the normal probability distribution function and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution 
function. The Inverse Mills Ratio is an estimate of the non-selection hazard that accounts for 
the probability of a stock with characteristics Fi,t being listed/ traded on a foreign exchange. 
The second stage of the estimation procedure evaluates the relationship between the 
measures of liquidity and volatility and the cross-listing and/or cross-trading status and other 
stock characteristics using a multivariate framework. Multivariate regression specifications 
additionally include the estimated Inverse Mills Ratios in order to account for the self-
selection bias and obtain consistent parameter estimates (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Doidge 
et al, 2004). Thus, the main model specification is as follows: 
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 This procedure has been used in a number of studies including Doidge et al (2004 and 2009a), Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000), Bailey et al (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008).  
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Liquidity/Volatility Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t          (3.3) 
where Di,t is dummy variable that reflects foreign listed/traded status of the stock i in month 
t; Fi,t are control variables; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio.
55
 
In order to control for other important determinants of stock liquidity and volatility 
around the change in listing status, additional interaction variables of the main control 
variables with a dummy variable representing foreign listed/traded status are included in the 
model: 
Liquidity/Volatility Measurei,t = α +βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t         (3.4) 
where Di,t is dummy variable that reflects foreign listed/traded status of the stock i in month 
t; Vi,t are stock characteristics, the main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables; λi,t 
is the Inverse Mills Ratio. 
 
3.4.2 Evolution of stock liquidity and volatility 
As discussed above, the endogeneity concern is that, potentially, more liquid and 
less risky stocks have a higher propensity to cross-list and/or cross-trade outside the home 
market. One way to test this proposition and, additionally, to evaluate the long-term 
sustainability of the changes in liquidity and volatility after the change in the listing status, is 
to track the evolution of stock liquidity and volatility of cross-listed stocks before and after 
cross-listing/trading.
56
  In order to reveal the dynamics, the year of the initial foreign 
presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading is assigned as the year 0, and the years around the year 
0 are assigned accordingly as the years ≤-4, -3, …, 0, +1, …, +3, ≥+4 relative to the year 0. 
Initially, stock liquidity and volatility of cross-listed stocks individually in each of the years 
≤-4, -3, …, 0, +1, …, +3, ≥+4 are compared against the stock liquidity and volatility in the 
year 0 and against the liquidity and volatility of domestic stocks. Then, the evolution of stock 
liquidity and volatility is evaluated using a multivariate regression analysis framework. In 
the cross-sectional regression (model specification (3.4), section 3.4.1) variables representing 
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 The estimation procedure that does not account for self-selection bias engages similar model 
specification without the Inverse Mills Ratio: Liquidity/Volatility Measurei,t = α + γDi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, 
where Di,t is the foreign presence dummy variable for stock i in month t and Fi,t are control variables. 
56
 Similar analysis was performed by Gozzi et al (2008) to track the evolution of Tobin’s Q of cross-
listed stocks around cross-listing event and also by Hail and Leuz (2009) to analyze the sustainability 
of the reduction in the cost of capital of cross-listed stocks around cross-listing. 
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foreign presence, cross-listing and cross-trading listing statuses are replaced with a series of 
dummy variables representing years around foreign presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading 
from beyond year -4 to beyond year +4. Coefficient estimates on these year dummies relative 
to the year of cross-listing/ trading would thus indicate the evolution of stock liquidity and 
volatility before, during the year of and after cross-listing and cross-trading, controlling for 
other factors. 
 
3.4.3 Time-series framework 
The other way to control for the self-selection bias is to examine the changes in the 
liquidity and volatility of the cross-listed stocks before and after the cross-listing/trading. In 
this analysis, the liquidity and volatility of cross-listed/ traded stocks are compared against 
the stock liquidity and volatility of the same stocks over the period of time when the stocks 
were not listed or traded abroad, i.e. had domestic listing status. I use a 36 month period
57
 
before the first foreign listing/trading as the base period for calculation of the base or 
benchmark variables. I calculate the base, or benchmark, measures of stock liquidity and 
volatility for each stock as the averages of these measures over the period of time when the 
stock was not listed/ traded abroad. Then, for the purpose of univariate analysis, I calculate 
ratios of the liquidity/volatility measures as a ratio of the average liquidity/volatility measure 
over the period of time when stock is present abroad (cross-listed and/or cross-traded) to the 
base liquidity/volatility measure for each stock. Estimated liquidity and volatility ratios of 
more than one indicate an increase in a liquidity/volatility measure after the change in the 
listing/trading status. A ratio of less than one represents a decrease. 
Additionally, liquidity and volatility ratios are analysed cross-sectionally using 
multivariate regression analysis. For the purpose of multivariate analysis, ratios of the 
liquidity/volatility measures are calculated for each stock-month by dividing the liquidity/ 
volatility measure by the base liquidity/volatility measure. The regression specifications 
include ratios of the explanatory and control variables, calculated similar to the liquidity and 
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 If a full 36 months of data is not available I only use the data if at least 12 full months of complete 
data are available. 
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volatility ratios, as ratios of a variable in month t to the base variable, i.e. the average value 
of the variable over the period of time when the stock had domestic listing status: 
(Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,t / Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,base) =  
= α + γDi,t + Σθ(Fi,t /Fi,base) + εi,t,             (3.5) 
where Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,t is liquidity or volatility measure of stock i in month 
t; Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,base is base liquidity or volatility measure of stock i, i.e. the 
average over the period of time when the stock was not listed/ traded abroad; Di,t is dummy 
variable that reflects foreign listed/traded status of the stock i in month t; Fi,t are stock 
characteristics, the explanatory and control variables, of stock i in month t; Fi,base are base 
stock characteristics of the stock i, i.e. the average over the period of time when the stock 
was not listed/ traded abroad. Such model specifications allow the examination of whether 
the change in stock liquidity and volatility is driven by the change the foreign listing/trading 
status or by the changes in stock characteristics after cross-listing. 
 
3.4.4 Variables definition and measurement 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables reflect stock price behaviour on the stock’s home market. 
All liquidity and volatility measures, defined below, are calculated for each month using 
daily data. The following widely accepted measures of stock liquidity and volatility are 
calculated. 
Liquidity 
Proportional bid-ask spread is a commonly used liquidity measure (Copeland and 
Galai, 1983; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001) that reflects the 
difference between the ask and bid home market prices relative to the midpoint, i.e. the 
average of the ask and bid prices. Monthly average bid-ask spread is the average of the daily 
bid-ask spreads: Bid-Ask Spreadi,T=(1/Ni,T)∑( Pask i,t - Pbid i,t)/(( Pask i,t + Pbid i,t)/2), where Bid-
Ask Spreadi,T is the average bid-ask spread of stock i in month T; Ni,T is number of trading 
days for stock i in month T; Pask i,t is the ask price of stock i at day t; Pbid i,,t is the bid price of 
stock i at day t. 
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Trading volume in the home market, another common trade-based proxy for stock 
liquidity (Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Rubin, 2007; Chordia et al, 2007), is measured by the 
average daily number of shares traded on the home market in each month:  
VOi,T =(1/Ni,T)∑VOi,t, where VOi,T is average share trading volume of stock i in month T; Ni,T 
is number of trading days for stock i in month T; VOi,t is number of shares traded on the 
home market of stock i at day t. 
Turnover ratio, used by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Leuz (2003) as a proxy for 
the level of information asymmetry, is the monthly average of the daily turnover ratios 
calculated as a ratio of the trading volume by value, i.e. the product of the number of shares 
traded and the stock price, to the stock’s market capitalization
58
:  
TVtoMVi,T =(1/Ni,T)∑(VOi,t Pi,t /MVi,t), where TVtoMVi,T is average turnover ratio of stock i in 
month T; Ni,T is number of trading days for stock i in month T; VOi,t is number of shares 
traded on the home market of stock i at day t; Pi,t is closing price of stock i at day t; MVi,t is 
market capitalization of stock i at day t. 
When a stock is traded in more than one market, as in the case of cross-listed stocks, 
analysis of home market liquidity might not provide a complete picture if a significant 
portion of the stock trading takes place in foreign market(s). Accordingly, it is beneficial for 
an understanding of the stock’s overall liquidity to additionally examine the changes after 
cross-listing/ trading in total trading volume and total turnover ratio. Total trading volume 
and total turnover ratio take into account trading volumes in all markets where the stock is 
listed and traded. 
Total trading volume is the average of the total daily trading volume in each month. 
Daily trading volume is calculated as the sum of the number of shares traded at day t on all 
exchanges in the sample where the stock is being traded: 
VOTotali,T =(1/Ni,T)∑∑VOi,m,t, where VOTotali,T is the average share trading volume of stock 
i in month T; Ni,T is number of trading days for stock i in month T; VOi,m,t is number of shares 
traded on exchange m of stock i at day t. If trading on a foreign exchange takes place in the 
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 This turnover measure is numerically equal to the share turnover (Lo and Wang, 2009), calculated 
as the ratio of the share trading volume to the number of shares outstanding, which is widely used in 
the literature (Datar et al, 1998; Lo and Wang, 2000; Chordia et al, 2001;  Chordia et al, 2007;  
Statman et al, 2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). 
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form of depository receipts (DR) then the number of shares traded on a foreign exchange is 
adjusted using the DR conversion ratio. 
Total turnover ratio is the monthly average of the daily total turnover ratios 
calculated as a ratio of the total trading volume in GB pounds (GBP) to the stock’s market 
capitalization in GBP. Total trading volume in GBP is the sum of the trading volumes in 
GBP on each exchange in the sample where the stock is traded, calculated as the product of 
the number of shares traded and the stock price converted to GBP: 
TVTotaltoMVi,T=(1/Ni,T)∑((∑VOi,m,tP
GBP
i,m,t)/MV
GBP
i,t), where TVTotaltoMVi,T is the average 
total turnover ratio of stock i in month T; Ni,T is number of trading days for stock i in month 
T; VOi,m,t is number of shares traded of stock i on exchange m at day t; P
GBP
i,m,t is closing 
price of stock i on exchange m at day t converted to GBP; MV
GBP
i,t is home market 
capitalization of stock i at day t converted to GBP. 
Volatility 
Higher levels of information asymmetry between companies and shareholders and 
among investors are associated with higher variability in stock returns (Barry and Brown, 
1985 and 1986; Wang, 1993; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). I use three measures of volatility 
to quantify stock risk.
59
  First, following Lang and Lundholm (1993), and Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000), I use stock return volatility as a proxy for information asymmetry 
defined as the monthly standard deviation of the stock’s daily returns including dividend 
income. 
The second measure of volatility is the firm-to-market volatility ratio, used by 
Agrawal et al (2004) and Clayton et al (2005). It additionally accounts for market level 
volatility and is calculated as the ratio of monthly standard deviation of the stock’s daily total 
returns to the monthly standard deviation of daily total returns of the home market index:  
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 The focus of this study is on the total stock risk. A number of studies link the quality of the 
information environment to stock’s idiosyncratic risk (e.g. Ferreire and Laux, 2007; Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008). I acknowledge that stock idiosyncratic risk would be an appropriate measure; 
however, I do not use it due to data limitations. In order to obtain reliable estimates of the 
idiosyncratic risk using a market model a relatively long time series of daily stock returns are required 
(Draper and Paudyal, 1995).  In this study I evaluate and compare stock risk over periods of time 
when the stock had different listing statuses and in many cases the length of such time periods is not 
sufficient to estimate the parameters of a market model. 
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Volatility Ratioi,T = σi,T / σm(i),T, where Volatility Ratioi,T is the firm-to-market volatility ratio 
of stock i, or monthly market-adjusted volatility of stock i’s daily returns in month T; σi,T is 
monthly standard deviation of stock i’s daily returns in month T; σm(i),T is monthly standard 
deviation of stock i’s home market index daily returns in month T. 
The third measure of stock volatility focuses on the intra-day volatility of the stock 
price. The high-low ratio (Parkinson, 1980; Martens and van Dijk, 2007; Alizadeh et al, 
2002) is the average of the daily high-low ratios calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the highest stock price achieved on the day to the lowest price achieved on the day: 
High-low Ratioi,T = (1/Ni,T)∑ln(Phigh i,t /Plow i,t), where High-low Ratioi,T is the average of 
daily high-low ratios of stock i in month T; Ni,T is number of trading days for stock i in 
month T; Phigh i,t is the highest price achieved of stock i at day t; Plow i,t is the lowest price 
achieved of stock i at day t. 
Table 3.1 summarizes definition, measurement and data sources for the dependent 
variables. 
Explanatory and control variables 
Explanatory variable: cross-listing/trading status 
Definition, measurement and data sources for the explanatory variables are presented 
in Table 3.2. The main explanatory variable is the listing status variable that reflects one of 
the following listing and/or trading statuses:  
 domestic, i.e. not listed or trade outside of the home market 
 cross-traded, i.e. traded abroad without stock exchange listing in addition to the 
home market listing 
 cross-listed, i.e. listed on a foreign exchange in addition to the home market listing 
 with a foreign presence, i.e. cross-listed and/or cross-traded inclusive 
 cross-listed and cross-traded, i.e. cross-listed and cross-traded simultaneously 
Listing/ trading status of a cross-listed company in the sample changes over time: 
from domestic to listed and/or traded on one or more foreign exchanges/ trading venues. The 
listing/ trading classification is based on the sample data. 
 
 124 
 
Main control variables 
As outlined in section 3.3.4, a number of firm-specific characteristics could be 
responsible for the change in the stock’s information environment and, accordingly, in stock 
liquidity and volatility. Company size is measured by stock market capitalization. Daily 
stock market capitalization is used to calculate daily measures of stock liquidity and 
volatility, whereas stock market capitalization at the end of the month is used in the 
regression analysis that uses monthly data. International accounting standards (IAS) is the 
dummy variable that proxies for the adoption of IAS or US GAAP accounting practices. The 
IAS variable is time varying, i.e. it reflects any changes in the accounting standards used by 
a company over time. Analyst coverage is measured by the total number of EPS one-year 
estimates on the company in the I/B/E/S database, similar to Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). In 
order to overcome the problem of a high correlation between company size and analyst 
coverage and to assess the incremental role of analyst coverage in reducing the level of 
information asymmetry, I follow Draper and Paudyal (2008) and use residual analyst 
coverage variable in the regression analysis, which is the error term εi,t from the regression of 
the analyst coverage on the company size:  ln(1+ACi) = α + βln(MVi,t) + εi,t, where  ACi 
is analyst coverage measured by the total number of EPS estimates for stock i in the 
preceding year;  MVi,t  is company size measured by the stock market capitalization of stock 
i in month t. The last main control variable of the changes in stock volatility after cross-
listing/trading is the level of trading activity, measured by the stock’s total trading volume, 
defined in section 3.4.4 and Table 3.1. 
Other control variables 
Extensive literature (Roll, 1984; Atkins and Dyl, 1997; Glosten and Harris, 1988; 
Stoll, 1989; and Menyah and Paudyal, 2000; Gregoriou et al, 2005) documents that stock 
liquidity is determined, in addition to company size, by stock return volatility and, in case of 
the bid-ask spread, by the level of trading activity. To control for these two determinants, I 
include the stock turnover ratio and return volatility variables (defined in section 3.4.4) in the 
regressions of the bid-ask spread and return volatility variable in the regressions of the other 
liquidity measures. Further, stock liquidity and volatility are expected to be affected by the 
level of the stock’s ownership concentration that restricts the availability of shares for 
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trading to common investors (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008). 
Ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of shares held by insiders of the total 
common shares outstanding at the end of the preceding year. To control for various 
dimensions of company risk, I include in the regressions of volatility measures company-
level fundamentals such as sales growth, leverage and intangibles. Sales growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the preceding three years. Leverage is the ratio of the total 
liabilities to total assets at the end of the preceding year. Intangibles is the ratio of the total 
value of intangible assets to the total assets at the end of the preceding year. 
Liquidity and volatility of a stock are inevitably affected by the level of the equity 
market liquidity and volatility of the stock’s primary market of trading, i.e. the home 
country. The level of market liquidity and volatility varies significantly across countries and 
is determined by the level of economic and financial development and the level of investor 
protection (Domowitz et al, 2001; Chiyachantana et al, 2004; Chiyachantana et al, 2006). 
Since the sample includes stocks from seventeen countries that vary significantly by the 
above characteristics, it is essential to control for the home country characteristics in the 
regression analysis of liquidity and volatility. 
As a proxy for the level of economic development of the home country I use the 
natural logarithm of the 3-year-average per capita GDP in US dollars. Market size is the 
proxy for the level of financial development of the home country and is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total market capitalization of the Datastream Total Market index, 
converted from local currency to GB pounds. The level of the market liquidity of the home 
country complements market size as, despite their size, some small markets are very liquid. 
Market-level liquidity is measured by the market turnover ratio calculated as the average of 
the daily ratios of the aggregate trading volume by value to the aggregate market 
capitalization of the Datastream Total market index, calculated for each month. To control 
for the legal environment of the home country, I follow Durnev and Kim (2005) and use the 
legal index, defined as the anti-director rights index multiplied by the rule-of-law index, 
which assesses the law and order tradition of a country. Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that 
the Legal index reflects both de jure and de facto aspects of investor protection, which is 
important since some countries with high de jure protection do not have high de facto 
investor protection. The anti-director rights index is from Djankov et al (2007) and the rule-
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of-law index is from Kaufmann et al (2005). Finally, in order to evaluate the change in the 
quality of the stock’s information environment due to a change in the listing status, it is 
necessary to control for the quality of the information environment of the home country, 
which I proxy with the accounting opacity index from Kurtzman et al (2004) that quantifies 
inadequate accounting and governance practices on a country level. 
 
 
3.5 The sample 
The main sample consists of European stocks that are cross-listed on a foreign stock 
exchange(s). The sample stocks are matched with domestic stocks. Cross-listed stocks are 
those that have had their stock cross-listed on at least one foreign exchange in addition to 
listing on the exchange in the home market. Cross-listing data includes events up to 
December 2007 and comes from the stock exchanges’ web-sites, Factiva news database and 
foreign listings dataset of Sarkissian and Schill (2004, 2009a). Data on depository receipts 
(DRs) are from the BNY, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan DRs databases available 
on-line. The additional requirement for sample inclusion is the availability of a home market 
listing, i.e. direct foreign IPOs are excluded. The analysis is performed on the security level 
rather than the company level: all related listings for each cross-listed stock are identified by 
ISIN (data source: Datastream). Underlying ISINs and conversion ratios for depository 
receipts are from the mentioned above DRs databases. Only common equity and major 
securities are included in the sample. 
The initial sample included 820 European cross-listed stocks with multiple foreign 
listing and trading accounts.
60
 For each of these stocks I determine their foreign listing/ 
trading status, as defined in section 3.4.4, for each month from January 1990 to December 
2007.
61
  Stock price and other financial data are obtained from Datastream. After checking 
for the availability of daily data required in order to calculate stock liquidity and volatility 
measures I am left with the sample of 509 cross-listed/traded stocks from 20 European 
                                                 
60
 Those are 820 unique stocks. Each of these stocks contributes to the sample at least one foreign 
account. On average, a sample stock is listed and/or traded on more than one foreign exchange. 
61
 The period of time before year 1990 is excluded from analysis due to poor data availability. 
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countries. The final sample for the regression analysis includes 425 stocks with a foreign 
presence from 17 European countries. The sample is reduced from 509 to 425 stocks due to 
unavailability of data on some of the explanatory and control variables. Columns (2) and (5) 
of Table 3.3 present the distribution of stocks with a foreign presence by home country. The 
most represented country is the United Kingdom, followed by France and Germany.  
For the purpose of the cross-sectional analysis, the sample of cross-listed stocks is 
supplemented by a sample of European domestic stocks, i.e. stocks that have not been listed 
or traded on a foreign exchange. The list of listed and traded stocks for each European 
country in the sample is obtained from Datastream. For each stock in the list I identify 
related listing and trading accounts using the Datastream database. The list of domestic 
stocks is obtained by eliminating stocks with at least one foreign listing/ trading account 
from the Datastream’s list of European stocks. Initially, I identified 4,844 European domestic 
stocks. After checking for the availability of daily data required to calculate stock liquidity 
and volatility measures, I am left with the sample of 3,702 domestic stocks from 20 
European countries. Out of these 3,702 domestic stocks only 1,755 stocks have data 
available for all explanatory and control variables. Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3.3 present 
the distribution of domestic stocks by home country. The most represented country is 
Germany, followed by the United Kingdom
62
 and France. 
The total cross-sectional sample includes observations from January 1990 to 
December 2007 and consists of 4,211 stocks, including 509 stocks with a foreign presence. 
The sample used in regression analysis is reduced due to the unavailability of data for some 
of the explanatory and control variables; the smallest sample used to estimate some model 
specifications contains 2,180 stocks, including 425 stocks with a foreign presence. Columns 
(4) and (7) of Table 3.3 present the distribution of the sample by home country. 
Finally, for the purpose of the time-series analysis, the sample of 509 cross-listed 
stocks from 20 European countries is checked for availability of daily data over the period of 
36 months (at least 12 months) prior to the first foreign listing/trading, i.e. over the base 
                                                 
62
 The relatively small number of domestic stocks from the UK can be explained by the fact that 
majority of the UK stocks are listed or admitted to trade on other European exchanges. Out of the 
1,928 UK stocks available in Datasream, only 546 stocks were identified as domestic, while 1,138 
stocks were identified as stocks with a foreign presence. The majority of stocks with a foreign 
presence are admitted to trade on Berlin exchange, Frankfurt exchange and XETRA. 
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period when a stock had domestic listing status, for the purpose of calculating the base, or 
benchmark, measures of liquidity and volatility. Eventually, for the time-series analysis I am 
left with a sample of 491 cross-listed stocks. 
To avoid drawing spurious inferences from extreme values, the observations of all 
liquidity and volatility measures over the whole sample period are trimmed 1% at each end. 
Similarly, the observations of company size, sales growth, leverage, and intangibles 
variables are also trimmed 1% at each end. The closely held shares variable, proxy for 
ownership concentration, is discarded if it is more than 100 percent.  
 
 
3.6 Empirical results 
The empirical results section first discusses the findings from the cross-sectional 
analysis of cross-listed stocks as well as domestic stocks. The aim is to evaluate the impact 
of the change in the listing status on the stock liquidity and volatility. The cross-sectional 
analysis is followed by a discussion of the evolution in the stock liquidity and volatility 
before and after cross-listing/trading. Then there will be an examination of the changes in 
stock volatility and liquidity performed using the time-series framework. The final sub-
section discusses the implications of multi-market trading for stock from developed vs. 
emerging markets. 
 
3.6.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
In this section the liquidity and volatility of cross-listed stocks is evaluated against 
those of domestic stocks from the respective home countries.  First, there is discussion of the 
descriptive summary statistics of the liquidity and volatility measures and also of firm 
characteristics. Then, the following section estimates the probability of cross-listing and/or 
cross-trading. The estimated probability of foreign presence is used in the following 
multivariate regression analysis in order to control for the potential self-selection bias. The 
final part of the cross-sectional analysis investigates in detail the evolution of stock liquidity 
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and volatility around cross-listing on a year-by-year basis relative to a foreign listing/ trading 
event. 
 
Summary statistics 
Stock liquidity and volatility measures 
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the mean and median of the liquidity and volatility 
measures and the number of stock-month observations (N observations) for the full sample 
and for sub-samples by listing/ trading status. Table 3.4 also reports the difference in 
variable means and medians between two groups of stocks: 1) stocks with a particular 
foreign listing/ trading status (with a foreign presence, and individually for cross-traded only, 
cross-listed only and cross-listed and traded simultaneously), and 2) domestic stocks. The 
significance of the difference in means is evaluated with the t-test, while the significance of 
the difference in medians is evaluated using non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. Based 
on the t-test and the Wilcoxon test, I find that mean and median liquidity measures of stocks 
with a foreign presence are significantly different from those of domestic stocks. In line with 
expectations, compared to those of domestic stocks, stocks with a foreign presence and, 
particularly, stocks that are cross-listed and cross-traded at the same time, enjoy a 
significantly lower bid-ask spread and significantly higher home market trading volume, 
total trading volume, home market turnover ratio and total turnover ratio. However, in 
contrast to the expectation that a foreign exchange listing is associated with greater 
improvement in stock liquidity compared to an admission to trade, cross-traded stocks have 
higher liquidity than cross-listed stocks. Further, Panel A of Table 3.4 reports that, in line 
with expectations, mean and median volatility measures of the stocks with a foreign 
presence, including cross-listed and cross-traded stocks, are significantly lower than those of 
domestic stocks based on the t-test and the Wilcoxon test accordingly. 
Firm characteristics 
Panel B of Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics of firm characteristics that are 
used as control variables in the multivariate analysis. Based on the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
test, companies with a foreign presence and particularly, stocks simultaneously listed and 
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traded abroad, are significantly larger than domestic companies. In fact, a company that has 
its stock listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange is, on average, 25 times larger in terms of 
market capitalization than an average domestic company in the sample. However, I find no 
evidence that companies with a presence on foreign exchange(s) adopt internationally 
recognized accounting standards more often than domestic companies. Only stocks that list 
and trade abroad at the same time have a higher mean IAS variable than domestic stocks. As 
expected, stocks with a foreign presence and, particularly, stocks simultaneously listed and 
traded abroad, have significantly higher analyst coverage than domestic stocks (on average, 
13.8 analysts follow a stock with a foreign presence as opposed to only 2.9 analysts that 
follow a domestic stock) and have significantly lower ownership concentration, measured by 
the percentage of closely held shares, than domestic stocks (the difference in ownership 
concentration between a stock with a foreign presence and a domestic stock is around 20%). 
Furthermore, companies with a foreign presence exhibit significantly lower sales growth, are 
significantly more leveraged, and have a significantly higher ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets. 
Appendix 3.1 reports a correlation matrix of the dependent, explanatory, and control 
variables that indicate that the level of correlations between independent variables is within 
an acceptable range and, thus, should not cause any bias in the estimation of the determinants 
of the stock liquidity and volatility. 
 
Probability of a foreign presence 
The first stage of Heckman’s (1979) estimation procedure, which is used to correct 
potential self-selection bias in cross-listing and cross-trading status, includes modelling the 
probability of a change in the listing status. The probability of a foreign presence is 
estimated using the full sample of cross-listed/ traded and domestic stocks as a function of 
company and home country-specific characteristics. Table 3.5 reports the output from a 
probit regression of the foreign presence dummy variable on company size and a number of 
the home country characteristics, including per capita GDP, market size, legal index and 
accounting opacity index. The coefficients are estimated using maximum-likelihood 
procedures; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the stock level. Pseudo R-squared 
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statistics indicate that the model has significant explanatory power. All variables have the 
predicted sign and are significant. I find that companies are more likely to cross-list and/or 
cross-trade outside of the home country if they are larger and fulfil one of the following 
country-level factors:  higher per capita GDP, smaller capital markets, weaker investor 
protection and higher accounting opacity. Additional analysis (not reported) of the individual 
probability of cross-listing and cross-trading indicates that the determinants of cross-listing 
status and the determinants of cross-trading status are quantitatively similar. The estimates of 
the probability of foreign presence from the probit model are utilized to estimate the Inverse 
Mills Ratios that are used in the second stage of Heckman’s (1979) correction procedure. 
 
Multivariate analysis 
This section discusses the estimation results from the second stage of Heckman’s 
(1979) procedure that accounts for the self-selection bias.  Alternatively, the output of the 
regressions of liquidity and volatility measures without the Inverse Mills Ratio, i.e. of the 
regressions that do not account for the self-selection bias, are reported in Appendix 3.2 for 
the liquidity measures and Appendix 3.3 for the volatility measures. 
A multivariate framework is used to test the main hypothesis that a stock’s 
availability for trading on a foreign exchange can improve the stock’s liquidity and volatility. 
Also I control for other factors that are likely to affect the cross-section of stock-level 
liquidity and volatility. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis is used to test whether the 
impact of cross-listing differs from that of cross-trading. All explanatory and control 
variables are discussed in section 3.4.4 and summarized in Table 3.2. Panel data regressions 
reported in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 for liquidity measures and in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 for 
volatility measures are estimated using an OLS procedure with heteroskedasticity consistent 
(White, 1980) standard errors that are adjusted to account for the possible correlation within 
a cluster (Rogers or clustered standard errors).
63
  Additionally, all model specifications 
include industry-fixed effects to account for potential cross-sectional dependence within an 
industry and year-fixed effects to account for potential dependence across time. Finally, I 
                                                 
63
 This estimation method is chosen based on the findings of Petersen (2009) that it produces unbiased 
standard errors when there is a possibility that residuals are correlated cross-sectionally. 
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control for country level differences by including country-level control variables: per capita 
GDP, capital market size, legal index and accounting opacity index.  
As a robustness test, I use two alternative panel data methods to estimate the 
relationship between stock liquidity and volatility and the stock’s foreign presence 
controlling for other firm-level and country-level determinants of stock liquidity and 
volatility: 1) firm fixed effects that control for all unobserved heterogeneity across stocks 
and 2) random effects. The estimation results are presented in Appendix 3.4 for liquidity 
measures and Appendix 3.5 for volatility measures. 
 
Liquidity 
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report results from the regressions of the liquidity measures, 
bid-ask spread, trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover ratio, 
on the explanatory and control variables that potentially affect stock liquidity. The dependent 
variables are defined in Table 3.1. Regression specifications in Table 3.6 aim to evaluate the 
power of the stock’s foreign presence in explaining stock liquidity and additionally include 
the Inverse Mills Ratio to account for the probability of a stock having a foreign presence. 
Additionally, model specifications (2) of Table 3.6 include interactive variables of 
the foreign presence dummy variable with the main control variables: company size, 
international accounting standards, and residual analyst coverage. This enables the impact of 
the changes in these firm characteristics after cross-listing/ trading to be accounted for. The 
interaction variables measure the incremental contribution to the change in stock liquidity 
due to the change in the company size, company-level accounting practices and analyst 
coverage. 
Regression specifications in Table 3.7 focus on the difference in the impact of cross-
listing and cross-trading on stock liquidity and include, instead of a foreign presence 
variable, cross-listing and cross-trading variables. Additionally, model specifications (2) of 
Table 3.7 include interactive variables of the cross-listing and cross-trading dummy variables 
with the main control variables, company size, international accounting standards and 
analyst coverage. 
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Bid-ask spread 
The hypothesis to test is that cross-listing and, to a lesser degree, cross-trading, 
result in a lower bid-ask spread of the stock. In model specifications that do not control for 
the change in the following variables: company size, analyst following and accounting 
standards (bid-ask spread models (1), Tables 3.6 and 3.7), the coefficient estimates of the 
foreign presence variable and the cross-listed variables are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. However, after introducing interactive variables to reflect changes in firm 
characteristics after the change in listing status, the foreign presence and cross-listed and 
cross-traded variables have coefficient estimates that are negative and statistically 
significant. The foreign presence variable also has negative and significant coefficient 
estimates in the firm fixed effects and random effects models (bid-ask spread models (1) and 
(2) in Appendix 3.4).  
Theoretically, stocks of larger companies that use higher quality accounting 
standards provide lower trading costs to investors due to lower information costs. 
Empirically, I find that indeed, company size and international accounting standards are 
negative and statistically significant determinants of the bid-ask spread (bid-ask spread 
models, Tables 3.6 and 3.7). However, I find that the impact of cross-listing/trading on the 
bid-ask spread is asymmetric based on company size and accounting standards used. It is 
smaller companies that experience a more considerable incremental reduction in the bid-ask 
spread following cross-listing/trading, as suggested by the positive and highly significant 
coefficient estimates on the interaction variables of company size with listing status dummy 
variables (bid-ask spread models (2), Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Similarly, companies that use 
international accounting standards experience an increase in the bid-ask spread after 
becoming present on a foreign exchange, suggested by the IAS*Foreign presence variable 
coefficient of 0.01, which is significant at 1%. The bid-ask spread model (2) of Table 3.7 
reveals that the latter result is driven by cross-traded stocks rather than by cross-listed stocks. 
Greater analyst coverage results in lower information costs for investors and, 
accordingly, in lower bid-ask spreads. Empirically, the coefficient estimate on the residual 
analyst coverage is negative in all bid-ask spread model specifications. However, the 
negative impact of the change in intensity of analyst coverage after the change in listing 
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status holds only for cross-trading (bid-ask spread model (2), Table 3.7). Also, the findings 
are in line with the theoretical expectations that the bid-ask spread is lower for stocks that are 
more actively traded and higher for stocks that exhibit higher return volatility and a higher 
concentration in stock ownership (bid-ask spread models, Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
To summarize, the findings provide empirical support for the hypothesis H1.1 that 
cross-listed and cross-traded stocks have lower trading costs. This finding is in line with 
existing empirical evidence of Foerster and Karolyi (1998), Domowitz et al (1998) and 
Hamet (2002). I find that foreign presence overall, and cross-listing and cross-trading 
individually, significantly reduces the bid-ask spread, after controlling for stock-specific and 
country-level determinants of the bid-ask spread and after controlling for the asymmetric 
impact of company size and company accounting practices on the bid-ask spread following 
cross-listing/trading. However, the expectation that cross-listing has a more profound impact 
than cross-trading due to additional disclosure requirements (hypothesis H1.2) is not 
supported empirically. I find that the impact of cross-listing on the bid-ask spread is similar 
to that of cross-trading: based on the Wald test the difference in coefficient estimates is 
insignificant. 
Trading volume 
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the output of the regressions of home market trading 
volume and total trading volume (the sum of trading volumes on all exchanges and trading 
venues) on the determinants of the stock trading activity. It is found that stocks with a 
foreign presence exhibit more active home and total trading activity, controlling for other 
stock-level and market-level factors (trading volume models (1) and (2), Table 3.6). The 
improvement in home market trading is driven equally by cross-listed and cross-traded 
stocks (trading volume models (1) and (2), Table 3.7). Furthermore, I investigate whether 
trading volume is affected by the change in the listing status itself or rather by the changes in 
firm characteristics that emerge after cross-listing/trading, namely: company size, accounting 
practices and analyst coverage, and estimate model specifications (2) (Tables 3.6 and 3.7).  
As expected, larger companies have higher trading volumes in the home market and 
overall. It is, however, smaller companies that experience a more considerable increase in 
trading volume after cross-listing/ cross-trading, suggested by the negative and highly 
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significant coefficient estimates on the interaction variables of company size with listing 
status dummy variables (trading volume models (2), Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Similarly, 
companies that use international accounting standards experience a reduction in trading 
volume after becoming present on a foreign exchange, suggested by the negative and 
significant coefficient on IAS*Foreign presence variable. Residual analyst coverage is 
associated with both significantly higher home market trading volume and total trading 
volume. However, the liquidity impact is higher for stocks with a smaller increase in analyst 
coverage after cross-listing, as suggested by the negative and significant coefficient estimate 
on the Analysts*ForeignPresence and Analysts*Cross-traded variables. In addition, the 
trading volume models show that the home market trading volume and the total trading 
volume are higher for stocks that exhibit higher return volatility and are lower for stocks 
with a higher proportion of closely held shares (Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Based on the Wald test, 
the difference between the estimated coefficients of cross-listed and cross-traded variables 
(trading volume models (2), Table 3.7) is insignificant. 
Overall, the findings support the hypothesis H1.1 that a stock’s presence on a foreign 
market increases trading volume of the stock. This is in line with the empirical evidence of 
Smith and Sofianos (1997), Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1998), Hamet (2002). However, 
empirical evidence does not support hypothesis H1.2, that is, cross-listing is associated with 
a greater increase in the stock’s trading volume than cross-trading. 
Turnover ratio 
Stocks with a foreign presence do have higher home market and total turnover ratios, 
controlling for other stock-level and market-level factors (turnover ratio models (1), Table 
3.6). However, based on the output of the regressions that include variables reflecting the 
impact of the change in company size, accounting practices and analyst coverage after cross-
listing/trading (turnover ratio models (2), Table 3.6), it is the increase in company size and 
the increase in analyst coverage (in the case of the home market turnover) that drive the 
improvement in the turnover ratios rather the change in listing status per se. Cross-listing has 
a positive and significant impact on stock liquidity, measured by the total turnover ratio, 
after controlling for other factors (total turnover ratio models (1) and (2) Table 3.7). The 
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Wald test provides inconclusive evidence on the difference in the impact of cross-listing and 
cross-trading on the stock’s turnover ratio. 
To sum up, the findings on the change in stock liquidity after cross-listing/ trading 
partly support the hypothesis H1.1 that cross-listing and cross-trading improves the liquidity 
of a stock. More specifically, it is found that cross-listing, as well as cross-trading, 
significantly reduces the stock’s transaction cost measured by the bid-ask spread and 
increases the stock’s trading volumes. This is possibly due to facilitated inter-market 
competition among market makers rather than the increase in the level of information 
disclosure since the evidence suggests that the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on 
the liquidity of a stock is similar. 
 
Volatility 
The next step is to examine whether cross-listing and cross-trading contribute to a 
change in stock return volatility, controlling for other factors that are likely to affect the 
cross-section of stock-level return volatility. I use three measures that reflect different 
aspects of stock volatility: stock return volatility, volatility ratio that accounts for market-
level volatility and high-low ratio that captures intra-day stock price variation. The 
dependent variables are defined in Table 3.1. Then, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report output for 
regressions of the volatility measures on the explanatory and control variables that are 
defined in Table 3.2. Regression specifications in Table 3.8 include the foreign presence 
variable and evaluate the impact of the stock’s foreign presence on stock volatility. Table 3.9 
reports output of regressions that focus on the difference in the impact of cross-listing and 
cross-trading on volatility and include, instead of a foreign presence variable, cross-listing 
and cross-trading variables. Additionally, model specifications (2) of Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 
include interactive variables of the listing status variable with the explanatory variables, 
company size, international accounting standards, residual analyst coverage, and trading 
volume, in order to measure the incremental contribution to the change in stock volatility 
resulting from the change in these firm characteristics after the change in listing status.  
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report that the coefficient estimates on the foreign presence, 
cross-listed and cross-traded variables are negative and statistically significant or 
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insignificant in all model specifications, except for the high-low ratio models (1). After 
controlling for the changes in firm characteristics after cross-listing/ cross-trading (models 
(2), Tables 3.8 and 3.9), coefficient estimates become more negative and statistically 
significant. The exception is the coefficient estimate on the cross-traded variable in the 
volatility ratio model (2) (Table 3.9). The high-low ratio, which has positive and significant 
coefficient estimate in models (1), becomes negative and significant after controlling for the 
change in company size and in stock trading volume (models (2)), implying that intra-day 
volatility is also reduced by cross-listing and cross-trading. 
As predicted, company size is a highly significant negative determinant of all 
measures of stock volatility. However, the impact of foreign presence on stock volatility is 
asymmetric based on company size, meaning smaller companies experience larger 
reductions in volatility following cross-listing/ cross-trading, as suggested by the positive 
coefficient estimates on the interaction variables of company size with foreign presence 
(models (2), Table 3.8). This holds for cross-listed but not for cross-listed stocks (models (2), 
Table 3.9). In contrast to expectations, the coefficient estimate on the international 
accounting standards variable is positive and significant in all model specifications (Tables 
3.8 and 3.9). However, for cross-listed/ cross-traded stocks the adoption of international 
accounting standards is rewarded with lower return volatility. Furthermore, no consistent 
evidence is found that residual analyst coverage has an impact on return volatility. In line 
with extensive empirical evidence in the literature (Karpoff, 1987; Schwert, 1989; Jones et 
al, 1994; Chan and Fong, 2000), higher trading volume is found to be associated with higher 
volatility. The interactive variables of the trading volume and listing status variables capture 
the additional increase in volatility due to the increase in trading activity of cross-listed/ 
traded stocks (return volatility model (2), Tables 3.8 and 3.9). The results also reveal that 
stocks with higher growth rates, higher leverage, higher intangibles and more concentrated 
stock ownership have significantly higher volatility. 
Overall, there is empirical evidence to support hypothesis H2.1 that cross-listing and 
cross-trading reduce volatility. In contrast, there is no evidence found to support hypothesis 
H2.2 that cross-listing results in greater reduction in return volatility compared to cross-
trading due to additional mandatory information disclosure requirements. The impact of 
cross-listing is not different from that of cross-trading as the coefficient estimates are similar 
 138 
 
in magnitude and statistical significance as suggested by the Wald test (Table 3.9). The fact 
that cross-trading reduces volatility as much as cross-listing implies that the improvement in 
the stock’s information environment comes not from the imposed cross-listing disclosure 
requirements but mostly from the increased production of stock-specific information that 
occurs because after cross-listing/ trading, a larger number of investors  have access to the 
stock. 
 
3.6.2 Evolution of stock liquidity and volatility 
Estimates reported in Tables 3.6 - 3.9 provided evidence on whether cross-listing/ 
trading has a significant impact on stock liquidity and volatility. The next empirical question 
is: what are the dynamics of stock liquidity and volatility around cross-listing and cross-
trading? In order to reveal the dynamics, stock liquidity and volatility are examined around 
the initial year (year 0) of foreign presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading. 
Panels A.1, A.2, and A.3 of Figure 3.1 plot the results of univariate analysis of the 
evolution of stock liquidity and volatility around foreign presence, cross-listing, and cross-
trading respectively. To construct the plotted relative measures of stock liquidity and 
volatility, mean liquidity and volatility measures are first calculated for companies with a 
foreign presence in year ≤-4, -3, …, 0, +1, …, +3, ≥+4 relative to the year 0 of foreign 
presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading accordingly, then the calculated means are divided by 
the mean of the corresponding measure of stock liquidity/ volatility of the companies with 
domestic listing status. 
Table 3.10 reports the regression estimation output of the evolution of stock liquidity 
and volatility controlling for other factors. Regression specifications are the same as model 
specifications (2) of Tables 3.6 – 3.9, except that variables representing listing status are 
replaced with a series of dummy variables representing years around foreign presence/ cross-
listing/ cross-trading from beyond year -4 to beyond year +4. Only coefficient estimates on 
the dummy variables representing years around the year of the change in listing status are 
reported in Table 3.10. Panels B.1, B.2, and B.3 of Figure 3.1 plot coefficient estimates on 
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the dummy variables that represent the year relative to the change in listing status reported in 
Table 3.10. 
Bid-ask spread 
A relative bid-ask spread of 0.54 and below (Figure 3.1 Panel A.1) indicates that the 
bid-ask spread of companies with a foreign presence is almost half of that of domestic 
companies even before foreign listing/ admission to trade, as long as it is four or more years 
before cross-listing/ cross-trading. The plot reveals that there is a significant downward trend 
in the bid-ask spread following both cross-listing and cross-trading, suggesting that the 
reduction in the bid-ask spread after foreign listing/ trading endures over time. After 
controlling for other factors that affect the stock’s bid-ask spread, the impact of foreign 
presence is profoundly negative (Panel A of Table 3.10; Panel B.1 of Figure 3.1). 
Specifically, coefficient estimates on the dummy variable representing years relative to 
foreign presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading are positive for the years before the change in 
listing/ trading status and both negative and statistically significant in the year of foreign 
listing/ trading and thereafter. Coefficient estimates on the dummy variables for cross-listing 
and cross-trading are similar in magnitude and statistical significance; in other words the 
impact of cross-listing and that of cross-trading are comparable. Overall, there is evidence 
that listing/trading on foreign exchanges is associated with a significant decrease in the bid-
ask spread that is sustainable over time. 
Trading volume 
Relative trading volume and relative total trading volume measures of 6.33 and 
above (Panel A.1 of Figure 3.1) suggest that mean trading volumes of stocks with a foreign 
presence is at least 6.33 times higher than those of domestic stocks even before the foreign 
listing and continue to increase for the duration of the foreign listing/trading. After 
controlling for other factors, foreign listing status is associated with a positive and 
statistically significant contribution to the stock’s trading volumes (Panel A of Table 3.10; 
Panel B.1 of Figure 3.1). However, the positive impact of the change in listing status is 
observed only around cross-listing, whereas the initial year of cross-trading (year 0) is 
associated with smaller trading volumes. 
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Turnover ratio 
The next proxy of stock liquidity, turnover ratio, accounts for the number of shares 
outstanding. Turnover ratio and total turnover ratios of cross-listed stocks three or more 
years before the year of the cross-listing/ trading event are no different from those of 
domestic stocks. In the year of cross-listing/trading, mean turnover ratios of cross-listing/ 
cross-trading stocks are above the level of those of domestic stocks, in other words, relative 
mean turnover ratio is more than one, and is steadily increasing following the cross-
listing/trading event (Panel A.2 of Figure 3.1). After controlling for other factors, a foreign 
exchange listing is associated with a positive contribution to the stock’s turnover ratio and, 
particularly, total turnover ratio, while admission to trade is associated with a negative 
contribution to the stock’s turnover ratio (Panel A of Table 3.10; Panel B.2 of Figure 3.1). 
This finding empirically supports hypothesis H1.2 that cross-listing has a more profound 
positive impact on stock liquidity than cross-trading. 
Volatility 
Panel A.3 of Figure 3.1 shows that stock volatility, measured by stock return 
volatility, the volatility ratio, i.e. stock return volatility relative to the stock market volatility, 
and the high–low ratio, of cross-listed stocks is less than that of domestic stocks, as relative 
volatility measures are below one for any year relative to a cross-listing/ trading event. There 
is an increase in the mean stock return volatility and high-low ratio during (-1; +1) years 
around the cross-listing/ trading event, followed by a downward trend during and after the 
second year relative to the change in listing status. After controlling for other factors that 
potentially affect stock volatility in the regression analysis, foreign trading is associated with 
a negative and statistically significant contribution to the stock’s return volatility and the 
high-low ratio, while a foreign exchange listing is associated with a negative but 
insignificant contribution to the stock volatility (Panel B of Table 3.10; Panel B.3 of Figure 
3.1). Overall, the decrease in volatility as a result of the change in listing is persistent over 
time. 
To sum up, the findings of the analysis of the evolution of stock liquidity and 
volatility confirm and further extend the results from the cross-sectional analysis (section 
3.6.1). Supportive of the hypothesis H1.1, trading on a foreign exchange is found to be 
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associated with reduced transaction costs. Supportive of the hypothesis H1.2 that cross-
listing has greater positive impact on stock liquidity than cross-trading, cross-listing is found 
to be associated with a significant increase in trading activity, whereas cross-trading is not. 
Furthermore, the findings support hypothesis H2.1 that the stock price of cross-listed/ traded 
stocks is less volatile and do not support hypothesis H2.2 that cross-listing is associated with 
greater reduction in volatility than cross-trading. More importantly, the improvements in 
stock liquidity and volatility due to listing and/or trading on a foreign exchange are found to 
be sustainable more than four years after the initial change in listing status. 
 
3.6.3 Time-series analysis: Change in stock liquidity and volatility around 
cross-listing/trading  
The results from the cross-sectional analysis (section 3.6.1) have revealed a 
significant relationship between stock foreign listing/trading status and stock liquidity and 
volatility. The next step is to examine the changes in stock liquidity and volatility measures 
specifically for cross-listed stocks after the changes in the listing/ trading status. The changes 
are related not only to the stock’s listing status but also to firm characteristics. In contrast to 
the preceding cross-sectional analysis, the benchmark is liquidity and volatility of cross-
listed stocks prior to the change in listing status and not those of domestic stocks. 
Univariate analysis 
Initially, liquidity and volatility measures for each stock are calculated for the 
periods of time when the stock had a different listing status. The liquidity and volatility 
ratios are calculated by dividing the average liquidity/volatility measure over the period of 
time when the stock is present abroad, cross-listed and/or cross-traded, to the base 
liquidity/volatility measure for each stock, i.e. the average for the period of time when the 
stock had just a domestic status. An estimated liquidity/volatility ratio of more than one 
indicates an increase in a liquidity/volatility measure after the change in the listing status 
from the domestic listing status. Stocks with the same listing status are pooled to estimate the 
mean and median effect of the foreign listed/ traded status relative to the domestic status. 
Panel A of Table 3.11 reports mean and median liquidity and volatility ratios for the sub-
samples of stocks with various listing statuses: stocks with a foreign presence inclusive of 
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cross-listing and trading, and individually cross-traded (but not cross-listed) stocks, cross-
listed (but not cross-traded) stocks, and stocks cross-listed and cross-traded simultaneously. 
Liquidity 
Panel A of Table 3.11 reports that the mean and median bid-ask spread ratios of 
cross-listed and cross-traded stocks are less than one and are statistically significant based on 
the t-test and the Wilcoxon test. This finding implies that a sample stock, on average, 
experiences a significant decrease in the bid-ask spread following a foreign listing/ 
admission to trade. The lowest bid-ask spread ratio, in other words, the most considerable 
decrease in bid-ask spread, is for stocks that are listed and traded on a foreign exchange(s) 
simultaneously. 71.7% stocks with a foreign presence and as many as 83.1% of stocks that 
are cross-listed and traded simultaneously have a bid-ask spread ratio less than one. The 
mean and median trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover 
ratio ratios are significantly more than one, suggesting that a sample stock, on average, 
experiences significant increases in trading following a foreign listing/ trading. Around 70% 
of the stocks with a foreign presence have trading volume and turnover ratios of more than 
one, which indicates an increase in trading activity. 
Volatility 
Panel A of Table 3.11 reports that the mean and median volatility ratios of cross-
listed and cross-traded stocks are more than one or are not statistically different from one 
based on the t-test and the Wilcoxon test. This indicates either an increase or no change in 
return volatility after the change in listing status. Less than half of the stocks in the sample 
(48.9% for return volatility ratio, 47.3% for market-adjusted volatility ratio and 42.4% for 
high-low ratio ratio) have volatility measure ratios of less than one, or in other words, less 
than half the stocks experience a decrease in volatility after cross-listing/ trading. Thus, 
based on a univariate analysis there is no evidence that foreign listing/ trading reduces stock 
volatility. 
Firm characteristics 
Summary statistics of the cross-section of cross-listed/traded and domestic stocks 
(Panel B of Table 3.4) show that the firm characteristics of stocks with a foreign presence 
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differ significantly from those of domestic stocks. One possibility is that stocks with 
particular characteristics self-select to list on a foreign exchange. The other possibility, 
however, is that firm characteristics of a given stock change over time and, particularly, after 
a foreign listing. For example, a foreign listing reduces capital constraints for a cross-listed 
firm (Lins et al 2005), which in turn would have a positive impact on the company size as a 
direct outcome of equity capital and debt raising activity. In order to evaluate the change in 
company characteristics around foreign listing/ trading, I calculate ratios of the main control 
variables by dividing a variable mean for the period of time when the stock had a particular 
foreign listing status, by the average value of the variable over the period of time when the 
stock had a domestic listing status. Panel B of Table 3.11 reports the mean and median firm 
characteristics ratios. A variable ratio of more than one indicates an increase in the firm-level 
variable after foreign listing/ trading. The international accounting standards difference is 
calculated as the mean distance between the international accounting standards variable over 
the period of time with a particular listing status to the base international accounting 
standards variable; a positive international accounting standards difference indicates an 
improvement in company accounting practices after cross-listing/ cross-trading. 
There is compelling evidence that cross-listed companies experience a significant 
increase in company size after a foreign listing/ admission to trade as the mean and median 
company size ratios are significantly above one, based both on the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
test. The median company size of a stock with a foreign presence is on average 1.47 times 
larger than the median company size of the same stocks prior to foreign listing/ trading. The 
increase in size is particularly profound for stocks that are simultaneously listed and traded 
on foreign exchange(s): 88.8% of these stocks experience an increase in company size after 
becoming cross-listed and cross-traded. Company size in this analysis is quantified by the 
stock market capitalization, which is the product of the number of common shares 
outstanding and the stock price. Additionally, Appendix 3.6 presents analysis of the change 
in firm characteristics related to company size. It shows that cross-listed stocks experience a 
significant increase in both the number of shares outstanding, which is an indication of 
capital raising activity by cross-listed companies, and, to a lesser extent, in stock price, 
which is consistent with the literature supporting the existence of the cross-listing valuation 
premium (e.g. Miller, 1999; Doidge et al, 2004 and 2009a). Furthermore, Appendix 3.6 
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reports that a significant increase in total assets, which is an alternative proxy for company 
size, after cross-listing/trading is comparable to the increase in the market value. The 
increase in total assets is driven by the increase in the book value of equity capital and even 
more so by the increase in the value of long-term debt. This is consistent with the argument 
of Doidge et al (2004) that companies cross-list to take advantage of existing growth 
opportunities and also consistent with the argument of Lins et al (2005) that cross-listing 
improves access to capital by cross-listed companies. 
Simultaneously cross-listed and cross-traded stocks exhibit significantly improved 
accounting practices: on average, the use of international accounting standards increases by 
19% after foreign listing/ trading (Panel B Table 3.11). Contrary to expectations, the median 
analyst coverage ratio shows that presence on a foreign exchange is not associated with an 
increase in analyst coverage. In fact, for stocks admitted to trade on a foreign exchange there 
is a decrease in analyst coverage relative to the domestic listing status period. The only sub-
group of stocks that experience a statistically significant increase in analyst coverage are 
stocks listed on a foreign exchange. 
Based on the median ownership concentration ratio, stocks with a foreign presence 
and, particularly, simultaneously cross-listed and cross-traded stocks, have more dispersed 
ownership after foreign listing/ trading. Company sales growth, however, reduces after 
foreign listing/ trading: only around 35% of stocks have a sales growth ratio above one. 
There is no evidence that leverage changes significantly around a foreign listed/ trading. The 
ratio of intangible to total assets increases significantly: around 70% of stocks with a foreign 
presence have the Intangibles ratio above one. 
 
Multivariate time-series analysis 
The next step is to regress the liquidity and volatility measure ratios on the dummy 
variables representing a foreign listing and/or trading status and the ratios of the control 
variables in order to detect the primary determinants of the changes in stock liquidity and 
volatility around a foreign listing/ trading. Additionally, I control for market-level liquidity 
in regressions of stock-level liquidity measures. Table 3.12 reports the output of the 
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regressions of the liquidity and volatility measure ratios estimated using an OLS procedure 
with heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) standard errors adjusted to account for 
possible correlation within a cluster. 
Liquidity  
A stock presence (listed or traded) on a foreign exchange is associated with a 
significant decrease in the bid-ask spread and a significant increase in trading activity in 
terms of volume and turnover ratio (model (1), Table 3.12). Coefficient estimates on cross-
listed and cross-traded variables are of the same signs and similar magnitudes (model (2), 
Table 3.12). Additionally, model (3) controls for changes in firm characteristics and market-
level liquidity. As expected, a significant portion of the improvement in liquidity around 
foreign listing / trading can be explained by the increase in company size and by the use of 
better accounting standards. Furthermore, a part of the bid-ask spread reduction can be 
explained by higher stock turnover after foreign listing/ trading, which, in turn, is positively 
associated with increased stock return volatility after cross-listing/ trading. After controlling 
for the change in firm characteristics and for market-level liquidity in model (3), coefficient 
estimates on the cross-listed and cross-traded variables in the bid-ask spread model remain 
negative, however, this is significant only for the cross-traded variable; coefficient estimates 
on the cross-listed and cross-traded variables in the trading volume and turnover models 
remain positive and significant in all model specifications. 
Overall, the empirical results of the time-series analysis of the changes in stock 
liquidity after cross-listing/ trading support hypothesis H1.1 that cross-listing or an 
admission to trade on a foreign market improves the liquidity of a stock as a result of an 
enhanced information environment. However, the results do not support hypothesis H1.2 that 
due to greater enforced information disclosure, the impact of cross-listing on stock liquidity 
is more profound than the impact of cross-trading. On the contrary, it is found that, based on 
the Wald test statistics, the impact of cross-trading is as at least as significant as that of 
cross-listing, particularly in the case of the bid-ask spread. 
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Volatility 
Based on the regression output of models (1) and (2) (Table 3.12), cross-listing and 
cross-trading statuses are not significant determinants of the changes in return volatility and 
market-adjusted return volatility and are significant positive determinants of intra-day 
volatility, measured by the high-low ratio. Based on model (3) that additionally controls for 
changes in firm characteristics, an increase in company size and improvement in accounting 
standards, in line with the theoretical expectations, significantly reduces stock volatility, 
while the enhanced trading after cross-listing/ trading significantly increases stock volatility. 
Coefficient estimates on the cross-listed and cross-traded variables in the volatility models 
are not statistically different from zero, with the only exception being the negative and 
significant coefficient estimate on the cross-traded variable in the return volatility ratio 
model, suggesting that cross-trading reduces stock return volatility. 
Overall, the empirical results of the time-series analysis of the changes in stock 
volatility after cross-listing/ trading do not support hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 which relate to 
the decrease in stock volatility after cross-listing and/or cross-trading due to the 
improvement in the stock’s information environment. 
 
3.6.4 Implications of cross-listing and cross-trading for stocks from developed 
vs. emerging home markets 
In order to test hypothesis H3 that the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading 
differs depending on the stock’s home market, I estimate cross-sectional regressions of 
liquidity and volatility measures on the explanatory and control variables separately for two 
sub-samples: 1) stocks from developed markets and 2) stocks from emerging markets. Tables 
3.13 and 3.14 report the regression output of the liquidity and volatility measures 
respectively. The number of observations from stocks from developed markets is 
significantly larger than the number of observations from stocks from emerging markets. 
This means that the findings from the cross-sectional analysis for the full sample (discussed 
in section 3.6.1) may be driven by stocks from developed markets. Indeed, the findings on 
the determinants of the trading activity of developed market stocks (Table 3.13 and Table 
3.14) are in line with the findings for the full sample (Table 3.7 and Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.13 reports that the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on stock 
liquidity differs for stocks from emerging markets. While cross-listing and cross-trading by 
developed market stocks, on average, are associated with an improved stock liquidity in 
terms of bid-ask spread, cross-listing and cross-trading by stocks from emerging markets 
have no impact on the bid-ask spread. Negative and significant coefficient on the cross-
listing variable for turnover ratio and positive and significant coefficient on the cross-listing 
variable for total turnover ratio can be interpreted as evidence for the migration of the stock’s 
trading to foreign stock exchanges after cross-listing. This finding is in line with theoretical 
argument and empirical evidence of Domowitz et al (1998). 
Table 3.14 reports that there is no conclusive evidence that cross-listing reduces 
volatility for stocks from emerging markets. On the other hand, cross-trading by stocks from 
emerging markets reduces the home market stock return volatility after controlling for the 
increase in volatility due to more active trading. In terms of the reduction in stock volatility, 
cross-trading seems to be more beneficial than cross-listing for stocks from emerging 
markets. 
To summarize, the findings support the hypothesis H3 that stocks from developed 
markets experience more substantial improvement in liquidity and reduction in volatility 
than stocks from emerging markets. These findings are in line with the theoretical argument 
of Domowitz et al (1998)
64
  and the empirical findings of Domowitz et al (1998), Bacidore et 
al (2005), Halling et al (2008), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) on the impact of a foreign 
listing for emerging market stocks, which is the opposite to that of the impact of a foreign 
listing for developed market stocks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Domowitz et al (1998) show that a cross-listing by a stock from a market with poor information 
linkages, which is generally the case for an emerging market, results in a decrease in home market 
liquidity due to the migration of trading activity to the foreign market and increase in stock volatility 
due to deterioration of the quality of the home market. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
A company’s commitment to higher levels of information disclosure and scrutiny by 
market participants after a foreign listing should lower the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors and also between different groups of investors. The enhanced 
information environment of the stock after cross-listing, in turn, should positively affect 
stock liquidity and volatility. This study tests this proposition empirically by examining the 
changes in a stock’s liquidity and return volatility after the stock becomes available for 
trading on a foreign stock exchange. The sample used in the study is a set of European cross-
listed companies that have their shares listed and traded on various foreign exchanges. Since 
the presence on a foreign stock exchange enhances the stock’s information environment via 
additional information disclosure by the company and also via production of stock-specific 
information by an increased number of investors, stocks that can be traded on foreign 
exchange(s) are expected to be more liquid and exhibit less return volatility. Furthermore, 
this study distinguishes between cross-listing and cross-trading, as they differ in the level of 
mandatory information disclosure, and tests the hypothesis that cross-listing improves stock 
liquidity and reduces volatility to a greater extent than cross-trading. 
Three different methods are used to evaluate the relationship between the foreign 
listing status and stock liquidity and volatility. Firstly, the liquidity and volatility of cross-
listed and cross-traded stocks are compared against that of domestic stocks, controlling for 
other determinants of stock liquidity and volatility in the cross-sectional analysis. Secondly, 
the evolution of stock liquidity and volatility measures is tracked in the years around the year 
of cross-listing and/or cross-trading using the sample of cross-listed and/or cross-traded 
stocks as well as domestic stocks. Thirdly, stock liquidity and volatility after cross-listing 
and cross-trading are evaluated against those of the same stocks for the period of time prior 
to cross-listing and cross-trading using time-series analysis. Additionally, the impact of 
foreign listing and trading is evaluated individually for stocks from developed markets and 
for stocks from emerging markets to test the hypothesis that the implications of cross-listing 
and cross-trading depend on the level of economic development of the stock’s home market. 
The empirical evidence show that, compared to purely domestic stocks, stocks that 
can be traded on an exchange(s) outside of the home country have lower transaction costs, 
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higher trading activity and a less volatile stock return. After controlling for the self-selection 
bias and other factors that potentially affect stock liquidity and return volatility, a presence 
on a foreign exchange is associated with a significant reduction in transaction costs measured 
by the bid-ask spread, increase in trading volumes and a significant reduction in return 
volatility. Higher turnover ratios of stocks with foreign presence are mainly explained by the 
increase in company size after cross-listing and cross-trading. Cross-listing, however, is 
associated with significant improvements in the total trading volume and total turnover ratio 
as an outcome of active trading on foreign exchange(s) after cross-listing. 
The important finding is that the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on stock 
liquidity and volatility is sustained over time. More specifically, the observed decrease in 
bid-ask spread, the increase in total trading volume, and the decrease in volatility are 
sustained for four or more years after cross-listing and cross-trading. 
Evidence from time-series analysis that investigates the changes in the liquidity and 
volatility of cross-listed stocks suggests that cross-listing and cross-trading are associated 
with significant improvement in stock’s liquidity. This is true even after controlling for the 
change in firm characteristics following the change in listing status.  
The next major finding of this study is that the impact of cross-listing is not 
significantly different from that of cross-trading. There are two possible explanations for 
this. First, there is a possibility that the information environment of cross-listed stocks, 
although improved due to additional mandatory disclosure requirements, is not substantially 
better than the information environment of cross-traded stocks. The sample contains 
European stocks cross-listed on various exchanges, including European exchanges. The level 
of additional information disclosed from cross-listing within the European Union is not 
expected to be significant due to the presence of the mutual recognition principle with 
regards to stock exchange listings. According to this principle, EU-complied companies are 
not subject to any additional legal and disclosure requirements when cross-listing within the 
European Union. Due to the substantially different legal frameworks they offer, comparing 
the impact of cross-listing on different markets, particularly, the US and continental Europe, 
on the stock’s information environment, is one of the directions for future research on cross-
listing.  
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Second, the similar impact of cross-listing and cross-trading can be explained by the 
fact that along with added mandatory disclosure, there are other important factors that 
equally affect the information environment of cross-listed and cross-traded stocks. More 
specifically, these factors include improved stock accessibility to foreign investors, 
intensified competition among market makers, and increased production of stock-specific 
information by a larger number of market participants that have an economic interest in the 
stock after cross-listing and cross-trading. The finding that the difference between the 
implications of cross-listing and cross-trading is not significant triggers new questions for 
future research regarding the motivations and justification for cross-listing vs. cross-trading. 
Finally, the impact of increased scrutiny and disclosure after a foreign listing differs 
significantly based on the level of economic development of the home country. The findings 
discussed above on the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on stock’s liquidity and 
volatility are driven by the observations contributed by stocks from developed markets. For 
stocks from emerging markets, cross-listing has no significant impact on the stock’s liquidity 
and volatility. Cross-trading, however, is more beneficial for stocks from emerging markets 
than cross-listing in terms of reduction in the stock return volatility. 
 
Implications of the findings: 
The economic consequences of the findings of this study are relevant to corporate 
financial managers as well as equity investors and traders. It has been shown that foreign 
listing and trading result in a significant decrease in bid-ask spread, increase in home market 
and total trading activity and reduction in stock return volatility. This means that cross-
listing and cross-trading should be viewed by corporate financial managers as a means to 
achieve a lower cost of capital. When considering a foreign listing or an admission to trade 
as a corporate strategy to improve stock liquidity and risk (and ultimately the value of the 
firm) managers should consider the evidence that there is no significant difference in the 
impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on transaction costs and return volatility. 
Nevertheless, evidence shows that cross-listing results in greater total trading activity as a 
result of more active trading on foreign host exchange(s). The additional benefit of cross-
listing in terms of more active trading should, however, be evaluated against the extra costs 
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associated with a cross-listing as opposed to cross-trading. For equity investors and traders it 
is relevant to know that cross-listed and cross-traded stocks offer lower costs of trading, 
higher stock liquidity and lower return volatility and, accordingly, lower price uncertainty.
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Figure 3.1 The evolution of stock liquidity and volatility around cross-listing and/or cross-trading 
Panel A.1 The evolution of relative stock liquidity. Panel A plots the relative measures of stock liquidity in each year around the year of foreign presence, cross-listing and 
cross-trading (year 0). Foreign presence is inclusive of cross-listing and cross-trading. The relative measure of stock liquidity is defined as the mean measure of stock liquidity of 
the sub-sample of stocks with a particular listing status over the mean measure of stock liquidity of domestic stocks. 
         
 
Panel B.1 The evolution of stock liquidity: regression analysis. Panel B plots the coefficient estimates of the year-specific dummy variables relative to the year of foreign 
presence, cross-listing and cross-trading (year 0) from regressions reported in Table 3.10. Foreign presence is inclusive of cross-listing and cross-trading. 
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Panel A.2 The evolution of relative stock liquidity. Panel A plots the relative measures of stock liquidity in each year around the year of foreign presence, cross-listing and 
cross-trading (year 0). Foreign presence is inclusive of cross-listing and cross-trading. The relative measure of stock liquidity is defined as the mean measure of stock liquidity of 
the sub-sample of stocks with a particular listing status over the mean measure of stock liquidity of domestic stocks. 
     
 
Panel B.2 The evolution of stock liquidity: regression analysis. Panel B plots the coefficient estimates of the year-specific dummy variables relative to the year of foreign 
presence, cross-listing and cross-trading (year 0) from regressions reported in Table 3.10. Foreign presence is inclusive of cross-listing and cross-trading. 
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Panel A.3 The evolution of relative stock volatility. Panel A plots the relative measures of stock volatility in each year around the year of foreign presence, cross-listing and 
cross-trading (year 0). Foreign presence is inclusive of cross-listing and cross-trading. The relative measure of stock volatility is defined as the mean measure of stock volatility of 
the sub-sample of stocks with a particular listing status over the mean measure of stock volatility of domestic stocks. 
           
 
Panel B.2 The evolution of stock volatility: regression analysis. Panel B plots the coefficient estimates of the year-specific dummy variables relative to the year of foreign 
presence, cross-listing and cross-trading (year 0) from regressions reported in Table 3.10. Foreign presence is inclusive of cross-listing and cross-trading. 
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Table 3.1 Stock liquidity and volatility measures 
The table presents the list of stock liquidity and volatility measures and provides definition and data 
sources for each of the variables. 
Variable Definition/ Measurement Data source
Proportional Bid-ask 
spread
Monthly average bid-ask spread is the average of the daily bid-ask 
spreads. Daily bid-ask spread is the ratio of the difference between ask and 
bid home market prices to the average of ask and bid prices
Datastream
Trading volume the average daily number of shares traded on the home market for each 
month
Datastream
Turnover ratio the average of the daily turnover ratios. Daily turnover ration is the product 
of the number of shares traded and the stock price divided by the stock's 
market capitalization
Datastream
Total trading volume the average of the total daily trading volume for each month. Daily trading 
volume is the sum of the number of shares traded on all exchanges in the 
sample
Datastream
Total turnover ratio the average of the daily total turnover ratios. Daily total turnover ratio is 
calculated as the total trading volume in GBP divided by the stock market 
capitalization in GBP. Total trading volume in GBP is the sum of the trading 
volumes in GBP on each exchange in the sample, calculated as the product 
of the number of shares traded and the stock price converted to GBP
Datastream
Return volatility monthly standard deviation of the stock's daily total return (including dividend 
income)
Datastream
Volatility ratio the ratio of monthly standard deviation of the stock's daily total return to 
monthly standard deviation of the home market index daily total return
Datastream
High-low ratio the average of the daily high-low ratios. Daily high-low ratio is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of the highest stock price to the lowest stock price 
achieved on the day
Datastream
Liquidity
Volatility
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Table 3.2 Explanatory and control variables 
The table presents the list of the explanatory and control variables and the abbreviation used in the 
forthcoming tables, and provides definition and data sources for each of the variables. 
Variable Abbreviation Definition/ Measurement Data source
Foreign presence Foreign presence;        
FP
dummy variable =1 if stock is listed and/or 
traded on a foreign exchange, =0 otherwise
the sample
Inverse Mills Ratio Inverse Mills Ratio derived from probit model estimation of 
probability for a stock to have a foreign 
presence
estimated
Cross-listed Cross-listed;                  
CL
dummy variable =1 if stock is listed on a 
foreign exchange, =0 otherwise
the sample
Cross-traded Cross-traded;                
CT
dummy variable =1 if stock is admitted to 
trading on a foreign exchange, =0 
otherwise
the sample
Company size Company size stock market capitalization, daily and 
monthly at the end of the month
Datastream
International accounting 
standards
Int accounting 
standards;                   
IAS
dummy variable =1 if company used IAS, 
IFRS or US GAAP at the end of the 
proceeding year, =0 otherwise
Datastream
Analysts coverage Analysts coverage the total number of EPS one-year estimates 
on the company 
I/B/E/S, Datastream
Analysts coverage 
residual
Analysts;                       
Analysts Residual
the error term from the regression of the 
analysts coverage on the company size
estimated
Ownership concentration Own. concentration closely held shares – the percentage of 
shares held by insiders of the total common 
shares outstanding at the end of the 
preceding year
Datastream
Sales growth Sales growth the percentage increase in sales over the 
preceding three years
Datastream
Leverage Leverage the ratio of the total liabilities to total assets at 
the end of the preceding year
Datastream
Intangibles to Total 
assets ratio
Intangibles the ratio of total value of intangible assets to 
total assets at the end of the preceding year
Datastream
GDP per capita GDP per capita the natural logarithm of the 3-year average 
GDP per capita in USD
UN Statistics Division
Capital market size Market size the natural logarithm of total market 
capitalization of the DS Total Market index 
converted from local currency to GBP
Datastream
Market liqudity Market turnover the average daily ratio of the aggregate 
trading volume by value to the aggregate 
market capitalization of the DS Total market 
index calculated for each month
Datastream
Legal index Legal index the anti-director rights index multiplied by 
the rule-of-law index
Djankov et al (2007), 
Kaufmann et al (2005)
Accounting opacity Accounting opacity accounting opacity index Kurtzman et al (2004) 
Market-level variables
Stock-level variables
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Table 3.3 Sample description 
The table reports the sample description by the home country. It displays the number of companies with a 
foreign presence, i.e. listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange(s), the number of domestic companies, 
i.e. listed and traded in the home country exclusively, and the total number of companies, which is the 
sum of the two previous categories, for each home country in the sample and for the total sample. 
Columns (2) – (4) report description of the sample that includes stocks with data available for all liquidity 
and volatility measures defined in Table 3.1. Columns (5) – (7) report description of the sample that 
includes stocks with data available for all liquidity and volatility measures defined in Table 3.1 as well as 
with data available for all explanatory and control variables defined in Table 3.2. Accordingly, the former 
sample is used in univariate analysis, while the latter sample is used in multivariate regression analysis 
that incorporates the explanatory and control variables. Stocks from Belgium, Luxemburg and Norway 
are excluded from multivariate regression analysis due to unavailability of data on the control variables. 
Home Country
Number of 
companies with 
foreign presence
Number of 
domestic 
companies
Total 
number of 
companies
Number of 
companies with 
foreign presence
Number of 
domestic 
companies
Total 
number of 
companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Austria 11 6 17 10 2 12
Belgium 13 80 93 0 0 0
Denmark 12 115 127 12 68 80
Finland 9 42 51 8 32 40
France 57 442 499 55 245 300
Germany 55 1559 1614 51 685 736
Hungary 11 13 24 11 2 13
Ireland 42 6 48 33 4 37
Italy 20 64 84 18 38 56
Luxemburg 7 9 16 0 0 0
Netherlands 22 26 48 20 22 42
Norway 12 77 89 0 0 0
Poland 9 199 208 9 50 59
Portugal 2 29 31 2 15 17
Russia 34 122 156 23 26 49
Spain 10 26 36 10 17 27
Sweden 17 110 127 15 27 42
Switzerland 22 74 96 20 63 83
Turkey 12 250 262 11 162 173
United Kingdom 132 453 585 117 297 414
Total 509 3702 4211 425 1755 2180
Sample with data available               
for liquidity and volatility measures
Sample with data available              
for all variables
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Table 3.4. Summary statistics 
Panel A of the table reports the summary statistics of the stock liquidity and volatility measures by 
different listing status. Liquidity and volatility measures are defined in Table 3.1. Panel B of the table 
reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics by different listing status. Company-specific 
variables are defined in Table 3.2. All stocks are inclusive of domestic stocks and stocks with a foreign 
presence, i.e. listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange(s). Stocks with a foreign presence include traded 
only stocks, i.e. traded abroad without stock exchange listing in addition to the home market listing, 
cross-listed only stocks, i.e. listed on a foreign exchange in addition to the home market listing, and cross-
listed and cross-traded stocks (CL and CT), i.e. cross-listed and cross-traded simultaneously. Number of 
observations (N) is the number of stock-months observations of available data. Mean-difference with 
domestic is the difference between the mean of the sub-sample with a particular listing status and the 
mean of domestic stocks. Median-difference with domestic is the difference between the median of the 
sub-sample with a particular listing status and the median of domestic stocks.  
Variable
Listing/ trading 
status
N 
observations Mean
Mean - 
difference with 
Domestic (1) Median
Median - 
difference with 
Domestic (2) Min Max St Dev
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Liquidity
Bid-ask spread All 293,978 0.035 0.020 0.000 1.08 0.05
Domestic 253,644 0.039 0.023 0.000 1.08 0.05
Foreign Presence 40,334 0.013 -0.026*** 0.005 -0.017*** 0.000 0.40 0.02
Traded only 21,602 0.015 -0.024*** 0.006 -0.017*** 0.000 0.40 0.03
Cross-listed only 8,142 0.017 -0.022 0.009 -0.013*** 0.000 0.32 0.03
CL and CT 10,590 0.006 -0.033*** 0.003 -0.020*** 0.000 0.40 0.01
Trading volume All 293,978 599.9 12.2 0.000 39,820 2,525
Domestic 253,644 186.8 7.8 0.000 35,876 959
Foreign Presence 40,334 3,198.0 3,011.2*** 767.7 759.8*** 0.000 39,820 5,733
Traded only 21,602 3,003.8 2,817.1*** 655.2 647.3*** 0.000 39,820 5,847
Cross-listed only 8,142 1,631.0 1,444.3** 374.0 366.1*** 0.005 29,555 2,998
CL and CT 10,590 4,798.8 4,612.0*** 1,791.9 1,784.0*** 0.178 39,441 6,633
Total trading All 293,978 678.7 12.7 0.000 43,364 2,852
volume Domestic 253,644 189.6 7.9 0.000 41,116 995
Foreign Presence 40,334 3,754.5 3,564.8*** 1,092.1 1,084.2*** 0.011 43,364 6,490
Traded only 21,602 3,393.7 3,204.1*** 801.5 793.5*** 0.150 43,364 6,578
Cross-listed only 8,142 1,895.6 1,706.0** 517.9 510.0*** 0.011 33,163 3,289
CL and CT 10,590 5,919.5 5,729.9*** 3,005.5 2,997.6*** 0.361 42,605 7,498
Turnover ratio All 293,978 2.40 1.01 0.000 57.29 4.21
Domestic 253,644 2.23 0.86 0.000 57.29 4.34
Foreign Presence 40,334 3.52 1.30*** 2.83 1.98*** 0.000 23.20 3.03
Traded only 21,602 3.73 1.51*** 3.06 2.20*** 0.000 23.20 3.14
Cross-listed only 8,142 2.25 0.02** 1.86 1.00*** 0.001 17.67 2.00
CL and CT 10,590 4.06 1.84*** 3.58 2.73*** 0.001 22.82 3.17
Total turnover All 293,978 2.57 1.08 0.000 57.29 4.35
ratio Domestic 253,644 2.25 0.87 0.000 57.29 4.36
Foreign Presence 40,334 4.56 2.31*** 3.68 2.82*** 0.000 34.13 3.71
Traded only 21,602 4.53 2.29*** 3.65 2.78*** 0.000 30.41 3.76
Cross-listed only 8,142 3.15 0.91*** 2.44 1.57*** 0.006 28.09 2.97
CL and CT 10,590 5.70 3.45*** 4.90 4.03*** 0.009 34.13 3.74  
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Table 3.4 continued 
Variable
Listing/ trading 
status
N 
observations Mean
Mean - 
difference with 
Domestic (1) Median
Median - 
difference with 
Domestic (2) Min Max St Dev
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Volatility
Return volatility All 293,978 0.022 0.020 0.000 0.10 0.01
Domestic 253,644 0.022 0.020 0.000 0.10 0.01
Foreign Presence 40,334 0.018 -0.004*** 0.017 -0.004*** 0.000 0.06 0.01
Traded only 21,602 0.018 -0.004*** 0.017 -0.004*** 0.000 0.06 0.01
Cross-listed only 8,142 0.017 -0.005* 0.016 -0.004*** 0.000 0.05 0.01
CL and CT 10,590 0.017 -0.005*** 0.016 -0.004*** 0.001 0.05 0.01
Volatility ratio All 293,978 2.410 2.022 0.000 20.01 1.59
Domestic 253,644 2.482 2.087 0.000 20.01 1.66
Foreign Presence 40,334 1.961 -0.52*** 1.772 -0.314*** 0.000 10.36 0.95
Traded only 21,602 1.960 -0.521*** 1.764 -0.323*** 0.000 10.36 0.98
Cross-listed only 8,142 2.041 -0.441** 1.850 -0.237*** 0.020 9.94 1.01
CL and CT 10,590 1.902 -0.58*** 1.737 -0.350*** 0.091 8.82 0.82
High- low ratio All 293,978 0.033 0.027 0.000 0.19 0.02
Domestic 253,644 0.034 0.028 0.000 0.19 0.02
Foreign Presence 40,334 0.028 -0.006*** 0.024 -0.004*** 0.001 0.13 0.01
Traded only 21,602 0.029 -0.005*** 0.025 -0.003*** 0.001 0.13 0.02
Cross-listed only 8,142 0.026 -0.008*** 0.022 -0.006*** 0.001 0.12 0.01
CL and CT 10,590 0.027 -0.007*** 0.024 -0.004*** 0.001 0.12 0.01
(1) statistical significance reported is based on t-test
(2) statistical significance reported is based on Wilcoxon rank sum test
‘***’ indicates significance at 1% , ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%  
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Table 3.4 continued 
Variable
Listing/ trading 
status
N 
observations Mean
Mean - 
difference with 
Domestic (1) Median
Median - 
difference with 
Domestic (2) Min Max St Dev
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Company All 280,816 923 53 0 49,349 3,585
size Domestic 241,366 210 38 0 49,310 885
Foreign Presence 39,450 5,286 5,075*** 2,060 2,023*** 2 49,349 8,034
Traded only 21,249 3,852 3,642*** 1,546 1,509*** 2 49,349 6,250
Cross-listed only 8,105 3,448 3,237*** 862 824*** 2 48,681 6,195
CL and CT 10,096 9,780 9,569*** 5,970 5,932*** 4 49,280 10,582
Int. accounting All 248,387 0.35 0.0 0.00 1.00 0.48
standards Domestic 209,693 0.35 0.0 0.00 1.00 0.48
Foreign Presence 38,694 0.34 -0.01*** 0.0 0*** 0.00 1.00 0.47
Traded only 20,944 0.35 0.01 0.0 0 0.00 1.00 0.48
Cross-listed only 7,582 0.20 -0.15*** 0.0 0*** 0.00 1.00 0.40
CL and CT 10,168 0.41 0.06*** 0.0 0*** 0.00 1.00 0.49
Analysts All 273,594 4.5 1.0 0.0 54.0 7.1
coverage Domestic 233,788 2.9 1.0 0.0 41.0 5.1
Foreign Presence 39,806 13.8 10.9*** 13.0 12.0*** 0.0 54.0 9.8
Traded only 21,439 12.1 9.2*** 11.0 10.0*** 0.0 48.0 8.8
Cross-listed only 7,959 12.9 10.0*** 11.0 10.0*** 0.0 50.0 10.5
CL and CT 10,408 17.9 15.0*** 18.0 17.0*** 0.0 54.0 10.0
Ownership All 186,234 43.46 45.98 0.00 100.0 27.0
concentration Domestic 151,429 47.15 50.57 0.00 100.0 26.2
Foreign Presence 34,805 27.39 -19.76*** 22.97 -27.60*** 0.00 100.0 24.1
Traded only 19,016 29.84 -17.31*** 25.72 -24.85*** 0.00 100.0 24.7
Cross-listed only 6,827 26.29 -20.86*** 23.23 -27.34*** 0.00 97.9 22.9
CL and CT 8,962 23.04 -24.11*** 16.39 -34.18*** 0.00 100.0 23.0
Sales All 240,962 0.48 0.16 -0.95 22.7 1.50
growth Domestic 203,788 0.51 0.16 -0.95 22.7 1.60
Foreign Presence 37,174 0.31 -0.20*** 0.15 -0.01*** -0.78 7.9 0.70
Traded only 20,227 0.31 -0.20*** 0.15 -0.01*** -0.76 7.9 0.68
Cross-listed only 7,207 0.33 -0.18*** 0.17 0.01 -0.78 7.7 0.78
CL and CT 9,740 0.29 -0.22*** 0.14 -0.03*** -0.76 7.3 0.69
Leverage All 262,944 0.57 0.58 0.01 1.38 0.24
Domestic 224,652 0.56 0.57 0.01 1.38 0.25
Foreign Presence 38,292 0.62 0.06*** 0.62 0.05*** 0.05 1.21 0.22
Traded only 20,628 0.60 0.04*** 0.60 0.04*** 0.05 1.21 0.22
Cross-listed only 7,556 0.62 0.06*** 0.63 0.06*** 0.05 1.19 0.22
CL and CT 10,108 0.65 0.09*** 0.64 0.07*** 0.05 1.00 0.22
Intangibles All 258,522 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.67 0.13
Domestic 221,028 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.66 0.13
Foreign Presence 37,494 0.12 0.03*** 0.06 0.04*** 0.00 0.67 0.14
Traded only 20,290 0.12 0.03*** 0.07 0.05*** 0.00 0.65 0.14
Cross-listed only 7,339 0.10 0.02*** 0.03 0.01* 0.00 0.66 0.14
CL and CT 9,865 0.13 0.04*** 0.06 0.04*** 0.00 0.67 0.15
(1) statistical significance reported is based on t-test
(2) statistical significance reported is based on Wilcoxon rank sum test
‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%  
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Table 3.5 Probability of foreign presence 
The table reports the output from binary probit model regression of the dependent variable, foreign 
presence, on the company size and market-level variables: Probability (FPi,t) = f (ωFi,t), where Fi,t is the 
foreign presence dummy variable that equals one if stock i  is cross-listed and/or cross-traded in month t 
and equals zero otherwise; Fi,t are the potential determinants of cross-listing and/or cross-trading status. 
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.2. The number (N) of observations is the number of 
stock-months observations of available data. The coefficients are estimated using maximum-likelihood 
procedures, standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the stock level. 
Estimate z-stat Pr > |z|
Intercept -9.60 -9.77 <.0001
Company size 0.59 31.06 <.0001
GDP per capita 0.86 7.56 <.0001
Market size -0.28 -8.15 <.0001
Legal index -0.21 -6.75 <.0001
Accounting opacity 1.88 5.86 <.0001
Pseudo R-Sq 0.513
N observations 266,942
N stocks 3,967
Varible
Foreign presence
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Table 3.6 Stock liquidity and a foreign presence 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model 
(1) specification: Liquidity Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, and Model (2) specification: 
Liquidity Measurei,t = α +βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, where Di,t is foreign presence dummy 
variable; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio. The 
explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number of 
stock-months observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity 
consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, 
‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Foreign presence 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.72*** 2.02*** 1.11*** 1.85*** 0.67*** -1.56*** 1.77*** -1.01*
(4.20) (-3.19) (7.06) (5.18) (11.60) (5.63) (5.03) (-3.83) (9.68) (-1.72)
Company size*FP 0.004*** -0.15*** -0.09* 0.36*** 0.40***
(5.88) (-2.70) (-1.84) (5.73) (5.31)
IAS*FP 0.01*** -0.88*** -0.27** -0.36** 0.62***
(6.58) (-6.91) (-2.18) (-1.98) (3.01)
Analysts*FP -0.002** -0.28*** -0.36*** 0.45*** 0.30
(-2.30) (-2.78) (-3.84) (3.79) (1.54)
Company size -0.01*** -0.01*** 1.21*** 1.47*** 1.13*** 1.27*** 0.90*** 0.28* 0.71*** -0.00
(-28.95) (-27.40) (13.58) (12.13) (13.16) (11.74) (6.73) (1.66) (4.75) (-0.00)
Stock turnover ratio -0.001*** -0.001***
(-14.87) (-15.31)
Return volatility 0.41*** 0.40*** 45.02*** 43.35*** 43.58*** 42.94*** 76.12*** 76.32*** 78.68*** 80.44***
(15.31) (14.89) (22.50) (22.05) (21.96) (21.91) (24.77) (25.16) (24.57) (25.58)
Int accounting stnds -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.04 0.13* 0.06 0.09 -0.37*** -0.24** -0.21** -0.30***
(-7.65) (-9.08) (-0.63) (1.86) (0.90) (1.38) (-3.92) (-2.48) (-2.04) (-3.02)
Own. concentration 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(3.88) (4.14) (-22.49) (-22.49) (-22.54) (-22.52) (-16.71) (-16.74) (-17.07) (-17.19)
Analysts following -0.001** -0.00 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.57*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.19***
(-1.98) (-1.22) (11.62) (11.61) (11.52) (11.84) (6.39) (4.58) (4.01) (3.88)
Market turnover 0.003** 0.00 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18***
(2.31) (1.50) (6.02) (7.06) (5.08) (5.55) (12.65) (12.56) (11.77) (11.01)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.004** -1.33*** -1.05*** -1.62*** -1.48*** -2.81*** -3.49*** -3.45*** -4.23***
(0.45) (2.06) (-8.13) (-5.68) (-10.40) (-8.81) (-7.82) (-8.76) (-9.29) (-10.55)
Market size 0.01*** 0.005*** -0.07 -0.18*** -0.00 -0.05 -0.45*** -0.23** -0.28*** -0.01
(8.68) (8.10) (-1.28) (-2.85) (-0.01) (-0.85) (-5.24) (-2.51) (-3.14) (-0.16)
Legal index -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.69*** -0.76*** -0.64*** -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.50*** -0.56*** -0.37***
(-3.33) (-5.11) (-13.18) (-12.81) (-12.86) (-12.21) (-9.19) (-6.44) (-7.95) (-4.93)
Accounting opacity -0.02** -0.01 5.29*** 5.96*** 4.44*** 4.81*** 2.81*** 1.14 1.45** -0.41
(-2.05) (-0.75) (10.90) (11.15) (9.36) (9.49) (4.61) (1.61) (2.20) (-0.56)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.004*** 0.002** 1.19*** 1.68*** 0.99*** 1.24*** 1.75*** 0.60* 1.34*** 0.00
(4.13) (2.40) (6.22) (6.82) (5.34) (5.65) (6.16) (1.73) (4.33) (0.01)
Intercept 0.03 0.01 7.82*** 4.04* 10.80*** 8.80*** 24.73*** 34.37*** 31.00*** 41.84***
(1.58) (0.31) (4.42) (1.84) (6.31) (4.47) (6.66) (7.92) (7.90) (9.51)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq 0.3440 0.3513 0.6721 0.6760 0.6884 0.6898 0.3587 0.3625 0.3688 0.3727
N observations 167,542 167,542 166,191 166,191 166,194 166,194 167,542 167,542 167,542 167,542
N stocks 2,347 2,347 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
Bid-ask spread Trading volume Total trading volume Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Table 3.7 Stock liquidity and cross-listing and cross-trading status 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model 
(1) specification: Liquidity Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, and Model (2) specification: 
Liquidity Measurei,t = α +βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, where Di,t is dummy variable representing 
cross-listing or cross-trading status accordingly; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control 
variables; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio. The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-months observations of available data. Reported in 
parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock 
level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance 
at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Cross-listed 0.01*** -0.01* 0.21* 2.17*** 0.64*** 2.54*** 0.20 0.55 1.21*** 1.09**
(4.35) (-1.76) (1.69) (3.58) (5.75) (5.77) (1.24) (1.15) (6.70) (2.16)
Company size*CL 0.002*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.04 -0.02
(2.79) (-3.26) (-4.55) (-0.62) (-0.34)
IAS*CL -0.004** -0.48** 0.03 -0.48* 0.52*
(-1.97) (-2.52) (0.13) (-1.67) (1.80)
Analysts*CL 0.00 -0.08 -0.18 0.30** 0.34
(1.00) (-0.56) (-1.20) (2.06) (1.61)
Cross-traded 0.01*** -0.01** 0.59*** 1.82*** 0.91*** 1.65*** 0.91*** -1.51*** 1.90*** -0.37
(7.07) (-2.16) (5.70) (5.03) (9.31) (4.67) (6.12) (-3.37) (9.32) (-0.48)
Company size*CT 0.003*** -0.13*** -0.09* 0.38*** 0.32***
(3.82) (-2.75) (-1.82) (6.07) (3.63)
IAS*CT 0.01*** -0.71*** -0.24 -0.45** 0.22
(6.48) (-4.88) (-1.61) (-2.20) (0.82)
Analysts*CT -0.003** -0.30** -0.36*** 0.43*** 0.19
(-2.40) (-2.57) (-3.58) (3.25) (0.78)
Company size -0.01*** -0.01*** 1.21*** 1.58*** 1.04*** 1.35*** 0.76*** 0.27 0.34** -0.08
(-29.09) (-28.06) (12.47) (12.61) (11.17) (12.08) (5.35) (1.61) (2.18) (-0.48)
Stock turnover ratio -0.001*** -0.001***
(-15.14) (-15.40)
Return volatility 0.41*** 0.41*** 45.16*** 43.25*** 43.72*** 42.76*** 76.12*** 75.89*** 78.67*** 79.91***
(15.19) (15.22) (22.52) (21.92) (21.97) (21.75) (24.78) (25.02) (24.73) (25.45)
IAS -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.04 0.11 0.06 0.07 -0.38*** -0.19** -0.21** -0.27***
(-7.81) (-8.95) (-0.64) (1.55) (0.90) (1.07) (-3.98) (-2.05) (-2.16) (-2.73)
Own. concentration 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(3.96) (4.13) (-22.64) (-22.63) (-22.64) (-22.67) (-16.69) (-16.73) (-17.06) (-17.18)
Analysts residual -0.001** -0.00 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.57*** 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.19***
(-2.20) (-1.31) (11.75) (11.60) (11.59) (11.87) (6.29) (4.39) (3.97) (3.77)
Market turnover 0.003** 0.00 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(2.32) (1.32) (5.81) (6.89) (4.86) (5.52) (12.46) (12.59) (11.54) (11.18)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 -1.32*** -0.92*** -1.74*** -1.41*** -2.99*** -3.57*** -3.97*** -4.45***
(0.55) (1.16) (-7.48) (-4.78) (-10.59) (-7.98) (-8.03) (-8.96) (-10.59) (-11.10)
Market size 0.01*** 0.005*** -0.08 -0.22*** 0.04 -0.08 -0.39*** -0.21** -0.11 0.05
(8.78) (8.40) (-1.27) (-3.44) (0.66) (-1.27) (-4.35) (-2.28) (-1.23) (0.50)
Legal index -0.01** -0.01* 5.28*** 6.21*** 4.17*** 5.01*** 2.33*** 0.94 0.28 -0.82
(-2.14) (-1.94) (10.44) (11.32) (8.47) (9.60) (3.73) (1.35) (0.42) (-1.16)
Accounting opacity -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.70*** -0.80*** -0.61*** -0.69*** -0.63*** -0.50*** -0.44*** -0.33***
(-3.75) (-4.57) (-12.60) (-13.20) (-11.93) (-12.40) (-8.27) (-6.28) (-6.30) (-4.35)
Bid-ask spread Trading volume Total trading volume Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Table 3.7 continued 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.004*** 0.004*** 1.15*** 1.89*** 0.78*** 1.39*** 1.50*** 0.58* 0.64** -0.17
(4.75) (4.74) (5.64) (7.32) (3.96) (6.05) (5.01) (1.67) (2.00) (-0.47)
Intercept 0.03* 0.03 8.00*** 2.37 12.56*** 7.74*** 27.22*** 35.33*** 37.69*** 44.31***
(1.73) (1.60) (4.20) (1.04) (6.92) (3.78) (7.05) (8.19) (9.46) (10.16)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq 0.3462 0.3525 0.6707 0.6730 0.6869 0.6900 0.3604 0.3650 0.3747 0.3773
N observations 167,542 167,542 166,191 166,191 166,194 166,194 167,542 167,542 167,542 167,542
N stocks 2,347 2,347 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
Coefficient Estimates Difference:
Cross-listed - Cross-traded -0.006 0.004 -0.378 0.353 -0.276 0.892 -0.714 2.057 -0.694 1.456
Wald test ( Pr > F stats) 0.002 0.724 0.017 0.589 0.071 0.129 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.156
Bid-ask spread Trading volume Total trading volume Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Table 3.8 Stock volatility and a foreign presence 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: return volatility, 
volatility ratio, and high-low ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model (1) specification: Volatility Measurei,t = α 
+ βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, and Model (2) specification: Volatility Measurei,t = α +βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + 
ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, where Di,t is foreign presence dummy variable; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are 
other control variables; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio. The explanatory and control variables are defined in 
Table 3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-months observations of available data. 
Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering 
at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates 
significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Foreign presence 0.00 -0.005*** -0.03 -0.05 0.004*** -0.01***
(1.30) (-5.14) (-0.84) (-0.43) (6.14) (-3.22)
Company size*FP 0.001*** 0.02 0.00***
(4.10) (0.97) (4.39)
IAS *FP -0.003*** -0.35*** -0.01***
(-7.42) (-7.72) (-7.16)
Analysts *FP -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(-0.64) (-0.52) (-0.64)
Total trading volume*FP 0.0003*** 0.00 0.00
(2.61) (0.31) (1.37)
Company size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(-26.63) (-26.65) (-27.45) (-25.85) (-28.57) (-28.86)
Total trading volume 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(19.92) (18.22) (20.62) (19.53) (22.39) (21.02)
Sales growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(8.69) (8.91) (3.45) (3.39) (7.64) (7.84)
Leverage 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(3.89) (3.58) (4.65) (4.56) (4.29) (4.03)
Intangibles 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(7.38) (7.50) (5.18) (5.06) (6.28) (6.40)
Int accounting standards 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(8.96) (10.95) (8.67) (10.50) (6.76) (9.32)
Ownership concentration 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(10.35) (10.98) (7.49) (7.68) (9.94) (10.55)
Analysts following 0.00 0.00 -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.92) (1.11) (-6.00) (-5.66) (3.02) (3.08)
GDP per capita 0.03*** 0.03*** 3.23*** 3.12*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(7.46) (7.84) (6.61) (6.37) (5.92) (6.35)
Market size -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-8.10) (-8.69) (-3.88) (-3.75) (-6.98) (-7.63)
Legal index -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-6.94) (-7.36) (-3.63) (-3.43) (-6.03) (-6.53)
Accounting opacity 0.10*** 0.10*** 7.68*** 7.30*** 0.16*** 0.17***
(7.27) (7.67) (4.81) (4.59) (6.06) (6.49)
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Table 3.8 continued 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.06*** 0.06*** 4.30*** 4.10*** 0.09*** 0.10***
(8.07) (8.45) (5.21) (4.98) (6.75) (7.17)
Intercept -0.36*** -0.37*** -35.38*** -33.93*** -0.55*** -0.57***
(-7.17) (-7.50) (-6.10) (-5.85) (-5.69) (-6.06)
Industry indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq 0.2797 0.2856 0.2523 0.2545 0.3154 0.3222
N observations 149,640 149,640 149,640 149,640 149,640 149,640
N stocks 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Table 3.9 Stock volatility and cross-listing and cross-trading status 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables, return volatility, 
volatility ratio, and high-low ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model (1) specification: Volatility Measurei,t = α 
+ βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, and Model (2) specification: Volatility Measurei,t = α +βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + 
ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, where Di,t is dummy variable representing cross-listing or cross-trading status 
accordingly; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio. 
The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number 
of stock-months observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity 
consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, 
‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Cross-listed 0.00 -0.003** -0.02 -0.26 0.001** -0.00
(0.96) (-2.11) (-0.42) (-1.48) (2.15) (-0.87)
Company size*CL 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.72) (0.89) (1.30)
IAS *CL -0.001** -0.19*** -0.003***
(-2.23) (-2.86) (-2.63)
Analysts *CL -0.00** -0.14** -0.00
(-2.08) (-2.53) (-1.09)
Total trading volume*CL 0.0004* 0.03 0.00
(1.66) (1.15) (0.04)
Cross-traded 0.001** -0.003*** -0.03 0.12 0.004*** -0.004*
(2.44) (-2.94) (-0.85) (0.92) (6.91) (-1.73)
Company size*CT 0.001*** 0.00 0.001***
(2.87) (0.10) (3.23)
IAS*CT -0.002*** -0.26*** -0.005***
(-6.05) (-5.24) (-6.38)
Analysts*CT 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.90) (0.60) (0.14)
Total trading volume*CT 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(1.48) (-0.81) (0.79)
Company size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-26.91) (-26.78) (-27.10) (-25.95) (-28.83) (-28.94)
Total trading volume 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(19.75) (18.54) (20.63) (19.88) (22.28) (21.41)
Sales growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(8.76) (8.87) (3.44) (3.40) (7.69) (7.79)
Leverage 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(3.88) (3.68) (4.64) (4.67) (4.32) (4.16)
Intangibles 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(7.40) (7.31) (5.18) (4.97) (6.36) (6.28)
Int accounting standards 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(8.93) (10.90) (8.66) (10.25) (6.71) (9.34)
Ownership concentration 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(10.41) (11.02) (7.49) (7.72) (10.01) (10.53)
Analysts following 0.00 0.00 -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.83) (1.03) (-6.00) (-5.54) (2.95) (2.96)
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Table 3.9 continued 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
GDP per capita 0.03*** 0.03*** 3.23*** 3.13*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(7.49) (7.80) (6.55) (6.37) (6.14) (6.50)
Market size -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-8.11) (-8.59) (-3.84) (-3.71) (-7.22) (-7.77)
Legal index -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-7.00) (-7.34) (-3.59) (-3.43) (-6.28) (-6.71)
Accounting opacity 0.10*** 0.10*** 7.67*** 7.36*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(7.31) (7.65) (4.77) (4.61) (6.27) (6.63)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.06*** 0.06*** 4.29*** 4.13*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(8.12) (8.44) (5.17) (5.00) (6.98) (7.34)
Intercept -0.37*** -0.37*** -35.35*** -34.14*** -0.57*** -0.58***
(-7.20) (-7.47) (-6.04) (-5.86) (-5.90) (-6.20)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq 0.2800 0.2855 0.2523 0.2547 0.3166 0.3227
N observations 149,640 149,640 149,640 149,640 149,640 149,640
N stocks 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180
Coefficient Estimates Difference:
Cross-listed - Cross-traded 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.379 -0.003 0.001
Wald test ( Pr > F stats) 0.383 0.996 0.798 0.118 0.004 0.803
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Table 3.10 Cross-listing and/or cross-trading and the evolution of stock liquidity and volatility 
Panel A of Table 3.10 reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: bid-ask 
spread, trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover ratio, defined in Table 3.1. 
In the regressions, foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading variables are replaced by a series of the 
year-specific dummy variables relative to the year of foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading 
accordingly (year 0). Model specification: Liquidity Measurei,t = α + ΣγYn +ΣβDi,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, where 
Yn is variable representing a year relative to the year of foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading 
accordingly (from year -4 and earlier to year +4 and later); Di,t is dummy variable representing foreign 
presence, cross-listing, cross-trading accordingly, Vi are main stock-specific control variables; Fi,t are 
other control variables. The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. Only the 
coefficient estimates on the year-specific dummies around foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading 
are reported in the Table but the regressions include the full set of control variables as in model (2) of 
Table 3.6 for foreign presence and model (2) of Table 3.7 for cross-listing and cross-trading. Reported in 
parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock 
level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance 
at 10%. 
≤-4y -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ≥+4y
Panel A: Liquidity
Bid-ask spread
Foreign presence 0.018 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(1.42) (4.65) (6.51) (8.59) (-3.21) (-2.93) (-3) (-3.03) (-2.73)
Cross-listed 0 0.004* 0.006** 0.007*** -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011*
(0.12) (1.83) (2.55) (2.94) (-1.64) (-0.85) (-1.44) (-1.58) (-1.91)
Cross-traded 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.016*** -0.01 -0.012* -0.012* -0.011* -0.01
(3.63) (6.14) (8.18) (9.8) (-1.54) (-1.88) (-1.86) (-1.79) (-1.45)
Trading volume
Foreign presence 1.801*** 1.237*** 1.137*** 1.134*** 0.613* 0.685** 0.754** 0.693** 0.765**
(3.83) (7.74) (8.22) (9.03) (1.94) (2.21) (2.36) (2.11) (2.17)
Cross-listed 0.229 0.392** 0.487*** 0.739*** 1.194** 1.365*** 1.281** 1.233** 1.028*
(0.87) (1.97) (2.89) (5.18) (2.26) (2.6) (2.3) (2.2) (1.66)
Cross-traded 0.847*** 1.134*** 1.056*** 0.938*** 0.537 0.486 0.596* 0.529 0.73**
(3.27) (7.38) (7.81) (7.43) (1.63) (1.47) (1.79) (1.54) (2.02)
Total trading volume
Foreign presence 1.89*** 1.244*** 1.185*** 1.194*** 0.808*** 0.838*** 0.888*** 0.841*** 0.863***
(4.43) (7.75) (8.65) (9.53) (2.82) (3.01) (3.13) (2.89) (2.8)
Cross-listed 0.217 0.407** 0.47*** 0.725*** 1.792*** 1.894*** 1.852*** 1.776*** 1.508***
(0.85) (2.27) (2.86) (4.91) (4.48) (4.9) (4.56) (4.46) (3.57)
Cross-traded 0.862*** 1.194*** 1.173*** 1.089*** 0.699** 0.627* 0.672** 0.638* 0.694*
(3.43) (8.15) (9.15) (9.07) (2.1) (1.89) (2.01) (1.84) (1.89)
Turnover ratio
Foreign presence 1.186 0.559*** 0.453*** 0.473*** -2.517*** -2.169*** -1.98*** -1.845*** -1.389***
(1.11) (3.74) (3.16) (3.74) (-7) (-6.08) (-5.52) (-4.98) (-3.55)
Cross-listed -0.133 -0.024 -0.199 -0.046 0.054 0.345 0.317 0.415 0.596
(-0.42) (-0.09) (-0.99) (-0.24) (0.11) (0.75) (0.67) (0.86) (1.18)
Cross-traded 0.218 0.421*** 0.365** 0.426*** -2.295*** -1.999*** -1.733*** -1.49*** -1.19**
(0.72) (2.82) (2.56) (3.2) (-5.44) (-4.66) (-4.09) (-3.43) (-2.55)
Total turnover ratio
Foreign presence 1.468 0.514*** 0.456*** 0.553*** -1.435** -1.166** -1.046* -0.978* -0.293
(1.07) (3.19) (2.99) (3.85) (-2.57) (-2.03) (-1.87) (-1.73) (-0.45)
Cross-listed -0.122 -0.068 -0.273 -0.128 1.07* 1.173** 1.167** 1.152** 1.358**
(-0.31) (-0.27) (-1.21) (-0.58) (1.91) (2.24) (2.3) (2.29) (2.52)
Cross-traded 0.144 0.48*** 0.546*** 0.684*** -0.689 -0.354 -0.267 0.023 0.363
(0.38) (3.02) (3.38) (4.67) (-0.95) (-0.47) (-0.36) (0.03) (0.42)
Years relative to foreign presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading
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Table 3.10 continued 
Panel B of Table 3.10 reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: return 
volatility, volatility ratio, and high-low ratio, defined in Table 3.1. In the regressions, foreign presence, 
cross-listing, cross-trading variables are replaced by a series of the year-specific dummy variables relative 
to the year of foreign presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading accordingly (year 0). Model specification: 
Volatility Measurei,t = α + ΣγYn +ΣβDi,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, where Yn is variable representing a year relative 
to the year of foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading accordingly (from year -4 and earlier to year 
+4 and later); Di,t is dummy variable representing foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading 
accordingly, Vi are main stock-specific control variables; Fi,t are other control variables. The explanatory 
and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. Only the coefficient estimates on the year-specific 
dummies around foreign presence, cross-listing, cross-trading are reported in the Table, but regressions 
include the full set of control variables as in model (2) of Table 3.8 for foreign presence and model (2) of 
Table 3.9 for cross-listing and cross-trading. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity 
consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, 
‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
≤-4y -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ≥+4y
Panel B: Volatility
Return volatility
Foreign presence -0.003** 0 0 0.001 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-2.02) (0.83) (0.36) (1.56) (-3.77) (-4.25) (-4.72) (-4.07) (-3.73)
Cross-listed 0.001* 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(1.68) (0.54) (0.82) (0.07) (-0.87) (-1.21) (-1.3) (-1.4) (-1.07)
Cross-traded -0.001 0 0.001 0.001*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003***
(-1.12) (-0.14) (1.51) (2.9) (-2.49) (-2.74) (-2.88) (-2.53) (-2.59)
Volatility ratio
Foreign presence -0.174 -0.01 0.028 0.091 0.017 0.049 0.019 -0.02 -0.141
(-1.03) (-0.14) (0.46) (1.6) (0.15) (0.44) (0.16) (-0.18) (-1.23)
Cross-listed 1.680 0.540 0.820 0.070 -0.870 -1.210 -1.300 -1.400 -1.070
(0.01) (-0.61) (0.03) (-0.93) (-0.69) (-0.99) (-0.78) (-0.84) (-1.21)
Cross-traded -1.120 -0.140 1.510 2.900 -2.490 -2.740 -2.880 -2.530 -2.590
(-0.08) (0.13) (1.86) (3.54) (0.95) (1.15) (1.09) (0.47) (-0.46)
High- low ratio
Foreign presence -0.003 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.004**
(-0.94) (2.6) (3.06) (5.47) (-1.99) (-2.62) (-3.09) (-2.48) (-2.21)
Cross-listed 0.001 0 0.002 0.002 0 0 -0.001 0 0
(0.55) (-0.03) (1.14) (1.53) (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.2) (0.01) (0.03)
Cross-traded 0 0.003** 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*
(-0.26) (2.36) (4.57) (6.88) (-1.28) (-1.76) (-1.95) (-1.77) (-1.82)
Years relative to foreign presence/ cross-listing/ cross-trading
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Table 3.11 The changes in stock liquidity, volatility and firm characteristics around cross-listing 
and cross-trading: Univariate analysis 
Panel A of the table reports the number of observations and the mean and the median ratios of the stock 
liquidity and volatility measures by different listing status. The ratios are calculated as the average 
liquidity/volatility measure for the period of time when stock is cross-listed and/or cross-traded, over the 
base liquidity/volatility measure, which is the average liquidity/volatility measure for the period of time 
during 36 months (at least 24 months) before the cross-listing/ cross-trading. Liquidity and volatility 
measures are defined in Table 3.1. Stocks with a foreign presence are those that are listed and/or traded 
on a foreign exchange(s). Stocks with a foreign presence include traded only stocks, i.e. traded abroad 
without stock exchange listing in addition to the home market listing, cross-listed only stocks, i.e. listed 
on a foreign exchange in addition to the home market listing, and cross-listed and cross-traded stocks (CL 
and CT), i.e. cross-listed and cross-traded simultaneously. Additionally, Panel A reports t-statistics and p-
value of the test of the difference of the means of the ratios from one and chi-sq statistics and p-value of 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test of the difference of the medians of the ratios from one (the ratio of one would 
indicate no change in the liquidity/ volatility measure after cross-listing/ trading). Last two columns 
report the percentage of observations of the ratios that are less than one and greater than one. N is the 
number of stocks with available data. 
t-stats Pr (t) Chi-Sq Pr(Chi-Sq)
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Liquidity
Bid-ask spread Foreign Presence 491 0.90 2.70 0.01 0.72 130.7 <.0001 71.7%
Ratio Traded only 298 0.91 1.74 0.08 0.72 114.0 <.0001 71.8%
Cross-listed only 104 1.04 0.51 0.61 0.91 25.0 <.0001 61.5%
CL and CT 89 0.70 3.81 0.00 0.48 200.9 <.0001 83.1%
Trading volume Foreign Presence 491 8.62 1.71 0.09 1.69 153.8 <.0001 73.5%
Ratio Traded only 298 2.58 5.49 <.0001 1.48 97.7 <.0001 70.1%
Cross-listed only 104 5.13 2.14 0.04 1.43 69.5 <.0001 69.2%
CL and CT 89 32.93 1.31 0.19 2.93 290.2 <.0001 89.9%
Total trading Foreign Presence 491 9.52 1.89 0.06 1.91 261.1 <.0001 80.7%
volume Ratio Traded only 298 2.90 6.09 <.0001 1.73 210.2 <.0001 79.5%
Cross-listed only 104 6.61 2.46 0.02 1.60 91.9 <.0001 72.1%
CL and CT 89 35.07 1.39 0.17 3.28 360.2 <.0001 94.4%
Turnover ratio Foreign Presence 491 2.54 3.58 0.00 1.39 100.8 <.0001 69.00%
Ratio Traded only 298 1.74 4.05 <.0001 1.31 57.4 <.0001 65.4%
Cross-listed only 104 2.26 2.56 0.01 1.22 50.2 <.0001 66.3%
CL and CT 89 5.53 2.42 0.02 2.15 214.7 <.0001 84.3%
Total turnover Foreign Presence 491 3.27 5.45 <.0001 1.66 217.9 <.0001 78.0%
ratio Ratio Traded only 298 2.45 5.36 <.0001 1.54 173.7 <.0001 76.8%
Cross-listed only 104 2.80 3.13 0.00 1.37 84.1 <.0001 71.2%
CL and CT 89 6.59 2.83 0.01 2.30 290.9 <.0001 89.9%
Volatility
Return volatility Foreign Presence 491 1.09 3.06 0.00 1.01 0.3 0.55 48.9%
Ratio Traded only 298 1.02 0.89 0.38 0.98 2.7 0.10 53.4%
Cross-listed only 104 1.21 1.92 0.06 1.08 4.3 0.04 45.2%
CL and CT 89 1.22 2.40 0.02 1.07 25.5 <.0001 38.2%
Volatility ratio Foreign Presence 491 1.15 3.33 0.00 1.02 2.1 0.15 47.3%
Ratio Traded only 298 1.08 4.00 <.0001 1.01 0.7 0.41 48.3%
Cross-listed only 104 1.20 1.32 0.19 1.01 0.2 0.68 49.0%
CL and CT 89 1.33 2.03 0.05 1.04 13.0 0.00 41.6%
High- low ratio Foreign Presence 491 1.20 6.26 <.0001 1.07 16.2 <.0001 42.4%
Ratio Traded only 298 1.15 3.58 0.00 1.02 1.7 0.19 47.3%
Cross-listed only 104 1.17 3.80 0.00 1.13 17.4 <.0001 40.4%
CL and CT 89 1.40 4.46 <.0001 1.25 87.8 <.0001 28.1%
Median difference     
from 1 (1)
Mean difference 
from 1
N < 1,    
%  of 
Total
N > 1,    
%  of 
TotalVariable
Listing/ trading 
status N Mean Median
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Table 3.11 continued 
Panel B of the table reports the number of observations and the mean and the median ratios of the firm 
characteristics by different listing/ trading status. The ratios are calculated as the firm characteristic for 
the period of time when stock is cross-listed and/or cross-traded, over the base firm characteristic, which 
is the firm characteristic for the period of time during 36 months (at least 24 months) before the cross-
listing/ cross-trading. Firm characteristics are defined in Table 3.2. Stocks with a foreign presence are 
those that are listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange(s). Stocks with a foreign presence include traded 
only stocks, i.e. traded abroad without stock exchange listing in addition to the home market listing, 
cross-listed only stocks, i.e. listed on a foreign exchange in addition to the home market listing, and cross-
listed and cross-traded stocks (CL and CT), i.e. cross-listed and cross-traded simultaneously. 
Additionally, Panel B reports t-statistics and p-value of the test of the difference of the means of the ratios 
from one and chi-sq statistics and p-value of the Wilcoxon rank sum test of the difference of the medians 
of the ratios from one (the ratio of one would indicate no change in the firm characteristic after cross-
listing/ trading). Last column reports the percentage of observations of the ratios that are greater than one. 
N is the number of stocks with available data. 
t-stats Pr (t) Chi-Sq Pr(Chi-Sq)
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Company Foreign Presence 487 2.83 3.61 0.00 1.47 139.6 <.0001 72.5%
size Ratio Traded only 295 2.01 5.39 <.0001 1.42 91.0 <.0001 69.5%
Cross-listed only 103 1.85 4.81 <.0001 1.34 53.9 <.0001 67.0%
CL and CT 89 6.66 2.13 0.04 2.29 273.5 <.0001 88.8%
IAS Difference Foreign Presence 447 0.11 7.78 <.0001 0.00 95.4 <.0001 46.3%
Traded only 270 0.12 7.45 <.0001 0.05 120.1 <.0001 51.9%
Cross-listed only 94 0.00 0.12 0.90 0.00 0.5 0.49 18.1%
CL and CT 83 0.22 4.71 <.0001 0.19 126.3 <.0001 60.2%
Analysts Foreign Presence 435 1.53 5.35 <.0001 0.98 1.4 0.24 47.1%
coverage Traded only 257 1.44 3.38 0.00 0.90 15.9 <.0001 40.9%
Ratio Cross-listed only 92 1.64 3.23 0.00 1.06 14.0 0.00 58.7%
CL and CT 86 1.68 2.91 0.00 1.03 2.7 0.10 53.5%
Ownership Foreign Presence 403 9.31 1.62 0.11 0.96 8.5 0.00 43.4%
concentration Traded only 247 2.62 2.73 0.01 0.99 1.4 0.24 46.6%
Ratio Cross-listed only 83 13.95 1.12 0.26 0.95 12.6 0.00 41.0%
CL and CT 73 26.69 1.03 0.31 0.80 31.1 <.0001 35.6%
Sales Foreign Presence 409 1.15 0.53 0.59 0.64 48.8 <.0001 35.2%
growth Ratio Traded only 247 1.05 0.11 0.91 0.63 48.3 <.0001 34.0%
Cross-listed only 87 0.99 0.06 0.95 0.79 18.9 <.0001 39.1%
CL and CT 75 1.68 0.99 0.33 0.58 36.3 <.0001 34.7%
Leverage Foreign Presence 450 1.04 2.19 0.03 0.99 2.8 0.09 46.4%
Ratio Traded only 272 1.05 1.98 0.05 1.00 0.3 0.60 48.5%
Cross-listed only 95 1.02 0.55 0.58 0.99 1.2 0.28 47.4%
CL and CT 83 1.04 0.88 0.38 0.99 22.0 <.0001 38.6%
Intangibles Foreign Presence 357 8.50 2.94 0.00 1.35 60.2 <.0001 67.0%
Ratio Traded only 224 11.21 2.53 0.01 1.35 81.3 <.0001 71.0%
Cross-listed only 75 2.49 2.77 0.01 1.05 0.6 0.46 52.0%
CL and CT 58 5.82 3.24 0.00 1.88 57.2 <.0001 70.7%
Mean difference 
from 1
Median difference 
from 1 (1)
N > 1,    
%  of 
TotalVariable
Listing/ trading      
status MedianMeanN
 
(1) based on Wilcoxon rank sum test 
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Table 3.12 The change in stock liquidity and volatility around cross-listing and cross-trading: 
Regression analysis 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables, the ratios of the bid-
ask spread, trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio, total turnover ratio, return volatility, 
volatility ratio, and high-low ratio variables, defined in Table 3.1, to the appropriate base measure, i.e. the 
average measure for the period of time when the stock had domestic listing status. Model specification: 
(Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,t / Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,base)= α + γDi,t + Σθ(Fi,t /Fi,base) + εi,t,  
where Liquidity or Volatility Measurei,base is average liquidity or volatility measure over the period of 
time when the stock was not listed/ traded abroad; Di,t is dummy variable representing cross-listing or 
cross-trading accordingly; Fi,t are control variables; Fi,base is average control variable over the period of 
time when the stock was not listed/ traded abroad. The control variables (except for the market turnover 
variable) are calculated as the ratio of the control variables, defined in Table 3.2, to the appropriate base 
measure, i.e. the average measure for the period of time when the stock had domestic listing status. 
Market turnover variable is defined in Table 3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-
months observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent 
(White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates 
significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
Bid-ask 
spread 
Ratio
Trading 
volume 
Ratio
Total trading 
volume 
Ratio
Turnover 
ratio 
Ratio
Total 
turnover 
ratio Ratio
Return 
volatility 
Ratio
Volatility 
ratio 
Ratio
High-low 
ratio 
Ratio
Model (1)
Foreign Presence -0.46*** 0.81*** 0.95*** 0.47*** 0.76*** -0.03 0.02 0.14***
(-10.36) (10.97) (13.05) (8.62) (12.05) (-1.20) (0.91) (4.46)
Intercept -0.13*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.21*** 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.18***
(-13.64) (-13.82) (-12.76) (-13.09) (-9.83) (6.76) (5.39) (-11.33)
Adj. R-sq 0.063 0.086 0.125 0.047 0.095 0.0004 0.0002 0.009
Model (2)
Cross-listed -0.26*** 0.73*** 0.79*** 0.42*** 0.49*** 0.01 -0.016 0.13**
(-2.91) (5.74) (6.36) (4.75) (5.38) (0.34) (-0.53) (2.55)
Cross-traded -0.53*** 0.82*** 0.95*** 0.50*** 0.79*** -0.02 0.03 0.14***
(-11.13) (10.37) (12.95) (8.27) (11.58) (-0.96) (1.13) (3.95)
Intercept -0.08*** -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.30*** -0.26*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.19***
(-3.65) (-10.87) (-10.96) (-11.04) (-8.85) (5.07) (4.27) (-10.51)
Adj. R-sq 0.112 0.152 0.204 0.088 0.145 0.0004 0.0007 0.016
Model (3)
Cross-listed -0.02 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.31*** 0.45*** 0.0 -0.016 0.02
(-0.44) (2.98) (3.65) (2.84) (4.28) (-0.01) (-0.48) (0.38)
Cross-traded -0.15*** 0.49*** 0.66*** 0.32*** 0.61*** -0.10*** 0.002 -0.01
(-4.96) (5.45) (7.87) (5.11) (9.16) (-4.52) (0.08) (-0.15)
Company size Ratio -0.37*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.11** 0.13** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.11***
(-13.58) (3.19) (4.00) (2.08) (2.38) (-3.93) (-3.28) (-2.72)
IAS Difference -0.42*** 0.17 0.31*** 0.11 0.35*** -0.14*** -0.06 -0.09**
(-6.84) (1.6) (3.29) (1.43) (4.23) (-4.22) (-1.63) (-2.26)
Analysts coverage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0001*** 0.0 0.0001** 0.0 0.0002**
Ratio (0.8) (1.63) (0.62) (3.24) (1.32) (2.28) (-1.17) (2.47)
Own. Concentration 0.0 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ratio (-0.07) (-5.18) (-5.42) (-0.23) (-1.08) (-1.34) (-0.65) (-1.3)
Turnover ratio -0.27*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.26***
Ratio (-8.73) (7.2) (5.24) (7.72)
Return volatility 0.63*** 0.35*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.41***
Ratio (23.15) (3.66) (7.78) (3.81) (5.85)
Liquidity Volatility
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Table 3.12 continued 
Bid-ask 
spread 
Ratio
Trading 
volume 
Ratio
Total trading 
volume 
Ratio
Turnover 
ratio 
Ratio
Total 
turnover 
ratio Ratio
Return 
volatility 
Ratio
Volatility 
ratio 
Ratio
High-low 
ratio 
Ratio
Sales Growth Ratio 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.51) (-0.53) (-0.31)
Leverage Ratio 0.05 0.07 0.08
(0.83) (1.28) (1.25)
Intangibles Ratio 0.0 0.0 0.0
(1.16) (0.44) (1.07)
Market turnover 0.0 0.15*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.03**
(-0.13) (8.52) (3.66) (9.54) (2.41)
Intercept -0.86*** -1.07*** -0.81*** -0.95*** -0.73*** 0.0 -0.03 -0.19***
(-18.06) (-9.72) (-11.06) (-10.21) (-9.03) (0.0) (-0.51) (-2.69)
Adj. R-sq 0.549 0.282 0.315 0.234 0.245 0.087 0.046 0.175
N observations 31,404 31,575 31,575 31,575 31,575 22,621 22,621 22,621
N stocks 309 309 309 309 309 238 238 238
Coefficient Estimates Difference:
CL - CT 0.124 -0.004 -0.067 -0.007 -0.160 0.102 -0.017 0.025
Wald test ( Pr > F) <.0001 0.7829 <.0001 0.5293 <.0001 <.0001 0.0385 0.009
Liquidity Volatility
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Table 3.13 Stock liquidity: Developed vs. emerging home market 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model 
specification: Liquidity Measurei,t = α +βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, where Di,t is dummy variable 
representing cross-listing or cross-trading status accordingly; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other 
control variables; λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio. The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 
3.2. The model is estimated for each liquidity measure for two sub-samples: 1) stocks from developed 
markets and 2) stocks from emerging markets. Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-
months observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent 
(White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates 
significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Cross-listed -0.02** -0.09 2.26*** 3.34** 2.67*** 0.94 0.57 -13.23*** 0.83* 17.42***
(-2.42) (-1.38) (3.62) (2.56) (6.13) (0.58) (1.41) (-3.31) (1.72) (3.37)
Company size*CL 0.003*** 0.01 -0.26*** -0.43*** -0.28*** 0.05 -0.06 1.67*** -0.01 -1.37**
(3.43) (0.93) (-3.38) (-2.79) (-5.09) (0.22) (-1.13) (3.24) (-0.22) (-2.10)
IAS*CL -0.00 0.00 -0.49** 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.64*** 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(-1.31) (.) (-2.48) (.) (-0.17) (.) (-2.61) (.) (-0.04) (.)
Analysts*CL 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.54 -0.16 0.21 0.29** 1.31 0.36* -2.41
(0.52) (0.48) (-0.61) (-0.87) (-1.15) (0.27) (2.13) (0.86) (1.70) (-0.83)
Cross-traded -0.03*** -0.03 2.12*** 2.33** 2.10*** 1.92* -0.53 0.56 0.84 1.20
(-3.32) (-0.90) (5.63) (2.52) (6.05) (1.94) (-1.26) (0.28) (1.03) (0.58)
Company size*CT 0.004*** 0.00 -0.17*** -0.18 -0.15*** -0.08 0.25*** 0.00 0.16* 0.03
(4.68) (1.03) (-3.51) (-1.22) (-3.21) (-0.54) (4.47) (0.00) (1.81) (0.10)
IAS*CT 0.01*** -0.02* -0.42*** -0.37 0.11 -0.29 -0.15 1.26 0.67*** 1.17
(5.47) (-1.84) (-3.05) (-0.84) (0.90) (-0.63) (-0.82) (1.00) (2.95) (0.79)
Analysts*CT -0.00** -0.00 -0.36*** -0.02 -0.43*** -0.09 0.26** 1.01** -0.03 0.91*
(-2.35) (-0.13) (-2.76) (-0.07) (-4.05) (-0.33) (2.08) (1.97) (-0.13) (1.66)
Company size -0.01*** -0.005*** 1.63*** 1.72*** 1.42*** 1.51*** 0.13 2.21 -0.15 1.80
(-28.80) (-3.31) (12.48) (3.81) (12.65) (3.22) (0.86) (1.58) (-0.94) (1.24)
Stock turnover ratio -0.001*** -0.0003***
(-10.29) (-3.95)
Return volatility 0.45*** 0.17*** 41.67*** 46.62*** 40.96*** 47.34*** 56.83*** 242.94*** 60.62*** 249.15***
(16.24) (2.88) (20.25) (12.28) (20.10) (12.50) (25.34) (13.26) (25.63) (13.64)
IAS -0.01*** -0.00 0.11 0.43** 0.09 0.40** 0.02 -0.41 -0.05 -0.44
(-10.24) (-1.35) (1.60) (2.37) (1.22) (2.20) (0.27) (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.85)
Own. concentration 0.0001*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.08***
(5.21) (1.15) (-21.33) (-4.20) (-21.55) (-4.06) (-24.74) (-4.66) (-22.44) (-4.68)
Analysts residual 0.00 -0.00 0.57*** 0.12 0.58*** 0.14 0.20*** -0.56 0.18*** -0.47
(0.52) (-0.34) (11.57) (0.85) (11.76) (0.94) (5.69) (-1.40) (4.44) (-1.16)
Market turnover 0.001*** -0.00 0.12*** 0.03** 0.10*** 0.02** 0.12*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 0.22***
(4.84) (-0.03) (8.70) (2.48) (7.55) (2.24) (10.17) (4.52) (8.27) (4.65)
GDP per capita -0.01** -0.00 -5.49*** -2.70*** -6.31*** -3.19*** 0.18 -2.38 -1.07** -3.31
(-2.01) (-0.33) (-9.04) (-3.30) (-10.48) (-3.76) (0.41) (-0.97) (-2.30) (-1.29)
Market size 0.00*** 0.00 -0.43*** -1.42*** -0.30*** -1.38*** 0.10 -1.76** 0.28*** -1.61**
(5.99) (0.28) (-5.93) (-4.97) (-4.51) (-4.82) (1.25) (-2.32) (3.35) (-2.12)
Legal index -0.004*** 0.03*** -0.99*** -0.88*** -0.91*** -0.70** -0.12* -1.60** -0.03 -1.28
(-7.50) (4.01) (-14.73) (-3.36) (-14.50) (-2.58) (-1.88) (-2.17) (-0.47) (-1.64)
Accounting opacity -0.04*** 1.14*** 5.27*** -19.68*** 4.06*** -17.83** 2.09*** 5.94 0.39 5.38
(-5.98) (3.19) (8.99) (-2.63) (7.41) (-2.41) (3.43) (0.38) (0.63) (0.33)
Bid-ask spread Trading volume Total trading Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Table 3.13 continued 
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.005*** 0.01 1.96*** 2.85*** 1.50*** 2.47** -0.03 7.68*** -0.64** 6.86**
(7.84) (0.81) (7.29) (3.05) (6.48) (2.55) (-0.09) (2.65) (-1.98) (2.29)
Intercept 0.18*** -0.45* 48.89*** 40.77*** 57.49*** 45.10*** -3.48 20.45 9.49* 30.73
(3.25) (-1.72) (7.79) (4.46) (9.25) (4.79) (-0.73) (0.72) (1.93) (1.06)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq 0.3929 0.3385 0.6993 0.4148 0.7154 0.4274 0.3753 0.3850 0.4138 0.3745
N observations 152,755 14,787 151,405 14,786 151,408 14,786 152,755 14,787 152,755 14,787
N stocks 2,020 327 2,018 326 2,018 326 2,019 326 2,020 327
Bid-ask spread Trading volume
Total trading 
volume Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Table 3.14 Stock volatility: Developed vs. emerging home market 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: return volatility, 
volatility ratio, and high-low ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model specification: Volatility Measurei,t = α 
+βDi,t +Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + γλi,t +εi,t, where Di,t is dummy variable representing cross-listing or cross-
trading status accordingly; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables; λi,t is the Inverse 
Mills Ratio. The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. The model is estimated for 
each liquidity measure for two sub-samples: 1) stocks from developed markets and 2) stocks from 
emerging markets. Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-months observations of available 
data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for 
clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ 
indicates significance at 10%. 
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Cross-listed -0.003** 0.02 -0.17 1.02** -0.00 -0.03*
(-2.12) (1.61) (-0.89) (2.02) (-1.09) (-1.75)
Company size*CL 0.00 -0.00*** 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.71) (-4.26) (0.75) (-1.46) (1.19) (0.73)
IAS *CL -0.001** 0.00 -0.17** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00
(-2.05) (.) (-2.43) (.) (-2.70) (.)
Analysts *CL -0.001** -0.01** -0.13** -0.02 -0.00* -0.01***
(-2.52) (-2.47) (-2.24) (-0.10) (-1.91) (-2.84)
Total trading volume*CL 0.00* 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.00
(1.72) (1.19) (0.81) (-1.47) (0.52) (1.08)
Cross-traded -0.002* -0.01*** 0.12 -0.40*** -0.00 -0.01**
(-1.66) (-3.53) (0.79) (-2.73) (-0.62) (-2.34)
Company size*CT 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.01 0.03 0.00** -0.00
(1.98) (2.00) (0.50) (1.13) (2.56) (-0.00)
IAS*CT -0.002*** 0.00 -0.26*** -0.02 -0.004*** -0.01
(-5.52) (0.13) (-4.80) (-0.25) (-5.90) (-1.61)
Analysts*CT 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.09** 0.00 -0.00
(0.52) (0.87) (-0.07) (2.31) (0.07) (-0.47)
Total trading volume*CT 0.00 0.0003** -0.02 0.04*** 0.00 0.002***
(1.17) (2.01) (-0.98) (2.82) (0.24) (3.64)
Company size -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.27*** -0.09*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(-25.68) (-8.93) (-26.23) (-7.58) (-26.95) (-12.59)
Total trading volume 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.15*** 0.05*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(17.27) (7.25) (19.03) (6.03) (20.08) (6.83)
Sales growth 0.001*** 0.00 0.03*** -0.01 0.001*** -0.00
(9.07) (0.21) (3.36) (-1.48) (8.02) (-0.84)
Leverage 0.002*** 0.002** 0.27*** 0.13** 0.003*** 0.003**
(3.24) (2.36) (4.33) (2.58) (3.82) (2.18)
Intangibles 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.48*** 0.57*** 0.01*** 0.00
(7.10) (3.36) (4.72) (3.34) (6.26) (0.54)
Int accounting standards 0.003*** 0.00 0.35*** -0.07** 0.005*** 0.00
(10.16) (1.21) (10.34) (-1.99) (9.20) (1.07)
Ownership concentration 0.00001*** 0.00001** 0.004*** 0 0.0001*** 0.00001***
(10.08) (2.08) (7.43) (1.40) (9.86) (2.63)
Analysts following 0.0002* -0.001*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.001*** -0.002***
(1.67) (-2.63) (-6.19) (-5.05) (3.75) (-3.17)
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Table 3.14 continued 
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
GDP per capita 0.05*** 0.14** 2.84*** -7.71* 0.08*** 0.39**
(10.90) (2.45) (4.19) (-1.70) (8.95) (2.29)
Market size -0.01*** -0.01* -0.24*** 1.17** -0.01*** -0.05**
(-10.03) (-1.95) (-3.66) (2.17) (-8.78) (-2.25)
Legal index -0.01*** -0.03** -0.44*** 2.14* -0.01*** -0.10**
(-9.05) (-2.50) (-3.55) (1.93) (-7.91) (-2.30)
Accounting opacity 0.14*** 0.21* 8.00*** -25.29** 0.22*** 0.89**
(10.12) (1.75) (4.56) (-2.48) (8.53) (2.33)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.08*** 0.21** 4.46*** -14.59** 0.12*** 0.62**
(10.71) (2.31) (4.95) (-2.03) (9.06) (2.30)
Intercept -0.56*** -1.49** -31.88*** 93.78* -0.92*** -4.37**
(-10.60) (-2.34) (-4.12) (1.83) (-8.70) (-2.28)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq 0.3006 0.1856 0.2527 0.2083 0.3206 0.2717
N observations 138,102 11,538 138,102 11,538 138,102 11,538
N stocks 1,886 294 1,886 293 1,886 294
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Appendix 3.1 Correlation matrix 
The table reports the correlation matrix of the dependent variable, defined in Table 3.1, and the 
explanatory and control variables, defined in Table 3.2. The sample includes monthly observations 
contributed by 2,180 stocks including 425 stocks with a foreign presence. 
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Bid-ask spread -0.29 -0.30 -0.17 -0.18 0.17 0.11 0.33 -0.22 -0.15 -0.21 -0.50 -0.14 0.01 0.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.11 -0.10 -0.03
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.74) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Trading volume 1.00 0.99 0.53 0.55 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.53 0.35 0.49 0.58 -0.07 0.21 -0.49 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.26 -0.20 0.01 -0.39 0.31
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Total trading 1.00 0.51 0.56 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.56 0.38 0.52 0.61 -0.05 0.21 -0.49 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.24 -0.19 0.01 -0.37 0.29
volume (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Turnover ratio 1.00 0.95 0.14 0.04 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.12 -0.06 0.07 -0.23 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.26 -0.34 -0.15 -0.28 0.25
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Total turnover 1.00 0.14 0.04 0.21 0.29 0.19 0.30 0.18 -0.03 0.08 -0.25 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.23 -0.32 -0.14 -0.26 0.23
ratio (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Return volatility 1.00 0.58 0.73 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.24 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.13 -0.03 0.13 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 0.16 -0.18
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Volatility  ratio 1.00 0.36 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.13 -0.21 0.17 0.11 0.14 -0.19
(0) (0) (0) (0.0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.49) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
High-low ratio 1.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.25 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.08 -0.16 -0.07 0.07 -0.09
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Foreign presence 1.00 0.63 0.88 0.61 0.00 0.17 -0.31 -0.04 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.05 -0.05 -0.12 0.19
(0) (0) (0) (0.24) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Cross-listed 1.00 0.35 0.43 -0.02 0.13 -0.23 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.10 0.11
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Cross-traded 1.00 0.57 0.03 0.14 -0.26 -0.03 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.17
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Company 1.00 0.06 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.09
size (0) (0.66) (0) (0.76) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Int. accounting 1.00 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.21 -0.27 0.21 0.07 0.34 -0.33
standards (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Analysts 1.00 -0.29 -0.03 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.09
coverage (0) (0) (0.84) (0) (0.47) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Ownership 1.00 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 -0.17 0.25 -0.01
concentration (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Sales 1.00 -0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
growth (0) (0) (0.14) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Leverage 1.00 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.03
(0) (0) (0) (0.02) (0) (0)
Intangibles 1.00 -0.04 0.20 0.16 0.06 -0.13
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Market turnover 1.00 -0.08 0.08 -0.50 0.44
(0) (0) (0) (0)
GDP per capita 1.00 0.57 0.18 -0.37
(0) (0) (0)
Market size 1.00 -0.17 -0.30
(0) (0)
Legal index 1.00 -0.44
(0)  
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Appendix 3.2 Stock liquidity and a foreign presence (without the Inverse Mills Ratio) 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables: bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total turnover ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model 
(1) specification: Liquidity Measurei,t = α +βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, and Model (2) specification:  
Liquidity Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, where Di,t is foreign presence dummy variable; 
Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables. Foreign presence dummy variable equals 
one if the stock is listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange and equals zero otherwise. Control variables 
are defined in Table 3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-months observations of 
available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted 
for clustering at stock level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ 
indicates significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Foreign presence 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.88*** 0.81** 1.25*** 0.95*** 0.91*** -1.99*** 1.95*** -1.01*
(12.97) (-2.89) (8.86) (2.49) (13.28) (3.29) (7.15) (-5.7) (11.91) (-1.75)
Company size*FP 0.004*** 0.07* 0.08* 0.44*** 0.40***
(6.06) (1.66) (1.89) (8.82) (5.94)
IAS*FP 0.01*** -0.91*** -0.29** -0.37** 0.62***
(7.76) (-6.9) (-2.42) (-2) (3.01)
Analysts*FP -0.002** -0.34*** -0.41*** 0.42*** 0.30
(-2.12) (-3.3) (-4.3) (3.61) (1.56)
Company size -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.08*** -0.02 0.08*** -0.002
(-28.84) (-27.23) (34.27) (30.6) (35.79) (31.12) (3.36) (-0.54) (3.12) (-0.07)
Stock turnover -0.001*** -0.001***
(-15.16) (-15.63)
Return volatility 0.39*** 0.39*** 47.18*** 45.38*** 45.37*** 44.44*** 79.23*** 77.03*** 81.06*** 80.44***
(14.5) (14.48) (23.22) (22.92) (22.56) (22.57) (25.69) (25.65) (25.42) (25.79)
Int accounting standards -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.05 0.14** 0.06 0.11 -0.38*** -0.23** -0.21** -0.30***
(-7.93) (-9.64) (-0.7) (2.04) (0.82) (1.52) (-3.98) (-2.43) (-2.11) (-3.02)
Ownership concentration 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(3.69) (4.06) (-22.68) (-22.56) (-22.73) (-22.6) (-17) (-16.79) (-17.42) (-17.2)
Analysts residual -0.001** -0.001 0.54*** 0.59*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.19***
(-2.18) (-1.38) (11.91) (12.18) (11.81) (12.26) (6.85) (4.81) (4.3) (3.89)
Market turnover 0.0004*** 0.0002** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18***
(3.37) (2.02) (5.67) (6.13) (4.78) (4.81) (12.26) (12.23) (11.48) (10.95)
GDP per capita 0.01*** 0.01*** -2.11*** -2.11*** -2.27*** -2.27*** -3.96*** -3.87*** -4.33*** -4.24***
(3.17) (3.51) (-17.4) (-17.68) (-18.9) (-19.09) (-12.16) (-12.13) (-13.31) (-13.14)
Market size 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.21*** -0.06 -0.11** 0.01 -0.01
(7.79) (7.5) (4.55) (4.26) (5.19) (5.15) (-1.21) (-2.14) (0.26) (-0.27)
Legal index -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.37*** -0.41*** -0.34*** -0.37***
(-5.76) (-6.34) (-11.87) (-12.24) (-11.75) (-11.96) (-7.74) (-8.66) (-7.03) (-7.75)
Accounting opacity 0.005 0.01 3.60*** 3.59*** 3.04*** 3.06*** 0.32 0.30 -0.45 -0.42
(0.89) (1.14) (8.95) (9.08) (7.71) (7.88) (0.69) (0.65) (-0.97) (-0.91)
Intercept -0.03* -0.03 17.52*** 17.87*** 18.84*** 19.0*** 38.99*** 39.27*** 41.91*** 41.87***
(-1.72) (-1.62) (17.15) (17.60) (18.53) (18.77) (12.14) (12.35) (12.99) (13.05)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-sq 0.342 0.351 0.669 0.673 0.687 0.688 0.355 0.362 0.367 0.373
N observations 167,542 167,542 166,191 166,191 166,194 166,194 167,542 167,542 167,542 167,542
N stocks 2,347 2,347 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
Bid-ask spread Trading volume
Total trading 
volume Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Appendix 3.3 Stock volatility and a foreign presence (without the Inverse Mills Ratio) 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variables, return volatility, 
volatility ratio, and high-low ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model (1) specification: 
Volatility Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, and Model (2) specification:  
Volatility Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, where Di,t is foreign presence dummy variable, 
Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables. Foreign presence dummy variable equals 
one if the stock is listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange and equals zero otherwise. Control variables 
are defined in Table 3.2. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) 
and adjusted for clustering at stock level. ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 
5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Foreign presence 0.0 -0.004*** -0.03 0.02 0.004*** -0.01**
(1.18) (-4.33) (-0.8) (0.18) (5.99) (-2.44)
Company size*FP 0.0004*** 0.004 0.001***
(2.99) (0.23) (3.4)
IAS*FP -0.003*** -0.36*** -0.01***
(-8.1) (-8.23) (-7.73)
Analysts*FP 0.0 -0.03 -0.001
(-1.06) (-0.72) (-1.03)
Total trading volume*FP 0.0004*** 0.01 0.0005**
(3.29) (0.68) (1.97)
Company size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.004*** -0.01***
(-26.67) (-26.37) (-27.47) (-25.74) (-28.68) (-28.7)
Total trading volume 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(20.18) (18.46) (20.75) (19.64) (22.71) (21.28)
Sales growth 0.0005*** 0*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(8.82) (9.01) (3.63) (3.53) (7.76) (7.93)
Leverage 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(3.97) (3.66) (4.71) (4.62) (4.34) (4.07)
Intangibles 0.006*** 0.01*** 0.52*** 0.5*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(7.12) (7.2) (5.07) (4.93) (6.1) (6.18)
Int accounting standards 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.28*** 0.36*** 0.004*** 0.01***
(10.69) (12.59) (9.79) (11.51) (8.26) (10.84)
Ownership concentration 0.00005*** 0.00005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(10.76) (11.39) (7.8) (7.98) (10.33) (10.93)
Analysts residual 0.0 0.0 -0.1*** -0.09*** 0.001*** 0***
(1.03) (1.36) (-5.97) (-5.55) (3.1) (3.3)
GDP per capita -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.66*** 0.66*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-8.28) (-8.47) (14.77) (14.98) (-8.74) (-8.87)
Market size 0.0 0.0 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.0005** 0***
(-0.32) (-1.26) (5.38) (4.99) (-2) (-2.95)
Legal index 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.001*** 0***
(10.44) (9.76) (11.89) (11.55) (6.42) (5.71)
Accounting opacity -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.77*** -0.76*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-10) (-10.22) (-5.42) (-5.41) (-9.37) (-9.47)
Intercept 0.05*** 0.05*** -4.88*** -4.81*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(16.61) (18.04) (-13.53) (-13.57) (14.43) (15.24)
Industry indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-sq 0.275 0.280 0.250 0.253 0.311 0.318
N observations 149,788 149,788 149,788 149,788 149,788 149,788
N stocks 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Appendix 3.4 Stock liquidity and a foreign presence: Firm fixed effects and random effects 
models 
The table reports the estimates from the fixed-firm effects and random effects regressions of the 
dependant variables: bid-ask spread, trading volume, total trading volume, turnover ratio and total 
turnover ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model specification: Liquidity Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + Σβ1Di,tVi,t + 
ΣθFi,t + εi,t, where Di,t is foreign presence dummy variable; Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other 
control variables. Foreign presence dummy variable equals one if the stock is listed and/or traded on a 
foreign exchange and equals zero otherwise. The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 
3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number of stock-months observations of available data. Reported 
in parentheses is t-value.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ 
indicates significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Foreign presence -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.12*** -0.12*** -1.31*** -1.48*** -1.11*** -1.25***
(-19.21) (-18.13) (-1.40) (-1.59) (-2.92) (-2.88) (-11.96) (-13.68) (-9.54) (-10.90)
Company size*FP 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.32***
(22.25) (22.25) (8.34) (8.52) (12.15) (12.13) (18.68) (20.49) (19.05) (20.78)
IAS*FP 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.02 -0.00 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 1.00*** 1.00***
(7.83) (8.86) (1.05) (-0.23) (11.10) (9.87) (17.27) (17.20) (24.73) (24.61)
Analysts*FP -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.29*** 0.37*** 0.25*** 0.34***
(-2.67) (-5.52) (10.62) (14.19) (5.41) (9.22) (10.47) (13.66) (8.55) (11.89)
Return volatility 0.38*** 0.41*** 25.64*** 23.45*** 25.68*** 23.25*** 59.24*** 54.46*** 63.67*** 58.21***
(48.87) (54.72) (95.03) (88.02) (96.24) (88.10) (85.80) (80.53) (86.86) (81.09)
Stock turnover ratio -0.001*** -0.001***
(-29.05) (-32.83)
Company size -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.14***
(-146.53) (-157.68) (55.33) (69.53) (59.63) (74.44) (7.86) (11.15) (9.58) (13.69)
Int acc. standards -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.04* 0.18***
(-7.85) (-9.44) (12.23) (13.62) (9.36) (11.74) (4.51) (9.49) (1.76) (8.18)
Analysts following 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.09*** -0.20*** -0.05*** -0.17***
(5.74) (6.34) (6.26) (4.59) (10.70) (8.38) (-6.97) (-15.76) (-3.81) (-12.50)
Own. concentration 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(12.14) (12.74) (-76.61) (-78.34) (-77.37) (-79.01) (-42.34) (-43.20) (-42.96) (-43.88)
Market turnover 0.0001** 0.00 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(2.03) (0.23) (36.93) (37.37) (24.60) (24.00) (35.27) (35.80) (29.13) (29.58)
GDP per capita -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.18* 1.04*** -0.16* 1.25*** 1.78*** 1.73*** 1.52*** 2.02***
(-3.45) (-6.63) (-1.92) (36.42) (-1.76) (43.96) (7.60) (24.91) (6.10) (27.60)
Market size 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.03 -0.30*** -0.20*** -0.40***
(24.56) (25.93) (-15.34) (-21.93) (-16.56) (-27.75) (-0.82) (-15.06) (-4.97) (-19.12)
Accounting opacity 0.05*** 6.42*** 0.42 6.28*** 7.73*** 7.50***
(5.90) (18.72) (0.00) (18.31) (14.02) (13.35)
Legal index -0.00** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.63***
(-2.06) (-18.56) (-18.99) (-12.38) (-12.60)
Intercept 0.07*** 0.07*** 5.70*** -7.69*** 5.58 -9.06*** -16.38*** -13.87*** -12.16*** -15.37***
(2.72) (9.06) (6.65) (-27.97) (0.00) (-33.18) (-7.44) (-22.34) (-5.21) (-23.58)
Year fixed effects yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
R-sq 0.6622 0.2884 0.9246 0.4594 0.9286 0.4573 0.6882 0.1186 0.6827 0.1305
N stocks 2,347 2,347 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
N observations 167,542 167,542 166,191 166,191 166,194 166,194 167,542 167,542 167,542 167,542
Bid-ask spread Trading volume Total trading volume Turnover ratio Total turnover ratio
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Appendix 3.5 Stock volatility and a foreign presence: Firm fixed effects and random effects 
models 
The table reports the estimates from the fixed-firm effects and random effects regressions of the 
dependant variables: return volatility, volatility ratio, and high-low ratio, defined in Table 3.1. Model 
specification: Volatility Measurei,t = α + βDi,t + Σβ1Di,tVi,t + ΣθFi,t + εi,t, where Di,t is foreign presence 
dummy variable, Vi are main control variables; Fi,t are other control variables. Foreign presence dummy 
variable equals one if the stock is listed and/or traded on a foreign exchange and equals zero otherwise. 
The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 3.2. Number (N) of observations is the number 
of stock-months observations of available data. Reported in parentheses is t-value. ‘***’ indicates 
significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Foreign presence 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.39*** 0.10* 0.00 0.00
(6.21) (3.18) (6.22) (1.70) (0.31) (0.15)
Company size*FP -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.01 0.01 -0.0004*** -0.0005***
(-5.91) (-5.03) (-1.08) (1.46) (-3.77) (-4.33)
IAS*FP -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.20*** -0.24*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-9.04) (-10.14) (-9.84) (-11.68) (-12.72) (-13.48)
Analysts*FP -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.02 0.15*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(-6.14) (-13.59) (1.43) (9.74) (-7.58) (-15.52)
Total trading volume*FP -0.00 0.00*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(-0.77) (4.72) (-10.52) (-11.70) (7.63) (12.90)
Company size -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.005*** -0.01***
(-34.89) (-61.84) (-13.29) (-28.81) (-66.35) (-90.80)
Total trading volume 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(88.01) (78.59) (80.60) (83.66) (75.47) (70.79)
Sales growth 0.0002*** 0.001*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(12.12) (27.46) (-5.96) (-13.77) (18.00) (31.41)
Leverage 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.68*** 0.44*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(11.89) (10.60) (23.44) (16.28) (9.16) (8.87)
Intangibles 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.09* 0.12*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(6.75) (13.48) (1.93) (2.75) (10.00) (18.22)
Ownership concentration 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(18.33) (21.37) (10.35) (11.01) (19.45) (22.66)
Int accounting standards 0.002*** 0.0002** 0.02 0.02 0.003*** 0.001***
(18.09) (2.18) (1.34) (1.50) (23.31) (10.76)
Analysts following 0.0001** 0.001*** -0.13*** -0.21*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.40) (15.40) (-17.91) (-30.36) (9.78) (17.30)
GDP per capita 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.14 1.24*** 0.02*** -0.02***
(21.46) (-38.33) (1.09) (39.51) (11.38) (-37.76)
Market size -0.001*** 0.003*** -0.44*** -0.30*** 0.001*** 0.01***
(-3.78) (41.74) (-21.18) (-32.07) (5.84) (49.17)
Accounting opacity -0.02*** -3.42*** -0.01***
(-14.97) (-24.36) (-3.56)
Legal index 0.00*** 0.15*** 0.004***
(23.93) (11.56) (15.92)
Intercept -0.16*** 0.08*** 4.99*** -6.03*** -0.14*** 0.13***
(-19.24) (38.45) (4.18) (-22.45) (-10.23) (33.77)
Year indicators yes no yes no yes no
R-sq 0.4696 0.1594 0.4080 0.0717 0.5268 0.1907
N observations 149,788 149,788 149,788 149,788 149,788 149,788
N stocks 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180
Return volatility Volatility ratio High-low ratio
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Appendix 3.6 Change in firm characteristics related to company size around cross-listing/ 
trading 
The appendix reports the number of observations and the mean and the median ratios of firm 
characteristics related to company size by different listing/ trading status. The ratios are calculated as the 
firm characteristic for the period of time when stock is cross-listed and/or cross-traded, over the base firm 
characteristic, which is the firm characteristic for the period of time during 36 months (at least 24 months) 
before the cross-listing/ cross-trading. Company size is the stock market capitalization. Number (N) of 
shares outstanding is the total number of ordinary shares that represent the capital of the company. Stock 
price is the official closing price of the stock. Total assets are the annual Worldscope data on the value of 
the firm’s total assets. Book value represents the book value of the equity capital of the company at the 
company’s fiscal year end. Long-term debt represents all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding 
amounts due within one year. Market capitalization, price, total assets, book value and long-term debt 
data are obtained from Datastream. Stocks with a foreign presence are those that are listed and/or traded 
on a foreign exchange(s). Stocks with a foreign presence include traded only stocks, i.e. traded abroad 
without stock exchange listing in addition to the home market listing, cross-listed only stocks, i.e. listed 
on a foreign exchange in addition to the home market listing, and cross-listed and cross-traded stocks (CL 
and CT), i.e. cross-listed and cross-traded simultaneously. Last column reports the percentage of 
observations of the ratios that are greater than one. N is the number of stocks with available data. 
Company size Ratio Foreign Presence 487 2.83 1.47 72.5%
Traded only 295 2.01 1.42 69.5%
Cross-listed only 103 1.85 1.34 67.0%
CL and CT 89 6.66 2.29 88.8%
N of shares Foreign Presence 469 4.77 1.22
outstanding Ratio Traded only 282 2.63 1.18 75.9%
Cross-listed only 102 2.20 1.05 61.8%
CL and CT 85 14.98 1.90 88.2%
Stock price Ratio Foreign Presence 473 2.01 1.26
Traded only 283 1.47 1.20 60.1%
Cross-listed only 102 1.49 1.21 58.8%
CL and CT 88 4.35 1.59 75.0%
Total assets Ratio Foreign Presence 444 2.35 1.40
Traded only 267 1.84 1.35 75.7%
Cross-listed only 96 1.61 1.15 60.4%
CL and CT 81 4.89 2.20 87.7%
Book value Ratio Foreign Presence 363 1.62 1.22
Traded only 223 1.61 1.19 68.6%
Cross-listed only 77 1.32 1.09 59.7%
CL and CT 63 2.05 1.62 84.1%
Long-term debt Foreign Presence 415 7.01 1.58
Ratio Traded only 248 5.13 1.57 72.6%
Cross-listed only 89 4.99 1.23 61.8%
CL and CT 78 15.30 2.57 83.3%
N > 1,    
%  of TotalVariable
Listing/ trading      
status N Mean Median
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Chapter 4 
The determinants of the foreign trading  
volume of cross-listed stocks 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Globalization has opened up new possibilities for companies to have their shares listed 
and traded on foreign markets. In addition, recent technological advances, particularly the 
emergence of electronic trading systems, have resulted in significantly intensified competition 
within the stock exchange industry. In response, stock exchanges have gone through dramatic 
changes over the last decades.
65
 In the new business environment, a stock exchange’s 
competiveness is a function of the exchange’s ability to ‘attract order flow and so provide 
liquidity to investors’ (Aggarwal, 2002).
66
 
This chapter contributes to the literature by addressing the following research question: 
What determines the distribution of trading of cross-listed stocks? The implications of the 
location of trading of cross-listed stocks are investigated both from the point of view of stock 
exchanges and also from the point of view of companies. From a stock exchange perspective, it 
compares the ability of stock exchanges to attract trading of foreign stocks. This contributes to 
the literature that has examined how stock exchanges can attract stocks for listing (Pagano et al, 
2001; Fernandes and Giannetti, 2009). From a corporate perspective, this study examines stock-
level determinants of the distribution of foreign trading volume. Because the study analyzes the 
case of stocks from multiple countries traded in various foreign stock exchanges, it adds to the 
literature that has examined the determinants of foreign trading volume distribution of non-US 
                                                 
65
 The changes in the stock exchange industry have included the demutualization of stock exchanges and 
stock exchanges becoming for-profit entities. This has been accompanied by stock exchange 
consolidations, the development of new market segments and alternative markets and the introduction of 
new trading systems and platforms. 
    Some evidence from the financial press on the intensified competition and the changes in stock 
exchange industry include: “In New York: Big Board faces growing threats from its rivals”, The Asian 
Wall Street Journal (January, 20, 2000); “Stock market shakeout: A wave of stock market mergers heralds 
a new era of competition”, National Post (July, 20, 2000); “Exchanges face up to competition”, Financial 
News (February, 22, 2004). 
66
 Anecdotal evidence on the importance of trading volumes for the stock exchanges survival includes: 
“Lack of volume brings end to financial chapter”, The Boston Globe, (October, 3, 2007). 
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stocks that cross-list in the US (Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999; Baruch et al, 2007; Halling et 
al, 2008). As a further contribution, this study examines the role of stock exchange 
characteristics as the determinants of the trading volume distribution of cross-listed stocks. In 
addition, this study considers the role of firm specific factors in the ability of a stock exchange 
to attract trading volumes of foreign stocks. This is important because some provisions of stock 
exchanges may be suitable for some firms but not for others.
67
  Detailed discussion of the above 
contributions of this chapter follows. 
The ability of a stock exchange to attract trading volumes is determined by the quality 
of the trading environment. Previous research shows that the quality of the equity listing and 
trading environment is positively associated with the demutualized status of the exchange 
(Hughes and Zargar, 2006; Krishnamurti et al, 2003), the implementation of electronic trading 
(Jain, 2005), and the introduction and enforcement of insider trading regulation (Fischer, 1992; 
Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Beny, 2005). In the integrated financial markets, however, the 
competitive position of a stock exchange can be further strengthened by focusing on attracting 
business from abroad and several studies have examined the ability of a stock exchange to 
attract foreign listings (Pagano et al, 2001; Fernandes and Giannetti, 2009). There is no 
evidence, however, on the determinants of the ability of a stock exchange to attract trading 
volumes of foreign stocks.  This study contributes to the market microstructure literature by 
evaluating the ability of stock exchanges to attract foreign equity trading and by assessing the 
stock exchange characteristics that affect the location of trading of foreign stocks. 
Knowledge of the determinants of foreign trading volume is also important for cross-
listed companies. Companies choose to cross-list their shares on a foreign exchange in order to 
gain access to global capital, internationalize and expand their investor base, and improve stock 
visibility to foreign investors. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this thesis document that an 
international cross-listing is beneficial in terms of the increase in shareholders’ wealth and in 
terms of improvement in stock liquidity and volatility. However, in order to achieve the benefits 
of cross-listing, it is crucial for cross-listed companies to develop and maintain active stock 
trading following the cross-listing. Active trading on a foreign exchange after cross-listing is 
associated with lower trading costs measured by the bid-ask spread (Foerster and Karolyi, 
                                                 
67
 For example the effect of cost of listing, annual fees, and disclosure requirements could depend on firm 
size. 
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1998), improved valuation
68
 of cross-listed stocks (King and Segal, 2004), and a higher foreign 
market share of the stock price discovery (Eun and Sabherwahl, 2003). Additionally, data from 
the industry show that insufficient foreign trading volume of cross-listed stocks is a primary 
reason for de-listings from foreign exchanges.
69
 In addition to the evidence on the stock 
exchange characteristics that determine foreign trading volumes, this study provides empirical 
evidence on the stock-specific factors that affect the distribution of trading volume across 
various foreign host markets. 
Theoretical models on multi-market trading highlight the importance of market quality 
in explaining the location of trading since trading tends to agglomerate on a single market with 
the most favourable trading environment.
70
  However, determining the factors that lead to a 
more favourable trading environment is an open empirical question. Existing empirical studies 
provide evidence of the increase in liquidity following a cross-listing (Smith and Sofianos, 
1997; Foerster and Karolyi, 1993 and 1998; Karolyi, 1998; Jayakumar, 2002; chapter 3 of this 
thesis). At the same time, there is evidence of great variability in the foreign market fraction of 
trading (Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999; Baruch et al, 2007; Halling et al, 2008).  
Existing empirical evidence on the distribution of trading volume of cross-listed stocks 
is limited to the evidence from foreign stocks that are listed in the US. Focusing on the US as a 
single host market has several major limitations. First, such analysis accounts only for the home 
market’s share and the US market’s share of trading and ignores trading on other exchanges. 
However, companies, particularly European companies, have a long tradition of listing on 
multiple exchanges.
71
  Second, empirical findings on the distribution of equity trading from the 
US market might not be applicable to other host markets due to some distinctive US market 
characteristics, particularly the time zone difference, which is an important factor in explaining 
the distribution of equity trading volume (Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999). However, in the case 
                                                 
68
 Improved stock liquidity after cross-listing and, accordingly, lower trading costs and reduced illiquidity 
premium for investors are expected to lower the cost of capital of cross-listed companies (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Brennan et al, 1998; Jacoby et al, 2000; and 
Amihud, 2002). 
69
 Survey of 119 de-listing announcement statements by European companies obtained from Factiva news 
database reveals that the low trading volume on a foreign exchange is by far the main reason for de-listing 
(named in 53 out of 119 statements). 
70
 Theoretical models on multi-market trading have been developed by Kyle (1985), Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988), Pagano (1989) and Chowdhry and Nanda’s (1991). 
71
 For example, Volkswagen AG simultaneously listed its shares on 13 stock exchanges, Bayer AG listed 
on 10 exchanges, Deutsche Bank AG listed on 10 exchanges, Daimler Chrysler AG listed on 7 exchanges 
(Abee and Zimmermann, 2006). 
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of equity trading within Europe, the time zone difference is negligible. Thus, the distribution of 
trading volume must be driven by other factors that need to be investigated empirically. Finally, 
analysis of the US as the single foreign host market does not allow the comparison of various 
host markets and does not provide any evidence on relative host market characteristics that 
determine the distribution of equity trading. In contrast to the existing research, this study 
evaluates trading volume distribution of European cross-listed stocks among multiple foreign 
stock exchanges and trading venues.  
While the US exchanges attract foreign companies due to a large investor base and a 
high level of liquidity, other major non-US stock exchanges are also important as listing and 
trading locations of foreign stocks. According to the World Federation of Exchanges’ statistics, 
in 2007 listed foreign companies constituted 18% of the total number of listed companies on the 
NYSE, 10% on NASDAQ, 22% on LSE, 12% on Deutsche Borse, 19% on Euronext and 25% 
on SWX. In addition to the significant number of foreign companies listed, foreign equity 
trading contributes significantly to the exchanges’ turnover: in 2007 the fraction of foreign 
equity trading in the total equity trading was 9% on the NYSE, 10% on NASDAQ, 41% on 
LSE, 8% on Deutsche Borse, 1% on Euronext, and 9% on SWX. The fraction of foreign equity 
trading differs among the exchanges and this can potentially be explained by variation in the 
stock exchange characteristics, such as market size, aggregate market liquidity, organizational 
structure, and market design. 
The first part of the analysis of the distribution of foreign equity trading takes place at 
the stock exchange level and evaluates the characteristics of the host stock exchange that affect 
trading volume of foreign stocks. Exchange characteristics are considered to be the gravitation 
forces or the ‘pull’ factors of trading volume. The exchange’s ability to attract foreign equity 
trading is quantified by the average foreign trading volume share, which is the average (across 
the stocks traded on the exchange) fraction of the trading volume on a particular foreign 
exchange out of the total trading volume. Arguably, due to the increasing significance of trading 
commissions in stock exchange profitability, a trading-volume-based measure of a stock 
exchange’s ability to attract foreign business is a better measure than the ‘number of foreign 
stocks listed’ measure used in previous research (Pagano et al, 2001; Fernandes and Giannetti, 
2009). Indeed, Aggarwal (2002) states that the main source of a stock exchange’s revenues 
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comes from trading commissions.
72
 Trading commissions in turn, are a function of trading 
volume. Thus, for a stock exchange’s survival, it is crucial to succeed in attracting equity 
trading volumes, including trading volumes of foreign equity. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on 
the relative attractiveness of regulated markets vs. non-regulated markets (off-exchange venues, 
such as OTC markets and trading platforms) that differ mainly in terms of additional disclosure 
and listing requirements. Off-exchange equity trading activity is largely ignored by academic 
research. Nevertheless, industry statistics show that as much as one third of cash equity trading 
of European blue chip stocks takes place over-the-counter.
73
  Also, Voth (2004) argues that 
OTC trading in equities is the main source of competition for exchanges.  
In the second part of the empirical investigation, analysis of the distribution of foreign 
equity trading takes place at the stock level. This allows the evaluation of the stock-specific 
factors that affect the distribution of trading volume across various markets. As discussed 
above, existing research on the distribution of foreign trading of cross-listed stocks provides 
evidence from foreign stocks cross-listed in the US. Baruch et al (2007) show that the US share 
of trading of cross-listed stocks is positively determined by the level of correlation of stock 
returns with returns of other assets traded on the host market. Halling et al (2008) report that the 
US share of equity trading depends on a number of company characteristics such as size, 
volatility and industry and on the level of development of the stock’s home market and the 
extent of investor protection. Using a pooled sample of observations from various host 
exchanges, this study evaluates stock-level determinants of foreign trading volume distribution. 
Stock-level determinants include listing characteristics, company characteristics and home 
country characteristics. Several listing characteristics, including currency of listing, form of 
listing (depository receipts vs. ordinary listing), and the order of foreign listing (first vs. 
consequent), have not been evaluated in the prior literature. These variables have become 
                                                 
72
 This is because other sources of revenue have lost their significance: listing fees have been reduced as a 
result of intensified competition among exchanges, membership fees have been cancelled as a result of 
the demutualization processes, revenues from sales of market data have diminished as a result of 
technological advances which dramatically reduced the costs of obtaining such data. 
    Statistics on the sources of revenue of stock exchanges support the argument on the importance of 
trading commissions: according to the World Federation of Exchanges’ ‘Cost & Revenue Survey 2006’ 
listing fees is only a small fraction - on average less than 10% of total revenues of a stock exchange while 
trading commissions is the major revenue source - on average 50% of the total revenues.  
73
 “Exchanging Over the Counter”. The Banker (2004), p.49. 
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available for investigation due to the novelty of the sample used in this study, which consists of 
stocks that are cross-listed on various exchanges. 
Finally, this study examines whether the stock-level determinants of foreign trading 
volume share differ by host exchange. Pagano et al (2002) show that the US exchanges are more 
successful in attracting listings of high-growth companies, technology companies and 
companies with a large share of foreign sales, whereas European exchanges mostly attract 
listings of companies with a strong record of past profitability.
74
 The role of stock-specific 
factors in explaining the distribution of foreign trading by the host stock exchange is 
investigated by estimating the determinants of foreign trading distribution individually for major 
exchanges. 
The sample consists of the 795 cross-listed stocks from 25 European countries, 
including 7 emerging markets. In contrast to the existing empirical studies on the determinants 
of the US fraction of trading, this study includes in the sample all foreign listing and trading 
accounts of cross-listed stocks (subject to data availability). In total that gives 2,853 foreign 
trading accounts on more than 30 foreign stock exchanges (including OTC and trading 
platforms) over the period from January 1990 to December 2007.  
The empirical findings reveal the superior ability of the US stock exchanges to attract 
foreign equity trading of European stocks. Furthermore, this study shows that such stock 
exchange characteristics as demutualized status, greater aggregate market liquidity and enforced 
insider trading laws are positive determinants, while higher trading costs and higher levels of 
accounting opacity are negative determinants of an exchange’s average foreign trading volume 
share. There is clear evidence, both from exchange level and stock level analysis, that OTC’s 
and trading platforms’ accounts generate significantly less active trading activity than stock 
exchanges’ accounts. In addition, the level of investor protection is an important factor in 
foreign equity trading: markets that provide better investor protection are more successful in 
attracting trading of foreign stocks. 
The results also highlight the importance of stock-specific factors, including listing and 
company characteristics, in explaining the fraction of trading volume on a foreign exchange. 
                                                 
74
 In addition, there is industry evidence to suggest that exchanges specialize in stocks with particular 
characteristics. For example, companies traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange differ from those traded 
on NYSE, most prominently by company size and industry affiliation. 
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Thus, the fraction of trading on a foreign exchange is higher if it takes place in the same 
currency as trading on the stock’s home market and increases with the duration of listing. 
Foreign trading volume share is larger for smaller and riskier companies and for stocks that 
exhibit lower stock correlation returns with market index returns in the host market. Lastly, 
analysis of the determinants by stock exchange reveals that export-oriented foreign companies 
have better liquidity in the US. Stocks from emerging markets and from English-speaking 
countries have most active foreign trading in London, while larger companies from counties 
with stronger investor protection and a better information environment have a higher foreign 
trading volume share on VIRTX. 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on multimarket trading.  Section 4.3 develops testable 
hypotheses on the potential determinants of the foreign trading volume distribution. Section 4.4 
and section 4.5 describe the methodology and the sample respectively. Section 4.6 presents the 
empirical findings. Finally, section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Theoretical background on multimarket trading 
The central prediction of theoretical models of multimarket equity trading by Kyle 
(1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Pagano (1989) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) is that 
all trades of any asset will gravitate to a single market that offers the most favourable trading 
conditions.
75
  The rationale is that all traders will concentrate on a single market in order to 
attain the highest possible level of liquidity.  
Pagano’s (1989) model assumes the presence of more than one market with different 
characteristics where traders can choose to trade. Accordingly, the depth and liquidity of a 
market are endogenous and depend on the traders’ choice of trading location. Initially, traders 
are assumed to hold different endowments of the stock. Asset price is modelled as a function of 
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 O’Hara (1995) provides a comprehensive overview of the earlier theoretical literature on liquidity and 
multimarket trading in Chapter 8. 
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the demand, which arises as traders need to rebalance portfolios after receiving a random 
endowment shock. Traders maximize their mean-variance utility function and are aware that the 
demand affects the market price and, thus, have to base their trading decisions on the 
expectations of other traders’ actions. In a one-market world, an increase in the number of 
traders in the market has two opposite effects on the expected utility of an investor. On the one 
hand, it decreases the variance of the stock price and, consequently, lowers the expected utility. 
On the other hand, it positively affects the asset price and, thus, leads to a higher utility from 
trading on this market. In cases where a trader can choose between markets, Pagano (1989) 
defines a two-market conjectural equilibrium with the condition that each trader’s expectations 
about the number of traders on each market and about the endowment variances of traders are 
accurate, and shows that all traders will concentrate on a single market. In other words, no two-
market conjectural equilibrium exists unless the two markets are identical in terms of the 
number of traders and trading costs, which is possible but highly unlikely. Additionally, the co-
existence of two markets is possible when the difference in the trading costs is compensated for 
by the difference in the market volatility (‘speculative value’) or by the difference in the number 
of traders (‘liquidity value’).  
The limitation of Pagano’s model is that it ignores information asymmetry issues as it 
assumes that all risk-averse traders, trading a risky asset in more than one market, have the same 
information regarding the asset’s future value. However, strategic behaviour of informed traders 
can significantly distort the equilibrium described by Pagano’s model. In fact, Kyle (1985) 
shows that the level of trading by informed traders is determined by market liquidity, which, in 
turn, depends on trading activity of noise traders. On similar lines, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
show that the behaviour of informed traders can affect market liquidity. Informed traders 
intensify the concentration of trading at particular times of the day by liquidity traders, who in 
turn, cluster their trading in order to avoid the effects of informed trading. 
Building upon the framework of Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), which 
incorporates the presence of information asymmetries in a simultaneous multimarket trading 
environment, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) consider informed traders as well as large and small 
liquidity traders. In contrast to the outcome of Pagano’s (1989) model, the co-existence of more 
than one market that simultaneously trades the same assets is always possible due to the 
presence of small liquidity traders. Informed and large liquidity traders have the option of 
193 
 
trading in multiple markets. Informed traders would trade in multiple markets in order to 
maximize profit from private information, and large liquidity traders would trade in order to 
minimize costs measured by the price impact of a trade. Small liquidity traders trade only on a 
single market. The price in each market is determined by the order flow, traders’ behaviour, 
trading rules and the mechanisms of this particular market, and, thus, can differ across markets. 
The more segmented the markets are in terms of information flow, the higher informed traders’ 
expected profits are, due to the presence of small liquidity traders concentrated on a single 
market. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) give small liquidity traders discretion to choose the single 
market where they trade and show that they, predictably, choose the market with the lowest 
transaction costs and, in equilibrium, will concentrate in the market that has the highest volume 
of trading by large liquidity traders. In sequence, the market with the concentration of small 
liquidity traders will attract more trading by informed traders as well as by large liquidity 
traders. The key implication of Chowdhryand Nanda’s (1991) model is that in equity trading 
there always emerges a dominant market with the most favourable trading conditions that 
attracts the majority of the trades of the security. 
A more recent paper by Domowitz et al (1998) develops a theoretical model of multi-
market trading after international cross-listing that focuses on the importance of informational 
linkages between markets. Building upon the framework of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Domowitz et al (1998) allow both domestic and foreign investors to trade in the local market as 
well as in the foreign market where the stock is cross-listed. Trading costs of local and foreign 
markets are different due to the difference in the costs of gathering information about stock 
fundamentals. The consequences of the foreign listing in the model depend on the level of 
informational segmentation between the foreign and domestic markets. Domowitz et al (1998) 
show that in the case of perfect quotation transparency, cross-listing is followed by 
improvement in market liquidity, both in terms of trading volume and depth, and by a reduction 
in stock price volatility. This is due to intensified competition for order flow from both markets, 
improved informativeness of the stock price and the increased number of analysts following the 
stock. The model predicts an increase in total trading volume following cross-listing, however, 
the distribution of trading volume between the foreign and domestic markets is subject to the 
costs of trading in the foreign market. In the opposite case of complete fragmentation, i.e. no 
information linkages between the markets, cross-listing is followed by migration of investors to 
the foreign market and the reduction of trading volume in the domestic market. Furthermore, the 
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reduction in trading activity leads to higher spreads and higher stock price volatility in the 
domestic market after cross-listing. To sum up, the key prediction of Domowitz et al’s (1998) 
model is that the consequences of multi-market trading vary significantly depending on the level 
of informational transparency between foreign and local markets. 
The two most recent theoretical models of the multimarket trading by Baruch et al 
(2007) and Baruch and Saar (2009) emphasize the importance of the level of correlation 
between stock returns and returns of other securities listed on this market, i.e. the commonality 
in return patterns, in explaining the market share of equity trading. Both models employ Kyle’s 
(1985) theoretical framework with two markets and three assets:  one traded on the first market 
only, one traded on the second market and one cross-listed, i.e. traded on both markets. 
Competitive risk-neutral market makers make the market for assets listed on their exchange and 
can observe the order flow of assets only in their own market. Two groups of investors: 
informed traders and discretionary liquidity traders, can choose the market to trade or can trade 
on both markets. Market makers obtain information about the asset not only from the asset’s 
own order flow, but also from the order flow of other assets traded on the market, which is 
feasible due to the correlation of the assets returns traded on the same market. In equilibrium, 
the relevance of the order flow of an asset for pricing of another asset in the market is a function 
of the level of correlation between these assets, which also negatively affects the sensitivity of 
the asset price to its own order flow. Baruch and Saar (2009) further extend the model to 
demonstrate how the location of listing affects stock liquidity and show that a stock is more 
liquid when it is listed on a market where other assets, that exhibit higher level of correlation 
with the stock return, are traded. On the other hand, Baruch et al (2007) extend the model to 
analyze the distribution of trading of cross-listed stocks. They show that the level of correlation 
of returns of cross-listed stock with other assets traded on the market, determines how 
informative the other assets’ order flow for pricing the cross-listed stock is seen to be. 
Accordingly, both informed and liquidity traders submit a larger proportion of their orders in the 
market that is more informative. In other words, the market on which the cross-listed stock has 
higher correlation with the other assets hosts a higher fraction of the trading volume of cross-
listed stock. 
To summarize, the theoretical models discussed in this section predict the equilibrium 
distribution of trading volumes for stocks that are traded on more than one market. According to 
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Pagano (1989), conditions for the co-existence of two markets are unrealistic. Thus, the likely 
scenario is that only one market with the most favourable transaction costs will survive. 
Similarly, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) predict a ‘winner takes most’ equilibrium, meaning that 
traders concentrate on the most liquid market. Domowitz et al (1998) show that such an 
equilibrium is complicated by the degree of information segmentation between two markets. 
Finally, Baruch et al (2007) and Baruch and Saar (2009) highlight the importance of correlation 
of stock’s returns with that of the other assets traded on the market in explaining the distribution 
of order flow. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical research on multimarket trading 
Cross-listed stocks are traded on more than one market. These markets generally differ 
significantly in their characteristics and, thus, provide a natural setting for empirical testing of 
theoretical models of multimarket trading. Empirical literature on the distribution of trading 
volumes of cross-listed stocks indicates a great variability in the foreign market share of global 
trading and the explanatory power of its determinants. 
The NYSE working paper by Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) was the first study to 
address the question of what factors determine the location of trading of a cross-listed stock. 
This study examines 1996’s global trading data on 254 NYSE-listed non-US stocks and reports 
that, on average, 34% of total trading volumes of these stocks are contributed by trading on the 
NYSE. However, they also report a great variability in the foreign trading share across different 
companies: from 1% for Japanese cross-listed stocks to 95% for Latin American cross-listed 
stocks. Further, they examine the determinants of the distribution of trading activity including 
time-zone distance, whether the firm comes from developed or emerging economy, home-
market commission rates and several other issue-specific factors. They report that altogether 
these factors explain 64 percent of the variation, but it is the time zone factor that is the most 
dominant: companies with home markets that trade around the same time-zone as the US are 
likely to be more active on the US markets.  
Baruch et al (2007) analyse weekly stock returns and volume data on 251 non-US 
stocks cross-listed in the US and find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that trading 
volume of internationally cross-listed stocks is higher on exchanges on which cross-listed asset 
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returns have a greater correlation with returns of other assets traded on that market. They report 
that the US information factor, a proxy for the informativeness of the US market in explaining 
returns of the cross-listed stock, is the main determinant of the distribution of trading volumes 
between home and US markets.  
Halling et al (2008) report that foreign trading volumes peak right after the cross-listing 
date and then decrease dramatically in the subsequent six months. However, they point out 
considerable cross-sectional variation in the persistence and magnitude of foreign trading. 
Halling et al (2008) use a sample of 437 non-US companies that are listed in the US and find 
that the portion of the US trade is higher for smaller, export and high-tech oriented companies 
and for companies from home markets with higher trading costs and weaker insider trading 
protection. 
To conclude, empirical evidence on the distribution of trading volumes of cross-listed 
stocks is relatively new and still limited. Moreover, the literature offers empirical evidence on 
the determinants of foreign trading volume distribution only for non-US stocks that cross-list in 
the US. Finally, the role of stock exchange characteristics as the determinants of trading volume 
distribution of cross-listed stocks is totally ignored by the prior literature. 
 
 
4.3 Testable hypotheses 
This study examines the factors that determine the distribution of foreign trading 
volume of European cross-listed stocks among various exchanges. Arguably, there are two main 
forces that affect the location of the trading of foreign equity. On the one hand, there is a set of 
characteristics of a host exchange/market where trading of the stock takes place. On the other 
hand, there is a set of factors inherent to the traded stock and to the country of its origin. Host 
market characteristics determine how favorable a foreign trading environment is and, 
consequently, determine the ability of the host exchange to attract or ‘pull’ foreign equity 
trading. In turn, stock-specific factors drive trading volumes towards the foreign market 
depending on the suitability of a particular host market for the stock. Therefore, the two major 
groups of determinants are: 1) host market characteristics (the pull factors) and 2) stock-level 
factors. The pull factors include host exchange characteristics and host country characteristics as 
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well as characteristics of the host country relative to those of the home country. The stock-level 
factors include: listing characteristics, company characteristics and home market characteristics. 
Thus, two general testable hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Host market characteristics determine the ability of the host exchange to attract 
foreign equity trading. 
H2: The distribution of foreign equity trading volume of a stock is significantly affected 
by firm specific factors.  
The forthcoming sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 develop specific testable hypotheses on the 
pull factors and stock-level factors of foreign trading volume distribution. The list of potential 
determinants of foreign trading volume, including host market characteristics and stock-level 
factors, and the predicted direction of the effect of the determinants on the foreign trading 
volume share are presented in Table 4.1. 
 
4.3.1 Host market characteristics: the pull factors of foreign trading 
Host market characteristics that potentially affect a stock exchange’s ability to attract 
foreign equity trading, include host stock exchange characteristics such as: the level of 
disclosure, organizational structure, market design, foreign equity expertise and industry 
specialization, market size, market liquidity, and trading costs. Other factors include host 
country characteristics, absolute and relative to those of the home country, such as the quality of 
legal and information environments. 
Level of disclosure: stock exchange vs. trading platform. Cross-listed stocks can be 
traded on both regulated markets, which are stock exchanges where the stock is listed subject to 
compliance with listing requirements, and on non-regulated markets, i.e. trading venues where 
the stock is traded without meeting any disclosure or listings requirements. Specifically, non-
regulated markets in the sample include US OTC market and VIRTX and XETRA trading 
platforms. Since the higher level of disclosure of regulated markets reduces traders’ information 
costs regulated markets are expected to outperform non-regulated markets in terms of attracting 
trading volumes of foreign stocks. 
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H1.1: Regulated markets outperform non-regulated markets in terms of attracting 
trading volumes of foreign stocks. 
Exchange characteristic: Demutualization of a stock exchange. One of the main 
developments in the stock exchange industry since the early 1990s has been the trend to 
demutualize exchanges from not-for-profit member-owned organizations into publicly owned 
corporations, mainly as a response to technological advances and the increase in global 
competition (Aggarwal, 2002). Demutualized exchanges are arguably superior to mutualised 
exchanges due to a more flexible governance structure, greater investor participation and greater 
access to global markets and capital (Hughes and Zargar, 2006). Empirical evidence suggests 
that demutualized stock exchanges provide a better quality market (Krishnamurti et al, 2003) 
and demonstrate a higher level of technical efficiency (Serifsoy, 2008). 
H1.2: Demutualized exchanges have superior ability to attract foreign equity trading 
compared to that of mutualised exchanges. 
Exchange characteristic: Market design: Electronic market vs. Floor trading. The other 
prominent innovation in the stock exchange industry in the last 20 years has been the dramatic 
change in market design due to technological advances, specifically, the introduction of 
automated or electronic trading as an addition to and later a replacement for, traditional floor 
trading. An electronic market has lower transaction costs due to low development and operating 
costs and lower implicit costs of trading (Domowitz, 2002). Empirically Jain (2005) shows that, 
based on the evidence from exchanges from 120 countries, electronic trading enhances liquidity 
and informativeness of stock markets. In turn, lower transaction costs and higher market 
efficiency are expected to enhance the ability of the exchange to attract foreign equity trading. 
H1.3: Exchanges that have introduced electronic trading platforms have better ability to 
attract foreign equity trading compared to the period of time before the implementation 
of electronic trading and also compared to other exchanges that utilize floor trading. 
Exchange characteristic: Foreign stock concentration. A stock exchange that has a 
significant share of foreign companies in its total number of listed companies might have a 
competitive advantage in attracting trading of foreign stocks, possibly due to market expertise in 
foreign equity. Pagano et al (2001) show that companies are more likely to cross-list on a 
foreign exchange that already has a significant number of cross-listed companies. Additionally, 
Serifsoy (2008) argues that the exchange’s share of new foreign listings out of the total number 
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of new foreign listings worldwide is a measure of the general attractiveness of the capital 
market. 
H1.4: Exchanges with higher share of foreign companies listed have superior ability to 
attract foreign equity trading. 
Exchange characteristic: Industry specialization. Pagano et al (2002) and Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004) argue that a company’s industry is one of the most important factors affecting 
a cross-listing decision. Companies are more likely to cross-list on a foreign exchange with a 
higher fraction of cross-listed companies in the same industry (Pagano et al, 2001). 
Furthermore, Baruch and Saar (2009) argue that ‘stock is more liquid when it is listed on a 
market where ‘similar’ securities (i.e., securities with which its value innovations are more 
correlated) are traded’ (p. 2240). One of the possible sources of the commonality in returns is 
the company’s industry affiliation.  
H1.5: Exchanges with a higher fraction of foreign stocks traded from the same industry 
attract more active foreign equity trading. 
Trade friction: Common language. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) argue that a common 
language between countries is a proxy for cultural proximity as it often results from shared 
historical background and cultural proximity and is thus an important determinant of a cross-
listing decision. Along similar lines, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that investors are more 
likely to trade stocks of companies that communicate in the investor’s native language. This can 
be explained by the fact that the language differential, meaning information barriers between 
home and foreign markets, gives home market traders an informational advantage over foreign 
market traders under the assumption that most price-sensitive information is generated in the 
company’s home market. 
H1.6: Host market attracts trading of cross-listed stocks more easily when the host and 
home markets share a common language. 
Trade friction: Geographic distance. Geographic distance can be interpreted as a 
measure of stock’s unfamiliarity to foreign traders.
76
   Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that 
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 Geographic distance between the host and home countries is closely related to the difference in time 
zones between the host and home countries. According to Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999), the time zone 
difference is the most significant determinant of foreign trading volume on NYSE. However, in the case 
of the European stocks traded within continental Europe, the time zone difference is not relevant as all 
continental Western European countries (with the exception of Portugal) are in the same time zone. 
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investors’ equity trading activity is negatively related to the distance between the investor and 
the company’s headquarters. Portes and Rey (2005) report that the distance between capital 
cities is the main negative determinant of cross-border equity flows. In addition, Sarkissian and 
Schill (2004) provide evidence that corporate cross-listing decisions exhibit a ‘proximity bias’ 
meaning that companies tend to cross-list in geographically-approximate markets. Lastly, 
Halling et al (2008) report that the US share of trading is larger for companies based in 
countries that are geographically close to the US.  
H1.7: Stock’s foreign trading volume share is inversely related to the geographic 
distance between host and home countries. 
Trade friction: Market size. According to Fernandes and Giannetti (2009), market 
capitalization of the host exchange is a positive determinant of the probability of a foreign 
company listing on the exchange. The equity market size can be interpreted as a proxy for the 
size of the investor base and the level of equity market development. More developed markets 
with larger investor bases facilitate market liquidity and, accordingly, are expected to induce 
equity trading of foreign stocks. 
H1.8: Larger markets have superior ability to attract foreign equity trading.  
Trade friction: Aggregate market liquidity. Fernandes and Giannetti (2009) report that 
the probability of listing on a foreign exchange is positively related to the level of liquidity of 
the foreign exchange and negatively related to the level of liquidity of the home exchange. 
Serifsoy (2008) suggests that market liquidity measures the market depth and, thus, is a proxy 
for an exchange’s importance and market power.  
H1.9: Exchanges that offer a higher level of aggregate market liquidity have a stronger 
competitive position in attracting foreign equity trading.  
Trade friction: Trading costs. When a stock is traded on several exchanges with 
different levels of trading costs it is reasonable to expect that order flow will migrate to the 
exchange that offers the lowest costs of execution. Empirically, Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) 
report that higher home market commissions lead to a higher US share of trading. Halling et al 
(2008) report a strong negative relationship between the level of the home market’s financial 
development, an indirect proxy for transaction costs in the home market, and the US share of 
trading of cross-listed stocks. 
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H1.10: Exchanges that offer lower costs of trading have superior ability to attract 
foreign equity trading. 
Host country characteristic: Legal environment. The quality of the legal environment 
relevant to equity trading is determined by the level of investor protection and enforcement of 
insider trading legislation in the country. Weak legal investor protection in the country 
empowers corporate managers to seize private benefits of control and, accordingly, increases 
the costs of owning and trading stocks for investors and, particularly, for foreign investors who 
do not understand how the local system works (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In a case when a 
stock is traded on more than one market with different levels of investor protection, the rational 
expectation is that investors would choose to trade on a market where they are better legally 
protected. 
H1.11: Host markets that offer better legal protection to investors have superior ability 
to attract foreign equity trading. 
The other important consideration for traders is legislation regarding insider trading. 
The principal aim of insider trading regulation is to prevent insiders with an information 
advantage from trading at the expense of other traders (Durnev and Nain, 2007). Numerous 
studies on the benefits of prohibiting insiders from trading argue that regulation reduces the 
amount of trading based on private information (Durnev and Nain, 2007), decreases adverse 
selection costs for market participants (Fischer, 1992), improves investor confidence by 
providing incentives for corporate managers to disclose information (Maug, 2002) and enhances 
stock price informativeness and market liquidity (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009; Beny, 2005). 
Furthermore, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002, 2009) suggest that the introduction of the 
regulation itself is not sufficient. It is the enforcement of insider trading laws rather than the 
existence of such laws that actually results in positive consequences for capital markets. 
Empirically, Halling et al (2008) show that the difference in the level of enforcement of insider 
trading legislation between the US and the home market is a significant positive determinant of 
the US fraction of foreign trading.  
H1.12: Host markets that enforce insider trading laws have superior ability to attract 
foreign equity trading. 
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Host country characteristic: Information environment. In order to minimize the costs of 
obtaining reliable information about the stock, investors would choose to trade on a market with 
a better information environment.  
H1.13: Host markets with lower levels of accounting opacity have superior ability to 
attract foreign equity trading. 
 
4.3.2 Stock-level factors that affect foreign trading volume 
Stock-level factors that potentially affect the distribution of equity trading volumes 
include three main groups of variables: 1) listing characteristics, 2) company characteristics, and 
3) home market characteristics. 
 
Listing characteristics 
Although some of the listing characteristics that potentially affect the fraction of trading 
on a foreign exchange have been considered in previous studies (Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 
1999; Sabherwal, 2007), the majority of listing characteristics examined in this study are unique 
and became available for examination due to the novelty of the sample which consists of 
European stocks traded on various exchanges. 
Level of Disclosure: Listed versus traded. In addition to a stock exchange trading, a 
stock can be traded on over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Furthermore, in recent years a number 
of alternative markets and trading platforms have emerged that are similar to OTC markets in 
their admission rules, for example, the Open market of the Deutsche Borse, including the 
Frankfurt and XETRA exchanges, and VIRTX, the trading platform of the Swiss stock 
exchange. Often companies are not aware that their stocks are traded on such markets. A stock 
exchange listing, in contrast to an OTC and alternative markets trading, imposes additional 
disclosure requirements and, accordingly, results in enhanced stock visibility and lower 
information costs for investors. Moreover, by meeting stricter listing requirements, companies 
signal to the market their quality (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006; Fuerst, 1998). In this study, 
if a stock is traded on the exchange where it is listed, it is referred to as listed account. If a stock 
is traded on an OTC market or alternative markets where it is admitted to trade rather than 
listed, it is referred as a traded account. 
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H2.1: Listed accounts have a higher share of foreign trading volume compared to traded 
accounts. 
Stock visibility: Listing order. Arguably, the incremental increase in the investor base is 
largest for the first foreign listing. Empirically, Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) find that a first 
foreign listing has a more profound impact on corporate valuation than subsequent foreign 
listings.  
H2.2: The first foreign exchange listing generates a higher share of foreign trading 
volume compared to consequent foreign listings. 
Stock visibility: Duration of listing/ trading. According to Chordia et al (2007), the 
duration of listing is a proxy for stock’s visibility to investors and, thus, is expected to have a 
positive relationship with the stock’s trading volume on this exchange. Previous research 
provides contradictory evidence: Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) report a positive but 
insignificant impact of the duration of listing on the US share of trading volume, whereas 
Halling et al 2008 find that foreign trading volume decreases with the time elapsed since cross-
listing, meaning trading of cross-listed stocks eventually migrates back to the home market. 
H2.3: The duration of listing/trading on a foreign exchange positively affects the stock’s 
trading volume on this exchange.  
Stock visibility: Price level. Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) argue that stocks with a 
higher US dollar price have a larger US share of trading volume because the minimum tick size 
in New York is generally higher than the minimum tick size on the home market, which makes 
it difficult for the US market to compete with the home market in attracting order flow. Chordia 
et al (2007) report that stocks with higher price level experience higher turnover and interpret 
this result as consistent with the findings of Brennan and Hughes (1991), who show that trading 
costs are inversely related to price per share.  
H2.3: Stock price level is a positive determinant of the stock’s share of foreign trading 
volume. 
Trade frictions: Currency of listing. When equity trading in the home and host markets 
takes place in the same currency, splitting orders between markets is easier for investors as they 
bypass currency exchange risk and avoid the extra costs involved in converting local currency 
into a foreign currency. 
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H2.4: Foreign trading of stock is more active when it takes place in the same currency 
as the home market trading. 
Trade frictions: Depository receipts vs. ordinary listings. Foreign listing can take place 
in the form of ordinary shares as well as in the form of depository receipts (DRs). Often the DR 
conversion ratio, i.e. the number of underlying shares represented by a single depository receipt 
is different from one, making the price of a DR differ from the price of the underlying stock. 
For US investors ADRs (American DRs)  trading could be preferable to trading ordinary shares 
in the issuer's home market because ADRs trade, clear and settle according to international 
conventions and offer quotes and dividends in US dollars. On the other hand, trading ADRs 
could be more expensive than trading ordinary shares as, generally, the Depository
77
 charges a 
per share fee for every share purchased or sold and for dividends accrued. Arguably, the higher 
costs of trading outweigh the convenience of trading depository receipts. 
H2.5: Depository receipts generate a smaller fraction of foreign trading compared to the 
foreign trading volume share of ordinary stocks. 
 
Company characteristics 
Company’s visibility: Company size. Larger companies have greater visibility to 
investors because they release more public information, experience more intensive media 
attention, have larger advertising budgets and a greater analyst following (Bhushan, 1989; 
Aggarwal et al, 2005), and, accordingly, have more active trading of their stocks. Even though 
Kang and Stulz (1997) and Aggarwal et al (2005) report that larger companies have a greater 
fraction of equity owned by foreign institutional investors, it is not clear whether trading activity 
in stocks of larger companies would be driven abroad after cross-listing to a higher degree than 
trading activity in stocks of smaller companies. Empirically, Halling et al (2008) and Baruch et 
al (2007) show that larger companies have a lower share of the US trading volume. A possible 
explanation for this is that the trading of stocks of larger companies is anchored in the home 
market to a higher degree due to the presence of a more established investor base and a strong 
analyst following. 
H2.6: Stocks of smaller companies have a higher share of foreign trading.  
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 Depository is a bank that issues DRs and acts as a registrar, transfer and corporate action agent. 
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Company’s visibility: Growth opportunities. Another commonly used proxy for stock 
visibility is the company’s growth opportunities (Chordia et al, 2007) and this is expected to be 
a positive determinant of the stock’s trading activity. In addition, a company’s growth could 
signal that the company needs to raise capital. In this case, listing on a foreign exchange might 
be motivated by the ‘capital raising for investment’ hypothesis (Pagano et al, 2002). Raising 
capital on a foreign exchange increases the probability of having a larger investor base and more 
active equity trading on the foreign exchange. 
H2.7: Higher-growth stocks have a higher share of foreign trading.  
Company’s visibility: Foreign sales. Export-oriented companies are more visible to 
foreign investors due to their presence on the product market of the foreign country. Halling et 
al (2008) and Baruch et al (2007) argue that the fraction of foreign sales in the company’s total 
sales should be positively related to the ratio of foreign to domestic trading volume.  
H2.8: Stocks of companies with a higher fraction of foreign sales have a higher share of 
foreign trading.  
Stock ownership structure: Foreign institutional investors. Baruch et al (2007) and 
Halling et al (2008) report that the fraction of the firm’s shares owned by US institutional 
investors is a significant positive determinant of the US share of equity trading. Halling et al 
(2008) argue that institutional investors are likely to supply liquidity and encourage trading 
activity by other market participants in the market where they operate.  
H2.9: Stocks with higher foreign institutional ownership have a higher share of foreign 
trading.  
Stock ownership structure: Ownership concentration. The presence of controlling 
shareholders limits the ability of portfolio investors to hold the stock (Dahlquist et al, 2003). 
Thus, concentrated stock ownership is inversely related to stock liquidity (Heflin and Shaw, 
2000; Rubin, 2007). Additionally, high ownership concentration could signal poor governance 
and poor minority investor protection (La Porta et al, 2000).  
H2.10: Stocks with higher ownership concentration have a smaller share of foreign 
trading.  
Stock risk. Riskier stocks, i.e. stocks with higher stock price volatility, have a higher 
level of uncertainty about fundamental values. In turn, higher levels of prediction error and 
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rebalancing needs of investors would generate higher trading activity in the stock (Chordia et al, 
2007). Halling et al (2008) find that stock return volatility, interpreted as a measure of stock 
sensitivity to new information, is positively correlated with the US share of trading volume. 
H2.11: Riskier stocks have a higher share of foreign trading.  
Transparency level: accounting standards used. Higher levels of transparency at 
company level boost investor confidence due to the increased certainty about fundamental 
corporate values. Transparency at company level can be measured by the quality of the 
accounting standards used by the company. Adopting enhanced accounting disclosure 
standards, such as international accounting standards (IAS) or US GAAP, could be a way to 
overcome the home country’s institutional deficiencies, particularly for companies from 
developing countries (Aggarwal et al, 2005). 
H2.12: Stocks of companies that have adopted internationally recognised accounting 
standards have a higher share of foreign trading.  
Stock return correlation with foreign market index returns. Due to the potential 
portfolio diversification benefits, foreign investors should find stocks that exhibit low 
correlation of returns with the foreign market index returns appealing. Empirically, Halling et al 
(2008) report a negative and significant relationship between the correlation of cross-listed 
stock returns with the US market returns and the US share of equity trading. 
H2.13: Stocks that exhibit lower levels of correlation of returns with the foreign market 
returns have a higher share of foreign trading.  
Foreign information factor. Baruch et al (2007) argue that the trading volume of 
internationally cross-listed stocks is higher on exchanges in which the cross-listed stock returns 
have a higher level of correlation with returns of other assets traded on that market. They show 
that the most important determinant of the distribution of trading volumes of stocks cross-listed 
in the US, is the US information factor, a measure of the incremental contribution of the US 
market in explaining stock’s return.
78
  
H2.14: Stocks with a higher foreign information factor have a higher share of trading on 
the relevant foreign market. 
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 Calculation of the foreign information factor (Baruch et al, 2007) is explained in Appendix 4.1. 
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Home country characteristics 
Home countries in the sample exhibit significant differences in their level of economic 
development, the maturity of their legal systems, their accounting practices, the level of 
transaction costs, and their cultural and geographic proximity. These differences can potentially 
explain the variation in the foreign trading volume share of cross-listed stocks.  
Economic development. The sample includes a number of European countries with 
developed capital markets as well as countries with emerging capital markets such as Central 
and Eastern European countries. Baruch et al (2007) argue that due to the presence of regulatory 
constraints and higher overall trading costs in emerging countries, stocks from emerging 
countries should have higher foreign trading turnover. Empirically, Baruch et al (2007) and 
Halling et al (2008) show that stocks from emerging markets exhibit a higher fraction of foreign 
trading. 
H2.15: Stocks from emerging markets have a higher share of foreign trading. 
Legal environment. As discussed in section 4.3.1, markets with enhanced investor 
protection and enforced insider trading regulation have a competitive advantage in attracting 
foreign equity trading. Thus, enhanced legal investor protection in the home country should help 
to retain trading of cross-listed stocks on the home market. 
H2.16: Stocks from home markets with stronger legal protection of investors have a 
lower share of foreign trading. 
H2.17: Stocks from home markets with enforced insider trading regulation have a lower 
share of foreign trading. 
Information environment. Corporate transparency is greatly affected by the quality of 
accounting standards practised in the company’s country of origin. The accounting opacity of 
the home country is an additional risk factor for foreign investors as it increases valuation 
uncertainty due to the poor quality and unreliability of accounting information. Thus, it should 
be negatively related to the attractiveness of the stock to foreign investors (Aggarwal et al, 
2005). 
H2.18: Stocks from home markets with higher levels of accounting opacity have a 
lower share of foreign trading. 
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Trade friction: Trading costs. As discussed in section 4.3.1, markets that offer lower 
costs of trading to investors have a competitive advantage in attracting foreign equity trading. 
Thus, higher trading costs in the home market push the trading of cross-listed stocks away from 
the home market towards markets with lower costs of trading. 
H2.19: Stocks from home markets with higher costs of trading have a higher share of 
foreign trading. 
 
4.3.3 Stock-level factors of foreign trading volume by host stock exchange 
Finally, I argue that a stock with particular characteristics would have a different level 
of trading activity depending on the location of trading. In contrast to existing research on the 
distribution of trading volume of foreign stocks listed on US exchanges, this study investigates 
the determinants of the distribution of foreign trading among various host exchanges. 
Furthermore, the sample structure allows the empirical examination of whether exchanges 
specialize in different types of stocks, e.g. in terms of size and risk. Based on evidence from 
industry, I expect that the explanatory power of stock-level factors on the distribution of trading 
volume varies across host exchanges. 
H3: Sensitivity of stock-level factors of foreign trading volume varies by host exchange. 
 
 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Dependent variables 
Analysis is performed initially at the stock exchange level in order to evaluate the 
exchange-level factors that affect the exchange’s ability to attract foreign equity trading and 
then on the stock-level in order to evaluate the stock-level factors that affect the distribution of 
the stock’s trading volume. 
Stock–level dependent variable 
Foreign trading volume distribution on the stock-level is measured by the foreign share 
of equity trading volume, calculated monthly for each stock as the ratio of the number of shares 
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traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in the same month on all 
exchanges/ trading venues in the sample
79
:  
FTVSi,n = NSTi,n /(Σ
N
n=1NSTi,n)           (4.1) 
where FTVSi,n is the stock i’s foreign equity trading volume share on the exchange n in month t; 
NSTi,n is the number of  shares of stock i traded on the exchange n in month t. 
The main innovation of this way of calculating foreign trading volume share is that it 
takes into account trading activity on all the venues where a stock is being traded (subject to 
data availability). In contrast, the calculation of the US fraction of trading in previous studies 
(Baruch et al, 2007; Halling et al, 2008) ignores trading on markets other than the stock’s home 
market and the US market. Furthermore, using the number of shares traded for the calculation of 
foreign trading volume share rather than the dollar value of equity trading, as in Halling et al 
(2008), eliminates potential bias in the findings due to the currency exchange rate fluctuations. 
In order to account for the fact that the foreign trading volume share is bounded 
between zero and one, the regression analysis uses the logistic transformation of the foreign 
trading volume share:  logtrFTVSi,n = ln(FTVSi,n / (1- FTVSi,n))         (4.2) 
where FTVSi,n is the stock i’s foreign equity trading volume share on the exchange n in month t. 
 
Exchange–level dependent variable 
The ability of a stock exchange to attract foreign equity trading is measured by the 
exchange’s monthly average foreign trading volume share. The exchange’s average foreign 
trading volume share is calculated as the average of the trading volume shares of all foreign 
stocks traded on the exchange in each month. A stocks’ trading volume share on a particular 
foreign exchange (TVSi,n) is calculated as explained above (formula (4.1)).  
AFTVSn = (Σ
N
n=1 FTVSi,n )/N                          (4.3) 
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 For example, the Bank of Ireland stock (ISIN: IE0030606259) in 2007 had total trading volume of 
18,714 million GBP, including 7,896 million GBP on the home exchange Dublin, and the rest 10,819 
million GBP on foreign exchanges, referred to as the foreign trading volume in this study. Foreign trading 
volumes were contributed by trading on the London stock exchange (10,368 million GBP), on NYSE 
(446 million GBP), on the Frankfurt stock exchange (3 million GBP) and on the US OTC market (2 
million GBP). Thus, the Bank of Ireland stock’s foreign trading volume share on the London stock 
exchange in this example is 55% (=10,368/18,714), on NYSE 2%, on Frankfurt and US OTC market less 
that 1%. 
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where FTVSi,n is the stock i’s foreign equity trading volume share on the exchange n in month t; 
NSTi,n is the number of shares of stock i traded on the exchange n in month t; AFTVSn is the 
average foreign equity trading volume share of the exchange n in month t. 
An exchange’s average foreign equity trading volume share is an innovative measure of 
a stock exchange’s competitiveness in attracting foreign business as it is a trading volume-based 
measure in contrast to ‘the fraction of foreign stocks listed in the total number of stock listed’ 
measure of a stock exchange’s attractiveness for foreign stocks used in previous studies (Pagano 
et al, 2001; Fernandes and Giannetti, 2009). 
In order to account for the fact that the foreign trading volume share is bounded 
between zero and one, the regression analysis uses the logistic transformation of the average 
foreign trading volume share:  logtrAFTVSn = ln(AFTVSn / (1- AFTVSn))        (4.4) 
where AFTVSn is the average foreign equity trading volume share of the exchange n in month t. 
 
 4.4.2 Multivariate regression analysis 
The potential determinants of the foreign trading volumes share are evaluated using 
multivariate regression analysis. Based on the findings of Petersen (2009) and following Baruch 
et al (2007) the regressions are estimated using OLS procedure with heteroskedasticity 
consistent (White, 1980) standard errors adjusted to account for the possible correlation within a 
cluster, also called Rogers or clustered standard errors.
80
  In the exchange-level analysis, 
standard errors are adjusted for cluster by exchange, while in the stock-level analysis the cluster 
variable is the company’s foreign account on a particular exchange. As a robustness test, in 
some model specifications I additionally control for year-fixed effects by introducing year-
specific dummy variables. 
Exchange-level multivariate analysis: the pull factors 
The first proposition is that host market-specific factors, or the pull factors of the 
foreign trading volume, can explain an exchange’s level of equity trading of foreign cross-listed 
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 Petersen (2009) compares a number of approaches for estimating standard errors in panel data sets 
where the residuals may be correlated cross-sectionally and across time, and concludes that in the 
presence of a firm fixed effects (which is the case in this study) only clustered standard errors are 
unbiased. 
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stocks. To test this proposition, the monthly average foreign share of equity trading volume, the 
measure of a stock exchange’s ability to attract foreign equity trading, is regressed on a set of 
exchange-specific and host country-specific variables. In addition, the regression includes a 
mean size of foreign companies traded on the exchange as a control variable. 
logtrAFTVSn = α0 + Σ θk Zk,n + Cn + εn                   (4.5) 
where logtrAFTVSn is log-transformation of the average foreign equity trading volume share on 
the host exchange n in month t; Zk,n is characteristic k of host market n in month t; Cn is average 
size of companies traded on host exchange n in month t (control variable). Estimated 
coefficients θk and their significance indicate the importance of the stock exchange-level factors 
and host country characteristics in explaining the level of the foreign equity trading. 
 
Stock-level multivariate analysis 
The second proposition is that stock-level factors, along with the pull factors, 
significantly affect the distribution of foreign equity trading volume of cross-listed stocks. The 
significance of the stock-level factors and the joint significance of the pull and the stock-level 
factors in explaining the foreign share of equity trading volume of European cross-listed stocks 
are evaluated at stock level using the following regressions: 
logtrFTVSi,n = α0 + Σ γj Xj + εi,n                   (4.6) 
logtrFTVSi,n = α0 + Σ γj Xj + Σ θk Zk,n + εi,n                      (4.7) 
where logtrFTVSi,n is log-transformation of the stock i’s fraction of trading volume on the 
exchange n in month t; Xj is vector of stock-level factors; Zk,n is characteristic k of the host 
market n or characteristic k of the host market n relative to characteristic k of the stock’s home 
market. Where possible, the difference in characteristics between the host and the home markets 
is used in the regression instead of the host and home market-specific factors individually. 
 
Multivariate analysis: Stock-specific factors by stock exchange 
 The third proposition is that the determinants vary depending on the trading venue. To 
test this proposition the loadings of the explanatory variables are estimated individually for all 
major exchanges in the sample by introducing interaction variables of a stock exchange dummy 
variable with the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the foreign share of equity 
trading volume on the stock level. The regression is as follows: 
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logtrFTVSi,n = α0 + Σn,j ωn,j (D_SEn Xj) + εi,n              (4.8) 
where logtrFTVSi,n is log-transformation the stock i’s share of trading volume on the exchange n 
in month t; D_SEn is dummy variable that equals one if trading takes place on exchange n and 
zero otherwise; Xj is vector of stock-level factors. Estimated coefficients ωn,j indicate the 
loadings of each of the stock-level factors specifically for exchange n. 
 
4.4.3 Economic significance 
Since the regression analysis uses the logistic transformation of the dependent variable, 
the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straight forward. To overcome this issue, 
the relative importance of variables is approximated by the economic significance of coefficient 
estimates calculated following the methodology of Welch (2004) and Bris et al (2007). The 
economic significance indicates the percentage standard deviations of the dependent variable 
explained with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. It is calculated as a 
ratio of the product of the coefficient estimate and the standard deviation of the variable in the 
sample, termed the unit-normalized coefficient, to the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable (Bris et al, 2007). Importantly, the economic significance is comparable across 
explanatory variables. 
 
4.4.4 Multicollinearity concern 
The explanatory variables used in the analysis, particularly country characteristics, may 
exhibit high correlations and, thus, may trigger concerns about multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity could inflate the estimates of a parameters variance (Greene, 2008). This in 
turn inflates the standard errors of the parameter estimates, reducing the significance of the 
coefficient estimates.  
To detect whether multicollinearity is an issue, first, I look at the correlation matrix of 
the explanatory variables. Second, I estimate variance inflation factors (VIF) for each 
coefficient estimate.
81
 Third, if there is evidence of multicollinearity, I additionally estimate 
regression specifications that omit the variable with the highest VIF and evaluate whether there 
                                                 
81
 VIF quantifies the severity of the multicollinearity in OLS regression analysis and provides an index 
that measures how much the variance of the parameter estimates is inflated due to multicollinearity 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
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are any significant changes in coefficient estimates of other variables that are potentially 
correlated with the omitted variable. 
 
4.4.5 Explanatory variable definitions 
Explanatory variables, i.e. potential determinants of foreign trading volume distribution, 
include two main groups: host market characteristics and stock-level factors. Each of these 
groups is expected to affect the distribution of trading volumes of cross-listed stocks. Host 
market characteristics, or the pull factors of foreign trading volume, include host stock exchange 
characteristics, host country characteristics and host country characteristics relative to home 
country characteristics. Stock-level factors include company characteristics, listing 
characteristics, and home country characteristics.  
Total trading costs are calculated as a sum of price impact costs, implicit costs and 
explicit costs, i.e. commissions, from Chiyachantana et al (2004). As a proxy for the level of 
investor protection, I use the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al (2008) that enumerates 
the legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders. The 
quality of the country’s information environment is measured by the quality of accounting 
information prevailing in the country using the accounting opacity index from Kurtzman et al 
(2004).
82
  The company’s growth opportunities are measured by the price-to-book ratio (as in 
Chordia et al, 2007). Foreign institutional ownership is measured by the fraction of total shares 
in issue held by institutions domiciled in a country other than that of the stock. 
Table 4.2 presents detailed definitions and data sources of all the explanatory variables. 
Additionally, Appendix 4.1 explains the calculation of the foreign information factor (Baruch et 
al, 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
82
 The most commonly used proxy in the literature for the quality of accounting information on a country 
level is the accounting standards index from La Porta et al (1998). However, this index captures the 
differences in the quality of accounting information between various countries based on data from 1990 
and, thus, is obsolete today. To add to this, there have also been changes in accounting practices in recent 
decades, such as the global trend towards the implementation of international accounting standards. In 
contrast, this study employs a more recent accounting opacity index from Kurtzman et al (2004) that 
quantifies inadequate accounting and governance practices in 48 countries including emerging markets. 
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4.5 The sample 
The sample consists of European companies that have had their stock cross-listed on at 
least one foreign stock exchange. The sample here is the same as the sample used in chapter 3.83 
The final sample consists of 795 companies from 25 different countries with 2,853 
foreign accounts, which is about 3.6 accounts per stock. Foreign accounts in the sample include 
stock exchange listings and also OTC and admitted to trade accounts. In total there are 39 
foreign exchanges in the sample. However, out of 39 exchanges only eleven exchanges attract 
more than 90% of the foreign trading volume of European cross-listed stocks in the sample. 
Those stock exchanges are: the NYSE, NASDAQ, US OTC, the London stock exchange, Paris, 
Amsterdam, Milan, Frankfurt, XETRA, the Swiss stock exchange and VIRTX.
84
  In this study 
Datastream is the main data source for company data such as stock price, number of shares 
traded total return index, market capitalization, price-to-book ratio, fraction of foreign sales and 
ownership structure. 
The final sample includes observations from January 1990 to December 2007. The 
period of time prior to 1990 is excluded from analysis due to poor data availability. Market level 
data on equity turnover is available from January 1995 from Datastream (DS Total Market 
indices). 
 
 
 
                                                 
83
 From chapter 3 the Sample section: “Cross-listing data includes events up to December 2007 and 
comes from the stock exchanges’ web-sites, Factiva news database and foreign listings dataset of 
Sarkissian and Shill (2004, 2009). Data on depository receipts is from the BNY, Citibank, Deutsche Bank 
and JP Morgan DRs databases available on-line. The additional requirement for sample inclusion is the 
availability of home market listing, i.e. direct foreign IPOs are excluded. The analysis is performed on the 
security level rather that the company level: all related listings for each cross-listed stock are identified by 
ISIN (data source: Datastream). Underlying ISINs and depository receipts conversion ratios for 
depository receipts are from the above mentioned Depository receipts (DRs) databases. Only common 
equity and major securities are included in the sample”. 
84
 Each of these eleven exchanges attracts at least 2% of the total equity trading volume of the sample 
stocks with the exception of the Deutsche Borse’s XETRA and the Swiss stock exchange’s VIRTX 
trading platforms that are included in the analysis of the major host exchanges for two reasons. First, they 
are integral parts of the larger exchanges: the Deutsche Borse and the Swiss stock exchange respectively. 
Second, the number of the accounts in the sample on these the exchanges are highly significant. Thus, in 
2007, 18.7% of all the account-month observations are contributed by XETRA and 5.8% by VIRTX. 
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4.6 Sample summary statistics 
4.6.1 Foreign equity trading distribution 
Foreign equity trading distribution is examined on both the exchange-level and the 
stock-level. 
Foreign equity trading: Exchange-level analysis 
The first part of the empirical investigation takes place at stock exchange level. The 
variable under investigation is a stock exchange’s monthly average trading volume share, 
defined in section 4.4.1. Panel A of Table 4.3 reports the average foreign trading volume share 
(AFTVS) for the total sample that consists of the pooled sample of 28 foreign exchanges. Panel 
A of Table 4.3 also reports AFTVS individually for eleven major stock exchanges. The AFTVS 
is calculated using a monthly panel trading data of 812 European cross-listed stocks from 
January 1990 to December 2007. Figure 1 graphically presents the AFTVS and the number of 
account-month observations by year, both for the total sample and individually for the eleven 
exchanges (based on data reported in Table 4.4). The sample period prior to 1995 is 
characterised by a small number of available observations and, thus, should be treated with 
caution. 
The AFTVS for the total sample is 11.9%. The LSE and NASDAQ have the highest 
AFTVSs (36.6% and 29.2% respectively), while VIRTX and XETRA have the lowest AFTVSs 
(0.2% and 2.0% respectively) (Panel A of Table 4.3). London’s AFTVS (mean 36.6%), the 
highest among the eleven exchanges, reached its maximum of 38.2 % in 1999 (discarding 
observations prior to 1995) and its minimum of 10.5% in 2005 (Table 4.4).  
NASDAQ’s AFTVS (mean 29.2%), the second highest in the sample, has been 
relatively stable across the years with a maximum of 36.7% in 2007 (discarding year 1990 
because of the small number of observations) and a minimum of 18.7% in 1994. In the most 
recent years of the sample from 2003 to 2007, NASDAQ’s AFTVS is within the 31-37% range, 
which is above its historical average. The NYSE’s AFTVS is above the sample’s average: 
15.5% with a minimum of 10.4% in 2003. The US OTC’s AFTVS is 9.7% and it has shown a 
clear downward trend over the years: it was at its peak of 30.2% in 1990, has been declining 
ever since and reached its minimum of 3.6% in 2007.  
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Amsterdam’s AFTVS is 34.9% with a maximum of 24.6% in 1997 (discarding 
observations prior to 1995) and a minimum of 8.3% in 2000. In the last two years of the sample 
2006-2007, Amsterdam’s AFTVS was around 17%, the highest since 1998.  The Paris stock 
exchange is also part of Euronext, and has also seen an improvement in the AFTVS in 2005-
2007: it has been steadily improving and reached a maximum of 10.3% in 2007 (with the 
historical mean of 2.9%). Milan’s AFTVS is 6.9% with significant fluctuations over time from 
16.1% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2007. 
The exchanges of Deutsche Borse, Frankfurt and XETRA, both have AFTVSs of 
around 2%, significantly below the sample average and this has been steadily low across the 
years. Similarly, the Swiss stock exchange and VIRTX have low AFTVSs of 2.9% and 0.2% 
respectively. The VIRTX’s share has been low since 2001, when the exchange was introduced. 
On the other hand, the Swiss stock exchange seems to have lost the ability to attract trading 
volumes of foreign European stocks over time: it had its maximum foreign trading volume share 
of 8.8% in 1996 and ever since its share has been declining and went as low as 0.1% in 2007. 
In addition to the AFTVS and the number of account-month observations, Table 4.4 
reports the foreign trading volume (FTV) in GB pounds (GBP) by year for the total sample and 
individually for eleven major exchanges.
85
  In 2007 the total FTV of the sample European 
stocks was 1,044.6 billion GBP. Overall, there is an upward trend in the total FTV over the 
years. On average, about 69% of the FTV of the European stocks takes place in the US and 25% 
on the major European exchanges, including 18% in the UK and about 7% in continental 
Europe. The NYSE is an absolute leader in attracting foreign trading of European cross-listed 
stocks in absolute terms: it attracts on average about 43.8% of the total foreign trading volume 
of the European stocks, followed by the LSE (19.4%), US OTC market (18.6%) and NASDAQ 
(6.5%). The rest of the exchanges attract on average 2% or less of the FETV. 
The distribution of foreign trading volume in monetary units (GBP) differs significantly 
from the distribution of the number of foreign accounts (Table 4.4). Thus, on average, the US 
exchanges attract seven times more of the FTV compared to the major European exchanges 
excluding London. At the same time, the US exchanges host only 35% of the foreign accounts 
in the sample, while continental European exchanges host 40% of the foreign accounts. 
Deutsche Borse’s exchanges Frankfurt and XETRA stand out from the other exchanges by the 
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 Trading volumes on various exchanges are converted to GB pounds for comparability. 
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number of the accounts they host, particularly, in the most recent period. In 2007 Frankfurt 
contributed 26.8% of all accounts and XETRA contributed 18.7%. The absolute majority of 
those accounts is an admission to trade rather than a stock exchange listing. Despite the 
significant number of trading accounts, Deutsche Borse and, similarly, the Swiss stock 
exchange’ VIRTX struggle to attract and maintain active trading of foreign stocks. 
Overall, analysis of the distribution of the foreign trading of the sample European 
stocks reveals that the US exchanges are the most successful in attracting trading volumes of 
European stocks: the NYSE attracts the highest foreign trading volume in monetary terms 
whereas NASDAQ has the highest AFTVS in the sample in 2007. The London stock exchange 
follows the NYSE and NASDAQ in ability to attract trading volume of foreign European 
stocks: it has both a significant FTV and AFTVS that are above the sample’s average. US OTC 
historically hosted a significant portion of the trading volume of European stocks. However, 
between 2003 and 2007 it lost the ability to maintain active foreign equity trading. Both the 
Euronext stock exchanges in the sample, Amsterdam and Paris, have shown improvements in 
recent years in absolute FTV as well as in AFTVS. The Milan stock exchange generates 
insignificant FTV compared to the other stock exchanges in the sample. The Frankfurt stock 
exchange, XETRA and VIRTX despite having a large number of foreign stocks traded, have not 
shown the ability to attract the active trading of foreign stocks. The Swiss stock exchange had 
significant business from foreign stocks in the 1990s. However, since then, it has been losing its 
share in foreign equity trading of European stocks. 
 
Foreign equity trading volume share: Stock-level analysis 
The second part of the empirical investigation takes place at stock level. The variable 
under investigation is stock’s foreign trading volume share (FTVS), defined in section 4.4.1. 
Panel A of Table 4.5.1 reports the FTVS for the 1990-2007 sample of 519 stocks with 1,714 
foreign accounts. For the 2003-2007 sample the table reports the FTVS of 446 stocks with 
1,477 foreign accounts and it separately reports the 2003-2007 sub-samples of listed and traded 
accounts.
86
  The AFTVS for the 2003-2007 samples is around 3.0%, which is less than the 
                                                 
86
 The number of stocks in the sample in this section is significantly smaller than the number of stocks 
used in the analysis of foreign equity trading on the exchange level, 519 (446) stocks vs. 812 stocks, 
because the sample in this section includes only stocks with data available for all main stock-level 
explanatory variables. 
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FTVS for the 1990-2007 sample of 4.2%.
87
  The difference in the mean FTVS between listed 
and traded accounts is striking: 8.0% for listed vs. 1.0% for traded accounts. Additionally, for 
the 2003-2007 sample Table 4.5.2 reports FTVS individually by host stock exchange for eleven 
major stock exchanges. NASDAQ has the highest FTVS in the sample (32.1%), followed by 
Milan (8.4%), the NYSE (8.4%), Amsterdam (7.8%) and London (6.7%). The Swiss stock 
exchange and VIRTX have the lowest FTVSs of around 0.1%, while Frankfurt and XETRA’s 
FTVSs are only slightly higher (around 0.5%). 
 
4.6.2 The determinants of the foreign equity trading distribution 
As discussed in section 4.3, there are two major groups of factors that potentially affect 
the distribution of foreign trading of cross-listed stocks: 1) host market characteristics or the 
pull factors and 2) stock-level factors. 
Pull factors of foreign equity trading 
Pull factors: Exchange-level analysis 
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports summary statistics of the pull factors for the total sample 
and individually for eleven major stock exchanges, calculated using a monthly panel trading 
data of 812 European cross-listed stocks from January 1990 to December 2007. Around 11% of 
the observations are traded accounts, i.e. traded on the US and London OTC markets and 
VIRTX and XETRA trading platforms. Almost half of all observations in the sample take place 
on a demutualised exchange. Indeed, by the end of the sample period all major host exchanges 
in the sample had been demutualized. The lowest mean demutualization indicator is for the 
NYSE, which was only demutualized in 2006. On average, 80% of the observations take place 
on an electronic market as opposed to the traditional floor trading. The lowest electronic market 
indicator is for the NYSE which in 2000 was among the last exchanges in the world to introduce 
automated trading. After 2002, all exchanges in the sample, both of host and home markets, had 
adopted electronic trading making the electronic market indicator an irrelevant variable.  
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 The foreign trading volume shares for the total sample and by stock exchange reported in Tables 4.5.1 
and 4.5.2 differ from the ones reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.2 for two reasons: 1) the samples vary since 
the main sample in current section includes only stocks that have data available for all main explanatory 
variables and excludes observations prior 2003, and 2) the weighting methods for the mean calculation 
are different. 
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The Amsterdam and Swiss stock exchanges have the highest concentration of foreign 
stocks listed (42% and 35% respectively), whereas the Italian stock exchange has the lowest 
(2%). The US market stands out through its market size in terms of market capitalization of 
listed stocks (5,157.4 billion GBP), which is almost four times larger than the average market 
size in the sample (1,299.0 billion GBP) whereas Amsterdam has the smallest market size in the 
sample (261.7 billion GBP). The US market has the highest aggregate market liquidity of 
100.04 on average (measured by the ratio of the aggregate monthly trading volume to the total 
market capitalization), followed by the Frankfurt stock exchange with a 93.06 turnover ratio. 
XETRA has the lowest level of liquidity in the sample with a turnover ratio of 36.96. Total 
trading costs vary from 0.47 on the Amsterdam stock exchange to 0.94 on the Swiss market 
with the sample average being 0.62. The level of investor protection in the host country is 
highest in the UK (investor protection index is 0.95) and the lowest in the Netherlands (investor 
protection index is 0.20). About 80% of the observations take place in a country where insider 
trading laws have been enforced. The lowest enforcement of insider trading laws variable is for 
the Frankfurt stock exchange (0.72). Italy has the highest level of accounting opacity (0.63), 
followed by the Netherlands (0.38), whereas Germany and the USA have the lowest level of 
accounting opacity (0.17 and 0.20 respectively). The average size of a foreign company in terms 
of market capitalization is smallest for NASDAQ (3.11 million GBP) and largest for VIRTX 
(18.56 million GBP). 
Pull factors: Stock-level analysis 
Panel B of Table 4.5.1 reports summary statistics of the pull factors calculated at stock 
level, specifically, host market characteristics relative to home market characteristics and host 
exchange characteristics such as an exchange’s industry specialization and foreign stock 
concentration. Additionally, Panel B of Table 4.5.2 reports summary statistics of the pull factors 
on stock-level individually for eleven major exchanges. A host market is on average 9.91 times 
larger than a home market. The largest difference in market size is 41.39 for NASDAQ 
accounts, followed by 28.43 for the NYSE and 26.55 for US OTC. Among non-US exchanges, 
London has the largest difference in market size at 9.66. For Amsterdam, Milan and VIRTX the 
difference in market size between the host and home markets is less than one, suggesting that 
foreign stocks traded on these markets come from home markets that, on average, are larger 
than the host market.  
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Aggregate market liquidity of the host market is on average 5.2 times higher than the 
market liquidity of the home market. For Swiss and Italian stock exchanges the difference in 
market liquidity between the host and home markets is highest (19 times), whereas for Frankfurt 
and XETRA it is lowest (0.03), in other words, Frankfurt and XETRA trade foreign stocks that 
come from home markets more liquid than the host market. A negative average difference in 
trading costs between the host and home markets implies that, on average, costs of trading on 
the host market are lower than costs of trading on the home market. London offers the best 
improvement in total trading costs (the difference is -0.13), while the Swiss stock exchange and 
VIRTX on average have higher trading costs relative to the home market (the positive 
difference is 0.39 and 0.41 respectively).  
The sample’s average difference in the level of investor protection between the host and 
home countries is negative but small in magnitude, i.e. the home market on average has slightly 
better investor protection than the host market. London has the highest positive difference, i.e. 
improvement, in the level of investor protection at 0.52. The sample average difference in the 
enforcement of insider trading laws of 0.09 implies that host countries in the sample have 
insider trading laws enforced more often than the home countries. The difference in insider 
trading law enforcement is highest for London (0.24) and NASDAQ (0.22), while foreign 
listing in Netherlands, Italy, France and Switzerland does not provide any improvement in terms 
of insider trading regulation. 
The level of accounting opacity in a home country is on average, higher than the level 
of accounting opacity in the host country. The highest negative difference between accounting 
opacity of the home and host countries is for Frankfurt and XETRA accounts (a difference of  -
0.19), while Italy has a significantly higher level of accounting opacity than the level of 
accounting opacity in the home country of foreign stocks traded in Milan (a difference of 0.31). 
Around 22% of all observations in the sample are for accounts that are traded abroad in 
the same language environment as the home country. The highest common language indicator is 
for the Swiss stock exchange and NASDAQ’s accounts (0.52 and 0.51 respectively), while 
Amsterdam, Milan, and Paris do not host trading of stocks from countries with a common 
language. The average geographic distance between home and host markets is around 2,000 km, 
driven by the distance of European home markets from the US (average geographic distance to 
a US exchange is above 6,000km). Within Europe, the average geographic distance between 
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home and host markets varies insignificantly within a 534–672 km range with the exception of 
Milan accounts that have average distance of 1,183 km. 
Host stock exchange industry specialization is on average 13% with variation from 28% 
for NASDAQ to 10% for Frankfurt. On average, 18% of the companies listed on a host stock 
exchange in the sample are foreign companies (foreign stock concentration variable). The 
Amsterdam stock exchange has the highest fraction of foreign listed companies (43%), whereas 
Italian stock exchange has the lowest (2%). 
Pull factors:  Correlation analysis 
Table 4.6.1 reports the correlation matrix of the AFTVS and the pull factors at stock 
exchange level. As predicted, the trading platform indicator is negatively correlated to the 
AFTVS. In contrast to expectations, the AFTVS is negatively correlated to demutualized status, 
electronic trading, and foreign stock concentration variables. For the rest of the variables, the 
signs of the correlation coefficients with the AFTVS variable are in line with theoretical 
expectations. Thus, exchanges that have a greater investor base, measured by the total market 
capitalization, and offer greater level of aggregate market liquidity have a higher AFTVS. Stock 
exchanges located in countries with better investor protection and actively enforced insider 
trading laws have more active trading of foreign stocks. Total trading costs and the level of 
accounting opacity in the host country are negatively correlated with the AFTVS. A control 
variable, average size of traded companies, is negatively correlated with the AFTVS variable. 
Pull factors: correlation analysis at stock level 
Table 4.6.2 reports the correlation matrix of the FTVS and the pull factors calculated at 
stock level. In line with expectations, the differences in market size, in aggregate market 
liquidity, in the level of investor protection and in the enforcement of insider trading laws and 
the existence of a common language between the host and home countries are all positive 
predictors of the FTVS, while the difference in the costs of trading between the host and home 
countries is a negative predictor of the FTVS. However, contrary to expectations, the difference 
in accounting opacity is positively correlated to the FTVS but the magnitude of the correlation 
is low (0.04). Also in contrast to expectations, the geographic distance variable is positively 
correlated to the FTVS. However, further analysis reveals that the geographic distance to the US 
exchanges variable is a positive and significant predictor of the FTVS, while the geographic 
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distance to non-US exchanges variable is a negative and significant predictor of the FTVS. A 
significant correlation coefficient between the FTVS and stock exchange industry specialization 
of 0.11 suggests that foreign stocks have a higher fraction of trading on a foreign exchange that 
has higher share of foreign stocks traded from the same industry. Foreign stock concentration, 
contrary to expectations, is negatively correlated to the FTVS. 
 
Stock-level factors of foreign equity trading 
Panel B of Table 4.5.1 reports summary statistics of stock-level factors of foreign 
trading volume for the 1990-2007 and the 2003-2007 samples. The reason for using the 2003-
2007 sample rather than the full sample is that data for two important explanatory variables 
related to stock ownership structure, foreign institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration, are available from Datastream database only from 2003. Both samples in Table 
4.5.1 include only observations that have data available for all major explanatory variables. 
Panel B of Table 4.5.2 reports summary statistics of the stock-level factors individually for 
eleven major exchanges. 
Listing characteristics 
Average trading indicator has increased from 0.63 for the 1990-2007 sample to 0.71 for 
the 1990-2007 sample reflecting the introduction of new trading platforms that in later years, 
hosted foreign trading of European cross-listed stocks. Frankfurt, XETRA and London hosted 
both listed and traded accounts. London is the most common choice for a first foreign listing by 
European companies in the sample: 12% of accounts are a first foreign listing compared to a 2% 
sample average, followed by NASDAQ (9%). The average age of an account in the sample is 
6.24 years.
88
  The oldest are the Swiss stock exchange’s accounts (12.72 years), followed by the 
NYSE’s accounts (10.61 years), while Milan’s accounts are the youngest (4.35 years). The same 
currency indicators for the US exchanges and for the Swiss stock exchange equal zero. On the 
other hand, trading on VIRTX takes place in the currency of the stock’s home listing. As a 
result of the adoption of the single European currency, the Euro, the same currency indicator for 
continental European stock exchanges is relatively high (from 0.55 to 0.98). In the sample, 27% 
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 Average duration of London listing/trading in the sample is relatively short (4.64 years). This can be 
explained by the changes in trading systems which resulted in the disruption of continuous listing, rather 
than a true reflection of the actual duration of listing. 
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of the accounts are in the form of depository receipts. Depository receipts are predominantly 
traded in the US. The NYSE, NASDAQ and US OTC have respectively 95%, 89% and 75% of 
all accounts in the form of ADRs. Frankfurt, XETRA and to a lesser extent London, accept 
depository receipts for trading as a supplement to trading ordinary shares. The average price 
level of European cross-listed stocks is 19.9 GBP with the lowest at 10.6 GBP for NASDAQ- 
traded and the highest at 33.2 GBP for Swiss stock exchange-traded stocks. 
Company characteristics 
The average market value of European cross-listed stock is 15.3 billion GBP for the 
2003-2007 sample. The smallest in terms of market capitalization (3.8 billion GBP) and the 
riskiest foreign stocks in the sample are traded on NASDAQ. The Milan stock exchange has the 
highest average market value of traded stocks (30.9 billion GBP). The Swiss stock exchange, 
including VIRTX trading platform, attracts large low-risk foreign stocks. The NYSE and 
NASDAQ trade stocks that have the highest relative market valuation measured by a price-to-
book ratio, of 4.83 and 3.21 respectively, both above the sample’s average of 3.07. Milan hosts 
trading of stocks with price-to-book ratio of 2.0, the lowest in the sample. Noticeably, average 
price-to-book ratio for the 1990-2007 sample is higher than the price-to-book ratio for the 2003-
2007 sample (3.64 vs. 3.07), reflecting higher market valuations in the late 1990s, particularly in 
the US. On average, the fraction of foreign sales in the company’s total sales is 57% reflecting 
the strong export orientation of cross-listed companies. NASDAQ-traded European companies 
have the highest foreign sales share in the sample of 68%. Surprisingly, foreign institutional 
ownership of European stocks that are traded abroad is only 8% with a slight variation among 
exchanges: from 3% for Amsterdam- and Milan- traded stocks to 9% for London- and 
NASDAQ- traded stocks. Ownership concentration is 26% for the sample average, varying 
from 11% for Milan-traded stocks to 30% for Frankfurt-traded stocks.  
The use of international accounting standards have increased significantly over time: 
from a 0.52 average for the 1990-2007 sample to a 0.73 average for the 2003-2007 sample. The 
Swiss stock exchange and VIRTX only trade stocks of companies that comply with 
international accounting standards requirements. The lowest average international accounting 
standards variable of 0.68 is for NASDAQ accounts. Average stock return correlation with 
foreign market returns and foreign information factor variables have increased over time, 
reflecting the increasing integration of the financial markets. The sample’s average stock return 
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correlation with foreign market return is 0.48 with a small variation from 0.35 for NASDAQ- 
traded stocks to 0.65 to Milan-traded stocks. The sample’s average foreign information factor is 
2.62 with the smallest being for VIRTX-traded stocks (1.47) and the largest for Amsterdam-
traded stocks (3.64). 
Home market characteristics 
2% of observations in the sample are contributed by stocks that originate in the 
emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe. The Amsterdam, Milan, NASDAQ, Paris, 
Swiss stock exchanges and VIRTX trading platform do not host the trading of stocks from 
emerging markets. The highest average emerging market indicator in the sample is for 
Frankfurt’s and XETRA’s observations (0.04 and 0.032 respectively). The average investor 
protection index of the home market is 0.48 varying from 0.33 for Milan- traded accounts to 
0.59 for NASDAQ-traded accounts. For 91% of observations, insider trading laws are enforced 
in the home country. The average trading costs in home countries are 0.62 with the highest 
being 0.69 for London’s accounts and the lowest being 0.53 for VIRTX’s accounts. The 
sample’s average accounting opacity index of the home country is 0.34. Stocks from countries 
with the lowest level of accounting opacity are traded on the Swiss stock exchange (0.24), while 
stocks from countries with the highest level of accounting opacity are traded on the Frankfurt 
and XETRA exchanges (0.36). 
Listed vs. traded accounts 
Additionally, for the 2003-2007 sample Table 4.5.1 reports summary statistics 
separately for listed and traded accounts. Listed companies are larger than those admitted to 
trade (18.2 billion GBP vs. 14.0 billion GBP), are listed on a foreign exchange for a longer 
period of time (8.26 years vs. 5.42 years), are more likely to list in foreign country that shares a 
language with the home country (common language indicator 0.34 vs. 0.17), and are more likely 
to list in a country that is further away from the home country (geographic distance 2,283 km 
vs. 1,974 km). 
Stock-level factors: Correlation analysis 
Table 4.7 reports a correlation matrix of the FTVS and the stock-level variables for the 
2003-2007 sample. All explanatory variables, with the exception of the international accounting 
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standards variable, are significantly correlated with the FTVS variable. Larger companies and 
companies with higher growth opportunities have a smaller FTVS. The FTVS is higher for 
companies that are more export-oriented, have higher foreign institutional ownership, are riskier 
(in terms of stock return variance), and have returns that are less correlated with foreign market 
returns. The foreign information factor, contrary to expectations, is negatively correlated to the 
FTVS. However, splitting the foreign information factor into two variables the US information 
factor and the foreign (non-US) information factor, reveals that these two variables have 
opposite effects on the FTVS: the US information factor is positively and significantly 
correlated to the FTVS while the foreign (non-US) information factor is negatively and 
significantly correlated to the FTVS.  
FTVS is higher for companies that are listed (as opposed to admitted to trade), if the 
listing is the company’s first foreign listing, if there is a longer duration of listing, and if the 
listing takes place in the form of a depository receipt. Stock price level and the same currency 
indicator have a rather low negative correlation with the FTVS. 
The signs (positive or negative) on the correlation coefficients of all the home country-
level variables are in line with expectations. Companies have a higher FTVS if they come from 
an emerging market, from a country with weaker investor protection and insider trading 
regulations, with less accounting opacity, and with higher trading cost. 
 
 
4.7 Empirical results 
4.7.1 Pull factors of foreign equity trading: Multivariate regression analysis 
The first testable proposition is that host market characteristics determine the ability of 
the host exchange to attract foreign equity trading. The ability of the exchange to attract foreign 
equity trading is measured by the exchange’s AFTVS defined in section 4.4.1. Equation (4.5) 
from section 4.4.2 is used in the regression analysis. Section 4.3.1 identifies the following host 
exchange-specific factors as potential determinants of the foreign equity trading distribution: the 
level of disclosure, demutualization status, market design, and foreign equity expertise, trading 
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frictions including capital market size, aggregate market liquidity and trading costs, and the 
quality of the legal and information environment. 
Table 4.8 reports the output of the regressions of the logistic transformation of the stock 
exchange’s monthly average foreign share of trading volume (AFTVS) on the host stock 
exchange characteristics, the pull factors. Model (1) includes stock exchange-specific factors, 
whereas models (2)–(5) additionally include host country characteristics, such as the level of 
investor protection, enforcement of insider trading laws and accounting opacity index. Data for 
foreign stock concentration are available only for stock exchanges but not for trading platforms 
and OTC markets. To avoid the loss of observations, the foreign stock concentration variable is 
included only in model (5). As a robustness test, model (3) is estimated with year fixed effects. 
Model (4) is estimated with exchange-fixed effects and includes OTC, VIRTX and XETRA 
indicators but excludes the demutualization indicator that is not available for OTC observations. 
For model (2) of Table 4.8, the primary model specification in the multivariate regression 
analysis of the pull factors of the foreign trading volume share, Table 4.8 additionally reports 
the economic significance of the coefficient estimates. 
In line with the theoretical predictions, trading platforms have, on average, a lower 
AFTVS compared to the stock exchange in the sample as coefficient estimates on the trading 
platform dummy variable are negative in all model specifications. Model (4) includes, instead of 
the trading platform indicator, OTC, VIRTX and XETRA indicators. Coefficient estimates on 
the OTC and VIRTX indicators are negative and significant at the 1% level, while coefficient 
estimate of the XETRA indicator is insignificant. In line with the theoretical argument that 
demutualized exchanges are more efficient, the demutualization dummy variable has positive 
and significant coefficient estimate in models (1) and (2). However, after controlling for time 
effects in model (3), the demutualization variable is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. In contrast to expectations that automated trading provides a competitive advantage to a 
stock exchange in attracting trading volumes, the electronic market indicator has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimates in model specifications (1) to (4).
89
  A possible 
explanation for the negative sign of the electronic market indicator is that electronic markets in 
the sample are overrepresented by trading platforms which have a significantly smaller average 
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 In contrast to literature that supports the higher efficiency and lower costs of electronic vs. floor trading 
argument (Domowitz, 2002; Jain, 2005), Venkataraman (2001) reports higher trading costs on the 
electronic market (Paris) vs. floor trading (NYSE) and suggests that ‘there is a benefit to human 
intermediation in the trading process’ (p.1448). 
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share of foreign equity trading. It is possible that the electronic market indicator actually reflects 
the lesser ability of trading platforms to attract foreign equity trading  
Market size is a positive and significant determinant of the AFTVS in model (1). 
However, after controlling for host country characteristics, such as the level of investor 
protection, enforcement of insider trading laws and accounting opacity index, it becomes 
insignificant. In line with the theoretical predictions, markets with a greater level of aggregate 
liquidity are more successful in attracting active trading of foreign stocks, as the coefficient 
estimates on the market liquidity variable are positive and highly significant in all model 
specifications. Higher transaction costs are expected to be a significant competitive 
disadvantage in attracting trading to the exchange. Indeed, the regression analysis reveals that 
total trading costs in the host market is a negative and statistically significant determinant of an 
exchange’s average fraction of foreign equity trading.  
The quality of the legal environment in the host country is expected to have a positive 
impact on the stock exchange’s ability to attract foreign equity trading. Analysis reveals that 
enforcement of insider trading laws in the host country is positive and significant determinant of 
the AFTVS. The level of investor protection is a positive, although statistically insignificant, 
factor. As expected, accounting opacity in the host country has a negative impact on the stock 
exchange’s ability to actively trade foreign stocks: coefficient estimate on the accounting 
opacity index is negative and significant. A control variable, average company size, is a highly 
significant (at 1% significance level) and negative determinant of the AFTVS.  
Model (5) additionally includes a foreign stock concentration variable that is found to 
be an insignificant determinant. Since a foreign stock concentration variable is available for 
stock exchanges but not for trading platforms, Model (5) includes stock exchange observations 
only and has the highest explanatory power (adjusted R-squared is 77.9%), suggesting that 
determinants of the AFTVS differ for stock exchanges and trading platforms. The forthcoming 
section 4.7.2 examines the difference in the determinants of foreign trading volume share 
between listed and traded foreign accounts. 
Multicollinearity issue 
There is legitimate concern that the stock exchange level explanatory variables are 
correlated. A correlation matrix of the pull factors (Table 4.3) shows that the market size 
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variable is highly correlated with other variables, particularly market liquidity, the level of 
investor protection and the enforcement of insider trading laws indicator and the level of 
accounting opacity. However, the correlation coefficients are within an acceptable range (0.42-
0.56). Additionally, I estimate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for coefficient estimates for all 
model specifications reported in Table 4.8. Estimated coefficients and variance inflation factors 
of the pull factors of foreign equity trading are reported in Appendix 4.2. The estimated VIFs 
are within the range of 1.08 to 4.18 indicating that multicollinearity should not affect the 
findings in any significant way.
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Pull factors: Economic significance 
Table 4.8 additionally reports the economic significance of the coefficient estimates for 
model (2). Average company size is the most significant determinant of the average fraction of 
foreign equity trading (with the economic significance of 42%). This result highlights the 
importance of company-specific factors for trading volume distribution and motivates stock-
level analysis that incorporates various stock- specific factors (discussed in forthcoming section 
4.7.2). The other significant determinants of the AFTVS are: electronic market trading (negative 
impact with the economic significance of 35%), total trading costs (negative impact with the 
economic significance of 29%), trading on a demutualized exchange (positive impact with the 
economic significance of 25%), and enforcement of insider trading laws in the host country 
(positive impact with the economic significance of 24%). In other words, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the electronic market indicator, total trading costs, demutualization 
indicator, and insider trading enforcement indicator variables would adjust the AFTVS by 0.35, 
0.29, 0.25 and 0.24 standard deviations respectively. Further, the aggregate market liquidity’s 
economic significance is 21% with positive sign, the accounting opacity index’s economic 
significance is 21% with negative sign, and the trading platform indicators’ economic 
significance is 14% with a negative sign. 
To summarize, the analysis has shown that stock exchange characteristics, or the pull 
factors of foreign trading volume, are significant determinants of a stock exchange’ average 
foreign trading volume share, which is the measure of a stock exchange’s ability to attract 
trading volumes of foreign stocks. The following stock exchange characteristics affect a stock 
exchange’s ability to compete for foreign equity trading: costs of trading, the level of 
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 Multicollinearity is likely to be an issue if a VIF is above 10 (Wooldridge, 2009; Sabherwal, 2007). 
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accounting opacity, demutualization, market-level liquidity, and the enforcement of insider 
trading laws. 
 
4.7.2 Stock-level determinants of the foreign trading volume share: Multivariate 
regression analysis 
The next step is the investigation of the determinants of the foreign share of trading 
volume at the stock level in the multivariate framework. The dependent variable in the 
regressions is the logistic transformation of the monthly foreign trading volume share (FTVS) 
for each foreign trading account, as defined in section 4.4.1. Equations (4.6) and (4.7), section 
4.4.2, are used in the regression analysis of foreign trading volume share at the stock-level. The 
output is reported in Table 4.9. Models (1.1) and (2.2) in Table 4.9 include only stock-specific 
characteristics such as listing characteristics, company characteristics and home market 
characteristics (equation (4.6)). Model specifications (3) - (5) in addition include the pull factors 
of the foreign trading volume share calculated at the stock level (equation (4.7)). The pull 
factors at the stock level include: the differences between host and home market characteristics 
and host exchange characteristics such as host exchange’s industry specialization and foreign 
equity expertise.
91
  Models (1) and (3) do not include stock ownership composition variable or 
foreign institutional ownership and ownership concentration variables, which were available 
only from January 2003, and, thus, employ the broadest sample of observations from January 
1990 to December 2007. Models (2), (4) and (5) contain a full set of the explanatory variables, 
including stock ownership composition variables, and, accordingly, employ the sample of 
observations from January 2003 to December 2007. Model (5) includes an additional exchange-
specific factor: foreign stock concentration variable, which is available only for stock exchange 
observations and not for trading platforms and OTC markets. Accordingly, model (5) is 
estimated using the sub-sample that includes only stock exchange accounts. 
Stock-level factors: Listing characteristics 
Table 4.9 reports that the most significant group of stock-level factors are the listing 
characteristics that are all found to be statistically significant determinants of the FTVS. One of 
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 None of the model specifications in Table 4.9 include the difference in the demutualization status and 
in electronic trading because all stock exchanges in the sample starting from year 2003 have been 
demutualized and have adopted automated trading, making these two variables irrelevant for the 2003-
2007 sample. 
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the most significant determinants is whether the stock is listed or traded on a foreign exchange. 
There is evidence that traded status, as opposed to listed status, substantially reduces the 
fraction of trading on the foreign exchange: the coefficient estimates on the traded indicator in 
all model specifications are negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, a corporate decision 
to list on a foreign exchange, as opposed to having a stock admitted to trade, although it entails 
additional listing requirements, guarantees more active foreign trading of stock. 
Coefficient estimates on the first foreign listing indicator, the duration of the listing and 
the same currency indicator variables are also positive and significant mostly at 1% in all model 
specifications. Accordingly, the findings suggest that FTVS is significantly higher when a 
company is listed abroad for the first time, traded on a foreign exchange in the same currency as 
the home listing, and increases with the duration of listing.  
The US listings take place primarily in the form of depository receipts, whereas other 
exchanges, such as Frankfurt, XETRA and the London stock exchanges, trade ADRs in addition 
to trading ordinary shares. After controlling for the US-specific effect
92
 in models (1.2), (2.2), 
(3.2) and (4.2), ADR indicator, as predicted, is a negative and significant determinant of the 
FTVS. In line with the expectation that higher priced stocks are more visible to foreign 
investors, the coefficient estimate on the price level variable is positive and significant in model 
specifications that do not control for the US as host market. 
Stock-level factors: Company characteristics 
Company size is found to be a negative and significant at 1%, determinant of the FTVS 
in all model specifications, suggesting that smaller companies have a significantly larger 
FTVSs. Regression analysis reveals that only for the 1990-2007 sample does a company’s 
growth significantly affect the FTVS, whereas the coefficient estimate on the price-to-book 
variable is statistically insignificant in all model specifications that employ the 2003-2007 
sample. The significance of the price-to-book ratio in earlier years could be driven by the 
observations from the late 1990s, the period of the dot-com bubble, when growth opportunities, 
including those of foreign companies, were valued more highly than ever. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that stock risk is a positive and significant at least at a 5% level determinant of the 
foreign trading volume share in all model specifications. Company export orientation, measured 
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 The US-specific effect is controlled for by including a dummy variable representing the US as the host 
market. 
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by the fractions of foreign sales in total sales, is a positive determinant of the FTVS that is 
statistically significant in the model specifications that employ the 1990-2007 sample.  
A higher fraction of foreign institutional ownership is expected to assure a FTVS, 
unless foreign institutional investors prefer to trade on the stock’s home market. After 
controlling for home market characteristics (model (2)) and for the differences in host and home 
market characteristics (models (4)–(5)) that potentially affect the attractiveness of the home 
market relative to the host market as a location of the stock trading, foreign institutional 
ownership is a positive and statistically significant determinant of the FTVS. Ownership 
concentration, on other hand, have a negative impact on the FTVS, as predicted, however, the 
statistical significance of this variable is rather low.  
Adopting IAS or US GAAP makes a company more transparent, comparable to other 
foreign companies, and, supposedly, more attractive to foreign traders (Aggarwal et al, 2005). 
However, I find no empirical support for this proposition: coefficient estimates on the 
International accounting standards dummy variable is insignificant in models (2), (4)–(5). 
Moreover, in models (1) and (3) that employ the 1990-2007 sample the IAS variable has 
negative and significant coefficient estimates, implying that stocks of companies that adopt 
international accounting standards are less actively traded in foreign markets. 
Due to potential portfolio diversification benefits, stocks that exhibit a low return 
correlation with foreign market returns are expected to appeal to foreign investors. Indeed, 
empirical evidence strongly supports this proposition: coefficient estimates on the return 
correlation with foreign market return variable are negative and significant mainly at 1% in all 
models in Table 4.9. 
According to Baruch at al. (2007), the foreign information factor that quantifies 
marginal contribution of foreign market returns in explaining the stock return pattern, is 
expected to be one of the main positive determinants of foreign trading volume share. 
Correlation analysis (section 4.6.2) show that the US information factor and the foreign (non-
US) information factor have opposite effects on the FTVS. Thus, these two variables are 
included in the regressions individually, in place of the foreign information factor.
93
  In line 
with the findings of Baruch et al (2007), regression analysis reveals that the US information 
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 In the model specification that incorporates the collective foreign information factor variable (not 
reported), the coefficient estimate on the foreign information factor is not statistically different from zero. 
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factor is a positive and highly significant determinant of foreign trading volume share. At the 
same time, the coefficient estimate on the foreign non-US information factor is negative and 
significant, which is directly opposite to the theoretical argument of Baruch et al (2007). 
Stock-level factors: Country characteristics 
Emerging markets are characterised by higher investment barriers for foreign investors. 
Thus, it is expected that a foreign listing by a company from an emerging market would 
generate more active foreign trading compared to a foreign listing by a company from a 
developed market. Empirical findings support this proposition as the coefficient estimate on the 
emerging market indicator has a positive sign in all model specifications and is statistically 
significant in models (1) and (2). The emerging market indicator becomes insignificant in the 
model specifications (3) and (4) that control for the difference in the host and home market 
characteristics.  
In line with the predictions, FTVS is higher when a stock is traded in a foreign country 
that shares a language with the company’s home country as the coefficient estimates on the 
common language indicator are positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Geographic distance is a proxy for foreign investors’ unfamiliarity and, accordingly, is 
expected to have a negative impact on the FTVS. In contrast to this prediction, the coefficient 
estimate on the geographic distance variable is positive and highly significant. Furthermore, 
summary statistics by stock exchange (Table 4.5.2) show that geographic distance from the US 
exchanges is very distinct from geographic distances from other host exchanges. Thus, it is 
possible that the geographic distance variable in the regressions captures the US-specific 
variation in the FTVS. To disentangle the US premium, models (1.2), (1.2), (2.2), (3.2) and 
(4.2) include, instead of the geographic distance variable, a dummy variable representing the US 
as the host market and also a residual geographic distance variable. The residual geographic 
distance variable is the residual from the OLS regression of the geographic distance variable on 
the US host market dummy variable. The coefficient estimate on the residual geographic 
distance variable, as expected, has a negative sign. In contrast, the coefficient estimate on the 
US host market indicator is positive and significant at the 1% level. This can be interpreted as 
the ‘US trading premium’.  
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Weaker investor protection and poor enforcement of insider trading laws in the home 
country are expected to drive the equity trading away from the home country to foreign markets 
where the stock is listed/ traded. Empirical evidence supports this proposition: the coefficient 
estimates on the investor protection and the enforcement of insider trading laws in the home 
country dummy variables are negative and significant at 1% in models (1) and (2). Furthermore, 
the variables that represent the differences in legal environment between the host and the home 
countries, the difference in investor protection and the difference in enforcement of insider 
trading laws also have positive and significant coefficient estimates. These findings are 
consistent with the theoretical argument that investors prefer to trade in countries that provide 
higher standards of investor protection and better enforcement of insider trading laws. 
Accounting opacity in the home country affects the perception of the quality of the 
company’s accounting information and, thus, should negatively affect the stock’s trading on a 
foreign exchange. Indeed, the coefficient estimates on the accounting opacity in the home 
country variable are negative and significant in models (1.1) and (2.1). Furthermore, the 
coefficient estimate on the difference in accounting opacity index between the host and the 
home countries (models (3) – (5)) is positive and significant, at least at the 5% level. This 
finding can be interpreted as evidence that foreign investors trade more actively those foreign 
stocks that come from countries with a level of accounting opacity lower than that in the foreign 
country. 
Pull factors at stock level 
Higher trading costs in the home country are a significant disadvantage in competing 
with foreign exchanges for equity trading volumes. Empirical findings show that the level of 
total trading costs in the home country (models (1.2) and (2.2)) is positive and significant at 1% 
determinant of the FTVS. However, there is no clear evidence that the difference in costs of 
trading between host and home markets is a negative determinant of the foreign trading volume 
share.  
The difference in the market size variable is positive and significant at least at 1% in 
models (3.1), (4.1) and (5) but is insignificant in models (3.2) and (4.2). In contrast to 
expectations, the coefficient estimate on the difference in the aggregate market liquidity 
between host and home markets is negative and statistically significant in all model 
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specifications, meaning the smaller the difference in market liquidity between the host and 
home markets, the higher the foreign fraction of equity trading. This result is difficult to 
interpret as the theoretical models of Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Pagano (1989) 
and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) predict concentration of trading in the most liquid market.  
Stock exchange industry specialization has insignificant coefficient estimates in all 
model specifications. The foreign stock concentration variable (model (5)), also has an 
insignificant coefficient estimate. In other words, there is no evidence found that a stock 
exchange with a higher share of listed stock from the same industry or a higher share of listed 
foreign stocks has an advantage in attracting trading of foreign stocks. 
Multicollinearity issue 
The correlation matrix of the stock-level factors (Table 4.7) reports that the level of 
correlations between the stock-level factors is within an acceptable range (<0.50). Correlations 
are higher for the market-level factors, particularly, the difference in market size, the difference 
in the level of investor protection, enforcement of insider trading laws, trading costs, and 
geographic distance variables (Table 4.6.2) (the highest correlation coefficient is 0.67). 
Estimated variance inflation factors (VIF) on the coefficient estimates of the determinants of the 
foreign trading volume share are less than 10 (Appendix 4.3), suggesting that multicollinearity 
should not cause a bias in the estimation results.
90
  As a robustness test, models (3.3) and (4.3) 
exclude the variable with the highest variance inflation factor, the difference in market size 
variable. The output of the models with the omitted variable shows that coefficient estimates on 
the other explanatory variables are not affected. Overall, there is sufficient evidence that 
multicollinearity does not influence the estimation results in this analysis. 
Economic significance of the determinants of foreign trading volume share 
Table 4.10 reports the output of the regressions that include all significant determinants 
of foreign trading volume share from the multivariate analysis at stock level (Table 4.9). 
Additionally, Table 4.10 reports the economic significance of the coefficient estimates. Listing 
characteristics are the most significant determinants of foreign trading volume share that jointly 
explain the 0.70 standard deviations variation of foreign trading volume share. The traded 
indicator variable is individually the most significant factor with economic significance of 
24.5%. Thus, change in status from traded to listed would increase the foreign trading volume 
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share by approximately 2.65% (0.242 times 0.11 standard deviation of the independent 
variables), keeping all other variables constant. An increase of 2.65% in the foreign trading 
volume share is highly significant taking into account that the sample’s average AFTVS is only 
about 3%. The other significant listing-specific factors are the duration of listing/trading and the 
same currency indicator variables with the economic significance of 19.7% and 14.2% 
respectively.  
Company size is the most significant company characteristics with an economic 
significance of 16.9% (negative contribution).  
The difference in the level of investor protection and in the enforcement of insider 
trading laws between the host and home countries, jointly explain the 12.5% variation (positive 
contribution) in foreign trading volume share. The difference in aggregate market liquidity has 
economic significance of 15.3% (negative contribution), whereas the difference in the 
accounting opacity index has economic significance of 14.9% (positive contribution). 
Geographic distance between the host and home countries has an economic significance of 
20.6% with a positive sign. Furthermore, output of Model (2) that includes the US host market 
indicator and the residual geographic distance variable reveals that the US host market indicator 
is the most significant determinant of foreign trading volume share with economic significance 
of 55.0%, while geographic distance is a negative factor with economic significance of 5.0%. 
The inclusion of the US host market indicator reverses the economic significance of the DR 
indictor from positive 4.8% to negative 6.2%, reduces the economic significance of the US 
information factor from 10.7% to 4.2% and of the common language indicator from 15.6% to 
8.3%, and increases the economic significant of the difference in the enforcement of insider 
trading laws from 1.9% to 9.3%. 
Overall, the stock-level analysis has shown that stock-specific factors of foreign trading 
volume are significant determinants of foreign trading volume distribution. Significant stock-
specific determinants of foreign trading volume distribution include: 1) listing characteristics 
such as listed vs. traded status, the duration and the currency of listing/trading, 2) company 
characteristics, particularly, company size and stock risk, and 3) home market characteristics, 
such as geographic proximity to the host market and the quality of both the legal and the 
information environment. The next section investigates whether the determinants are different 
for stocks that are listed as oppose to stocks that are admitted to trade. 
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The determinants of the foreign trading volume share: Listed vs. traded 
The nature of a foreign trading varies significantly depending on whether the stock is 
listed on a foreign exchange or is admitted to trade. Thus, the determinants of foreign trading 
volume share for listed and traded accounts are potentially different. To empirically investigate 
this proposition, the following regression is estimated: 
 logtrFTVSi,n= α0+ β1i Xj +β2i Zk,n+Σγj,Traded(DTradedXj)+Σθk,Traded(DTradedZk,n)+ εi,       (4.9) 
where logtrFTVSi,n is log-transformation the stock i’s share of trading volume on the exchange n 
in month t; DTraded is dummy variable that equals one if the stock is traded without meeting 
listing requirements on a stock exchange n in month t and equals zero otherwise; Xj is vector of 
stock-level factors; Zk,n is characteristic k of the host market n relative to characteristic k of the 
stock’s home market. 
Table 4.11 reports the results of this regression. Coefficient estimates on all the 
determinants have the same signs, meaning the direction of impact, for both listed and traded 
accounts. The only exception is the difference in the enforcement of the insider trading laws 
variable, which is positive and significant for listed accounts and negative but insignificant for 
traded accounts. The level of statistical significance of the determinants for listed and traded 
accounts varies for some variables. Thus, the foreign non-US information factor, the common 
language, the difference in the level of investor protection and the difference in market size 
variables are significant determinants for traded accounts. The difference in market liquidity is a 
significant factor for listed accounts. 
 
4.7.3 Stock-level factors by stock exchange: Multivariate regression analysis 
The last stage of the empirical investigation is analysis of stock-level determinants of 
the FTVS by stock exchange. Table 4.12 reports the output of the regression of the FTVS on the 
stock-level factors for the sample of 1,477 foreign accounts. The independent variables are the 
interaction variables of the explanatory variables with the dummy variables that represent 
eleven major foreign exchanges, namely: the NYSE, NASDAQ, US OTC, London SE, Swiss 
SE, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Milan, VIRTX, and XETRA (equation (4.8), section 4.4.2). 
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. 
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The regression output reveals that smaller companies have a notably higher foreign 
trading volume share when they are listed/traded in Milan, Amsterdam and US OTC market, 
whereas larger companies have a significantly higher FTVS when they are traded on VIRTX 
and XETRA. Price-to-book ratio is a positive and significant determinant of the shares of 
foreign equity trading for Milan and Amsterdam accounts, and is a negative and significant 
determinant for NASDAQ, London, Frankfurt and XETRA accounts. In other words, on the 
latter four exchanges value stocks have more active foreign equity trading compared to growth 
stocks. In line with the expectations and the findings of the previous section on the stock-level 
factors of foreign equity trading, stock risk is a positive determinant of the foreign trading 
volume share for the majority of the stock exchanges. Riskier stocks have particularly high 
FTVS on the Swiss stock exchange, Frankfurt stock exchange, XETRA, NYSE, and NASDAQ. 
The export orientation of a company is a positive predictor of the FTVS only when a stock is 
listed/traded on the US exchanges, namely, NYSE, NASDAQ, and US OTC. 
Higher foreign institutional ownership assures a higher FTVS only for NYSE listings. 
Although higher ownership concentration is expected to lessen stock trading on a foreign 
exchange, empirical results show that a stock’s ownership concentration is a negative 
determinant of foreign trading volume share only for NYSE listings, while it is a positive 
determinant for Milan trading accounts. As expected, companies that have adopted international 
accounting standards have higher foreign trading volume share, particularly when their stocks 
are traded on VIRTX, the Italian stock exchange, NASDAQ, the NYSE and the Paris stock 
exchange. However, the adoption of internationally recognized accounting standards is a 
negative determinant of the XETRA’s foreign trading share. Stocks that exhibit lower return 
correlations with foreign host market are more actively traded on NASDAQ, NYSE, and 
Frankfurt stock exchanges but significantly less actively traded on VIRTX. The foreign 
information factor is not a significant determinant of foreign trading volume share except for 
London and US OTC accounts (significant only at 10% confidence level).  
The interaction variable of the ‘Traded indicator’ variable is calculated only for 
exchanges that host listed and also traded accounts. As predicted, traded accounts of the 
Frankfurt and XETRA exchanges have significantly smaller FTVS than listed accounts. In 
contrast to the expectation that a company’s first foreign listing is expected to generate more 
active foreign trading compared to consequent foreign listings, it is found that the first foreign 
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listing indicator is a negative determinant of the FTVS for Paris, NYSE, and Amsterdam 
listings. The duration of listing is a significant and a positive determinant of foreign trading 
volume share for XETRA, Frankfurt, NYSE, and OTC accounts and a significant and negative 
determinant for VIRTX and Paris accounts. Coefficient estimates on the same currency 
indicator have positive signs for London, XETRA, and Frankfurt accounts but a negative sign 
for Milan accounts. Trading in the form of depository receipts vs. ordinary shares generates 
significantly less active trading only on European exchanges (London, XETRA, and Frankfurt), 
whereas the difference in foreign trading volume share generated by listings in the form of 
ADRs and ordinary listings is insignificant for NYSE and NASDAQ listings and positive and 
significant for US OTC market listings. Stocks with a higher price level have higher FTVS 
when listed/traded on US OTC market, NYSE and Frankfurt, but a smaller FTVS when listed in 
Paris. 
Amsterdam, Milan, NASDAQ, the Swiss stock exchange, VIRTX and XETRA do not 
host stocks from emerging markets in the sample. Stocks from emerging markets that are traded 
in London, Frankfurt and Paris have more active foreign trading compared to stocks from 
developed markets. However, stocks from emerging markets have a smaller FTVS compared to 
stocks from developed markets on the US OTC market. A common language between the home 
and host countries reduces information barriers for foreign investors and, thus, stimulates more 
active foreign equity trading, particularly on London, Frankfurt, and Swiss stock exchanges. 
Geographic distance between the home and host countries is a measure of the unfamiliarity of 
foreign investors with a stock: the greater the distance, the smaller the foreign trading volume 
share is for VIRTX, Paris, XETRA, and London accounts. The level of investor protection in 
the home country is a positive determinant for Milan, Amsterdam and Swiss stock listings and a 
negative determinant for London, Paris and VIRTX listings. Coefficient estimates on the 
enforcement of insider trading laws variable are around zero for all exchanges. Stocks from 
home markets with higher trading costs have higher FTVS in London and Amsterdam, but, 
unexpectedly, smaller FTVS on the Italian and Swiss stock exchanges. Lastly, the accounting 
opacity of the home country negatively affects FTVS on Italian stock exchange, VIRTX, Paris 
and New York stock exchanges, but positively on the London stock exchange. 
To summarize, analysis of stock-specific factors by stock exchange provides a useful 
insight for companies that are seeking to improve the liquidity of their stock. More specifically, 
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it provides evidence regarding which foreign market is more likely to provide active trading for 
a stock with particular characteristics, including company characteristics and the company’s 
home market characteristics. The US exchanges have more active trading in stocks of more 
export-oriented companies, the London stock exchange has active trading of stocks from 
emerging markets, from English-speaking countries and from countries with poor investor 
protection. VIRTX, in contrast, is most successful in generating equity trading of large foreign 
companies that comply with international accounting standards and come from countries with 
better investor protection and a better information environment. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This study examines the distribution of foreign trading volume of European cross-listed 
stocks and the factors that affect this distribution. The distribution of foreign equity trading is 
measured by foreign trading volume share, which is the ratio of the number of shares traded on 
a particular exchange to the total number of shares traded on all exchanges in the sample (home 
exchange as well as foreign exchanges) for each stock. Arguably, there are two main groups of 
determinants for foreign trading volume share: the pull factors of the foreign trading volume, or 
exchange-specific factors, and the stock-specific factors. Empirical analysis reveals that both of 
these groups are significant determinants of foreign trading volume share. 
Analysis of the location of cross-border equity trading of European cross-listed stocks 
shows that in terms of total trading volume (the NYSE) as well as in terms of the average 
foreign trading volume share (NASDAQ), the US exchanges are important markets where 
significant trading of European cross-listed stocks takes place. The London stock exchange 
follows the US exchanges for both total foreign equity trading volume and the average trading 
volume share of foreign stocks. There is evidence of the diminishing importance of US OTC as 
the market place for foreign equity trading. Also, there is evidence of the limited ability of other 
off-exchange trading venues, such as trading platforms XETRA and VIRTX, to attract active 
trading in foreign stocks despite a large number of foreign stocks being admitted to trade. 
The findings on the exchange-specific factors that facilitate a more favourable trading 
environment for foreign equity trading are relevant for stock exchanges that compete for trading 
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of foreign stocks. I find evidence that higher trading costs and a higher level of accounting 
opacity in the host country have a significant negative impact on the stock exchange’s ability to 
attract active foreign equity trading. Furthermore, there is evidence that demutualized stock 
exchanges, stock exchanges with higher levels of liquidity and stock exchanges in countries 
with enforced insider trading laws have a superior ability to attract equity trading of foreign 
stocks.  
The second part of the investigation focuses on stock-specific factors as the 
determinants of foreign trading volume share. Stock-level analysis provides strong evidence that 
stocks admitted to trade on a foreign exchange have a significantly lower share of foreign 
trading compared to stocks listed on a foreign exchange. This is in line with the findings on the 
exchange-level analysis and in line with the theoretical model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(2006) predicting that a foreign listing is beneficial due to the increase in investor awareness of 
the stock and the reduction in investors’ monitoring costs. In other words, a stock exchange 
listing (as opposed to an admission to trade) on a foreign exchange, despite higher fees and 
disclosure requirements, should be regarded as a preferable option for companies that are 
looking to improve stock liquidity. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the share of foreign 
trading increases over time. While this result is intuitively compelling since duration of listing/ 
trading is the measure of stock visibility on the exchange, it contradicts the findings of Halling 
et al (2008) that trading volumes of large foreign stocks migrate back to the home market after 
the first year of cross-listing.  
The findings suggest that company characteristics are important determinants of foreign 
trading volume share. Specifically, foreign trading volume share is larger for smaller and riskier 
companies, for companies with higher foreign institutional ownership and with lower stock 
return correlation with host market returns. However, the foreign information factor that Baruch 
et al (2007) name as the most significant determinant of trading volume distribution, is a 
positive determinant for the US observations but a negative determinant for non-US 
observations. 
Listing/trading on the US exchanges results in more active foreign trading activity 
compared to other host markets. I interpret this as the US trading premium of foreign trading 
volume share, similar to the US cross-listing valuation premium of Doidge et al (2004) and 
Doidge et al (2009a), which they justify by the fact that the US offers a deep and liquid capital 
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market and a better-quality informational and legal environment. Furthermore, the US trading 
premium is robust in controlling for the differences in the level of liquidity, the quality of the 
information and the legal environments between the host and home markets.  
After disentangling the US-specific variation and the geographic distance between the 
host and home markets, the measure of investors’ unfamiliarity with the stock is a negative and 
significant determinant of the foreign trading volume share. The finding is in line with the 
argument of Sarkissian and Schill (2004, 2009a) regarding the importance of investor 
familiarity for cross-listing decisions and is in line with the ‘home bias’ argument (Brennan and 
Cao, 1997; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Huberman, 2001; Grinblatt, and Keloharju, 2001).  
Finally, the findings highlight the importance of the quality of the legal and information 
environments for the distribution of foreign equity trading. I find that a market that provides 
better investor protection and has enforced insider trading laws has a strong advantage over 
other markets in attracting trading volumes of European cross-listed stocks. Furthermore, the 
higher the quality of the information environment of the home market and, particularly, of the 
home market relatively to the host market, the higher the fraction of trading on the foreign 
exchange. 
The findings of this study have two important practical applications. First, for stock 
exchange executives, it answers the question of which stock exchange characteristics determine 
a more favourable trading environment for foreign cross-listed stocks, i.e. what makes stock 
exchanges more competitive in attracting foreign equity trading. Second, for corporate 
managers seeking to improve their company’s stock liquidity, it answers the question of on 
which foreign stock exchange the company stock has the most potential to maximize its 
liquidity in terms of trading volume, given specific company characteristics. 
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Figure 4.1 Average stock exchange’s share of foreign equity trading of European cross-listed 
stocks and Number of observations 
The figures plot the annual average foreign equity trading share and the total annual number of stock-
month observations for the total sample and individually for eleven major exchanges. The average annual 
foreign trading share is the mean of the stock-level foreign trading shares of all the stocks in the sample 
that are traded on the stock exchange, calculated monthly as the ratio of the number of shares traded on 
the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample. 
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Figure 1 continued 
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Table 4.1 Potential determinants of the foreign trading volume share 
The table presents the list of potential determinants of foreign trading volume share, empirical measures 
employed to proxy each of the determinants and the sign of the predicted effect of the determinant on 
foreign trading volume share: ‘+’ positive impact or ‘-‘ negative impact. 
Determinant Empirical measure
Host market characteristics - Pull factors
Level of disclosure Trading platform indicator -
Exchange-specific factors Organizational structure - Demutualization indicator +
Market design - Electronic market indicator +
Foreign stock concentration +
Exchange's Industry specialization +
Trade frictions Common language +
Geographic distance -
Market size +
Aggregate market liquidity +
Trading costs -
Legal environment Investor protection +
Insider trading laws enforced +
Information environment Accounting opacity -
Stock-level factors
Level of disclosure Traded (vs. exchange-listed) -
Stock visibility First foreign listing +
Time listed +
Price level +
Trade frictions The same currency of listing +
DR (vs. ordinary listing) -
Company visibility Company size -
Company growth opportunities +
Company foreign sales +
Ownership structure Company's foreign institutional ownership +
Ownership concentration -
Stock risk Stock return variance +
Level of transparency International accounting standards used +
Returns co-movement Stock retrun correrlation with foreign market -
with foreign market Foreign information factor +
Economic development Level of development +
Legal environment Investor protection -
Insider trading laws enforced -
Information environment Accounting opacity -
Trade frictions Trading costs +
Effect on the foreign 
trading volume share
Company characteristics
Listing characteristics
Home market characteristics
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Table 4.2 Explanatory variables 
The table presents the list of explanatory variables, indicates whether the variable is used in the exchange-
level and/or the stock level analysis, and provides a definition and data sources for each of the variables. 
Explanatory variable Used in 
exchange 
level 
analysis
Used in 
stock 
level 
analysis
Definition Data source
Host market characteristics - Pull factors
Trading platform indicator Ѵ dummy varible =1 if trading takes place on VIRTX, 
XETRA trading platforms or on the US OTC market; 
=0 otherwise
dataset
Demutualization indicator (host 
market)
Ѵ dummy variable =1 if trading takes place on 
demutualized exchang; =0 
Aggarwal 
(2002), stock 
exchange web-
sites
Electronic market indicator (host 
market)
Ѵ dummy varible =1 after the introduction of an 
electronic market on a particular exchange
Jain (2005)
Foreign stock concentration 
(host market)
Ѵ Ѵ percentage of the number of foreign companies 
listed in the total number of companies listed on the 
exchange in the preceding month; it is avalable for 
stock exchanges only
WFE statistics
Exchange's Industry 
specialization (host market)
Ѵ percentage of foreign companies from the same 
industry traded on the exchange in the total number 
of companies traded on the exchange in the sample 
in the preceding month
dataset
Common language Ѵ dummy variable =1 if the host and the home 
countries share a common official language; =0 
otherwise
Sarkissian and 
Shill (2004)
Geographic distance Ѵ the natural logarithm of the geographic distance in 
kilometres between capitals of the host and home 
countries
Sarkissian and 
Shill (2004)
Market size (host market) Ѵ the natural logarithm of total market capitalization of 
DS Total Market index, converted from local 
currency to GBP
Market size (host market relative 
to home market)
Ѵ the log-difference between the host total market 
capitalization and the home total market capitalization
Aggregate market liquidity (host 
market)
Ѵ market turnover ratio calculated as the ratio of the 
total value of the DS Total Market index constituent 
shares traded to the DS Total Market index 
capitalization
Aggregate market liquidity (host 
market relative to home market)
Ѵ the log-difference between the market turnover ratio 
of the host and of the home markets
Trading costs (host market) Ѵ total trading costs are the sum of price impact costs, 
implicit costs and explicit costs
Trading costs (host market 
relative to home market)
Ѵ the difference in total trading costs of the host market 
and of the home markets
Investor protection (host market) Ѵ anti-self-dealing index
Investor protection (host market 
relative to home market)
Ѵ the difference in anti-self-dealing index of the host 
market and of the home markets
Chiyachantana 
et al (2004), 
Table V
Datastream
Datastream
Djankov et al 
(2008)
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Table 4.2 continued 
Explanatory variable Used in 
exchange 
level 
analysis
Used in 
stock 
level 
analysis
Definition Data source
Insider trading laws enforced 
(host market)
Ѵ dummy variable =0 before enforcement of insider 
trading laws and =1 in the year of enforcement of 
insider trading regulation and thereafter
Insider trading laws enforced 
(host market relative to home 
market)
Ѵ non-negative difference between the insider trading 
laws enforcement variable of the host and of home 
countries (1)
Accounting opacity (host market) Ѵ accounting opacity index
Accounting opacity (host market 
relative to home market)
Ѵ the difference in the accounting opacity index of the 
host country and of the home country
Stock-level factors
Traded (vs. exchange-listed) Ѵ traded indicator=1 if the stock is traded on the US 
OTC, London OTC, open market of Deutsche 
Bourse, or VIRTX; =0 otherwise
dataset
First foreign listing Ѵ dummy variable = 1 if the foreign account is the fist 
and the only foreign listing of the stock; =0 otherwise
dataset
Time listed/ traded Ѵ the number of years a stock has been listed or 
traded on a particular exchange
dataset
Price level Ѵ the natural logarithm of the stock price on a particular 
exchange denominated in GBP
Datastream
The same currency of listing Ѵ dummy variable =1 if foreign trading takes place in 
the same currency as home trading; =0 otherwise
Datastream
DR (vs. ordinary listing) Ѵ dummy variable =1 if the listing is in the form of a 
depository receipt; =0 otherwise
dataset
Company size Ѵ market value of the company’s share at the end of 
the preceding year
Datastream
Company growth opportunities Ѵ price-to-book value ratio at the end of the preceding 
year. If not available from Datastream, it is calculated 
as the ratio of the stock price to the company’s book 
value
Datastream
Company foreign sales Ѵ the fraction of foreign sales in company’s total net 
sales in the preceding year
Datastream
Foreign investors - company's 
foreign institutional ownership
Ѵ the percentage of total shares held by an institution 
domiciled in a country other than that of the company 
at the end of the preceding year
Datastream
Ownership concentration Ѵ calculated as one minus the percentage of total 
shares available to ordinary investors at the end of 
the preceding year 
Datastream
Stock return variance Ѵ standard deviation of stock weekly returns over the 
preceding 12 months, calculated for each month
Datastream
Company characteristics
Listing characteristics
Bhattacharya 
and Daouk 
(2002)
Kurtzman et al 
(2004)  
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Table 4.2 continued 
Explanatory variable Used in 
exchange 
level 
analysis
Used in 
stock 
level 
analysis
Definition Data source
International accounting 
standards used
Ѵ dummy variable =1 if the company used 
international accounting standards or US GAAP in 
the end of the preceding year; =0 otherwise
Datastream
Stock retrun correrlation with 
foreign market
Ѵ correlation coefficient of weekly stock returns and 
foreign index returns over preceding 36 (at least 
24) months, computed for each month
Datastream
Foreign information factor Ѵ Foreign information factor calculated using 
methodology of Baruch et al (2007), explained in 
Appendix 4.1 
Datastream
Level of development (home 
market)
Ѵ emerging market indicator =1 if the stock is from 
emerging market; =0 otherwise
MSCI list
Investor protection (home 
market)
Ѵ anti-self-dealing index Djankov et al 
(2008)
Insider trading laws enforced 
(home market)
Ѵ dummy variable =0 before enforcement of insider 
trading laws and =1 in the year of enforcement of 
insider trading regulation and thereafter
Bhattacharya 
and Daouk 
(2002)
Accounting opacity (home 
market)
Ѵ accounting opacity index Kurtzman et al 
(2004)  
Trading costs (home market) Ѵ total trading costs are the sum of price impact costs, 
implicit costs and explicit costs
Chiyachantana 
et al (2004), 
Table V
Home market characteristics
 
(1) Host market characteristic relative to home market characteristic: Xrelative = max[(Xhost – Xhome),0] 
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Table 4.3 Average foreign trading volume share and Pull factors: Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics of the exchange-level average foreign trading volume share and the 
host exchange-specific factors, or the pull factors of the foreign equity trading, for the total sample and 
individually for eleven major exchanges. The sample of 812 European cross-listed stocks is used to 
calculate the exchange-level average foreign trading volume shares, which are the means of the foreign 
trading volume shares of the stocks traded on the exchange in each month. Detailed summary statistics of 
the average foreign trading volume shares and the number of account-month observations by year and by 
stock exchange is presented in Table 4.4. The pull factors are defined in Table 4.2. 
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Average foreign trading share 0.119 0.349 0.025 0.366 0.069 0.155 0.292 0.097 0.029 0.029 0.002 0.02
Annual foreign trading volume, bln GBP 10.8 4.1 144.5 12.8 133.4 23.8 324.4 9.4 8.6 0.7 4.4
Foreign trading volume, % of total 2.0% 1.2% 19.4% 1.6% 43.8% 6.5% 18.6% 1.6% 2.1% 0.2% 1.0%
N observations, % of total 1.8% 19.2% 11.4% 0.6% 11.2% 3.4% 12.5% 8.9% 8.7% 8.2% 12.4%
Trading platform indicator 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Demutualization indicator 0.52 0.62 0.44 0.45 0.70 0.11 0.44 0.48 0.38 0.91 0.86
Electronic market indicator 0.84 0.79 0.94 0.63 0.89 0.44 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.00
Foreign stock concentration 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.12 0.02 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.35
Market size, billion GBP 1299 262 463 1113 285 5157 5157 5157 560 337 461 643
Market liquidity 66.1 84.5 93.1 75.5 79.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 60.0 57.7 66.6 37.0
Trading costs 0.62 0.47 0.57 0.56 0.45 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.50 0.94 0.94 0.57
Investor protection 0.46 0.20 0.28 0.95 0.42 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.38 0.27 0.27 0.28
IT laws enforcement 0.80 0.79 0.72 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00
Accounting opacity 0.30 0.38 0.17 0.33 0.63 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.17
Average company size,
million GBP 11.39 13.45 8.99 6.16 15.49 15.54 3.11 5.09 15.97 13.14 18.56 16.07
Panel A. Average foreign trading volume share
Panel B. Pull factors of the foreign equity trading
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Table 4.4. Foreign equity trading volume, Number of observations and Average foreign trading volume share 
The table reports the annual distribution of the foreign equity trading volume, the number of observations and the average foreign trading share (ATVS) for the total sample 
and individually for eleven major exchanges. The sample of 812 European cross-listed stocks with 2,965 foreign accounts is used to calculate the exchange-level foreign 
equity trading volume, the number of observations and the average foreign trading shares. Annual foreign equity trading volume is the sum of foreign trading volume of the 
sample cross-listed stocks traded on a particular exchange;  foreign trading volume for each stock is calculated as the product of the number of the shares traded on the 
foreign exchange and the stock price (on a daily basis) converted to GBP. The number of observations is the total number of account-month observations for each year. The 
average foreign trading share is the mean of the foreign trading volume shares of the stocks traded on the exchange, calculated monthly as the ratio of the number of shares 
traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total sample
Foreign trading, bln GBP 31 57 55 101 78 766 961 871 634 357 635 669 1,875 3,082 2,546 629 809 1,045
N observations 771 1,391 2,424 2,714 2,913 5,104 5,462 5,591 5,470 8,395 10,837 16,333 19,485 19,484 20,590 21,703 21,876 20,877
ATVS 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.13
Amsterdam
Foreign trading, bln GBP 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 6 14 18 25 25 15 14 14 18 24 55
N observations 10 12 12 18 24 25 66 140 235 310 368 319 318 336 339 379 348 326
ATVS 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.70 0.56 0.46 0.20 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.17
London
Foreign trading, bln GBP 1 0 0 1 1 567 815 702 437 21 20 21 35 43 53 76 162 224
N observations 14 25 34 38 48 1,789 1,770 1,385 799 296 554 1,538 2,406 2,465 2,538 2,595 2,625 2,437
ATVS 0.50 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.84 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.15 0.38 0.31 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.15
NYSE
Foreign trading, bln GBP 18 25 34 63 48 62 86 96 120 212 340 252 201 178 210 224 281 431
N observations 256 334 363 394 433 554 624 666 735 750 854 982 1,033 1,045 1,042 1,004 972 910
ATVS 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15
Nasdaq
Foreign trading, bln GBP 6 4 4 11 10 15 16 28 30 40 91 52 25 25 34 31 37 58
N observations 72 84 94 99 108 118 153 238 281 339 350 362 350 355 360 337 306 289
ATVS 0.44 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.37  
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Table 4.4 continued 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
OTC
Foreign trading, bln GBP 2 2 2 4 6 8 11 12 12 13 15 232 1,487 2,711 2,134 178 184 119
N observations 156 171 192 229 258 440 500 606 753 891 1,133 2,122 2,674 3,028 3,229 3,415 3,347 3,236
ATVS 0.30 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Paris
Foreign trading, bln GBP 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 68 16 28 6 7 8 16 48
N observations 189 558 567 587 590 630 667 613 574 534 522 493 457 385 394 348 342
ATVS 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10
Milan
Foreign trading, bln GBP 0 0 0 0 12 0 2 14 24 37 65 46 37 25 19
N observations 9 12 21 24 24 24 31 49 70 72 72 72 72 69 151 371
ATVS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.02
Frankfurt
Foreign trading, bln GBP 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 6 17 19 7 5 3 4 5 6 5
N observations 119 135 145 201 248 253 320 440 583 2,983 4,171 5,164 5,415 5,428 5,656 5,787 5,745 5,588
ATVS 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
XETRA
Foreign trading, bln GBP 0 1 8 10 12 10 12 13 14 16
N observations 3 435 908 1,602 2,398 2,862 3,457 4,042 4,318 3,913
ATVS 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Swiss stock exchange
Foreign trading, bln GBP 2 4 3 108 24 8 9 9 8 4 3 2 2 1 1 1
N observations 475 576 576 579 610 619 625 667 632 619 588 517 482 491 531 558
ATVS 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VIRTX
Foreign trading, bln GBP 4 4 2 2 2 1 1
N observations 1,555 2,496 1,607 1,551 1,491 1,407 1,204
ATVS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
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Table 4.5  Stock-level variables: Summary statistics 
Table 4.5.1 reports summary statistics of the stock-level foreign trading volume share and the stock-level 
determinants of the foreign trading volume share for the pooled 1990-2007 sample, the pooled 2003-2007 
sample and the 2003-2007 sub-samples of listed and traded foreign accounts.  
Table 4.5.2 reports summary statistics of the stock-level foreign trading volume share and the stock-level 
determinants of the foreign trading volume share individually for eleven major exchanges for the 2003-
2007 samples. 
Stock-level foreign trading volume share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to 
the total number of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample calculated 
monthly. The determinants are defined in Table 4.2. 
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 4.5.1 Stock-level variables: Summary statistics 
Mean N Mean N Min Max Listed Traded
Foreign trading volume share 0.042 81,917 0.030 51,846 0 1 0.080 0.010
Panel B. Stock-level factors
Listing characteristics
Traded indicator 0.63 81,917 0.71 51,846 0 1 0 1
First listing 0.05 81,917 0.02 51,846 0 1 0.07 0
Time listed 5.74 81,917 6.24 51,846 0.17 22 8.26 5.42
Price level 20.0 81,917 19.9 51,846 0.01 5841 18.15 20.66
Same currency 0.4 81,917 0.4 51,846 0 1 0.43 0.39
DR indicator 0.29 81,917 0.27 51,846 0 1 0.29 0.26
Company characteristics
Company size, GBP mln 14,969 81,917 15,254 51,846 1.55 127,867 18,221 14,039
Price-to-book ratio 3.64 81,917 3.07 51,846 0.02 194.68 3.06 3.07
Foreign sales fraction 0.57 81,917 0.57 51,846 0 1 0.59 0.56
Foreign investors 0.08 51,846 0.08 51,846 0 0.94 0.07 0.08
Ownership concentration 0.26 52,504 0.26 51,846 0 0.96 0.23 0.27
Stock risk 0.04 81,917 0.04 51,846 0 0.45 0.04 0.04
Int. accounting standards 0.52 81,917 0.73 51,846 0 1 0.71 0.74
Return correlation 0.44 81,917 0.48 51,846 -0.15 0.94 0.49 0.48
Foreign information factor 2.33 81,917 2.62 51,846 0 27.67 2.75 2.56
Home market characteristics
Emerging market indicator 0.02 81,917 0.02 51,846 0 1 0 0.03
Investor protection 0.49 81,917 0.48 51,846 0.18 0.95 0.48 0.49
IT  laws enforced 0.89 81,917 0.91 51,846 0 1 0.86 0.93
Accounting opacity 0.34 81,917 0.34 51,846 0.17 0.63 0.33 0.34
Trading costs 0.61 81,917 0.62 51,846 0.45 2 0.63 0.61
Market size difference 11.0 80,900 9.9 50,955 0.0 348.9 13.2 8.5
Market liquidity difference 4.2 80,254 5.2 50,955 0 109.8 7.86 4.15
Trading costs difference -0.02 81,825 -0.02 51,777 -1.28 0.49 -0.04 -0.02
Investor protection difference -0 81,917 -0.02 51,846 -0.75 0.77 0.04 -0.04
IT  law enforced difference 0.1 81,825 0.09 51,777 0 1 0.14 0.07
Accounting opacity difference -0.11 78,924 -0.11 78,924 -0.46 0.46 -0.08 -0.14
Common language 0.23 81,917 0.22 51,846 0 1 0.34 0.17
Geographic distance, km 2197 81917 2064 51846 174 8261 2283 1974
Pull factors - Host exchange 
Industry specialization 0.14 67,956 0.13 42,364 0.02 1 0.17 0.12
Foreign stocks concentration 0.19 42,397 0.18 30,658 0.01 0.86 0.2 0.17
N account-months observations 15,056 36,790
N foreign accounts 372 1,117
N stocks (ISINs) 211 410
51,846
1,477
Panel C. Pull factors - Host market  characteristics relative to home market characteristics
446
81,917
519
1,714
Sample 2003-2007
Panel A. Foreign trading volume share
Sample 1990-2007
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Table 4.5.2 Stock-level variables by stock exchange: Summary statistics 
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Foreign trading volume share 0.078 0.004 0.067 0.084 0.083 0.321 0.023 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.005
Traded indicator 0 0.88 0.65 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.82
First listing 0.02 0 0.12 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0 0
Time listed 5.92 6.24 4.64 4.35 10.61 10.19 6.26 9.66 12.72 5.86 4.38
Price level 20.7 22.4 19.5 25.0 18.8 10.6 15.5 22.9 33.2 30.7 18.8
Same currency 0.80 0.55 0.27 0.98 0 0 0 0.67 0 1 0.57
DR indicator 0 0.11 0.03 0 0.95 0.89 0.75 0 0 0 0.10
Company size, GBP mln 25,346 12,831 14,275 30,891 23,385 3,851 9,589 23,886 23,435 26,850 18,836
Price-to-book ratio 2.72 3.26 2.78 2.00 4.83 3.21 2.70 2.18 2.66 2.87 3.07
Foreign sales fraction 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.68 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.59 0.57
Foreign investors 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07
Ownership concentration 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.11 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.24
Stock risk 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Int. accounting standards 0.78 0.70 0.72 0.90 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.74 1 1 0.75
Return correlation 0.59 0.48 0.49 0.65 0.46 0.35 0.40 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.53
Foreign information factor 3.64 2.89 1.93 1.84 2.65 3.02 1.98 2.69 1.94 1.47 3.23
Emerging market indicator 0 0.04 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.03
Investor protection 0.42 0.50 0.43 0.33 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.45 0.34 0.40 0.46
IT  laws enforced 1 0.91 0.76 1 0.92 0.78 0.92 1 1 1 0.98
Accounting opacity 0 0.36 0.33 0 0.34 0.33 0.32 0 0 0 0.36
Trading costs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Market size difference 0.6 2.9 9.7 0.8 28.4 41.4 26.6 1.8 1.1 0.9 2.2
Market liquidity difference 15.4 0.03 11.9 19.0 8.6 5.3 9.0 11.1 19.4 11.6 0.03
Trading costs difference -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.39 0.41 -0.03
Investor protection difference -0.22 -0.21 0.52 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.18
IT  law enforced difference 0 0.09 0.24 0 0.09 0.22 0.09 0 0 0 0.02
Accounting opacity difference 0.08 -0.19 0 0.31 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.19
Common language 0 0.13 0.24 0 0.39 0.51 0.36 0 0.52 0.30 0.11
Geographic distance, km 554 672 638 1183 6261 6030 6258 534 643 582 646
Industry specialization 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.27 0.15 0.12 0.11
Foreign stocks concentration 0.43 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.27
N account-months observations 1,123 16,187 6,655 483 3,518 1,103 8,512 1,399 612 1,220 8,799
N foreign accounts 31 364 193 26 68 24 213 43 41 100 281
N stocks (ISINs) 31 320 186 26 68 24 187 43 41 100 248
Panel C. Pull factors
Host market  characteristics relative to home market characteristics
Host exchange characteristics
Company characteristics
Home market characteristics
Panel A. Foreign trading volume share
Sample 2003-2007
Panel B. Stock-level factors
Listing characteristics
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Table 4.6.1  Pull factors (exchange-level): Correlation matrix 
The table reports the correlation matrix of the exchange-level average foreign trading volume share and 
the host exchange-specific factors, or the pull factors of the foreign equity trading. The sample of 812 
stocks European cross-listed stocks is used to calculate the exchange-level average foreign trading 
volume shares, which are the means of the foreign trading volume shares of the stocks traded on the 
exchange in each month. The pull factors are defined in Table 4.2. 
A
ve
ra
ge
 tr
ad
in
g
 
vo
lu
m
e 
sh
ar
e
T
ra
di
ng
 p
la
tf
or
m
 
in
di
ca
to
r
D
em
ut
u
al
iz
at
io
n
 
in
di
ca
to
r
E
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
m
ar
ke
t 
in
di
ca
to
r
F
or
ei
gn
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s 
co
n
ce
nt
ra
tio
n
M
a
rk
e
t s
iz
e
M
a
rk
e
t l
iq
ui
d
ity
T
ra
di
ng
 c
os
ts
In
ve
st
or
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
IT
 la
w
s 
e
nf
o
rc
e
d
A
cc
ou
n
tin
g 
op
a
ci
ty
Trading platform indicator -0.05 1
(0)
Demutualization indicator -0.08 0.2 1
(0) (0)
Electronic market indicator -0.31 -0.14 0.43 1
(0) (0) (0)
Foreign companies -0.56 - -0.1 0.04 1
concentration (0) - (0) (0.16)
Market size 0.33 0.34 0.04 -0.12 -0.35 1
(0) (0) (0.04) (0) (0)
Market liquidity 0.39 0 -0.03 -0 -0.62 0.45 1
(0) (0.88) (0.16) (0.98) (0) (0)
Trading costs -0.26 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.11 -0.11 0.05 1
(0) (0) (0) (0.26) (0) (0) (0.01)
Investor protection 0.47 0.03 -0.2 -0.27 -0.35 0.42 0.27 -0.03 1
(0) (0.13) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.09)
IT laws enforced 0.23 0.19 0.29 0.1 0.02 0.56 0.11 -0.25 0.14 1
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.49) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Accounting opacity -0.06 -0.32 0.13 0.19 -0.31 -0.43 0.17 -0.27 -0.07 -0.21 1
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Average company size -0.2 0.03 0.35 0.3 0.18 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.31 0.2 0.13
(0) (0.12) (0) (0) (0) (0.13) (0.52) (0.09) (0) (0) (0)
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Table 4.6.2   Pull factors (stock-level): Correlation matrix 
The table reports the correlation matrix of the pull factors used in the stock-level analysis with the stock-
level foreign trading volume share and other explanatory variables for the 2003-2007 sample. Stock-level 
foreign trading volume share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total 
number of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample calculated monthly. The 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. 
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Common 0.32 -0.15 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.24 0.13 -0.08 -0.18 0.23 0.19 0.01 -0.19
language (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.06) (0.0)
Geographic 0.47 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.22 0.64 -0.41 -0.08 -0.05 0.22 -0.01 -0.48
distance US (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Geographic -0.48 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.20 -0.64 0.40 0.10 0.04 -0.23 -0.02 0.46
distance non-US (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.11) (0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Market size dif 0.45 -0.24 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.31 0.39 -0.28 -0.05 0.13 0.13 -0.09 -0.25
(0.0) (0.0) (0.05) (0.03) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.20) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Market liquidity dif 0.31 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.31 -0.32 -0.30 0.11 0.14 0.12 -0.27
(0.0) (0.03) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Trading costs dif -0.15 0.24 -0.01 0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 0.23 0.09 -0.09 0.04 -0.19 0.06 0.08 0.11
(0.0) (0.0) (0.02) (0.0) (0.0) (0.46) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Investor 0.18 -0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 -0.10 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.13 -0.13 -0.10 0.05 -0.01 0.24 0.00
protection dif (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.55) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.01) (0.0) (0.47)
IT law enforced 0.28 -0.29 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.10 -0.04 -0.35 -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.32 0.06 -0.19 0.11
dif (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.36) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Accounting 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.15 -0.04 -0.21 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.18 0.07 -0.03 0.21 -0.16
opacity dif (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.09) (0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Industry 0.11 0.01 -0.10 -0.15 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.07 -0.29 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.09
specialization (0.0) (0.06) (0.0) (0.0) (0.01) (0.0) (0.37) (0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.22) (0.0)
Foreign stock -0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.10 -0.22 -0.08 0.05 0.01 0.16
concentration (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.27) (0.0) (0.59) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.14) (0.0)  
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Table 4.6.2  continued 
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Common 0.13 -0.08 0.30 -0.34 -0.14 0.40 1.00
language (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Geographic 0.72 -0.05 0.13 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.23 1.00
distance US (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.40) (0.0)
Geographic -0.71 0.07 -0.13 0.00 0.13 0.03 -0.25 -0.99 1.00
distance non-US (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.49) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Market size dif 0.48 0.11 -0.16 -0.51 0.07 0.45 0.17 0.63 -0.57 1.00
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Market liquidity dif 0.28 -0.02 -0.16 -0.09 -0.35 0.08 0.17 0.50 -0.50 0.42 1.00
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Trading costs dif 0.06 -0.26 0.03 0.50 0.04 -0.92 -0.28 0.12 -0.15 -0.36 0.04 1.00
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Investor 0.10 0.07 -0.75 -0.01 -0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.19 -0.19 0.48 0.58 -0.08 1.00
protection dif (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
IT law enforced 0.05 -0.05 0.15 -1.00 0.12 0.54 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.09 -0.50 0.01 1.00
dif (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Accounting -0.07 -0.20 -0.09 0.06 -0.83 0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.60 -0.06 0.29 -0.06 1.00
opacity dif (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Industry -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.24 0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.25 1.00
specialization (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.30) (0.36) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Foreign stock -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.13 -0.02 -0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.31 -0.08 0.12 -0.23 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12
concentration (0.0) (0.03) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.02) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
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Table 4.7 Stock-level factors: Correlation matrix 
The table reports the correlation matrix of the stock-level foreign trading volume share and the stock-level factors of the foreign trading volume share for the 2003-2007 sample. 
Stock-level foreign trading volume share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges 
in the sample calculated monthly. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. 
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Company size -0.27 1.00
(0.00)
Price-to-book ratio -0.01 0.04 1.00
(0.06) (0.00)
Foreign sales 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign investors 0.09 -0.18 0.01 0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ownership 0.03 -0.26 0.03 -0.10 0.44 1.00
concentration (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock risk 0.12 -0.37 -0.01 0.13 0.10 0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.019) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Int accounting 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.29 1.00
standards (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return correlation -0.27 0.50 -0.10 0.03 -0.18 -0.24 -0.08 -0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
US Information factor 0.34 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.05 1.00
(0.00) (0.002) (0.003) (0.33) (0.00) (0.98) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign (non-US) -0.24 0.14 0.03 0.10 -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 0.06 0.24 -0.26 1.00
information factor (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Traded indicator -0.37 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.09 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.11 0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.097) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Table 4.7 continued 
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First listing indicator 0.23 -0.29 0.00 -0.04 0.09 0.09 0.05 -0.09 -0.23 -0.04 -0.06 -0.22 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time listed 0.34 0.11 0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 0.12 -0.02 0.19 -0.09 -0.33 0.04 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Price level -0.04 0.44 0.00 0.08 -0.15 -0.16 -0.28 0.23 0.27 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.08 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Same currency -0.09 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.22 -0.31 0.19 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.038) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
DR indicator 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.17 0.47 -0.25 -0.04 -0.06 0.17 0.03 -0.34 1.00
(0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Emerging market 0.06 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 0.17 0.11 -0.01 0.08 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investor protection -0.02 -0.02 0.13 -0.02 0.15 0.13 0.00 -0.23 -0.23 0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.13 0.04 -0.34 -0.34 0.11 -0.15 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IT law enforced -0.27 0.29 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.07 -0.10 0.04 0.35 0.04 0.10 0.11 -0.32 -0.06 0.19 -0.11 -0.05 0.05 -0.15 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Accounting opacity -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.21 0.04 0.20 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.25 0.25 -0.04 0.21 0.03 -0.12 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trading costs 0.23 -0.24 0.02 -0.06 0.12 -0.01 0.07 0.11 -0.31 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.21 0.00 -0.05 -0.19 0.03 0.27 -0.02 -0.54 -0.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Table 4.8 Pull factors of the foreign equity trading 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variable, the logistic 
transformation of stock exchange’s monthly average foreign share of trading volume. The exchange-level 
average foreign trading share is the mean of the foreign trading volume shares of the stocks traded on the 
exchange, calculated monthly as the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total 
number of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample. Regression specification is 
as follows: logtrAFTVSn = α0 + Σ θk Zk,n + Cn + εn, where Zk,n is characteristic k of host market n in month 
t, and Cn is average size of companies traded on host exchange n in month t (control variable). The 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. Additionally, regressions include a control variable, 
average company size measured by the natural logarithm of the mean stock market value of stocks traded 
on the exchange converted to GBP. Output for model (2) additionally includes economic significance 
(econ. sign.) of the variables calculated as the product of the coefficient estimate and the variable’s 
standard deviation divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Reported in parenthesis t-
value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at the stock exchange 
level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance 
at 10%. 
Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Econ. sign.
Intercept 3.51 6.83* 12.27*** 3.23 8.31**
(1.73) (1.84) (3.35) (0.8) (2.36)
Trading platform -1.13* -1.20* -0.14 -1.08
(-1.87) (-1.79) (-1.69)
Demutualization 1.17** 1.13* 0.25 -0.20 -0.31
(2.39) (1.9) (-0.47) (-0.52)
Electronic market -1.89*** -2.36** -0.35 -2.76*** -1.58** -0.37
(-3.34) (-2.89) (-4.32) (-2.8) (-0.93)
Foreign stocks concentration 0.14
(0.08)
Market size 0.42*** 0.10 -0.09 0.09 -0.12
(3.92) (0.69) (-0.85) (0.47) (-0.79)
Market liquidity 0.29* 0.46*** 0.21 0.52*** 0.50** 0.62***
(2.09) (3.11) (3.66) (2.2) (5.18)
Trading costs -4.14*** -4.35** -0.29 -5.00*** -2.39 -6.87***
(-3.36) (-2.6) (-3.21) (-1.2) (-4.58)
Investor protection 0.31 0.01 0.88 1.42
(0.2) (0.01) (0.52) (0.97)
IT  laws enforced 1.44** 0.24 1.65*** 1.55** 0.53
(2.77) (3.51) (2.34) (0.94)
Accounting opacity -3.57* -0.21 -3.62** -1.84 -3.49**
(-1.97) (-2.33) (-1) (-2.34)
Average company size -1.02*** -0.98*** -0.42 -1.32*** -0.83*** -0.76***
(-8.66) (-4.7) (-5.81) (-4.05) (-4.5)
OTC indicator -1.90***
(-4.99)
VIRTX indicator -2.26***
(-4.26)
XETRA indicator 0.35
(0.79)
Year-fixed effects No No Yes No No
Exchange-fixed effects No No No Yes No
Number of exchanges 16 13 13 15 11
Number of observations 2,574 2,237 2,237 2,572 958
Adj. R-sq 0.538 0.616 0.666 0.564 0.779
Model (1)
Model (2)
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Table 4.9 Determinants of the foreign share trading volume: Stock-level analysis 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regressions of the dependant variable, the logistic 
transformation of the foreign share of trading volume. The stock-level foreign trading share is the ratio of 
the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in the same month 
on all exchanges in the sample calculated monthly. Regression specifications are as follows: 
logtrFTVSi,n = α0 + Σ γj Xj + εi,n for Models (1)-(2) and logtrFTVSi,n = α0 + Σ γj Xj + Σ θk Zk,n + εi,n for 
Models (3)-(5), where Xj is vector of stock-level factors, and Zk,n is characteristic k of the host market n 
relative to characteristic k of the stock’s home market. Host US is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
US is the host market and zero otherwise. Geographic distance residual variable is the residual from the 
OLS regression of the geographic distance variable on the US host market dummy variable. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. All model specification control for year and industry fixed 
effects and model (5) additionally controls for exchange fixed effects, i.e. regressions includes dummy 
variables that represent year, industry or host stock exchange accordingly. Reported in parenthesis t-value 
is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at the foreign account level. 
‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
Model 
(1.1)
Model 
(1.2)
Model 
(2.1)
Model 
(2.2)
Model 
(3.1)
Model 
(3.2)
Model 
(3.3)
Model 
(4.1)
Model 
(4.2)
Model 
(4.3)
Model 
(5)
T raded indicator -1.74*** -1.63*** -1.82*** -1.68*** -1.79*** -1.66*** -1.76*** -1.97*** -1.89*** -1.98*** -2.25***
(-10.25) (-9.76) (-9.70) (-9.26) (-9.84) (-9.39) (-9.64) (-9.50) (-9.75) (-9.51) (-8.01)
First listing indicator 0.80** 0.87*** 2.20*** 2.28*** 0.86** 1.02*** 0.86** 2.23*** 2.47*** 2.23*** 0.99**
(2.38) (2.59) (4.99) (5.18) (2.43) (2.88) (2.46) (4.74) (5.06) (4.75) (2.01)
T ime listed/ traded 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.13***
(7.82) (6.83) (8.4) (7.96) (7.33) (7.33) (8.39) (7.78) (7.94) (8.23) (4.57)
Same currency 0.41** 0.70*** 0.88*** 1.15*** 0.70*** 1.14*** 0.74*** 1.14*** 1.49*** 1.12*** 1.12***
(2.21) (3.83) (4.60) (6.13) (3.52) (5.76) (3.80) (5.54) (7.46) (5.46) (4.25)
ADR indicator 0.24 -0.45* 0.14 -0.53** 0.14 -0.73** 0.24 0.01 -0.88*** 0.05 -0.38
(1.00) (-1.69) (0.61) (-2.14) (0.54) (-2.43) (0.95) (0.04) (-3.13) (0.20) (-1.34)
Price Level 0.17** 0.11 0.17** 0.08 0.18** 0.05 0.17** 0.23*** 0.05 0.23*** 0.14
(2.11) (1.46) (2.17) (1.03) (2.35) (0.69) (2.20) (2.59) (0.54) (2.60) (1.32)
Company size -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.24*** -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.35*** -0.39***
(-6.36) (-5.87) (-6.11) (-5.24) (-5.40) (-4.52) (-5.67) (-5.74) (-4.25) (-6.10) (-5.39)
Price-to-book ratio 0.01* 0.01** -0.004 -0.003 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1.87) (1.97) (-0.74) (-0.56) (2.13) (2.24) (2.10) (0.84) (0.72) (0.83) (0.58)
Stock risk 6.47*** 5.55*** 6.50*** 5.30** 7.38*** 6.48*** 7.57*** 6.44*** 5.40** 6.31*** 7.33**
(3.13) (2.67) (3.08) (2.53) (3.32) (2.93) (3.39) (2.71) (2.30) (2.66) (2.43)
Foreign sales 0.46** 0.47** 0.33 0.41* 0.22 0.20 0.32 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.06
(1.99) (2.05) (1.38) (1.71) (0.86) (0.80) (1.27) (0.22) (0.10) (0.37) (0.19)
Foreign investors 1.38*** 1.12** 1.33** 1.00** 1.43*** 1.39**
(2.94) (2.35) (2.54) (1.98) (2.75) (2.25)
Ownership -0.50* -0.30 -0.50 -0.25 -0.59* -0.55
concentration (-1.72) (-1.07) (-1.48) (-0.78) (-1.74) (-1.38)
Int. accounting -0.63*** -0.55*** -0.06 0.04 -0.45*** -0.38*** -0.48*** 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.20
standards (-5.02) (-4.37) (-0.60) (0.35) (-3.61) (-3.13) (-3.78) (0.35) (1.16) (0.17) (1.24)
Return correlation -1.79*** -1.57*** -1.36*** -1.20*** -1.95*** -1.96*** -2.04*** -1.08** -1.23*** -1.11** -1.59***
(-5.38) (-4.84) (-3.50) (-3.23) (-5.61) (-5.92) (-5.85) (-2.45) (-2.98) (-2.51) (-2.88)
US information factor 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.09** 0.25*** 0.29***
(7.70) (5.02) (5.69) (2.94) (7.14) (4.24) (7.27) (5.33) (2.01) (5.42) (4.11)
Foreign (non-US) -0.08*** -0.05** -0.05** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.04 -0.06** -0.07*** -0.04* -0.06*** -0.09***
information factor (-3.60) (-2.31) (-2.32) (-0.87) (-2.78) (-1.62) (-2.40) (-2.90) (-1.68) (-2.62) (-3.46)
Company characteristics
Listing characteristics
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Table 4.9 continued 
Model 
(1.1)
Model 
(1.2)
Model 
(2.1)
Model 
(2.2)
Model 
(3.1)
Model 
(3.2)
Model 
(3.3)
Model 
(4.1)
Model 
(4.2)
Model 
(4.4)
Model 
(5)
Home emerging 1.28*** 1.29** 1.60*** 1.62*** 0.61 0.61 1.33 1.30 1.43 1.81 2.41**
market (2.60) (2.40) (3.10) (2.87) (0.55) (0.48) (1.11) (1.00) (0.97) (1.37) (2.03)
Common language 1.04*** 0.59*** 1.09*** 0.59*** 1.14*** 0.72*** 1.11*** 1.31*** 0.81*** 1.27*** 1.74***
(5.20) (2.89) (5.65) (2.94) (5.68) (3.44) (5.62) (6.44) (3.81) (6.41) (5.83)
Geographic distance 0.68*** 0.91*** 0.52*** 0.78*** 1.00*** 1.15*** 1.00***
(6.75) (9.24) (3.41) (6.30) (6.19) (8.88) (4.83)
Host US 3.18*** 3.79*** 3.83*** 5.37***
(9.39) (11.57) (8.28) (11.22)
Geographic distance -0.20 -0.22 -0.39** -0.14
residual (-1.25) (-1.36) (-2.17) (-0.76)
Investor protection -1.61*** -1.30*** -1.12*** -0.90***
Home (-5.70) (-4.66) (-3.75) (-3.12)
Investor protection dif 1.05*** 1.37*** 1.76*** 0.66* 1.23*** 1.06*** -0.62
(3.13) (4.20) (6.59) (1.72) (3.28) (3.39) (-1.24)
IT  laws enforced -1.20*** -1.09*** -0.90** -0.77**
Home (-4.30) (-4.03) (-2.50) (-2.17)
IT  laws enforced dif 0.20 0.70** 0.81*** 0.40 1.20*** 0.88** -0.07
(0.63) (2.25) (2.75) (0.92) (2.71) (2.03) (-0.13)
Accounting opacity -1.57** -0.60 -1.73** -0.42
Home (-2.11) (-0.83) (-2.36) (-0.58)
Accounting opacity dif 2.56*** 3.03*** 1.88** 3.24*** 4.31*** 3.00*** 3.21**
(3.09) (3.80) (2.19) (3.05) (4.42) (2.82) (2.46)
Trading costs Home 0.23 1.47*** 0.26 1.75***
(0.48) (2.75) (0.51) (3.11)
Trading costs dif 1.05** -0.28 0.34 0.35 -0.87* 0.14 -0.48
(2.20) (-0.60) (0.83) (0.67) (-1.71) (0.28) (-0.72)
Market size dif 0.41*** 0.16 0.22* -0.09 0.32*
(3.10) (1.24) (1.65) (-0.62) (1.75)
Market liquidity dif -0.14*** -0.22*** -0.13** -0.22*** -0.35*** -0.22*** -0.18**
(-2.61) (-4.27) (-2.34) (-3.00) (-5.35) (-3.10) (-2.02)
Industry specialization 0.78 0.85 0.31 -0.09 0.17 -0.33 -0.49
(0.73) (0.8) (0.3) (-0.09) (0.19) (-0.36) (-0.46)
Foreign stock -2.81
concentration (-1.20)
Intercept -6.82*** -4.28*** -9.84*** -6.29*** -8.54*** -5.83*** -10.01*** -12.40*** -6.84*** -13.19*** -10.75***
(-7.08) (-5.97) (-9.19) (-7.21) (-7.22) (-9.27) (-9.04) (-9.72) (-9.47) (-10.94) (-7.20)
Adj. R-sq 0.423 0.441 0.476 0.504 0.462 0.489 0.457 0.497 0.540 0.496 0.619
N observations 81,917 81,917 51,846 51,846 63,602 63,602 63,602 40,889 40,889 40,889 24,061
N foreign accounts 1,714 1,714 1,476 1,476 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,145 1,145 1,145 593
Market characteristics
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Table 4.10 Economic significance of the determinants of the foreign trading volume share 
The table reports standard deviations (st dev) of the variables and the estimates from the OLS regressions 
of the dependant variable, the logistic transformation of the foreign trading volume share. The stock-level 
foreign trading share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number of the 
shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample calculated monthly. Host US indicator is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the US is the host market and zero otherwise. Geographic distance 
residual variable is the residual from the OLS regression of the geographic distance variable on the US 
host market dummy variable. Other explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. Output additionally 
includes the economic significance (econ. sign.) of the variables calculated as the product of the 
coefficient estimate and the variable’s standard deviation divided by the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. Reported t-statistics is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for 
clustering at the foreign account level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 
5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
estimate t-stats econ. sign. estimate t-stats econ. sign.
Foreign trading volume share 3.53
Listing characteristics
Traded indicator 0.45 -1.94*** -10.56 -0.245 -1.89*** -10.88 -0.239
First listing indicator 0.16 1.52*** 3.59 0.070 1.86*** 4.31 0.086
Years listed (traded) 3.83 0.18*** 10.54 0.197 0.18*** 10.48 0.194
Same currency indicator 0.49 1.02*** 6.01 0.142 1.31*** 7.98 0.181
ADR indicator 0.44 0.38* 1.73 0.048 -0.49** -2.05 -0.062
Company characteristics
Company size 1.93 -0.31*** -6.19 -0.169 -0.28*** -5.77 -0.154
Stock risk 0.03 7.00*** 3.89 0.055 6.29*** 3.55 0.050
Foreign investors 0.12 1.23*** 2.99 0.043 0.90** 2.31 0.031
Return correlation 0.19 -1.54*** -3.8 -0.083 -1.54*** -4.04 -0.083
US information factor 1.50 0.25*** 5.7 0.107 0.10** 2.42 0.042
Foreign (non-US) information factor 2.84 -0.06*** -2.87 -0.051 -0.03 -1.32 -0.022
Market  characteristics
Common language 0.41 1.33*** 6.83 0.156 0.71*** 3.49 0.083
Geographic distance 1.16 0.63*** 4.71 0.206
Host US indicator 0.44 4.43*** 10.96 0.550
Geographic distance residual 0.47 -0.37** -2.35 -0.050
Market size difference 1.52 0.27** 2.47 0.118 -0.06 -0.53 -0.025
Market liquidity difference 2.50 -0.22*** -3.62 -0.153 -0.32*** -5.69 -0.227
Trading costs difference 0.21 0.18 0.4 0.010 -1.33*** -3.17 -0.079
Investor protection difference 0.37 1.00*** 3.19 0.106 1.47*** 4.73 0.155
IT laws enforced difference 0.29 0.23 0.66 0.019 1.12*** 3.27 0.093
Accounting opacity difference 0.13 3.93*** 4.56 0.149 4.09*** 5.07 0.155
Intercept -9.55*** -9.48 -6.15*** -11.23
Adj. R-sq 0.487 0.526
N observations 56,682     56,682     
N foreign accounts 1,578       1,578       
st dev
Model (1) Model (2)
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Table 4.11 Determinants of the foreign trading volume share: Listed vs. traded 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regression of the dependant variable, the logistic 
transformation of the foreign trading volume share on the interaction variables of the explanatory 
variables and the dummy variable representing listed or traded status of the foreign account. The stock-
level foreign trading share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number 
of the shares traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample calculated monthly. Regression 
specification is as follows: logtrFTVSi,n= α0+ β1i Xj +β2i Zk,n+Σγj,Traded(DTradedXj)+Σθk,Traded(DTradedZk,n)+ εi, 
where DTraded is dummy variable that equals one if the stock is traded without meeting listing 
requirements on a stock exchange n in month t and equals zero otherwise, Xj is vector of stock-level 
factors, and Zk,n is characteristic k of the host market n relative to characteristic k of the stock’s home 
market. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. Reported t-statistics is heteroskedasticity 
consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at the foreign account level.  ‘***’ indicates 
significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
estimate t-stats estimate t-stats
First listing indicator 0.04 0.09
Time listed/ traded 0.12*** 4.15 0.25*** 11.06
Same currency 0.83** 2.32 1.20*** 6.23
DR indicator 0.81 0.98 0.18 0.81
Company size -0.46*** -4.71 -0.28*** -5.43
Stock Risk 6.65 1.58 6.78*** 3.34
Foreign investors 1.74** 2.01 0.95** 2.04
Return correlation -2.17*** -2.9 -1.00** -2.2
US information factor 0.19*** 3.58 0.27*** 3.72
Foreign (non-US) information factor -0.06 -1.2 -0.06** -2.44
Common language 0.56 1.29 1.35*** 6.38
Geographic distance 1.13*** 5.39 0.44*** 3.02
Investor protection difference 0.37 0.53 0.78** 2.25
IT  laws enforced difference 2.33** 2.46 -0.40 -1.13
Accounting opacity difference 5.20*** 2.71 3.73*** 4.04
Trading costs difference -0.51 -0.67 0.26 0.51
Market size difference 0.15 0.61 0.28** 2.22
Market liquidity difference -0.32*** -2.76 -0.10 -1.58
Intercept -10.74*** -10.65
Adj. R-sq 0.512
N observations 56,682     
N foreign accounts 1,578       
Variable Var*D_Traded
Listing characteristics
Company characteristics
Market  characteristics
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Table 4.12 Determinants of the foreign trading volume share by stock exchange 
The table reports the estimates from the OLS regression of the dependant variable, the logistic 
transformation of the foreign trading volume share, on the interaction variables of the explanatory 
variables and the dummy variable representing one of the eleven major host stock exchanges: 
logtrFTVSi,n = α0 + Σn,j ωn,j (D_SEn Xj) + εi,n, where D_SEn is dummy variable that equals one if trading 
takes place on exchange n and zero otherwise; Xj is vector of stock-level factors. The stock-level foreign 
trading share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares 
traded in the same month on all exchanges in the sample calculated monthly. The explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 4.2. Reported in parenthesis t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) 
and adjusted for clustering at the foreign account level.  ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates 
significance at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significance at 10%. 
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Listing charactersitics
Traded indicator -1.06*** -0.29 -0.79**
(-3.54) (-0.68) (-2.08)
First listing -1.24* 0.0 -0.62 -2.73*** 0.65 -3.89***
(-1.94) (0.0) (-1.09) (-3.45) (0.73) (-3.52)
Time listed/ traded -0.16 0.13*** 0.13 0.09 0.06** -0.1 0.05* -0.17** 0.01 -1.17*** 0.49***
(-1.64) (4.59) (1.49) (0.63) (2.30) (-1.61) (1.70) (-2.05) (0.23) (-10.39) (9.15)
Same currency 0.44 0.80** 1.91** -15.43** 0.37 1.55***
(0.37) (2.53) (2.30) (-2.21) (0.45) (2.98)
DR indicator -2.25*** -3.63*** 0.01 -1.48 1.98*** -3.01***
(-8.34) (-2.63) (0.02) (-1.41) (5.01) (-8.98)
Price level 0.37 0.25** 0.15 -0.25 0.26* -0.34 0.44*** -0.90*** 0.09 -0.03 -0.11
(1.29) (2.37) (1.05) (-0.56) (1.81) (-0.94) (2.63) (-3.14) (0.42) (-0.14) (-0.68)
Company charactersitics
Company size -1.28*** -0.1 -0.22 -2.12** 0.11 0.11 -0.25** 0.17 -0.07 0.45*** 0.22**
(-4.18) (-1.39) (-1.41) (-2.10) (0.69) (0.37) (-2.48) (0.67) (-0.43) (3.98) (2.03)
Price-to-book ratio 0.17** -0.01*** -0.1** 1.04** 0.0 -0.16* 0.01 0.3 -0.06 0.0 -0.02**
(2.41) (-3.91) (-2.50) (2.03) (0.33) (-1.76) (0.27) (1.43) (-0.5) (0.53) (-2.37)
Stock risk -5.33 16.56*** -1.63 17.93 14.92** 9.89** 2.66 -4.13 42.76*** -7.62 14.97***
(-0.61) (7.67) (-0.43) (1.49) (2.46) (2.10) (0.61) (-0.65) (2.72) (-0.56) (3.39)
Foreign sales 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.02 0.02*** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01 -0.01 0.0 0.0
(0.26) (-0.21) (0.05) (-1.37) (3.91) (2.33) (2.17) (0.82) (-1.06) (0.33) (0.86)
Foreign investors -0.02 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.0 0.0
(-0.80) (0.52) (1.01) (0.03) (3.01) (0.18) (1.09) (1.23) (-1.58) (0.39) (-0.23)
Ownership concentration 2.58 -0.26 0.98 5.60* -1.25** -2.38 -0.94 -0.83 1.5 -0.45 -0.16
(1.57) (-0.80) (1.59) (1.81) (-2.13) (-1.43) (-1.56) (-1.03) (1.55) (-0.76) (-0.28)
International accounting 0.21 0.15 0.28 2.85*** 0.42*** 1.26*** -0.17 0.73** 232.09 10.49** -0.51**
standards (0.40) (1.20) (1.23) (4.06) (2.81) (2.93) (-0.8) (2.08) (1.15) (2.53) (-2.57)
Return correlation 0.51 -1.78*** -1.02 2.98 -2.57*** -3.91* 0.04 -0.83 0.37 1.37* -1.22
(0.29) (-3.98) (-1.16) (1.62) (-3.2) (-1.91) (0.05) (-0.63) (0.23) (1.68) (-1.62)
Foreign information factor 0.0 -0.03 0.10* -0.02 0.0 0.06 0.09* 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.01
(-0.08) (-1.31) (1.90) (-0.22) (-0.15) (1.07) (1.68) (0.40) (1.54) (0.87) (0.18)  
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Table 4.12 continued 
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Home market charactersitics
Home emerging market 3.54*** 6.16*** -1.12 -2.55*** 2.42**
(6.21) (3.00) (-1.54) (-2.78) (2.41)
Common language 1.81*** 8.70*** 1.05 0.27 0.77 6.78* -0.04 1.11
(4.53) (3.01) (0.72) (0.07) (0.47) (1.86) (-0.05) (1.51)
Geographic distance 0.2 0.09 -0.40* 0.84 0.47 0.36 0.25 -1.08** 5.29 -1.01* -0.56**
(0.23) (0.63) (-1.9) (0.31) (1.52) (0.78) (1.27) (-2.29) (1.49) (-1.71) (-2.34)
Investor protection Home 8.85*** -0.56 -8.72* 12.28** -2.82 -0.57 -2.02 -4.21** 2.99*** -3.22*** -1.14
(5.14) (-0.96) (-1.70) (2.41) (-1.21) (-0.11) (-0.78) (-2.52) (3.10) (-5.18) (-1.46)
IT  laws enforced Home 0.0 0.0** 0.0 0.03** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0** -0.12 0.0 0.0
(-0.13) (2.02) (-0.29) (2.21) (-0.19) (1.00) (-1.12) (2.46) (-1.16) (-1.07) (0.53)
Trading costs Home 12.2* -0.79 5.3*** -42.8*** -0.53 0.98 -0.44 2.69 -42.79** 0.84 0.33
(2.46) (-1.3) (2.66) (-3.46) (-0.50) (0.32) (-0.46) (1.09) (-2.00) (0.35) (0.23)
Accounting opacity Home -4.07 -1.06 4.15** -15.11*** -1.47* 10.81 -0.53 -3.35** 0.0 -7.22* -2.80
(-1.03) (-1.18) (2.08) (-3.08) (-1.71) (1.64) (-0.33) (-2.39) (0.0) (-1.85) (-1.58)
Intercept -8.01***
(-20.49)
Adj. R-sq 0.674
N observations 51,846
N foreign accounts 1,477
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Appendix 4.1 Foreign information factor calculation 
Follow the methodology of Baruch et al (2007), the foreign information factor is calculate as the 
difference in R2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom) of a two-index model including foreign market 
index and of a single-index model with just the home market index.  
Foreign information factor is calculated monthly and each stock in the sample using weekly stock 
return and home and host index return data for the preceding 48 (at least 36) months. Home market 
returns are calculated using total return data, i.e. inclusive of price change as well as dividend 
income, converted into the currency of the foreign market.  
Firstly, the following two time-series regressions are estimate for each stock:  
  (1 - restricted model) 
 
(2 - unrestricted model) 
where   is the return, calculated in the currency of the foreign market, of stock i in period t,  
 is the return, calculated in the currency of the foreign market, on the home market index 
in period t+k, and  is the foreign market index return in period t+k. As in Baruch et al 
(2007), the lead and lag terms in the regressions are used to account for non-synchronous trading 
across markets in different time zones.  
The next step is to calculate the measure that captures the incremental contribution of the foreign 
market movement in explaining variation of the stock return in addition to the information about the 
stock return contained in movements in the home market index prices. Such measure is computed as 
F-statistics for each stock using R
2
 from the unrestricted, the second, model ( ), and R2 from the 
restricted, the first, model ( ):  
 
where n is the number of observations for the stock, 3 in denominator is for the three regressors in 
the restricted model and 6 in the denominator is for the six regressors in the unrestricted model. 
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Appendix 4.2 Pull factors of the foreign equity trading: coefficient estimates and variance 
inflation factors 
The table reports the coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors (VIF) from OLS regressions 
reported in Table 4.8. The dependant variable is the logistic transformation of stock exchange’s monthly 
average foreign share of trading volume. The exchange-level average foreign trading share is the mean of 
the foreign trading volume shares of the stocks traded on the exchange, calculated monthly as the ratio of 
the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in the same month 
on all exchanges in the sample. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.2. Additionally, 
regressions include a control variable, average company size measured by the natural logarithm of the 
mean stock market value of stocks traded on the exchange converted to GBP. 
estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF
Intercept 3.51 0 6.83 0 12.27 0 3.23 0 8.31 0
Trading platform -1.13 1.37 -1.20 1.43 -1.08 1.45
Demutualization 1.17 1.37 1.13 1.57 -0.20 4.18 -0.31 1.31
Electronic market -1.89 1.24 -2.36 1.32 -2.76 1.64 -1.58 1.38 -0.37 1.09
Foreign stocks concentration 0.14 2.38
Market size 0.42 1.21 0.10 3.03 -0.09 3.59 0.09 3.81 -0.12 3.91
Market liquidity 0.29 1.41 0.46 1.53 0.52 1.59 0.50 1.84 0.62 2.17
Trading costs -4.14 1.09 -4.35 1.58 -5.00 1.75 -2.39 1.85 -6.87 2.87
Investor protection 0.31 2.07 0.01 2.12 0.88 2.21 1.42 3.78
1.44 1.76 1.65 1.98 1.55 1.93 0.53 2.34
Accounting opacity -3.57 2.03 -3.62 2.12 -1.84 2.11 -3.49 3.36
Average company size -1.02 1.19 -0.98 1.73 -1.32 2.61 -0.83 1.92 -0.76 1.56
OTC indicator -1.90 1.43
VIRTX indicator -2.26 1.25
XETRA indicator 0.35 1.64
Year-fixed effects No No Yes No No
Exchange-fixed effects No No No Yes No
Number of exchanges 16 13 13 15 11
Number of observations 2,574 2,237 2,237 2,572 958
Adj. R-sq 0.538 0.616 0.666 0.564 0.779
Model (2)Model (1) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
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Appendix 4.3 Determinants of the foreign share trading volume (stock-level analysis): coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors 
The table reports the coefficient estimates and variance inflation factors (VIF) from OLS regressions reported in Table 4.9. The dependant variable is the logistic transformation 
of the foreign share of trading volume. The stock-level foreign trading share is the ratio of the number of shares traded on the exchange to the total number of the shares traded in 
the same month on all exchanges in the sample calculated monthly. Host US is a dummy variable that equals one if the US is the host market and zero otherwise. Geographic 
distance residual variable is the residual from the OLS regression of the geographic distance variable on the US host market dummy variable. Other explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 4.2.  
estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF
Listing characteristics
Traded indicator -1.74 1.33 -1.63 1.34 -1.82 1.26 -1.68 1.27 -1.79 1.39 -1.66 1.40 -1.76 1.38 -1.97 1.43 -1.89 1.44 -1.98 1.43 -2.25 2.21
First listing indicator 0.80 1.33 0.87 1.33 2.20 1.31 2.28 1.31 0.86 1.34 1.02 1.34 0.86 1.34 2.23 1.33 2.47 1.33 2.23 1.33 0.99 1.44
Time listed/ traded 0.12 1.24 0.11 1.25 0.15 1.27 0.14 1.27 0.13 1.29 0.13 1.29 0.14 1.26 0.16 1.31 0.16 1.31 0.16 1.29 0.13 1.57
Same currency 0.41 1.88 0.70 1.98 0.88 1.96 1.15 2.02 0.70 1.61 1.14 1.75 0.74 1.61 1.14 1.68 1.49 1.74 1.12 1.68 1.12 1.64
DR indicator 0.24 2.40 -0.45 2.83 0.14 1.92 -0.53 2.19 0.14 2.44 -0.73 2.90 0.24 2.39 0.01 1.95 -0.88 2.25 0.05 1.92 -0.38 2.06
Price Level 0.17 1.74 0.11 1.76 0.17 1.77 0.08 1.80 0.18 1.73 0.05 1.79 0.17 1.73 0.23 1.78 0.05 1.85 0.23 1.78 0.14 1.93
Company characteristics
Company size -0.30 1.93 -0.28 1.94 -0.32 2.07 -0.27 2.09 -0.29 2.05 -0.24 2.07 -0.30 2.05 -0.33 2.28 -0.25 2.33 -0.35 2.25 -0.39 2.62
Price-to-book ratio 0.01 1.03 0.01 1.03 -0.004 1.04 -0.003 1.04 0.02 1.05 0.02 1.05 0.02 1.05 0.02 1.12 0.02 1.12 0.02 1.12 0.02 1.12
Stock risk 6.47 1.28 5.55 1.28 6.50 1.40 5.30 1.40 7.38 1.30 6.48 1.30 7.57 1.30 6.44 1.42 5.40 1.42 6.31 1.41 7.33 1.46
Foreign sales 0.46 1.09 0.47 1.09 0.33 1.15 0.41 1.15 0.22 1.13 0.20 1.13 0.32 1.11 0.06 1.23 0.03 1.23 0.10 1.22 0.06 1.24
Foreign investors 1.38 1.37 1.12 1.37 1.33 1.37 1.00 1.37 1.43 1.36 1.39 1.40
Ownership concenration -0.50 1.46 -0.30 1.47 -0.50 1.56 -0.25 1.56 -0.59 1.53 -0.55 1.61
Int. accounting standards -0.63 1.34 -0.55 1.35 -0.06 1.29 0.04 1.30 -0.45 1.29 -0.38 1.30 -0.48 1.29 0.04 1.26 0.13 1.26 0.02 1.25 0.20 1.29
Return correlation -1.79 1.54 -1.57 1.55 -1.36 1.80 -1.20 1.80 -1.95 1.65 -1.96 1.65 -2.04 1.64 -1.08 1.93 -1.23 1.93 -1.11 1.92 -1.59 1.98
US information factor 0.31 1.63 0.20 1.74 0.25 1.67 0.13 1.78 0.29 1.65 0.16 1.75 0.30 1.64 0.24 1.69 0.09 1.81 0.25 1.68 0.29 1.72
Foreign (non-US) inform. factor -0.08 1.29 -0.05 1.32 -0.05 1.28 -0.02 1.31 -0.07 1.39 -0.04 1.41 -0.06 1.38 -0.07 1.41 -0.04 1.43 -0.06 1.39 -0.09 1.35
Market characteristics
Home emerging market 1.28 1.34 1.29 1.34 1.60 1.46 1.62 1.46 0.61 1.14 0.61 1.14 1.33 1.11 1.30 1.22 1.43 1.22 1.81 1.15 2.41 1.15
Common language 1.04 1.77 0.59 1.92 1.09 1.60 0.59 1.73 1.14 1.55 0.72 1.64 1.11 1.55 1.31 1.50 0.81 1.59 1.27 1.49 1.74 2.08
Model (1.1) Model (1.2) Model (2.1) Model (4.3) Model (5)Model (2.2) Model (3.1) Model (3.2) Model (3.3) Model (4.1) Model (4.2)
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Appendix 4.3 continued 
estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF estimate VIF
Geographic distance 0.68 3.08 0.91 2.77 0.52 5.34 0.78 3.43 1.00 5.70 1.15 3.38 1.00 4.41
Host US 3.18 4.60 3.79 3.74 3.83 8.50 5.37 7.98
Geographic distance residual -0.20 1.31 -0.22 1.35 -0.39 1.28 -0.14 1.41
Investor protection Home -1.61 1.83 -1.30 1.86 -1.12 1.79 -0.90 1.80
Investor protection dif 1.05 3.11 1.37 3.15 1.76 1.78 0.66 3.73 1.23 3.82 1.06 2.13 -0.62 4.59
IT  laws enforced Home -1.20 1.81 -1.09 1.82 -0.90 2.12 -0.77 2.13
IT  laws enforced dif 0.20 2.51 0.70 2.57 0.81 1.86 0.40 3.60 1.20 3.70 0.88 2.27 -0.07 5.06
Accounting opacity Home -1.57 1.45 -0.60 1.49 -1.73 1.50 -0.42 1.55
Accounting opacity dif 2.56 2.31 3.03 2.32 1.88 2.13 3.24 3.19 4.31 3.23 3.00 3.11 3.21 3.71
Trading costs Home 0.23 2.15 1.47 2.37 0.26 2.28 1.75 2.52
Trading costs dif 1.05 2.32 -0.28 2.52 0.34 1.94 0.35 2.35 -0.87 2.48 0.14 2.20 -0.48 2.57
Market size dif 0.41 7.53 0.16 7.96 0.22 8.43 -0.09 8.86 0.32 8.71
Market liquidity dif -0.14 3.08 -0.22 3.19 -0.13 3.06 -0.22 5.28 -0.35 5.53 -0.22 5.27 -0.18 6.18
Industry specialization 0.78 1.21 0.85 1.21 0.31 1.17 -0.09 1.29 0.17 1.29 -0.33 1.26 -0.49 1.49
Foreign stock concentration -2.81 1.54
Intercept -6.82 0 -4.28 0 -9.84 0 -6.29 0 -8.54 0 -5.83 0 -10.01 0 -12.40 0 -6.84 0 -13.19 0 -10.75 0
Adj. R-sq 0.423 0.441 0.476 0.504 0.462 0.489 0.457 0.497 0.540 0.496 0.619
N observations 81,917 81,917 51,846 51,846 63,602 63,602 63,602 40,889 40,889 40,889 24,061
N foreign accounts 1,714 1,714 1,476 1,476 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,145 1,145 1,145 593
Model (4.2) Model (4.3) Model (5)Model (1.1) Model (1.2) Model (2.1) Model (2.2) Model (3.1) Model (3.2) Model (3.3) Model (4.1)
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The thesis examines the effects of cross-listing and cross-trading in international stock 
exchanges, on the stock of European companies in terms of the impact on their price, liquidity 
and volatility, and the distribution of trading volume in a changing listing and trading 
environment. 
In particular, the three empirical issues addressed in each empirical chapter of the thesis 
are as follows. First, chapter 2 analyses the effect of international cross-listing on shareholders’ 
wealth and the determinants of these effects across various foreign destination markets and 
across time. Second, chapter 3 evaluates the changes in the liquidity and volatility of stocks 
after cross-listing and cross-trading. Third, chapter 4 examines the determinants of the 
distribution of foreign equity trading volumes both at a stock exchange level and at a firm level. 
Overall, the findings of the thesis show that the wealth of shareholders, stock liquidity and 
volatility, and the trading volume of European stocks are significantly affected by international 
cross-listing and cross-trading. However, the effects are sensitive to host stock exchanges and 
regulatory provisions.  
The findings of the thesis have several important implications for companies, 
international investors, stock exchange authorities, and to the regulators of financial industry. 
Furthermore, the findings represent international perspectives as they are based on the 
experience of companies from various European countries that are cross-listed in various 
international stock markets. The sample is also significant in that it represents a substantial 
portion of foreign stocks listed internationally. Finally, the analysis of European stocks allows 
an evaluation of the implications for the relative competitiveness of European, British and 
American equity markets. 
Chapter 2 examines the first empirical issue: the effects of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth. The effects on shareholders’ wealth are measured by abnormal returns 
around the announcement of a decision to cross-list and also around the cross-listing event. 
Abnormal returns are compared across cross-listings on European, British and American host 
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markets and over time. The potential determinants of the effect of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth are identified based on various theoretical explanations including market 
segmentation, legal bonding, liquidity, investor recognition, proximity preference, market 
timing, and business strategy. This study also examines the impact of recent significant 
developments in capital markets, such as the introduction of a single currency, the Euro, in 
Europe and the adoption of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, which may have affected 
the net benefits arising from international cross-listings. Finally, the chapter evaluates the 
change in the explanatory power of the determinants before and after the introduction of the 
Euro in Europe and before and after the adoption of SOX in the US. 
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that, on average, international cross-listings have a 
significant positive impact on shareholders’ wealth. However, the impact varies by host 
markets. The effect is positive and significant if the stocks are cross-listed in the American and 
in the British stock exchanges (3.3% and 2.7% cumulative abnormal returns respectively) while 
it remains statistically insignificant if they are cross-listed within European stock markets. In 
addition, there is a significant time-specific variation in the wealth effects of cross-listings that 
can be partly attributed to the recent developments in international capital markets. The 
adoption of SOX in the US is associated with a significant reduction in the gains from listing in 
the US markets, especially for smaller companies. In contrast, the shareholder gains from cross-
listing in the UK have increased significantly in recent years. This has been driven by the gains 
from AIM listings on the London stock exchange (AIM was established in the late 1990s) 
suggesting that the observed gain is primarily driven by the experience of smaller companies. 
The introduction of a single currency in Europe, however, has had no significant impact on 
shareholders’ gains from cross-listings within the Euro zone. Furthermore, the results reveal the 
importance of company characteristics, such as company size, industry, growth opportunities 
and previous foreign listing experience, in explaining the effect of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth.  Empirically, there is support for market segmentation theory applied to 
cross-listings in the US, for investor recognition theory applied to cross-listings within the Euro 
zone and to cross-listings that take place in the US after the adoption of SOX, and for proximity 
preference applied to listings in the UK. Also there is strong empirical support for business 
strategy theory. Overall, the findings emphasize the changing nature of the determinants of the 
benefits of cross-listings across different host markets and in the face of regulatory changes.  
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The findings of chapter 2 have practical implications for several groups of market 
participants. For company managers, increase in shareholders’ wealth is the ultimate goal of a 
corporate decision to cross-list. In this respect, the findings indicate that there is a significant 
cross-sectional difference in the net benefits of cross-listings across host markets and company 
characteristics. From an investor’s point of view, the findings contribute to a better 
understanding of the sources of value creation around cross-listings in different international 
markets. Finally, the findings on the impact of the Euro, AIM, and SOX on the net benefits of 
cross-listings in Europe, the UK and the US accordingly, should be of particular importance for 
financial market authorities and regulators. 
The gains in shareholders’ wealth around cross-listing documented in chapter 2 could 
be driven by the improvement in the stock’s information environment and, accordingly, in stock 
liquidity and volatility after cross-listing. Chapter 3 analyses empirically the impact of 
international cross-listing and multimarket trading on stock liquidity and volatility. Different 
dimensions of stock liquidity are captured by trading costs, trading volumes, and turnover 
ratios, while stock return variation and intraday stock price deviation are used to measure 
volatility. First, the liquidity and volatility of cross-listed companies are compared against those 
of non-cross-listed companies. Given the endogenous nature of a cross-listing decision, I use 
Heckman’s (1979) procedure to control for a potential self-selection bias. For a robustness test, 
I use time series analysis to evaluate changes in the liquidity and volatility before and after a 
foreign listing. In addition, chapter 3 also investigates the differences between the impact of 
cross-listing and cross-trading. Unlike cross-listing, cross-trading does not impose additional 
disclosure requirements but offers similar trading opportunities for investors. 
The results of chapter 3 indicate a significant improvement in trading costs and stock 
return volatility. The results hold even after controlling for several potentially responsible 
factors such as the change in company size, accounting practices, financial analyst coverage and 
stock trading volumes after cross-listing and cross-trading. The reduction in trading costs and 
stock return volatility after cross-listing and cross-trading is particularly profound for smaller 
companies. Supplementary analysis on the evolution of the liquidity and volatility before and 
after cross-listing reveals that the documented improvements are sustained in the long-run after 
the change in the listing status. In regards to the difference between the impact of cross-listing 
and the impact of cross-trading, cross-listing enhances the stock’s total trading volumes more 
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substantially than cross-trading due to significantly higher trading volumes on the foreign stock 
exchange(s) after cross-listing. Nevertheless, cross-trading, similar to cross-listing, improves 
stock liquidity and volatility in the company’s home market. Overall, the documented difference 
in the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on the liquidity and volatility of the stock is 
considerably smaller than predicted. This finding highlights the importance of alternative 
channels of information dissemination in improving the firm’s information environment after 
cross-listing and cross-trading. Such channels include greater production of stock-specific 
information by more traders after cross-listing and cross-trading and increased competition 
among traders. Finally, the findings suggest that the implications of cross-listing and cross-
trading vary depending on the level of development of the company’s home market. While a 
cross-listing is beneficial in terms of liquidity and volatility for companies from developed 
markets, it has no positive impact for companies from emerging markets.  
The findings of chapter 3 should be of considerable importance to companies that are 
considering a foreign listing and also to international investors. From a company’s perspective, 
stock liquidity and volatility directly affect transaction costs and the perceived riskiness of the 
stock, which, in turn, has an effect on the company’s cost of equity capital. The results suggest 
that for companies from developed markets cross-listing and cross-trading result in a significant 
decrease in the bid-ask spread, an increase in stock trading volumes, and a reduction in stock 
return volatility. From the perspective of international investors such findings suggest that 
investors could trade the stocks of cross-listed and cross-traded firms at a lower transaction cost 
and could have higher price certainty as well. 
Chapter 4 investigates the third empirical issue of the thesis: the determinants of the 
distribution of trading volumes of stocks that trade on various stock markets. The understanding 
of what determines the location of trading of cross-listed stocks is important because the 
benefits of cross-listing such as the gains in shareholders’ wealth and the improved stock 
liquidity and volatility documented in chapter 2 and chapter 3 are feasible if the cross-listing 
results in active trading on the foreign stock exchange. The determinants of the distribution of 
trading volume are analysed from both stock exchange and firm specific perspectives. First, 
from a stock exchange point of view, the chapter evaluates the ability of the major international 
exchanges to attract trading volumes of foreign equity. This ability is measured by a stock 
exchange’s average fraction of the total trading volumes of cross-listed stocks. The determinants 
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of a stock exchange’s ability to attract foreign equity trading, or the pull factors of foreign 
trading volumes, are examined using cross-sectional regression analysis. In addition, the study 
compares the ability of two types of markets – regulated stock exchanges and non-regulated 
markets (e.g., over-the-counter markets, alternative markets and trading platforms) to attract 
foreign equity trading. Second, from a company’s point of view, the chapter examines stock-
specific determinants of the trading volume distribution. Foreign trading volume distribution on 
a stock level is quantified by the stock’s trading volume share on the foreign exchange in the 
stock’s total trading volume. Finally, the firm level analysis is extended to further examine the 
firm level determinants separately for the major stock exchanges. 
The findings discussed in chapter 4 suggest that the ability to attract and maintain 
foreign equity trading varies significantly across the major stock exchanges. A cross-sectional 
regression analysis of a stock exchange’s fraction of the total trading volumes of cross-listed 
stocks reveals that this ability is positively associated with the stock exchange’s organizational 
efficiency, the level of market liquidity, the quality of investor protection, and the enforcement 
of insider trading regulation. The results also show that regulated stock exchanges are 
significantly more successful in attracting trading volumes of foreign stocks than non-regulated 
markets. From a company’s perspective, this finding is consistent with the view that a cross-
listing on a regulated exchange is more likely to result in active foreign trading than an 
admission to trade in a non-regulated market. Furthermore, the findings highlight the 
importance of stock characteristics, particularly company size and stock risk, and of listing 
characteristics, such as currency and duration of listing, in explaining the distribution of trading 
volumes between the foreign and the home markets. Particularly, smaller companies have 
higher fractions of trading taking place on foreign exchange(s). Finally, the chapter provides 
separate evidence on firm level determinants of foreign trading volume distribution by stock 
exchanges. Such evidence is helpful in understanding the expected levels of trading activity on 
various stock exchanges for a stock with particular characteristics. 
The findings of chapter 4 have practical implications for four main groups of financial 
market participants. First, for stock exchanges the findings contribute to better understanding of 
factors that determine a stock exchange’s competitive position within the industry. The evidence 
can be used by stock exchanges to focus their marketing efforts on targeting particular types of 
foreign companies for listing, especially those which are likely to have higher trading volumes. 
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Second, for cross-listed companies the chapter provides evidence on strategies to maximize the 
benefit of cross-listing and cross-trading in terms of active stock trading on foreign market(s). 
Active foreign equity trading is crucial for cross-listed companies because it determines the net 
benefits of international cross-listings in terms of reduced transaction costs, increased firm 
value, and better price discovery in the foreign market(s). Third, for international investors, 
knowledge of the location of trading of foreign stocks is essential as it allows investors to 
minimize the costs of trading foreign equity. Finally, for financial market regulators to have 
empirical evidence that regulated markets with investor protection and enforced insider trading 
laws have a superior ability to attract and maintain trading of foreign equity should be of 
considerable importance. 
On the whole, the findings of this thesis are supportive of the statement that on average 
an international cross-listing is beneficial for companies and their shareholders in terms of the 
market value of the firm and improved liquidity and reduced price volatility. However, these 
benefits vary significantly across firms and destination foreign markets. Chapter 2 provides 
evidence that cross-listings on American exchanges, on average, result in a higher increase in 
shareholders’ wealth than cross-listing on other host markets. However, the gains from cross-
listing in the US have diminished in recent years. Moreover, evidence in chapter 4 support the 
idea that the American exchanges have a superior ability to attract trading of European stocks in 
terms of absolute trading volumes and also in terms of the foreign fraction of the total trading 
volume. Overall, the US capital market, although arguably losing its competitive edge, is still an 
important cross-listing destination for European companies. The British capital market is the 
second most important market both in terms of the effects on shareholders’ wealth (chapter 2) 
and stock liquidity enhancements, particularly for companies from emerging markets (chapter 
4). Finally, European exchanges continue to attract listings of firms based in other European 
countries despite significant integration processes within the European Union. However, on 
average, firms do not experience any obvious benefit from cross-listing within European 
markets (chapter 2). 
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Recommendations for Future Research: 
While the thesis has examined the economic consequences of cross-listing and trading 
on multiple foreign exchanges, there is still a need for further research to continue on this topic.  
• The findings of this thesis, as well as earlier studies, suggest that cross-listing leads to an 
increase in shareholders’ wealth. It is possible that such an increase in wealth could be due 
to a reduction in the cost of transaction, a reduction in risk or a combination of both. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the possible sources of the value 
enhancement, i.e. to split the gains into the effects of the reduction in the cost of equity 
capital and the transaction costs. So far there is no evidence in the literature on how cross-
listings and admissions to trade on various foreign markets outside of the US affect the 
company’s cost of capital. 
• Chapter 3 of this thesis investigates the impact of cross-listing and cross-trading on 
various markets on the stock liquidity and volatility. However, it would also be useful to 
compare this impact across different host markets. 
• Finally, further research on the economic consequences of cross-listings in major 
international financial markets by companies from non-European markets, especially from 
Asian markets, which have recently demonstrated significant economic growth and 
increasing integration into the world financial markets, would help to provide a more 
complete understanding of the effects of international cross-listings. 
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